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FOREWORD 
 
“Surely it is an odd way to spend your life - sitting alone in a room with a pen 
in your hand, hour after hour, day after day, year after year, struggling to put 
words on pieces of paper in order to give birth to what does not exist, except 
in your head. Why on earth would anyone want to do such a thing?” These 
are the words of Paul Auster, renowned author of a number of novels, plays 
and collections of poems. 
Why indeed does anyone choose to spend the greater part of their working 
day and year in such a way? Although not a renowned author, my own rea-
sons for doing so have been quite straightforward. Throughout my studies 
and my working life I have taken an interest in issues related to develop-
ment and why some countries achieve their development goals seemingly 
without an effort, whereas others struggle on. The relationship between cor-
ruption and development caught my interest while working in southern 
Africa, as did the question of how corruption could be counteracted. Against 
the above, I was thrilled to be given the opportunity to delve into these 
linkages academically, and also gladly set forth on this (more or less) lonely 
path. 
Many people have provided support and guidance along the way. I would 
like to express my gratitude towards Professor Lauri Karvonen for believing 
in me at the onset, and for welcoming me back to Finland and Åbo Akademi 
University. I’m also very grateful towards my supervisor, Professor Carsten 
Anckar, for much valued advice during my doctoral studies and for being an 
approachable and supportive superior also in other respects. A sincere 
thank you goes out to my co-supervisor, Assistant Professor Staffan Anders-
son, for his support and invaluable advice, particularly concerning issues re-
lated to corruption. I am also indebted to Professor Emeritus Dag Anckar, 
who has provided precious feedback and advice at numerous occasions. 
Furthermore, I’m obliged to Professor Fernando Jiménez and Dr. Svante Ers-
son who, in the capacity of pre-examiners, have provided helpful advice and 
feedback. My colleagues and friends at the Department of Political Science 
have also supported me and brightened up my days. A sincere thank you 
goes out to each and every one!  
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My outermost gratitude is extended to all the individuals who so willingly 
have shared their expertise and answered my interview questions during 
my travels. Thank you for welcoming me into your countries and for setting 
aside the time to talk to me! These trips would not, of course, have been pos-
sible without proper funding, wherefore my gratitude also is extended to 
Seniorernas Råd (Åbo Akademi University), the Democracy: A Citizen Pers-
pective project (Åbo Akademi University) and Enheten för Forskning & 
Utbildning (Åbo Akademi University) which have funded my trips to collect 
data. These same entities have also provided other financial support (in the 
form of scholarships and travel grants) to attend courses and conferences 
during the course of my doctoral studies.  
Many people have made sure that my life over the past few years has in-
cluded other things than books and an increasingly worn key-board. These 
include dear friends near and afar who have cheered me on and put a smile 
on my face. Among these, a special thank you goes to Yrsa Neuman and 
Signe-Anita Lindgrén. A heartfelt thank you also goes out to my family in 
Hangö for always being there for me and believing in me.  
Last, but not least, I am immensely indebted to husband Kim and our child-
ren Julia and Simon, who have been my faithful supporters and my rock 
during this entire process.  
Åbo, 30.3.2013 
Catharina Groop 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption can be described as one of the great plagues of our time. As a 
consequence of corruption, people entitled to public services such as health 
care, water and electricity are overcharged or deprived of services alto-
gether, children are bereaved of an education, communities lose their liveli-
hoods, and victims of natural disasters go without assistance. Corruption 
also has severe consequences for entire nations in that democracy is 
weakened, institutions lose their legitimacy, development is stymied and 
inequality soars.1  
Not only are the effects of corruption disastrous, but corruption is also fairly 
common in certain societies. According to Transparency International, poor 
Mexican families pay about 20% of their income as bribes, 44% of parents in 
Ghana, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda have 
paid “school fees” despite the fact that schooling is free of charge, and 84% 
of Bangladeshis have encountered corruption within public and private 
sector institutions.2 Corruption is also common in many countries 
characterized by higher levels of human and economic development. 
According to the Global Corruption Barometer, almost 20% of Greeks and 
10% of Italians pay bribes to access medical services3, to take two examples. 
                                                 
 
1 Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, O-H. et al. (2000); Transparency International at 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/statistics-and-quotes/destabilising-
impact-of-corruption (26.11.2012); and the World Bank at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDG
OVERNANCE/EXTANTICORRUPTION/0,,contentMDK:20222075~menuPK:1165474
~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:384455~isCURL:Y,00.html 
(26.11.2012). 
2 Transparency International at http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption 
/statistics-and-quotes/destabilising-impact-of-corruption (26.11.2012). 
3 Transparency International at http://files.transparency.org/content/download 
/399/1640/Tabulations+by+country.zip (20.3.2013) 
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Although prevalent in certain societies, corrupt practices are nevertheless 
regarded as reprehensible by a majority of individuals.4 Corruption can, 
therefore, be described as a serious and urgent problem in need of a so-
lution.5 The search for such solutions has intensified over the past few 
decades, not least among academics representing a great variety of disci-
plines, including the political sciences.  
Political scientists have taken an interest in, among other things, political 
institution-building as a solution to the problem of corruption, arguing that 
political institutions constitute rules which human beings conform to, and 
therefore influence the extent to which corruption occurs in a given society. 
Research into the relationship between political institutions and corruption 
has, however, produced rather divergent results with regards to whether 
particular political institutions have a reducing or increasing effect on the 
occurrence of corruption. Furthermore, much of this research has disregar-
ded the very pathways through which political institutions might affect 
levels of corruption.  
1.1 The purpose of the thesis 
This thesis constitutes an attempt to provide a few substantial pieces to the 
complex jigsaw puzzle that counteracting corruption undeniably constitutes. 
It strives to do so by studying political institutions, the purpose being to 
establish the causal mechanisms through which certain political institutions 
might safeguard against corruption.  
Achieving the purpose requires a two-pronged approach which involves 
finding answers to two concrete research questions, the first of which 
constitutes a stepping stone towards answering the second.  
                                                 
 
4 This is confirmed through data from the World Values Survey, indicating that 68% 
of respondents find that accepting a bribe never is justifiable, see World Values 
Survey at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp (16.11.2011). 
5 For further discussions about the negative effects of corruption see e.g. Azfar, O., 
Lee, Y. & Swamy, A. (2001); Gray, C. & Kaufmann, D. (1998); Lundahl, M. (1997); 
Kaufmann, D. (2005); Mauro, P. (1995); or Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1995). It should, 
however, be noted that also opinions to the contrary have been expressed. For 
discussions about the potential benefits of corruption, see e.g. Nye, J.S. (1967); or 
Leff, N.H. (1970).  
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Both research questions are linked to the very relationship between political 
institutions and levels of corruption, although at different levels. The first 
research question is aimed at establishing whether a number of political 
institutions of interest to the study have a reducing effect on levels of 
corruption, the hypothesis being that they do.  
The second research question is aimed at identifying the mechanism 
through which the political institutions of interest contribute towards 
reduced levels of corruption, the hypothesis being that political institutions 
which enhance accountability have a reducing effect on levels of corruption, 
see table 1. 
Table 1: Research questions and hypotheses  
 Research questions Hypotheses 
1 Do the political institutions of 
interest6 have a reducing effect on 
levels of corruption?  
The political institutions of interest 
have a reducing effect on levels of 
corruption 
2 What are the mechanisms through 
which the political institutions of 
interest7 affect levels of corruption? 
The political institutions of interest 
reduce levels of corruption by 
enhancing accountability  
The analysis is set within the framework of representative democracy, i.e. a 
form of government based on the delegation of power by the voters to their 
representatives, and beyond. As a consequence, representative democracy 
exhibits a multitude of chains of delegation involving delegating parties (or 
principals) who entrust representatives (or agents) with authority, and who 
want these agents to act in accordance with the rules and guidelines 
provided by the principal. Agents do not always have the best interest of the 
principal at heart, however. Instead, they may deviate from the rules 
outlined by the principal in a number of ways. One such deviation is 
engagement in activities for personal benefit, such as corrupt activities. The 
                                                 
 
6 The main quantitative analysis takes an interest in parliamentarism, federalism, 
party-centred electoral systems and large bureaucracies. For a more thorough 
discussion about why these political institutions are singled out as the potential 
main determinants, see chapter 4.3. 
7 Within the framework of the qualitative analysis only three political institutions 
(parliamentarism, federalism, and party-centred electoral systems) are included. 
For a more thorough discussion with regards to why the qualitative analysis focuses 
on these, see chapter 4.4. 
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thesis takes an interest in a multitude of chains of delegation and 
accountability, inherent to the political institutions of interest to the study. 
The study argues that political institutions not only (i) establish such lines of 
delegation and accountability between principals and agents, but also (ii) 
provide rules and procedures according to which accountability is to be 
exercised. Political institutions thereby provide principals with tools for 
holding agents accountable, (i) making it possible for the principals to obtain 
information about the agents and their actions, (ii) forcing the agents to 
justify their actions and behaviour vis-à-vis the principals, and (iii) making it 
possible for the principals to sanction agents, should these deviate from 
their duties and what is expected by the principal. The thesis studies how 
principals as well as other actors hold agents accountable using specific ac-
countability mechanisms aimed at ensuring that agents have the interest 
and priorities of the principal at heart and act accordingly. These accounta-
bility mechanisms can be used ex ante (before power has been entrusted or 
delegated) as well as ex post (after power has been delegated).  
Theoretically, this line of argument is based on institutional theory, which 
regards political institutions as rules, procedures and operating practices 
with an impact on human behaviour, as well as a body of research which 
regards political institution-building as a tool to ascertain successful dele-
gation, i.e. increasing the ability of the delegating party (or principal) to en-
sure that the actor to whom power is delegated (or agent) does not deviate 
from the “contract” between the two.  
1.2 Methods and data 
Quantitative as well as qualitative methods are used to test the research 
hypotheses. Answers to the first research question are sought quantitatively 
using multiple regression analysis. The aim of the statistical analysis is to 
establish the overall strength of the relationship between the political insti-
tutions under scrutiny and levels of corruption, and to identify political insti-
tutions with a corruption-reducing effect. This is done controlling for the 
effect of other variables which are believed to affect levels of corruption. The 
statistical analysis therefore serves an important way station on the path 
towards answering the second research question.  
Answers to the second research question are sought qualitatively by means 
of case studies. These case studies are warranted given the fact that much of 
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recent, comparative research into the linkages between political institutions 
and corruption is quantitative by nature and therefore does not provide 
detailed answers as to how political institutions affect levels of corruption. 
Case studies, however, allow for in-depth analysis of the interface and 
interaction between the variables.  
The case studies use principal-agent relationships and institutional lines of 
accountability inherent to the political institutions of interest as their point 
of departure, analysing the extent to which principals are able to hold agents 
accountable. The studies focus on a number of accountability mechanisms 
available or unavailable to principals. Institutional lines of accountability 
characterized by de facto access to many such mechanisms are described as 
strong, whereas lines characterized by access to fewer such mechanisms are 
described as semi-strong or weak. These lines are then juxtaposed to 
available data on corruption to establish whether strong lines go hand in 
hand with low(er) levels of corruption and vice versa.  
The cases included, Austria and Botswana, have been selected with a point 
of departure in the statistical analyses. Austria constitutes a country well 
predicted by the best fitting statistical model, wherefore the focus within 
this case study lies on the extent to which the political institutions of interest 
to the thesis can be argued to enhance or impede accountability, thus 
influencing levels of corruption. Botswana, however, constitutes an outlier 
within the statistical analysis, wherefore this case study analyses (i) linkages 
between the political institutions of interest to the thesis and corruption, as 
well as (ii) other determinants of corruption.  
The combination of different methods allows the object under scrutiny to be 
approached from different angles and at different depth. It also allows 
different voices to be heard, including those with first-hand insights into 
particular country contexts, institutional structures, preconditions for ac-
countability as well as the very faces of corruption. The advantages of 
mixed-method strategies have been emphasized by, among others, Lieber-
man, who advocates for so called nested analyses, i.e. combining “the statis-
tical analysis of a large sample of cases with in-depth investigation of one or 
more of the cases contained within the large sample”8. Nested analysis, 
Lieberman claims, is beneficial since the two methods “can inform each 
                                                 
 
8 Lieberman, E.S. (2005, 436). 
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other to the extent that the analytic payoff is greater than the sum of the 
parts”9. 
Because of the strategy to employ quantitative as well as qualitative 
methods, a broad array of different types of data is employed. Whereas the 
statistical analysis uses quantitative data such as broad international indices 
of corruption and democracy, or institutional data emanating from academic 
databases10, the qualitative analysis is based on scholarly analyses of 
institutional structures and levels of corruption, national statistics, data 
published by different authorities and organizations at the national and 
international levels, and in-country semi-structured interviews. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the topics raised during the in-country interviews (as 
well as later communication with the interviewees), interviewees have been 
granted anonymity.  
Issues related to the validity and reliability of the data used and the results 
obtained are discussed in the thesis, particularly in connection to the 
measurement of corruption and the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. 
The time frame for both analyses is that of 2000-2005. As a result, the 
institutional characteristics of a given country are registered for the year 
2000, whereas outcomes in terms of corruption are registered five years 
later (mid-2000s).11 Democratic countries exhibiting stable political insti-
tutions during the period of interest to the thesis are included, the argument 
being that political institutions which constitute more than a mere façade 
exist primarily in democratic countries.12 
  
                                                 
 
9 Lieberman, E.S. (2005, 436). 
10 Described in greater detail in chapters 2.2.2 and 4.1.2. 
11 As will be noticed in chapter 5, however, the qualitative analyses include data 
from a slightly broader period in order to gain as full a picture as possible.  
12 The included countries have also been democratic and exhibited stable political 
institutions during one year prior to the year 2000, so as to avoid the inclusion of 
countries exhibiting major changes on the eve of the period under scrutiny, see 
chapter 4.1.1 for more detail.  
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1.3 Structure of the remainder  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
many faces and the elusive character of corruption. It introduces the concept 
of corruption, discussing different definitions of corruption as well as the 
definition chosen for the purpose of the thesis. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion pertaining to ways of measuring corruption as well as measures 
suited for the purpose of the thesis.  
Chapter 3 marks the start of a search for solutions to the problem of 
corruption. After an overview of different explanatory factors, the chapter 
discusses the risks involved when delegating tasks and authority, then 
scrutinizing political institutions as mechanisms through which processes of 
delegation can be regulated and rendered more successful, i.e. less liable to 
corruption. The chapter approaches accountability as the key to this process 
and also discusses accountability mechanisms available to the principal.  
Chapter 4 includes a statistical analysis of the relationship between political 
institutions and corruption, the aim being to establish the strength and the 
nature of the relationship between a number of institutional variables, on 
the one hand, and corruption, on the other. 
Chapter 5 examines two countries, both of which have managed to keep 
corruption from becoming entrenched. These countries are examined by 
means of case studies to gain an understanding of the factors which have 
contributed to them exhibiting low corruption levels. The case study of 
Austria, firstly, looks into institutional structures, conditions for accounta-
bility and outcomes in terms of corruption. The case study of Botswana, 
secondly, examines issues related to institutions and accountability as well 
as other factors contributing to outcomes in terms of corruption.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a discussion pertaining to the findings of 
the thesis, whether the hypotheses of the thesis have been confirmed, and 
how the thesis contributes to the state of the arts.  
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2  
 
CORRUPTION – 
A MULTIFACETED AND ELUSIVE 
PHENOMENON 
 
The past two decades have witnessed a surge in the number of books, 
scholarly articles and news reports related to corruption. The word 
corruption has thus entered most people’s vocabulary, yet many people 
have a rather vague idea of what corruption actually entails, and hesitate 
when requested to draw the line between corrupt and non-corrupt 
behaviour. A closer look at the concept of corruption is therefore warranted 
before attempts to find solutions can be made. Having discussed different 
ways of defining corruption, the chapter looks into ways of operationalizing 
the concept.  
2.1 Definitions of corruption 
2.1.1 Classical definitions 
The word corruption is derived from the Latin verb corrumpere, which 
refers to something being broken, annihilated, destroyed, spoilt or weake-
ned.13 In a broad sense, corruption “designates that which destroys whole-
someness”14 and has metaphorically been described as “a disease, a cancer 
that eats into the cultural, political and economic fabric of society, and 
destroys the functioning of vital organs”15. Corruption is also often figura-
tively associated with “slime, filth, […] rottenness, gangrene, [and] pollution, 
whereas those engaging in corrupt behaviour are compared to vultures, 
                                                 
 
13 See University of Notre Dame Latin Dictionary at http://www.archives.nd.edu 
/cgi-bin/lookup.pl?stem=corru&ending= (28.11.2008). 
14 Klitgaard, R. (1988, 23). 
15 Amundsen, I. (1999, 1). 
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hyena [and] jackals.”16 As can be seen from this powerful imagery, corrup-
tion is often described normatively as a negative, undesirable phenomenon, 
which should be combated. Increasing consensus thus prevails regarding the 
necessity to stem corruption. The same cannot, however, be said about the 
very attributes of corruption, or where the boundary between corrupt and 
non-corrupt behaviour should be drawn. No universally accepted definition 
of the concept exists, and the different definitions employed by scholars and 
practitioners at times point in different directions with regards to whether 
an act should be regarded as corrupt or not.  
Efforts to understand and define corruption are by no means limited to our 
day and age. Already Aristotle, Plato and later Machiavelli, among others, 
made efforts to capture the essence of the concept of corruption. These 
philosophers chiefly defined corruption in relation to the whole of society 
and its moral health. Over time, however, corruption has come to be 
described less in relation to society as a whole and more in relation to 
individuals and their behaviour.17 
2.1.2 Behavioural definitions 
Current debates about how to define corruption are still very much based on 
a categorization of early definitions of corruption, made by Heidenheimer.18 
According to the categorization, which focuses on definitions used by social 
scientists, corruption can be defined (i) as contrary to the public opinion, (ii) 
as contrary to the public interest, (iii) as a breach of public office norms, and 
(iv) from the perspective of the market.  
In what follows, these broad categories of definitions will be presented 
briefly along with what is perceived as their strengths and weaknesses. A 
few other attempts to define corruption will also be described before 
discussing the suitability of these definitions for the purpose of the thesis at 
hand, as well as the final choice of definition.  
                                                 
 
16 Brooks, R.C. (1910, 57). It should be noted that Brooks deplores “the levity with 
which the word [corruption] is bandied about”, saying that this contributes to the 
confusion as to what corruption actually entails.  
17 A brief discussion on the viewpoints of these can be found in Johnston, M. (1996, 
322).  
18 Heidenheimer, A.J. (1970a).  
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2.1.2.1 Corruption as contrary to the rules and regulations of public 
office 
Social scientists commonly use the rules and regulations applicable to public 
office-holders as a starting point when defining corruption. Corrupt 
behaviour, according to this perspective, entails violating the rules related to 
an official position. Many of these definitions thereby proceed from a legal 
perspective, implying that the concept of corruption refers to behaviour 
forbidden by law. These definitions also make a clear distinction between 
the official role of a person, on the one hand, and the private role, on the 
other, highlighting that it is behaviour within the framework of the former 
that is to be taken into account when determining whether an act constitutes 
corruption or not.19 One frequently quoted definition within this category is 
that by Joseph Nye, who regards corruption as “behavior which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status-gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”20. 
This definition will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.1.3. 
Public office-centred definitions have been praised as well as criticized. On 
the one hand, they are lauded for their (i) relative stability over time and (ii) 
clarity with regards to distinguishing between corrupt and non-corrupt be-
haviour in that the legislative framework or the set of rules applied deter-
mine whether an act constitutes corruption or not.21 Such clarity and stabi-
lity may, however, be an illusion in that the rules related to public roles, and 
the relationships between public officials and private interests keep 
changing, as pointed out by Johnston.22  
Public office-centred definitions have also been criticized on other accounts. 
Definitions which proceed from a legal perspective are often regarded as 
narrow, thereby including only the most visible or condemnable types of 
corrupt behaviour, oftentimes excluding types of behaviour, which ordinary 
citizens commonly regarded as corrupt.23 The types of corruption included 
                                                 
 
19 Gardiner, J. (2007, 25); Andersson, S. (2002, 28-29); and Sjölin, M. (2010, 33).  
20 Nye, J. (1967, 419).  
21 Mény, Y. & de Sousa, L. (2001, 2824). See also Mény, Y. (1996, 310-311).  
22 Johnston, M. (1996, 324).  
23 Sjölin, M. (2010, 35), see also Kurer, O. (2005, 225); and Meny, Y. & de Sousa, L. 
(2001, 2824).  
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in legislation also vary from one country to another, resulting in different 
interpretations of what constitutes corruption.24 Moreover, public office-
centred definitions have been criticised for assuming a clear distinction 
between the public and private roles of a public office-holder. Critics 
underscore that such a distinction is easier to make in some cultures than in 
others.25 Lastly, critics highlight that these definitions, in using the abuse of 
rules as a starting point, presuppose the existence and enforcement of such 
rules, which is not the case in some countries.  
2.1.2.2 Corruption as contrary to the public opinion 
Definitions based on public opinion proceed from the kinds of behaviour 
which the (majority of the) public regard as corrupt. The concept is thus 
potentially broadened to include legal as well as illegal behaviour.26 
Definitions within this category tend to cover “more ground” but are 
problematic in the sense that the public opinion about different phenomena 
tends to change over time, and can be manipulated by those in power.27 
Determining who constitutes the public may also be a complicated task. 
Johnston highlights that there in fact are many publics and that their views 
on different issues tend to diverge.28  
Heidenheimer’s distinction between black, grey and white forms of corrup-
tion belongs in this category of definitions. Heidenheimer’s typology catego-
rises (i) corruption condemned by the general public (the masses) as well as 
a majority of members of the elite as black, (ii) corruption condemned by a 
majority of members of the elite only as grey, and (iii) corruption tolerated 
by elites as well as the masses as white. 29  
                                                 
 
24 Sjölin, M. (2010, 35).  
25 Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (ed.) (2011, 4).  
26 Sjölin, M. (2010, 34).  
27 Sjölin, M. (2010, 35-26).  
28 Quoted in Gardiner, J. (2007, 33), see also Kurer, O. (2005, 224).  
29 Heidenheimer, A.J. (1970b, 27), see also Bull, M.J. & Newell, J.L. (ed.) (2003, 2).  
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2.1.2.3 Corruption as contrary to the public interest 
Definitions, which proceed from the public interest, are based on the 
assumption that public office-holders should serve the interest of the public. 
These definitions focus on outcomes rather than rules, i.e. whether the 
actions taken by public officials damage or benefit the public. As pointed out 
by Gardiner, an act may be legal but yet corrupt if it is harmful to the public, 
and vice versa.30 Corruption, according to this view, entails behaviour 
focused on enhancing the private interests of the office-holder rather than 
those of the public.31 This is in line with Machiavelli who understood 
corruption as the “decay of the capacity of the citizens and officials of a state 
to subordinate the pursuit of private interests to the demands of the 
common good or public interest”32. Much later, such an approach to 
corruption was adopted also by Rogow and Lasswell, who state that 
“violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt”33.  
Defining corruption with a point of departure in the public interest has its 
own problems, including the challenges related to determining what the 
interest of the public actually is, which makes it difficult to draw the line 
between corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour.34 Gardiner deems that such 
definitions inevitably are “broad and ambiguous”35, whereas Kurer claims 
that these definitions fail the operationability test, given the difficulties 
involved in reaching an “agreement on what constitutes ‘damage to the 
public and its interest’”36.  
2.1.2.4 Market-centred definitions 
Market-centred definitions regard corruption as an illegal market 
mechanism, i.e. “a way of getting hold of resources in order to maximize 
profit”37. One definition of corruption falling into this category would be that 
of van Klaveren, who maintains that corruption should be conceived “in 
                                                 
 
30 Gardiner, J. (2007, 32).  
31 Sjölin, M. (2010, 34).  
32 Philp, M. (2001, 45).  
33 Rogow, A.A. & Lasswell, H.D. (1970, 54).  
34 Sjölin, M. (2010, 36).  
35 Gardiner, J. (2007, 32).  
36 Kurer, O. (2005, 226), see also Scott, J.C. (1972, 3).  
37 Andersson, S. (2002, 28).  
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terms of a civil servant who regards his public office as a business, the 
income of which he will, in the extreme case, seek to maximize”38. 
As such, these definitions lay claims to being objective and non-normative.39 
Sjölin, however, emphasizes that they proceed from the assumption that 
“extra-legal” exchanges are unethical, and therefore cannot be called non-
normative.40 Andersson, for his part, underscores that market-centred defi-
nitions should in fact be regarded as attempts at explaining why corruption 
occurs, rather than actual definitions.41  
2.1.2.5 Other definitions 
A number of attempts have been made to formulate what are regarded as 
more operationable and less ambiguous and culturally relative definitions of 
corruption.  
One such attempt is that by Kurer, who argues that approaching corruption 
from the point of view of distributive justice is a better way of arriving at a 
universally accepted definition. In his view, which he regards as an “up-
grading of the public office definition”42, corruption entails “a holder of 
public office violating non-discrimination norms in order to gain a private 
advantage”43. Such a definition, he claims, should be understood globally 
since impartiality is a practically universal principle. The boundary between 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory behaviour will, however, vary from 
one context to another. Kurer suggests that prevailing norms should be used 
to determine whether a particular non-discrimination rule has been violated 
                                                 
 
38 Van Klaveren, J. (1970, 39).  
39 Another attempt at formulating a value-free definition of corruption is that of Leff, 
who states that “[c]orruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or 
groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such the existence 
of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-
making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case”, see Leff, N.H. 
(1970, 510).  
40 Sjölin, M. (2010, 36). Qizilbash, for his part, goes as far as stating that corruption 
cannot be defined in a value-free manner, see Qizilbash, M. (2001, 267).  
41 Andersson, S. (2002, 28), see also Johnston, M. (1996, 323); Sjölin, M. (2010, 36); 
and Heywood, P. (1997, 422).  
42 Kurer, O. (2005, 236).  
43 Kurer, O. (2005, 227).  
27 
 
and admits that the definition suggested thereby “suffers from all the prob-
lems of public office definitions”44. 
Brown emphasizes the need to “strip the definition of corruption back to 
more general, holistic fundamentals”, i.e. a base from which different actors 
can formulate their own specific definitions.45 He regards his definition, “the 
abuse of entrusted power”46, as a relationship-centred definition according 
to which corruption constitutes an abuse of a relationship of trust: “the 
power was not the office-holders to abuse at will, but rather a power held 
and wielded ‘on trust’”47. According to Brown, a multitude of standards (e.g. 
legal, religious and moral) can be used to establish whether entrusted power 
has been abused.48 Andersson and Heywood, however, list a number of 
problems connected to this seemingly straightforward definition, including 
the fact that only those who exercise entrusted power can be regarded as 
corrupt. As a result, they stress, a dictator whose power is not based on trust 
could not be regarded as corrupt.49 
Attempts have also been made to define different sub-categories of corrup-
tion such as political corruption, taking into account that politicians function 
in a slightly different setting than nominated public officials, and that the 
rules applying to the former often are less settled and precise than those 
applying to the latter.50 These definitions have focused on political corrup-
tion as a “violation of the spirit and the principles of democracy”51, “dupli-
citous exclusion”52 (people being excluded from decisions which affect 
them), “mediated corruption”53 (an open, accountable democratic process 
being sidelined for private or political gain), as well as “a violation of the 
duties of office and a negation of the values that should underlie the 
democratic political and administrative system founded on the rule of law, 
                                                 
 
44 Kurer, O. (2005, 233).  
45 Brown, A.J. (2006, 59).  
46 Brown, A.J. (2006). 
47 Brown, AJ. (2006, 70).  
48 Brown, A.J. (2006, 73).  
49 Andersson, S. & Heywood, P.M. (2009, 748).  
50 Warren, M.E. (2006, 804).  
51 Stapenhurst, R. & Pelizzo, R. (2004, 4).  
52 Warren, M.E. (2006, 804).  
53 Thompson quoted in Johnston, M. (1996, 332).  
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such as the distinction between public and private interests, equality of 
treatment of citizens, transparency of transactions, and so forth”54. 
In quite general terms, many scholars are of the opinion that more work is 
needed to arrive at a universally accepted, operationable and unambiguous 
definition of corruption, applicable to a broader set of contexts.55 Whether 
such a universal definition can be found is, however, questionable. Sjölin 
contends that the difficulties stem from diverging views on how the morality 
of an action should be evaluated in the first place. Public office-centred 
definitions, he says, proceed from deontological ethics, judging morality 
based on an action's adherence to rules. The same goes for market-centred 
definitions, which, despite their claim to non-normativity, have an implicit 
point of departure in deontological ethics. Public interest-centred 
definitions, on the other hand, proceed from teleological or consequentialist 
ethical theory, judging the morality of an action based on its consequences. 56 
As a result, evaluations based on these tend to produce different results with 
regards to whether an act should be regarded as corrupt or not.  
2.1.3 Type of definition of corruption selected 
Given its focus on processes of delegation and lines of accountability 
inherent to certain political institutions, this thesis takes an interest in 
corrupt acts amongst public officials to whom the public, directly or in-
directly, has delegated certain powers.57 The United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC) defines a public official as:  
“(i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office 
of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or tempo-
rary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s seniority; (ii) any 
other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or 
                                                 
 
54 Mény, Y. (1996, 311).  
55 Kurer, O. (2005). It should, however, also be emphasized that some scholars 
encourage the formulation of new, diverging definitions and see no need to find a 
universal one. Instead, they emphasize that the different perspectives enrich our 
understanding of the multifaceted concept that corruption constitutes, see Sjölin, M. 
(2010, 37).  
56 Sjölin, M. (2010, 42).  
57 For more information about processes of delegation and accountability between 
principals and agents, see chapter 3. 
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public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of 
the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; 
(iii) any other person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a State 
Party.” 58 
The public officials of interest to the thesis include e.g. political candidates 
and representatives, ministers, bureaucrats, and heads of state and govern-
ment.  
Given their public role, these actors are expected to behave in accordance 
with certain public office rules and regulations. These rules are formal by 
nature, i.e. made by a recognized unit or actor, and “written down and le-
gitimated through some formal process of decision-making”59. As such the 
rules include legal provisions but also other formal documents aimed at 
standardizing behaviour among public office-holders, such as (legislative 
and administrative) ethics codes, codes of conduct, guidelines, recommen-
dations and adopted principles.60 Given that the countries analysed within 
the scope of the study are democracies, the thesis assumes the existence of 
some sort of rules and regulations of this kind, structuring the behaviour of 
public officials. This is of importance since these rules provide the bench-
mark according to which the differentiation between corrupt and non-
corrupt behaviour is made. In the light of these facts, a public office-based 
definition of corruption suits the purpose of the study.  
As already stated, however, definitions of this kind have been criticized on a 
number of accounts. One of the deficiencies highlighted in relation to public 
office definitions is that of legal provisions (as well as other formal rules) 
differing from one country to another. This fact is noted by the thesis, which 
contends that the benchmarks connected to most definitions of corruption 
seem to suffer from the same problems. The thesis also stresses that 
differences in terms of formal norms sometimes are overestimated. A quick 
overview of corruption-related legislation and institutions within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (a region often described 
                                                 
 
58 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2004, 7-8), see also 
Andersson, S. (2002, 29).  
59 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) at http://www.fao.org/docrep 
/w7483e/w7483e0b.htm (14.3.2012). 
60 For a discussion about such documents, see the Gale Encyclopedia of Public 
Health at www.answers.com/topic/ code-of-ethics (15.3.2012). 
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as culturally and normatively very distinct from the West61), for instance, 
shows that all member states have ratified the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC)62, all member countries have signed the SADC 
Protocol against Corruption63, all have adopted national legislation reflecting 
a commitment to combat corruption, and about 50% of them have estab-
lished anti-corruption institutions of some kind.64 Moreover, the national 
legal instruments display less normative and conceptual divergence with 
“western norms”65 than anticipated in that they, for the most part, clearly 
distinguish between the public and the private roles of an official, and 
criminalize types of corruption such as bribery, conflict of interest, 
embezzlement, fraud and extortion. This finding is in line with Nye, who 
states that Western rules should be at least partly relevant also in non-
Western societies.66  
Also Bayley acknowledges that non-Western societies often exhibit moral 
codes, which do not fully agree with western codes. He suggests, however, 
that the western denotative definition of corruption be used nevertheless, 
since elites in non-Western countries will be familiar with the Western 
concept of corruption and its different types, and since applying culture-
specific definitions renders comparison of countries impossible.67 The same 
line of thinking can be found with Heidenheimer, according to whom “[t]his 
“imposition” on the rest of the world of Western standards in evaluating 
behaviour may well be […] a prerequisite to meaningful comparative 
                                                 
 
61 See Bayley, D.H. (1970, 523).  
62 With the exception of Swaziland, which is a signatory only, see United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties 
/CAC/signatories.html (16.3.2012). 
63 In 2005, the Protocol had furthermore been ratified by 2/3 of the member states, 
see Transparency International at http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities 
/international_conventions/conventions_instruments/sadc_protocol (16.3.2012). 
64 Goredema, C. (2002, 22). It should also be noted that the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) as well as the SADC Protocol against 
Corruption entered into force in 2005. National legislation (with some exceptions) 
dates back to the 1990s, thus constituting fairly “young” legal instruments.  
65 As outlined e.g. in anti-corruption instruments by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe or the United Nations, 
see for instance the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (2008).  
66 Nye, J. (1967, 419).  
67 Bayley, D.H. (1970, 523-524).  
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analysis of political corruption phenomena”68. Also Galtung – having com-
pared the corruption scores assigned to certain countries by nationals and 
non-nationals of these countries, and found only minimal divergence of 
opinion – states that “what counts as corruption in one part of the world, is 
understood similarly elsewhere. The degree of tolerance and acceptance of 
corruption may well vary significantly”69.  
This said, the thesis at hand remains cognisant of the fact that many 
countries in the world do not have clear rules with regards to corruption or 
have adopted such rules as a mere façade, that actors in many societies also 
are guided by standards originating from their proper culture, and that 
states may adopt legal frameworks at odds with cultural beliefs. These 
issues will, if need be, be touched upon within the qualitative analysis which 
– in an effort to provide a fuller picture of levels of corruption and factors 
contributing to these in a national context – also touches upon public 
opinion on what constitutes corruption.70 
Whereas many definitions of corruption have been described as vague and 
difficult to operationalize, public office-centred definitions are often 
perceived as relatively speaking clearer and more operationable, facilitating 
the task of distinguishing between corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour. 
Formal rules should also be a more stable benchmark over time than that of 
– for instance – public opinion. These are important characteristics of a 
definition, as a result of which public office-centred definitions are to be 
preferred to many other alternatives. Public office-based definitions, 
however, remain narrower in scope than for instance public interest-based 
and public opinion-based definitions. The thesis acknowledges that legi-
slation often does not incorporate less tangible forms of corruption. In an 
effort to include a broader spectrum of types of corruption, the thesis there-
fore uses not only legislation as a benchmark but also takes other formal 
rules (including formal codes of conduct, guidelines etc.) which regulate 
public behaviour into consideration.  
                                                 
 
68 Heidenheimer, A.J. (ed.) (1970b, 8).  
69 Galtung, F. (2006, 112).  
70 Such an approach is also recommended by Scott, according to whom “an adequate 
understanding of corruption generally requires a grasp of an entire network of 
influence”. Any analysis of corruption should therefore be embedded “contextually 
in a broader analysis of a regime’s political dynamics”, see Scott, J.C. (1972, 6).  
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Public office-based definitions of corruption proceed from the idea that cor-
ruption constitutes a deviation from a particular norm guiding public 
officials. As a result, they have been deemed unsuitable when analysing con-
texts where corruption is systemic, i.e. where corruption does not constitute 
an abuse of a rule but rather the rule itself71, something that is noted by the 
thesis. Given that the aim of the qualitative analysis is to study the factors 
contributing to low levels of corruption, the definition should be if not ideal 
then at least acceptable. 
Based on the discussion above, a public office type of definition will be 
employed to capture the essence of the concept of corruption. Such defi-
nitions come in different shapes and forms, however, as a result of which the 
constituent parts of such a definition need to be discussed and specified. The 
(public office-centred) definition of corruption provided by Joseph Nye 
constitutes a good point of departure for this enterprise. As already stated 
above, Nye defines corruption as behaviour “which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, 
private clique) pecuniary or status-gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”.72 Nye stresses that 
the definition includes “such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert 
the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-
regarding uses) [and that] it does not include much behavior that might 
nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards”73. Nye acknow-
ledges that his definition may not be ideal in non-Western societies where 
people also are strongly influenced by traditional norms. He maintains, how-
ever, that the rules which public officials are expected to adhere to tend to 
be expressed using more or less the same norms and concepts as those 
employed in his definition, making it “at least partly relevant”74 also in non-
Western societies.  
The very focus and characteristics of Nye’s definition (juxtaposed to 
definitions proposed by a number of other scholars) merit some further 
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72 Nye, J. (1967, 419).  
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attention, however. As can be seen from the definition, Nye – first of all – 
highlights the distinction between public and private roles and duties. Nye’s 
definition accentuates the duties of a public role, implying that at least one of 
the parties involved in corrupt activities should be a public office-holder, 
bound by the rules and regulations applicable to such an office. Most 
definitions of corruption found in social science research and literature tend 
to have a similar focus in that corruption is defined in terms of, for instance, 
the “abuse of public power for private benefit”75. Corruption which takes 
place exclusively within the private sector is thus often ignored by such 
definitions. The reason for this, according to Andvig and Fjeldstad, is that 
public sector corruption is perceived as “a more fundamental problem than 
private sector corruption, and because controlling public sector corruption 
is a prerequisite for controlling private sector corruption”76.  
Secondly, Nye also stresses that corrupt activities involve the search for 
gains or benefits, which can be monetary or non-monetary. Thompson and 
Philp stipulate that benefits also can be political.77 Philp, finally, highlights 
that an actor “may act to avoid certain costs rather than to incur certain 
benefits”78.  
Another trait of corrupt behaviour, according to Nye, thirdly, is that of 
corrupt activities potentially benefitting not just the perpetrator him/herself 
but also family members, relatives and friends. Gardiner, however, points 
out that Nye’s definition does not cover situations where the benefitting 
entity is the office-holder’s party or ethnic group, something that also is 
highlighted by Scott79.  
Brooks, fourthly, stresses that corruption is intentional80, something that is 
implied also in Nye’s definition, given its emphasis on gain. 
                                                 
 
75 Transparency International quoted in Amundsen, I. (1999, 2). See also Mauro, P. 
(1998); Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999); Treisman, D. (2000); and Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, 
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76 Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, O-H. et al. (2000, 14).  
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78 Philp, M. (2006, 46).  
79 Gardiner, J. (2007, 26); and Scott, J.C. (1972, 4).  
80 Brooks, R.C. (1910, 59).  
34 
 
Fifthly, scholars also debate the legality or illegality of corrupt acts, 
something that Nye’s definition only alludes to. Bardhan maintains that “just 
as clearly not all illegal transactions are corrupt, nor are all instances of 
corruption or bribery illegal”81. Kaufmann agrees with Bardhan: “an act may 
not necessarily be illegal for it to be regarded as corrupt in a broader 
sense”82. Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares, however, insist upon the 
illegality of corruption: “there is no question that corruption is, before 
anything else, a type of crime”83. The discussion pertaining to the legality or 
illegality of corrupt acts is illustrative of the problems involved in defining 
corruption. If defined broadly, corruption can refer to an abuse of the law as 
well as accepted, “unwritten” cultural norms. If such a broad definition is 
used, corruption can be both legal and illegal. A narrow definition, however, 
links corruption to a violation of the law or formal documents84, making 
corruption a legal offense. Amundsen discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of adopting a narrow (legalistic) or a broad definition of 
corruption. According to him “[a] strict and narrow definition of corruption 
[…] can be handy for fighting corruption when the problem is limited”85. The 
narrow definition may, however, fail to capture important aspects of 
corruption, making a broad definition more suitable in the fight against high 
levels of corruption. Meier and Holbrook, on the other hand, recognize that 
adopting a narrow legalistic definition results in the exclusion of politically 
interesting actions but still maintain that narrower definitions have their 
advantages in that they provide a more precise concept which is “more 
amenable to reliable measurement”86. 
Sixthly, Mény describes corruption as a “form of secret social exchange”87, 
implying that two or more parties are required for an act to be defined as 
corrupt. Nye does not take a clear stand on this issue but does regard 
misappropriation88 as corruption, which could be interpreted as corrupt acts 
                                                 
 
81 Bardhan, P. (1997, 1321).  
82 For examples, see Kaufmann, D. (2005, 82).  
83 Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Reis Soares, R. (2001, 4).  
84 Such as, for instance, codes of conduct. 
85 Amundsen, I. (1999, 1).  
86 Meier, K.J. & Holbrook, T.M. (1992, 136).  
87 Mény quoted in Amundsen, I. (1999, 2).  
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actually owned by someone else”, see the Free dictionary by Farlex at 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/misappropriation (25.3.2012). 
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not necessarily requiring two parties. This is the standpoint of Key, who 
discusses auto-corruption, i.e. power-holders playing the role of agents as 
well as third parties securing for themselves the “administrative privilege 
which would be secured by an outsider by bribery”89. Key (supported by 
Brooks, Heywood and Johnston)90 thereby maintains that also deeds by one 
actor should be regarded as corrupt. This line of thinking is, however, 
rejected by Grey and Kaufmann who maintain that fraud and embezzlement 
often are regarded as types of corruption but remain “malfeasance that a 
public official can carry out alone”91. Embezzlement and fraud should 
therefore, according to them, not be regarded as corruption from a strictly 
legal point of view, but rather as theft.92 
The issue of reciprocity between the parties involved in corrupt acts has also 
given rise to scholarly interest. Gerring and Thacker stress that corruption 
does not necessarily involve reciprocity: “It is important to note that 
corruption doesn’t always involve an exchange relationship; sometimes the 
beneficiary is an individual or group who take but give nothing in return”93. 
In fact, the absence of reciprocity may be more common than actual 
exchanges due to the uncertainty involved in corrupt dealings and the fact 
that corrupt “contracts” are not legally binding, which makes enforcement of 
corrupt deals difficult.  
Seventhly, Lapalombara and Scott stress that corrupt acts can be active as 
well as passive. They thus highlight that (i) failing to act in accordance with 
ones duties, or not enforcing laws and regulations may be just as corrupt an 
act as (ii) enforcing them in an arbitrary fashion.94  
Based on the discussions above, corruption is defined in line with Nye, as 
“behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status-gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence”95. A few additions are, however, made to Nye’s 
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definition: (i) in accordance with Thompson, Gardiner and Scott, the thesis 
recognizes that benefits also may be political, and that the benefitting 
entities may include political parties and ethnical groups, (ii) in accordance 
with Key, Brooks, Heywood and Johnston, the thesis maintains that acts of 
corruption can involve one party only, thereby regarding embezzlement and 
fraud as forms of corruption, (iii) in accordance with Gerring and Thacker, 
the thesis stipulates that reciprocity is not a requirement for an act to be 
regarded as corrupt, and (iv) in line with Lapalombara and Scott, the thesis 
includes active as well as passive acts of corruption.  
Despite certain voices to the contrary, the thesis considers this definition to 
cover also corrupt practices on the part of elected office-holders, whose 
duties undeniably remain much more fluid and elusive than those of non-
elected ones. Regarding both categories of office-holders as covered by the 
definition finds support, however, in the fact that the duties of elected office-
holders in many countries are stipulated in formal codes of conduct, which 
condemn certain types of behaviour on the part of, for instance, parlia-
mentarians.96 The Code of Conduct for British members of Parliament 
constitutes a good example. The Code specifies that the duties of members 
include “act[ing] in the interests of the nation as a whole [with] a special 
duty to their constituents [as well as behaving] with probity and integrity, 
including in their use of public resources”97. Furthermore, the Code insists 
that Members, when “carrying out their parliamentary and public duties […] 
will be expected to observe [a number of] general principles of conduct […] 
applying to holders of public office”98. These include the principles of 
selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness and honesty. The 
code of conduct for members of the Ugandan Parliament contains similar 
                                                 
 
96 According to Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, among others the Fiji Islands, Germany, 
Grenada, Israel, Japan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
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R. (2004).  
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elements99, as does the code regulating the behaviour of the members of the 
Indian Council of States (Rajya Sabha). Among other things, the latter 
stipulates that members should “utilise their position as members of Parlia-
ment to advance the general well-being of the people”100, “use public 
resources in such a manner as may lead to public good”101, subordinate their 
private interests to the duty of their public office, and “never expect or 
accept any fee, remuneration or benefit for a vote given or not given by them 
on the floor of the House, for introducing a Bill, for moving a resolution or 
desisting from moving a resolution, putting a question or abstaining from 
asking a question or participating in the deliberations of the House or a 
Parliamentary Committee”102. 
Within the parameters established above, corruption occurs at different 
levels of the system and may take a number of guises.103 Corrupt activities 
may occur at the very top of the political system or at lower levels. 
Corruption involving actors at the top of the political hierarchy is often 
called political corruption. Actors involved are in a position to influence 
legislation and policy formulation, and to award major contracts104. As such, 
they have ample opportunity to abuse their positions for the benefit of their 
family, friends, allies or themselves. 
                                                 
 
99 Parliament of Uganda at http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/images/stories 
/constitution/rules%20of%20procedure%20for%20the%208th%20parliament%2
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101 Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2005) at 
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scholars, see e.g. Heidenheimer, A.J. (ed.) (1970a, 23); Key, V.O. Jr. (1936, 46); Knack, 
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104 See Moody-Stuart, and Doig & Theobald quoted in Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, O-H. et 
al. (2000, 18).  
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Political corruption can be seen as having a negative impact on the work 
ethic at lower levels of the bureaucracy and is therefore usually a sign of a 
more wide-spread problem: “Political corruption is usually supported by 
widespread bureaucratic or petty corruption, in a pyramid of upward 
extraction. Furthermore, corruption in high places is regarded as contagious 
to lower level officials, as these will follow the predatory examples of, or 
even take instructions from, their principals”105. Parallels are sometimes 
drawn between political corruption and grand corruption, and the two are at 
times used synonymously106. The term “high-level corruption” is also 
sometimes used to designate the involvement of high level officials in large-
scale (grand) corruption.107  
Corruption within the public administration, however, is often called 
bureaucratic corruption. Whereas political corruption is something the 
general public rarely sees or comes across, bureaucratic corruption may be 
prevalent in ordinary people’s lives “in their encounter with public 
administration and services like hospitals, schools, local licensing 
authorities, police, customs, taxing authorities”108. Bureaucratic corruption 
is also sometimes distinguished from political corruption with regard to the 
amounts or the scope of the favours changing hands: “The sums involved are 
rather modest (adjusted to local conditions), and therefore bureaucratic 
corruption is frequently referred to as routine or “petty”. Even so, the sums 
involved may be considerable in particular cases and in aggregated 
terms”109. Bureaucratic corruption is sometimes called low-level corruption 
and usually takes place during implementation rather than policy formu-
lation, which is another factor differentiating it from political corruption.110  
Corruption takes a multitude of shapes and forms. One of these is 
favouritism, which refers to the tendency of decision-makers to make biased 
decisions in favour of certain people. Favouritism is related to corruption in 
cases where this preferential treatment implies “a corrupt […] distribution 
of resources”111. Nye defines favouritism as the “bestowal of patronage by 
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reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit”112. Nepotism is a 
particular type of favouritism in which “an office holder (ruler) prefers his 
proper kinfolk and family members (wife, brothers and sisters, children, 
nephews, cousins, in-laws etc.)”113. 
Corrupt acts may also come in the guise of bribery. The word bribery is often 
popularly used to denote corruption more generally. The Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, however, defines bribery as the act or practice of giving, taking 
or promising “money or favor […] in order to influence the judgment or 
conduct of a person in a position of trust”114. Nye moves along the same lines 
when defining bribery as the “use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a 
person in a position of trust”115. Amundsen, for his part, maintains that 
terms such as “kickback, baksheesh, sweeteners, grease-money [and] pay-
offs”116 are used synonymously to the term bribe. The term speed money is 
also used more specifically when the purpose of the bribe is linked to spee-
ding up processes. Speed money therefore “reduces delays in moving files in 
administrative offices and in getting ahead in slow-moving queues”117.  
Corruption may also involve coercion as in the case of extortion when 
“money and other resources are extracted by the use of coercion, violence or 
the threats to use force”118. Extortion or blackmailing can take place from 
“below” by groups or individuals in society (such as mafias or other criminal 
groups) or from “above” when the state is the actor extracting the money or 
the resources. 
2.2 Operationalization of corruption 
Research into any phenomenon requires reliable data about the object 
under investigation. This normally goes without saying, as does the fact that 
researchers into a particular subject matter should know their subject 
matter well enough to be able to delineate where it starts and ends. When 
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studying corruption, however, these seemingly obvious facts present them-
selves in a different light. This is due to the fact that (i) corruption consti-
tutes a covert phenomenon, making it difficult to access data about its pre-
valence and nature, and (ii) the concept of corruption being void of a uni-
versal definition, making it difficult to know what kind of data to target in 
the first place. Capturing all the different faces of corruption using a single 
measurement is a challenge, something that – according to Johnston – 
“thoroughly [has] stymied the comparative study of corruption”119. 
Much of early research into corrupt activities was qualitative and fairly 
narrow in scope due to these very problems. Since the 1990s, however, 
broader comparative studies have been made possible thanks to improved 
access to quantitative data covering a large number of countries. Access to 
such data does not, however, change the bottom line that data as a general 
rule is difficult to acquire due to the very nature of corrupt activities. Certain 
concerns have also been voiced with regards to the very quality of the 
quantitative data available.  
In the following, different types of quantitative data available to researchers 
will be discussed, with a particular focus on issues related to the validity, 
comparability, country coverage, survey questions and overall suitability of 
a number of sources of data. Having assessed the suitability of different 
sources for the purposes of the thesis, attention is turned to the way in 
which corruption will be operationalized within the framework of the 
quantitative analysis at hand. 
2.2.1 Overview of data sources and their characteristics 
2.2.1.1 Experience- and perceptions-based data 
Quantitative data on corruption is generated by a number of data providers, 
and comes in different shapes and forms. Such data is often divided into 
experience-based and perception-based data. Perception-based data uses 
perceptions of the prevalence or nature of corruption in a given context as a 
starting point, whereas experience-based data proceeds from actual 
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experiences with corruption. The latter type of data is often perceived as 
more objective and reliable than the former.120  
Data sources (wholly or partially) based on perceptions of corruption 
include the control of corruption (CC) component of the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank, the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) and the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) produced by Trans-
parency International (TI), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by 
the Political Risk Services Group, and a number of indices which use the CPI 
as a source, including the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Index 
of Economic Freedom (produced by the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal).121  
Experience-based data, on the other hand, is provided e.g. through the Crime 
Victimization Survey (CVS) co-generated by the Dutch Ministry of Justice 
and the British Home Office, the GCB by TI and some of the Regional 
Barometers such as the Latinobarómetro and the Afrobarometer.122 The CVS 
includes crime statistics, such as the yearly number of suspicions, arrests, 
prosecutions or convictions in corruption cases, all of which at times have 
been used as proxies for corruption levels. It should, however, be remem-
bered that such data may reflect other phenomena than that of corruption. 
Instead of reflecting a serious corruption problem, large numbers of prose-
cutions or convictions may reflect an efficient police force, public prose-
cution office or judiciary, or increased awareness about corruption and vice 
versa.123 Miller also reminds users of official statistics that these can be 
manipulated for political (or other) ends and that crime statistics are 
“notoriously unreliable”124. 
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2.2.1.2 Respondents 
Quantitative data also differs with regards to the very persons, whose 
experiences or perceptions are being measured. Whereas some sources map 
out the views and experiences of international as well as national actors 
from different walks of life, others merely consult elites such as experts or 
business executives.125 The former category includes sources such as the 
GCB by TI and the WGI by the World Bank, whereas the latter includes 
among others the Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) and the CPI by TI, or the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) by the 
World Bank.126  
2.2.1.3 Types of corruption captured 
The scope of sources of corruption data also differs. Oftentimes, sources of 
data are portrayed as covering all or many of the different aspects of 
corruption but do in reality only provide data on a very limited number of 
types or aspects of the phenomenon. Few sources actually capture types of 
corruption other than mere bribes.  
Data sources covering types of corruption other than bribery include the 
ICRG (which inquires into bribes, patronage, nepotism, secret party funding 
and conflict of interest) and the WGI (which includes data related to petty 
and grand corruption as well as state capture). Sources limited to capturing 
the prevalence of bribery include the BPI, the CPI127, and the GCB by TI, the 
CVS128, many of the Regional Barometers129 and the World Values Survey 
(WVS).130  
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Many sources used in quantitative corruption research in fact focus mainly 
on issues other than corruption. These include the BEEPS (which mainly 
focuses on the investment climate and competitiveness), the Global Com-
petitiveness Index (which focuses on competitiveness in a number of 
sectors), the Global Integrity Index (which maps out anti-corruption mecha-
nisms), the ICRG (which chiefly takes an interest in political, economic and 
financial risks), and the Open Budget Index (which measures access to 
budget information).131  
2.2.1.4 Sectors and contexts 
The question whether the sources include corruption across the board or in 
certain sectors or contexts only is also of interest. The BEEPS, for instance, 
examines corruption in the business sector only, whereas the Global 
Integrity Index, the CVS and ICRG target corruption within the public sector. 
The CPI and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) by the 
World Bank, for their part, include corrupt behaviour in the public and 
political sectors, and the financial, trade and public sectors, respectively, 
whereas the WGI examine instances in the public and private sectors.132  
2.2.1.5 Composite and non-composite sources 
In certain cases, sources have been aggregated into broader composite 
indices. Composite indices include the WGI, the CPI, the Global Competitive-
ness Index, the ICRG, and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Non-
composite sources such as the BPI, the GCB, the Global Integrity Index, the 
Open Budget Index, and data stemming from the regional Barometers and 
the WVS, are also available to users.  
2.2.2 Discussion 
The discussion above provides a few pointers with regards to sources 
available to researchers. From the point of view of the quantitative analysis 
at hand, many sources listed above can be excluded from the onset due to 
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their main focus on issues other than corruption. These include the BEEPS, 
the Global Competitiveness Index, the Global Integrity Index, the ICRG133, 
and the Open Budget Index. Priority should, furthermore, be given to 
sources including as wide a range of types of corruption as possible such as 
the WGI and sources which include as wide a range of respondents as 
possible, such as the GCB and the WGI. Experience- as well as perceptions-
based data has its weaknesses.134 As a result, both are deemed to be of use. 
The same goes for composite and non-composite data.  
Since the control of corruption (CC) component of the WGI (i) consult a 
relatively speaking broad range of respondents (ii) on corruption-related 
phenomena beyond mere bribery, (iii) including behaviour within the public 
(and private) sectors, and also (iv) exhibiting considerable country coverage 
over time, it constitutes a worthy alternative considering the requirements 
of the quantitative analysis. The WGI will therefore be discussed in more 
detail below.  
2.2.3 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
2.2.3.1 Features and structure 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are based on a research 
project by the same name, spearheaded by researchers from the Brookings 
Institution, the World Bank Development Research Group and the World 
Bank Institute.135 The WGI data has been produced since 1996 and the indi-
cators cover six dimensions of governance, one of which is ‘control of 
corruption’ (CC), which measures “the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests”136. The WGI is a 
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composite governance index and data is thus based on a number of 
underlying sources. Respondents include experts from the public and 
private sectors and civil society organizations, as well as non-expert 
individuals.137  
In 2005, the CC dimension of the WGI covered 204 countries and was 
constructed using 31 variables measuring different aspects of corruption. 
These originated from 18 sources produced by 16 different organizations.138 
The sources included the views of private sector representatives (for 
example through the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic 
Forum), representatives of commercial business information providers (for 
example the Country Risk Service by the Economist Intelligence Unit), NGO 
representatives (e.g. Countries at a Crossroads and Nations in Transition by 
Freedom House), representatives of public sector organizations (for 
example the Country Policy & Institutional Assessments by the World Bank) 
as well as households (for instance the Voice of the People Survey by Gallup 
International).139  
A glance at the primary sources shows that these differ from one another to 
a certain extent. Some of the primary sources provide information about a 
broader spectrum of aspects of corruption, including bribery, nepotism, 
patronage140, or even state capture141 whereas others focus on bribes / 
additional payments or do not, at least seemingly, take any interest whatso-
ever in particular forms of corruption. Some sources map out the prevalence 
of corruption in particular sectors or among certain categories of officials or 
                                                                                                                         
 
study. In 2008, the definition was changed to “perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain”, see e.g. the World Bank at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (16.4.2012); and Thomas, M. 
A. (2010, 36).  
137 See Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 36).  
138 See Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 37 and 46-88).  
139 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 36).  
140 E.g. the Business Risk Service Analyses by Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence; and the Political Risk Services analyses by the PRS Group, see 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 37 and 46-79).  
141 E.g. the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) by 
the World Bank; and the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic 
Forum, see Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 50 and 80).  
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individuals142. Among these, some sources focus on the private sector and 
take a business perspective on corruption. Other sources, however, focus on 
corruption at the national level, without going into areas or sectors.143  
The authors have divided the different sources into representative and non-
representative sources, depending on their country coverage. The 2005 CC 
component includes seven representative sources and twelve non-repre-
sentative sources. The former category, which has greater country coverage, 
includes assessments by commercial business information providers as well 
as a survey of business executives, all publically available. The latter cate-
gory, which exhibits sources with more variable country coverage, includes 
expert and NGO assessments as well as three household surveys. Repre-
sentative sources are claimed to be given greater weight when sources are 
aggregated. This will be discussed in chapter 2.2.3.2. 
The aggregation process of the WGI involves several steps. The process is 
described in great detail by the authors of the WGI as well as Arndt and 
Oman, wherefore only a brief overview will be provided within the frame-
work of the thesis, see appendix 3.144  
2.2.3.2 Critique of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Adserà et al. call an earlier version of the WGI “the most comprehensive and 
the closest to passing any internal validity test among the growing number 
of data that are being generated on corruption and governmental effective-
ness”.145 Arndt and Oman, in their thorough assessment of the WGI, maintain 
that – despite their shortcomings – the WGI are “[p]robably the most 
carefully constructed […] governance indicators”146 available. The WGI have, 
however, also been criticized on a number of accounts. The points of 
criticism levelled at the WGI are discussed below.  
  
                                                 
 
142 For instance the Afrobarometer, see Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. 
(2006, 47).  
143 More information about the primary sources used to construct the 2005 Control 
of Corruption component, can be found in Appendices 4 and 5.  
144 See Kraay, A. (2007); and Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006).  
145 Adserà, A., Boix, C. & Payne, M. (2000, 33).  
146 Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 49).  
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Perceptions as a proxy for reality 
In the 2005 version of the WGI, corruption was (as already noted) defined as 
“the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests”147. This definition undeniably gives the 
impression that the aim is to capture actual incidence of corruption in states. 
Most of the indicators used to construct the CC component, however, 
measure perceptions rather than actual incidence of corruption.148  
The authors of the WGI consider the usage of perceptions of corruption as a 
proxy for actual incidence of corruption justified, given the problems related 
to measuring corruption objectively.149 Perceptions-based data has, 
however, at times been claimed not to provide a reliable picture of the 
corruption landscape and changes occurring within it.150 Johnston stresses 
that perceptions are not the same thing as reality, and also points out that 
issues and circumstances such as corruption scandals, culture chock, 
language limitations or dislike of a particular country or its government, 
ignorance, or the trustful or sceptical personality of the respondent may 
affect and distort perceptions.151 He also highlights that grand corruption 
may be difficult to detect, wherefore it is not always reliably documented 
using perceptions.152 Kurtz and Schrank, for their part, stress that 
                                                 
 
147 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007b, 4).  
148 A glance at those questionnaires (related to the primary sources used for the 
2005 CC component) which are publicly available shows that sources such as the 
Corruption Survey by the Political & Economic Risk Group, the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook by the Institute for Management and Development, the 
publications Nations in Transition and Countries at a Crossroads by Freedom House 
as well as the questions used from the Afrobarometer all include perceptions-based 
questions on corruption. The Voice of the People Survey by Gallup International and 
the Latinobarómetro both contain experience-based questions and these seem to be 
the ones used when constructing the CC component. This is not 100% certain, 
however, given that the authors of the WGI do not publicize the exact questions used 
by the primary sources, but rather provide a list of “concepts measured” by these, 
see Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 47-80).  
149 Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, and Lambsdorff quoted in Razafindrakoto, M. & 
Roubaud, F. (2010, 1060).  
150 Andersson, S. & Heywood, P.M. (2009, 752), see also Duncan, N. (2006, 131).  
151 Johnston, M. (2007, 874); and Teorell, J. (2010, 66).  
152 Johnston, M. (2007, 874), see also Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 
1063).  
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respondents, when accounting for their perceptions of corruption, may be 
influenced by factors such as the economic situation of a country. Times of 
prosperity would, according to them, make people less critical of govern-
ment and thus less likely to perceive government and its officials as corrupt. 
During times of crisis, however, government is likely to be perceived as 
more corrupt.153 Such tendencies may naturally result in measurement 
error. The authors of the WGI dismiss claims that governance estimates are 
affected by the economic situation of a country and provide what they 
regard as evidence to the contrary.154 
Experts also highlight that perceptions change very slowly and that data 
based on perceptions therefore is not reliable when analysing changes over 
time.155 This is an important point, since users of corruption data often wish 
to establish whether strategies and interventions are bearing fruit.  
Using perceptions as a proxy has also been criticized by a Razafindrakoto 
and Roubaud who, having compared experts’ perceptions of corruption with 
the actual experiences of households in eight countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, conclude that the two remain uncorrelated. Experts’ perceptions, 
however, are correlated with many of the global corruption indices.156 Raza-
findrakoto and Roubaud, furthermore, find that experts tend to overestimate 
levels of corruption experienced by ordinary citizens.157 The authors stress, 
however, that their study only covers eight countries and that the results 
therefore have their limitations. As a consequence, Razafindrakoto & Rou-
baud do not categorically reject the usage of measurements based on per-
ceptions.158 Weber Abramo, finally, points to a certain level of agreement 
between perceptions-based and experience-based measures in some 
country contexts.159  
The usability of perceptions-based measures of corruption has been 
discussed extensively. When evaluating different types of data one must, 
however, bear in mind that also experience-based data has its 
                                                 
 
153 Kurtz, M. J. & Schrank, A. (2007, 543).  
154 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 15).  
155 See, for instance, Miller, W.L. (2006, 168).  
156 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1063).  
157 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1057).  
158 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1060).  
159 Weber Abramo, C. (2008, 29).  
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weaknesses.160 Such data is at times criticized for failing to capture grand or 
private sector corruption since respondents mainly include local (non-elite) 
actors.161 Miller also highlights that respondents may be unwilling or asha-
med to admit that they have been involved in corrupt activities, as a result of 
which survey results do not reflect the true state of affairs.162 Furthermore, 
experience-based data including crime statistics may, as already mentioned, 
measure phenomena other than corruption. 
Validity 
Thomas, as well as Kurtz and Schrank, question whether the WGI really 
measure what they purport to measure.163 Measures of a construct such as 
governance, Thomas highlights, are validated by showing that they “cor-
rectly represent the theoretical definition of the construct, and by evaluating 
whether the proposed measure has the same relationships with observable 
variables that the theory predicts the construct itself to have”164. With the 
exception of the CC component, Thomas claims, the WGI are poorly defined 
and oftentimes divorced from existing theory. As a result, the validity of the 
indicators cannot be assessed.165 This is corroborated by Kurtz and Schrank, 
who criticize the authors of the WGI for not having focused on “concept 
formation as a necessary prelude to both measurement and modelling”166. 
Arndt and Oman, for their part, point to the components of the WGI being 
defined by the primary indicators on which they are based rather than using 
theory as a starting point.167 This is also the view point of Knack, who calls 
the WGI conceptually imprecise and uncertain, stressing that composite 
indices in general “have no explicit definition, but instead are defined impli-
citly by what goes into them”168. Since the primary sources of such indices 
change over time, their implicit definition also changes.  
                                                 
 
160 See, for instance, Andvig, J.C. (2005).  
161 Teorell, J. (2010, 70).  
162 Miller, W.L. (2006, 170).  
163 Thomas, M. A. (2010); and Kurtz, M. J. & Schrank, A. (2007).  
164 Thomas, M. A. (2010, 38), where a construct is defined as an abstract idea, 
unobservable, which cannot be counted or measured directly. 
165 Thomas, M. A. (2010, 41).  
166 Kurtz, M. J. & Schrank, A. (2007, 563).  
167 Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 51).  
168 Knack, S. (2006, 18).  
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Whereas the validity of the WGI has been debated, the reliability of the indi-
cators has been perceived as less of a problem.169  
Kaufmann et al. retort that defining governance in general, and its different 
components in particular, is a contentious issue, and that the authors are 
entitled to provide definitions of their own, based on existing definitions and 
understandings of the different components within the WGI. They therefore 
dismiss the criticism that the different aspects of governance have not been 
properly defined, and that it is unclear what they actually measure.170  
Respondents  
The CC includes more heterogeneous sources (in terms of respondents and 
types of questions asked) than, for instance, the CPI.171 Arndt and Oman 
confirm that the WGI appear to be “reasonably diverse and representative of 
different stakeholders”172 but maintain that this is a mere façade since 
sources are assigned different weights173. Sources which differ from the 
majority of expert assessments and surveys of firms are given less impor-
tance in the WGI components. In practice, this means that household surveys 
carry less weight than other sources. Such biases can, however, be found in 
most governance surveys, including the CPI, whose sample is “not only 
private sector oriented, it is also overwhelmingly male and economically 
well off”174. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud acknowledge that the over-
representation of expert opinions seems to be due to the greater availability 
of such appraisals, not deliberate selection choice.175  
From the point of view of the CC component, the claimed private sector bias 
could result in the focus lying mainly on “corruption affecting large 
companies, especially in international trade and foreign investment”176 
rather than the forms of corruption experienced by ordinary citizens. Kurtz 
and Schrank also emphasize that the firms consulted by indices such as the 
                                                 
 
169 Kurtz, M. J. & Schrank, A. (2007, 544).  
170 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 26).  
171 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1057).  
172 Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 69).  
173 See the criticism of the aggregation process under “Aggregation procedure” 
below. 
174 Galtung, F. (2006, 112).  
175 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010).  
176 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1060).  
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WGI are the ones which have managed to enter a particular market, poten-
tially by corrupt means. Investors deterred by poor governance or 
corruption will not, however, be consulted. As a consequence, reporting will 
– according to Kurtz and Schrank – not necessarily reflect the true character 
of the corruption landscape.177 
In their response to the criticism, Kaufmann et al. maintain that according to 
their calculations, the perceptions of governance (including corruption) of 
business people and other members of society differ only little from one 
another, as a result of which claims about business sector bias are exagge-
rated. They also claim that Razafindrakoto and Roubaud’s study (mentioned 
above) which finds that corruption assessments made by experts, on the one 
hand, and experiences of households, on the other, remain uncorrelated, 
should take into consideration that measurement error may occur in 
household surveys as well as experts’ appraisals: any effort to collect cor-
ruption-related data, whether ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, will therefore 
“involve an irreducible element of uncertainty”178.  
Comparisons over time 
Users of indices such as the WGI are warned that these should not be used to 
measure trends, one reason being the rescaling procedure which “precludes 
the ability to track changes meaningfully over time”.179 This applies to gover-
nance estimates as well as rankings. Apparent changes over time may also in 
reality be due to new countries being added or new primary sources being 
included in or excluded from the WGI.  
Kaufmann et al. acknowledge that adding new countries could in principle 
change the ranking of existing countries but maintains that this is unlikely to 
happen in practice unless these newcomers are radically different from 
countries already ranked.180  
  
                                                 
 
177 Kurtz, M. J. & Schrank, A. (2007, 542).  
178 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. at http://www.eldis.org/go 
/display&type=Document&id=43823#.UVs3YFf4a9s (2.4.2012); and Kaufmann, D., 
Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 14).  
179 Knack, S. (2006, 20), see also Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 61).  
180 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 4).  
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Cross-country comparisons 
Arndt and Oman maintain that indices such as the WGI should not be used 
for cross-country comparisons due to unavoidable measurement errors, as 
well as assessments (in the extreme case) being based on completely 
different primary sources.181 The authors of the index maintain, however, 
that comparisons are possible as long as the margins of error are kept in 
mind.182 They also highlight that comparisons are possible despite differen-
ces in terms of primary sources since the aggregation procedure puts “the 
scores of these […] into common units and permits comparison between 
them despite the absence of a common data source”183. Furthermore, 
Kaufmann et al. highlight, several of the primary sources include quite 
general questions about corruption, minimizing definitional differences.184  
Aggregation procedure  
The WGI is a composite index based on a number of underlying sources. 
Aggregate indices of this kind have been praised as well as criticized. 
Whereas some stress that combining multiple sources in such a fashion is a 
means towards (i) capturing more dimensions of corruption, (ii) avoiding 
measurement error, and (iii) ensuring greater country coverage, others 
point to clarity being lost in the process due to diverging definitions, scope 
and overall methodology.185 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud do not criticize aggregation per se, but rather 
the very method through which primary sources are aggregated when 
constructing the WGI components.186 The aggregation procedure is based on 
the assumption that the errors of the primary sources underlying the WGI 
                                                 
 
181 Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 29).  
182 Arndt and Oman praise the authors for publishing these confidence intervals 
(containing the “true” governance score with a 90% probability) since it raises 
awareness among users of the problems involved in measuring governance and its 
different components. They highlight, however, that correlated errors may mean 
that confidence intervals should be broader than they currently are, which would 
render cross-country comparisons more difficult, see Arndt, C. & Oman, C. (2006, 
61).  
183 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 6).  
184 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a, 7).  
185 Teorell, J. (2010, 69-70); and Knack, S. (2006, 15).  
186 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1059).  
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remain independent, something that is of importance since data sources are 
weighted depending on how correlated they are. Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud as well as Arndt and Oman maintain that this assumption does not 
hold in that experts influence one another, thereby “contaminating” each 
other’s sources. Some primary sources are also claimed to systematically 
adjust their rankings to those assigned by other primary sources, or rely on 
the same information more generally.187 These expert sources are thus likely 
to be highly correlated and, in accordance with the methodology of the WGI, 
accorded greater weights than sources expressing divergent views. As a 
consequence the sources based on experts’ perceptions would influence the 
governance estimates disproportionately.188  
The number of primary sources required to calculate a governance estimate 
has also been discussed. The WGI generates a governance estimate for a 
given country even if only one source is available for that country as 
opposed to, for instance, the CPI which requires three sources.189 Arndt and 
Oman stress that relying on fewer sources increases the risk of erroneous 
grading, something that is corroborated by Iqbal and Shah.190  
Kaufmann et al., however, stress that “the mere fact that data sources “look 
at each other” does not by itself constitute evidence that these data sources 
will therefore make correlated errors”191. Furthermore, providing empirical 
evidence of the presence or absence of correlated errors is difficult since 
mere correlations may be due to a number of factors.192 Kaufmann et al. also 
stress that even if the errors of two data sources are somewhat correlated “it 
does not mean that we should discard them entirely from the aggregate 
                                                 
 
187 Knack, S. (2006, 22), see also Andersson, S. & Heywood, P.M. (2009, 753); and 
Teorell, J. (2010, 68).  
188 Knack, S. (2006, 21); and Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1059).  
189 Razafindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. (2010, 1058). The CC component for 2005 
included 15 countries whose assessments were based on one source only, nine 
whose assessments were based on two sources only and 14 whose assessments 
were based on three sources, see Iqbal, K. & Shah, A. (2008) at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/howdoworldwidegovernanc
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191 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007a). 
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indicator – they jointly still might well contain useful information, just not as 
much information as they would if they were truly independent.”193  
With regards to some sources being assigned greater weight simply due to 
the fact that they are correlated, Kaufmann et al. acknowledge that the 
weighting scheme may favour some sources unduly. They therefore gene-
rate unweighted estimates on all six dimensions of the WGI and conclude 
that these are extremely highly correlated with the weighted ones and 
conclude that the criticism can be dismissed.194  
Lack of transparency 
Arndt and Oman, and Knack highlight that users of governance indicators 
such as the WGI should be allowed to (i) understand how and why countries 
are assigned particular scores, and (ii) replicate the calculations made by the 
authors of the WGI. This is not possible, they claim, since neither the criteria 
used by the primary sources to rank countries, nor all the primary data are 
available to users.195  
The authors of the WGI find this criticism unfounded but admit that access 
to one primary source (the CPIA) cannot be ensured. All the remaining data 
has, however, been disclosed to users.196  
2.2.3.3 Discussion and choice of measure 
As can be seen from the overview of the WGI provided above, the indicators 
have been criticized on a number of accounts. Some of the critique applies to 
all the components of the WGI whereas other issues concern certain com-
ponents only, excluding the CC component.  
The WGI have, first of all, been criticized for focusing on perceptions of 
corruption despite the fact that perceptions, as indicated above, have a 
number of claimed weaknesses. These include perceptions allegedly not 
being suitable for analysis of trends, and being distorted by externalities. 
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Since the thesis at hand does not focus on developments over time, and since 
all measures of corruption are likely to be “imperfect signals”197 at best, 
these points of criticism are merely noted. The WGI have also been criticized 
for using perceptions of corruption as a proxy for actual incidence of 
corruption. Given that (i) the CC component does include a few sources 
which record experiences with corruption (see appendices 4 and 5), (ii) 
other studies use perception-data in this fashion, and (iii) experience-based 
data also has a number of weaknesses, a perceptions-based measure such as 
the CC component is regarded as an acceptable alternative when operationa-
lizing corruption. The CC component is also regarded as a valid enough 
alternative, given that much of the criticism of the WGI as not passing the 
validity test constantly and explicitly excludes the CC component.  
Claims that the WGI mainly convey the views of experts and business 
executives are also noted along with claims that certain types of corruption 
(such as corruption experienced by ordinary citizens) may not be captured 
by such assessments. In this context, it should be noted, however, that the CC 
component of the WGI does include the views of non-experts, and that 
sources focusing on the views of ordinary citizens only also are likely to miss 
certain types of corruption (such as grand corruption), wherefore the CC 
component is regarded as an acceptable option.198  
Criticism of the aggregation method used to construct the WGI is dis-
regarded based on Kaufmann et al.’s statement that more or less the same 
estimates are generated using unweighted values. The fact that estimates for 
some countries are generated using very few sources is, however, noted.  
More worrisome are the claims that the WGI should not be used for cross-
country comparisons due to measurement errors. The thesis retorts this 
criticism by arguing that all measures of corruption are likely to contain 
                                                 
 
197 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007b, 10).  
198 It is also worth while noting that other sources such as the CPI are characterized 
by an even more serious expert/private sector bias in that no non-expert sources 
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errors of some kind and that comparative research into corruption cannot 
come to a halt while awaiting new measures. Researchers therefore have to 
make do with the measures available while keeping their weaknesses in 
mind when presenting their findings. The fact that many researchers do not 
discuss the methodologies underlying these measures points to little 
interest in or awareness of these issues, however. 
Although not highlighted by the critics of the WGI, it is also noted that one of 
the original sources included in the WGI uses (anti-corruption and 
accounting) institutions as a proxy for corruption.199 This is problematic 
given the fact that the independent variables of interest to the thesis are 
political institutions. Since this approach to measuring corruption seems to 
be restricted to one source only, however, the problem is regarded as minor.  
As pointed out by Kurer, the ideal measure of levels of corruption should 
“capture the incidence of all practices that are corrupt according to the 
definition”.200 As already stated, however, such ideal measures of corruption 
are yet to be constructed, wherefore the phenomena captured by any 
corruption measure available are likely to differ substantially from those 
captured by the definition.201 Williams and Siddique go as far as stating that 
“searching for a ‘perfect’ measure of governance is undoubtedly an exercise 
in futility, and it is unlikely such a measure will ever be developed”202. 
Furthermore, they highlight that “the criticisms levelled at many of the 
indicators mentioned throughout this paper have been written more as a 
cautionary tale of their limitations, rather than as statements describing why 
they should never be used”203. This is echoed by one of the great authorities 
in corruption research, Michael Johnston, who states that “[i]t is unlikely 
that we will ever have valid, reliable, precise, subtle, and broadly 
comparable data on corruption – much less on all its various forms”204.  
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Given the above as well as the fact that the WGI also have been lauded by a 
number of respected scholars205, corruption will – within the framework of 
this thesis – be operationalized using the WGI CC component. 
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58 
 
  
59 
 
 
3 
 
SAFEGUARDING  
AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
This thesis approaches corruption as an undesirable and condemnable 
phenomenon, which certain countries have managed to keep from becoming 
entrenched, whereas others have not. Why some societies or countries have 
been more successful than others in this regard still attracts debate, 
however, and many are of the opinion that, despite considerable efforts by 
academics as well as practitioners, “knowledge about what causes govern-
ments to be clean and efficient [remains] in its infancy”206.  
A wealth of scholarly work seems to pull in different directions, pointing to 
an elusive, multi-faceted problem and numerous potential explanatory 
variables. A number of these, however, are often regarded as those holding 
the greatest explanatory power207, wherefore these will be discussed briefly. 
The first such variable is that of religious tradition. More precisely, a number 
of studies find a negative relationship between Protestantism and levels of 
corruption.208 Treisman suggests two distinct pathways through which 
religion is likely to affect levels of corruption. On the one hand, religion is 
likely to affect cultural attitudes to social hierarchy. In countries dominated 
by more “hierarchical” religions (such as Catholicism or Islam) people are 
less likely to challenge office-holders, which contributes towards increased 
levels of corruption. Where religions based on more egalitarian or 
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individualistic principles (such as Protestantism) dominate, however, 
accountability is facilitated, which reduces levels of corruption. On the other 
hand, religion is also likely to affect levels of corruption because of the 
distinct relationships between different world religions and the state. 
Treisman stresses that a separation between the church and the state 
(characteristic of many Protestant countries) is likely to have contributed to 
a more critical view of the state as well as increased monitoring of the same. 
As a result, such countries are likely to exhibit lower levels of corruption 
than states were the church and the state remain intertwined (characteristic 
of states where, for instance, Islam dominates).209 Accountability and ease of 
monitoring of the state could thus be the avenues through which 
Protestantism contributes towards stemming corruption. 
Economic causes of corruption have also been explored to quite an extent, 
and economic development is generally regarded as an important 
explanatory factor with regards to corruption.210 Andvig et al., quoting 
Paldam and Treisman, go as far as stating that the single ”most important 
determinant of corruption is economic development, measured by real GDP 
per capita”211. Andvig et al. conclude, however, that “[c]ausation runs from 
economic development to lower corruption, and from corruption to lower 
economic development”212, i.e. in both directions. Also Amundsen maintains 
that the direction of causality is hard to establish.213  
Economic development in itself may not, however, be enough to curb 
corruption. Unequal distribution of resources may in fact cause corruption 
even in the richest of nations.214 The effects of economic development have 
been attributed to a number of pathways, including officials in economically 
developed countries running higher chances of being exposed, economic 
development increasing levels of education and literacy, developed 
countries to a greater extent being characterrized by depersonalized 
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relationships, and social stigma being greater in economically developed 
countries.215 
A history of British rule is also found to reduce levels of corruption.216 One 
reason for his might be common law217, found in Great Britain and its former 
colonies. According to David and Brierly as well as La Porta, common law to 
some extent developed “as a defense of parliament and property owners 
against the attempts by the sovereign to regulate and expropriate them, 
[whereas] civil law systems […] developed more as an instrument used by 
the sovereign for state building and controlling economic life”218. Due to the 
greater protection of property rights against the state under common law 
systems, these are found to contribute towards efficient government, and 
corruption being stemmed.219 This may not be the only reason why former 
British colonies exhibit lower levels of corruption, however. According to 
Eckstein, the British have always emphasized the importance of following 
procedures220, and Treisman notes that judges have shown a willingness “to 
follow procedures even when the results threaten hierarchy”221, something 
that is likely to increase the likelihood of venal actors being sanctioned. A 
British heritage may thus contribute towards curbing corruption through an 
emphasis on procedures as well as protecting individuals against encroach-
ments by the state. 
A number of studies also link ethnic fragmentation to increasing levels of 
corruption.222 Mauro attributes this to bureaucrats in ethnically fragmented 
states favouring members of their own group223, whereas Treisman 
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highlights the corrupt contracts between members of the same group, as 
well as possibilities to employ sanctions against actors who act against 
members of one’s own group.224  
Linkages between democracy and corruption have been brought to the fore 
by a number of scholars.225 These scholars point to levels of corruption 
decreasing with (i) increasing levels of democracy or (ii) length of 
democratic history.226 The linkage between levels of democracy and levels of 
corruption may not, however, be as straightforward as initially assumed. 
Amundsen, for instance, points out that countries experiencing rapid trans-
formation such as democratic transition may in fact experience higher levels 
of corruption than stable democracies or authoritarian states.227 This is 
substantiated by Manow228 and Andvig et al. The latter point out that the 
relationship may in fact be bell-shaped since authoritarian regimes, contrary 
to newly democratized ones, are able to “control the levels of corruption and 
thus keep it at an economically viable level […]. When authoritarian control 
is challenged and destroyed […], but not yet replaced by democratic checks 
and balances, and by legitimate and accountable institutions, the level of 
corruption will increase and reach a peak before it is reduced with 
increasing levels of democratic governance”229. Also Treisman finds a non-
linear relationship between democracy and levels of (perceived) corruption. 
He finds that levels of (perceived) corruption decline as Freedom House 
political rights (PR) values go from 7 to 6 and 3 to 1. Between PR values 3 
and 6, however, he finds the effect of democracy on corruption to be more 
erratic.230  
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Sandholtz and Koetzle attribute the linkage between democracy and cor-
ruption to (i) institutional as well as (ii) normative components. The former 
category includes the fact that officials derive their powers from (and are 
expected to serve) the public which, in turn, is more able to control officials. 
Sandholtz and Koetzle also highlight the importance of freedom of speech 
and press in curbing corruption. The second category includes democratic 
norms which emphasize corruption as “antagonistic to basic democratic 
values”231. According to Sandholtz and Koetzle, it is because of this fact that 
the public bothers to engage in monitoring and sanctioning officials. 
The strong relationship between individual political institutions and levels 
of corruption has also been emphasized by scholars. How a number of 
political institutions have been found to interact with levels of corruption is 
discussed in chapter 3.2.3.  
Before analysing linkages between political institutions and corruption, 
however, the chapter discusses corruption from a principal-agent perspec-
tive, describing how corruption, or behaviour which deviates from the for-
mal duties of a public role, can be viewed through and analysed using a 
principal-agent lens. Such a perspective emphasizes (i) the public as the 
ultimate delegating party (or principal), (ii) the power-holder as the 
representative (or agent), (iii) the fact that the agent has duties towards the 
principal, and (iv) the fact that the agent can choose to do his duty or 
disregard it by focussing first and foremost on benefiting himself or people 
or groups close to him. This discussion points to a number of challenges and 
problems inherent to processes of delegation of power.  
The chapter then turns to political institutions as solutions to those prob-
lems, introducing accountability as a pathway through which political insti-
tutions impact on levels of corruption. The hypothesis put forward is that 
political institutions, by enhancing or hampering accountability, render 
corruption more or less practicable and attractive.  
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3.1 Delegation of power and its inherent risks 
Democracy as a form of government signifies rule by the people. In ancient 
Greece, democracy took the form of direct self-government, i.e. citizens 
debating and making decisions related to issues of common interest.232 The 
forms of democracy exhibited in modern states, however, most often differ 
from those of ancient Greece, one of the reasons being the difficulty of app-
lying the idea of direct democracy to large states with millions of citizens. 
Most modern democratic states have therefore adopted representative 
democracy, i.e. citizens delegating authority to representatives, who in their 
turn may delegate authority onwards.233 As a consequence, representative 
democracies exhibit a multitude of processes or chains of delegation. These 
are composed of different actors and exhibit varying length, but the citizens 
always constitute the main and ultimate delegating parties. 
Delegation of power is a necessity in a large state; it is a way of ensuring that 
a broad range of services can be provided and that those “with the talent, 
training and inclination”234 to assume certain responsibilities are tasked 
with executing them.235 According to Kiewiet and McCubbins, “[delegation] 
is what allows firms to profit, economies to grow, and governments to 
govern”236. 
The argument behind delegation of authority is that it contributes to 
efficient decision-making and execution. Delegation is, however, fraught 
with risks. At worst, delegation may turn into total abdication, i.e. the 
delegating party losing control over the party to whom authority has been 
delegated. According to McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, this may manifest itself 
in a number of ways, including the entrusted person shirking his duties, 
giving preference to his own (political) preferences rather than those of the 
delegating party, or engaging in downright corruption237, i.e. disregarding 
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his duty to the delegating party by focussing on activities benefitting himself 
or people or groups close to him.  
Such problems can to a certain extent be avoided through mechanisms 
geared towards controlling the person to whom authority is delegated. This 
thesis takes an interest in the very mechanisms through which the dele-
gating party – the principal – can avoid losing control over the person(s) or 
entities to which power is delegated – the agent(s). As will be discussed in 
the following, the thesis scrutinizes the ways in which political institutions 
structure the relationship between principals and agents, with view to 
ensuring that delegation does not equal abdication.238 Institutional design 
thus becomes a tool to ascertain successful delegation.  
3.1.1 Delegation from principals to agents  
As indicated above, processes of delegation may be studied using the prin-
cipal-agent model, whereby the delegating party constitutes the principal, 
and the person(s) to whom power is delegated constitute(s) the agent(s).  
The underlying idea of the model is that the principal (s)elects an agent to 
undertake tasks, which he / she, due to lack of time or expertise, cannot 
assume him- or herself. One of the assumptions governing the relationship is 
the fact that the interests of the principal and the agent are likely to 
diverge239, i.e. their interest with regards to how the delegated work should 
be carried out or what a reasonable output is, may differ. The principal 
naturally wishes to see the agent act in accordance with the principal’s 
interests, thus avoiding unnecessary costs.240 The principal is, however, 
likely to have limited information about and insight into the character and 
the doings of the agent.241 This becomes a challenge (the so called principal-
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agent problem) for the principal, who at worst has to expend considerable 
amounts of time, money and energy to ensure that the agent is acting in his 
interest (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Basic principal-agent model 
 
This is in line with Lupia and McCubbins, who state that acts of delegation 
share at least four common features. These include (i) the involvement of a 
principal tasked with delegating authority, and an agent to whom authority 
is delegated, (ii) the possibility of conflicting interests between the two, (iii) 
the possibility of the relationship being characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation, and (iv) the prospect of solving the problems related to delegation 
through mechanisms embedded in the institutional design.242 Lupia and 
McCubbins specify that the first three characteristics of principal-agent 
relationships contribute towards delegation at times being so problematic. 
Whereas conflicting interests provide the incentive to act against the 
instructions from or wishes of the principal, asymmetric information makes 
it possible for the agent to do so243, see figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Linkages between (i) interests and incentives and (ii) information 
and opportunities 
 
3.1.2 Application of the principal-agent model in the field of political 
science 
The principal-agent model was originally applied to such seemingly different 
relationships as those within the firm (analysing the dynamics between 
superiors and employees) or between insurance companies and customers 
procuring car insurance, with a focus on the difficulties faced by the 
superiors / the companies in terms of overseeing the behaviour of the 
employees / the insured, see figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Early use of the P/A framework within the field of economics 
 
The former model – for instance – helped to illustrate (i) the challenges in-
volved in ensuring that the drivers did not engage in risky and costly 
behaviour (simply because they had insurance), and (ii) the mechanisms 
available to make behaviour involving risk less attractive.244  
It was soon realized, however, that the principal-agent model had great 
potential in terms of gaining a better understanding of relationships, dele-
gation of power, informational asymmetries, diverging interests and control 
mechanisms in a broader context. Within the field of political science, for 
instance, the model has allowed scholars to gain new insights into 
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interaction, relationships and processes of delegation and control within the 
state.245  
As shown by a limited but convincing amount of work within the field of 
political science, politics may – as already stated – in fact be approached as 
an agreement between principals and agents. This is demonstrated by, for 
instance, (i) Strøm, who studies parliamentarian systems and chains of 
delegation from principals (voters, political representatives and ministers) 
to agents (representatives, ministers and bureaucrats) within these, and (ii) 
Kiewiet and McCubbins, (iii) McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, and (iv) 
McCubbins and Schwartz, who all study the US Congress (as the principal) 
and the process of delegating powers to standing committees and other 
entities (agents).246 Of interest is also research by (v) Kassim and Menon, 
who analyse the delegation of powers from the EU member states (as 
principals) to the European Commission and Court of Justice (as agents) and 
that by (vi) della Porta and Vannucci, who scrutinize the interaction and 
exchanges between principals, agents and third parties in an Italian political 
context.247  
The great potential for employing the principal-agent model within the field 
of political science is also underscored by Lupia and McCubbins, who state 
that “[i]f delegation is a key requirement of democracy, then discovering 
how principals adapt to the problems of delegation is essential to 
understanding of how democracy works”248. Advocates of the model also 
include Lane, according to whom the model offers new perspectives on the 
interactions between (i) voters (as principals) and politicians (as agents) as 
well as (ii) government (as the principal) and the bureaucracy (as the 
agent). Lane highlights that the contracts entered into in the political arena 
are ambiguous ones, difficult to monitor, providing agents with numerous 
opportunities to misbehave, be it in the form of shirking, corruption or 
other.249 As a result, mechanisms are needed to constrain these potentially 
unruly agents, channelling their behaviour in the right direction. Much in 
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line with the argument of this thesis, Lane regards political institutions as 
such mechanisms designed to structure the interaction between principals 
and agents, and avoid problems of delegation.250  
The principal-agent model has also to some extent been used in studies 
which, like the one at hand, focus on the causes of corruption. In this context, 
Klitgaard’s examination of the incentives created by institutions is widely 
quoted.251 Studies by Groenendijk, Adserà, Boix and Payne, Andersson, and 
Andersson and Bergman also deserve a mention. Whereas Groenendijk 
applies the principal-agent model to representative democracies to 
demonstrate its usefulness beyond the bureaucratic context, Adserà et al. 
take an interest in accountability mechanisms as the very pathways through 
which political institutions affect levels of corruption.252 Andersson, and 
Andersson and Bergman, finally, analyse processes of delegation and control 
as well as outcomes in terms of corruption in a number of Swedish 
counties.253  
As can be seen from the brief overview provided for, the principal-agent 
model is applied to the study of political institutions as well as the study of 
corruption. It should be noted, however, that the model also has been 
criticized as unsuitable for certain types of corruption research. Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell argue that the model cannot be used for analysing 
societies characterized by systemic corruption since “principled princi-
pals”254 acting in a non-selfish manner will be the exception rather than the 
rule. As a result, these societies will to a large extent lack actors willing to 
monitor agents and punish corrupt behaviour, and may instead see 
principals as well as agents pursuing their own narrow self-interests. When 
studying systemic or engrained corruption, therefore, the principal-agent 
framework loses its usefulness as an analytical tool.255 The study by Persson 
et al. points to this being the case in some African countries, where 
corruption, according to them, rather should be conceived as a collective 
action problem, i.e. actors (principals as well as agents) being aware of the 
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negative effects of corruption for society as a whole but yet engaging in 
corrupt behaviour since it benefits them personally, making corruption the 
norm rather than the exception.256 The same line of argument is presented 
by Mungiu-Pippidi, who emphasizes that corruption, in some societies, does 
not lie exclusively with the agent as the principal-agent model presupposes, 
and that corruption in these contexts constitutes the norm rather than the 
exception.257 Also Andvig and Fjeldstad point to the principal-agent model 
breaking down in cases where the principal engages in corruption. The 
authors, in line with Waterman and Meier, also flag the challenges related to 
multiple principals with potentially inconsistent and/or unclear prefe-
rences.258 Tirole, finally, calls attention to the fact that the principal-agent 
paradigm was “developed for two-tier organizations”259 and that many 
organizations in fact exhibit more complex structures, which means that 
coalitions and collusion between actors must be taken into consideration. 
Persson et al., Mungiu-Pippidi, Andvig et al., Waterman & Meier, and Tirole 
make important and valid inputs into the debate about how to define and 
analyse corruption, and are most probably right when criticising the usage 
of a model focusing on corruption as an exception in a context where 
corruption rather should be regarded as an institution in itself. The model 
does, however, remain useful when studying countries characterized by 
(relatively) low levels of corruption. Given that one of the aims of this thesis 
is to unveil mechanisms contributing to low levels of corruption, the model 
should contribute towards answering the research questions.  
3.1.3 Agency problems and corruption as a form of agency loss  
As already outlined, principal-agent relationships may be characterized by 
divergent preferences (the interests of the agent differing from those of the 
principal) and information asymmetries (the principal and the agent not 
having equal information). These features, inherent to the principal-agent 
relationship, may render the process of delegation and control very 
cumbersome and difficult to manage.  
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Limited information (also termed hidden information) about the perso-
nality, preferences or context of the agent(s), on the one hand, may lead to 
principal-agent problems in the form of adverse selection.260 Adverse 
selection refers to the difficulties faced by the principal with regards to 
seeing the true nature of the agent and determining whether it is wise to 
delegate to him/her. Such problems therefore occur before the principal has 
decided to enter into a principal-agent relationship with the agent (ex ante). 
Limited information about the actions of the agent (also termed hidden 
action), on the other hand, leads to principal-agent problems in the form of 
moral hazard.261 Moral hazard refers to the difficulties faced by the principal 
when it comes to making sure that the agent is behaving in accordance with 
the contract, i.e. what has been agreed upon with the principal. As opposed 
to problems of adverse selection, moral hazard problems, therefore, occur 
after the agreement or contract between the principal and the agent has 
been closed (ex post). 
Adverse selection and moral hazard increase the risk of agency loss, defined 
as the difference between what the principal wants from the agent and what 
the agent actually delivers262, see figure 4. Delegation always entails some 
level of agency loss since no agent will be able to act or produce outputs 
completely in accordance with the wishes of the principal. Delegating 
authority to an agent may still be worthwhile, however, as long as the 
principal deems that he is better off than he would be, had he not delegated 
at all.263  
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Figure 4: Informational challenges resulting in agency loss 
 
This thesis has already briefly touched upon a number of ways in which an 
agent can behave contrary to the wishes of the principal. Only one of these, 
however, is of interest to the study, namely corrupt behaviour. The thesis 
regards corruption as a societal problem giving rise to considerable political, 
economic, social, and environmental costs.264 Corruption, therefore, may be 
beneficial for individuals or groups involved in corrupt practices in the short 
term, but will have considerable adverse effects on individuals, groups or 
society as a whole in the long term. Although prevalent and even 
institutionalized in certain societies, the thesis claims that a majority of 
individuals do condemn corruption. This is in line with data from the World 
Values Survey, indicating that 68% of respondents find that accepting a 
bribe never is justifiable.265  
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As a consequence, the thesis argues that also a majority of principals would 
prefer (s)electing non-corrupt agents, and operationalizes (i) adverse 
selection as the principal being unable to (s)elect “clean” agents, i.e. agents 
with no intention of favouring themselves (or their immediate family or 
friends) through corrupt behaviour, (ii) moral hazard as the principal being 
unable to keep agent(s) non-corrupt, and (iii) agency loss as increased levels 
of corruption.  
3.2 Political institutions as problem-solvers 
Delegation is a necessity in a modern-day state, but may also be perilous. 
Agents may regard the office as a holiday resort rather than a place to 
work266 or they may engage in undesired activities such as theft or corrup-
tion. Principals fear losing control over the agents.  
Attention is now turned towards ways in which principals can avoid losing 
control over the actor(s) to whom power is (to be) delegated, the emphasis 
being on political institutions and how they contribute towards delegation 
not equalling abdication.  
The discussion opens with a closer look at institutional theory and political 
institutions as entities. This is followed by an overview of research into 
whether and how political institutions have been found to affect levels of 
corruption.  
3.2.1 Definition of a political institution 
The thesis at hand is grounded in institutional theory, which argues in 
favour of institutions having an influence on human behaviour as well as the 
outcomes of different processes. Institutional theory is employed within the 
scope of a number of disciplines, including the political sciences, economics 
and sociology.267 As highlighted by Blondel, however, the political sciences 
                                                 
 
266 Aptly described as the agency becoming a “Club Med for government officials”, 
see McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987, 247).  
267 Goldmann, K., Pedersen, M.N. & Østerud, Ø. (red.) (1997, 99).  
75 
 
take a particular interest in institutions, institution-building and their 
effects.268 
According to Blondel, political scientists often use the term “political 
institution” without providing a clear definition or specifying what should be 
included under its umbrella: “it [is] as if the meaning of the concept was self-
evident and we should immediately recognize an institution when we [see] 
one”269. Kollman highlights that the confusion surrounding the concept 
partly is due to the fact that it can refer to a multitude of entities as well as 
procedures.270  
This said, a number of scholars do provide definitions contributing to a 
clearer picture of the object under scrutiny. Kollman himself, first of all, 
defines political institutions as “codified constraints on behaviour”271, 
specifying that institutions include rules and procedures regulating a 
number of processes and that they “determine who can legally do what, 
when, and how”272. Hall and Taylor move along the same lines defining 
political institutions as the “rules, compliance procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals”273. 
Their emphasis lies on formal institutions, as does that of Levi, who defines 
political institutions as “[t]he formal arrangements aggregating individuals 
and regulating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and decision-
making processes, maintained by an individual or a group of individuals who 
formally have been authorized to hold such power”274. Goldmann, Pedersen 
and Østerud regard political institutions as “key political structures and 
rules and norms […] which actors conform to”275, whereas North defines 
political institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
[…] humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”276. Lane 
chooses to define political institutions simply as “enforced rules”277 and 
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270 Kollman, K. (2012, 6).  
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273 Hall and Taylor quoted in Bell, S. (2002, 2).  
274 Levi quoted in Rothstein, B. (1994) (own translation from Swedish). 
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from Swedish). 
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Groenendijk as “collectively binding working rules”278. Steinmo, finally, 
states that political institutions in the broadest sense are “simply rules”279, 
which define who is able to participate in the political arena, shape the 
political strategies of actors and influence what actors regard as possible 
and desirable.  
In line with the definitions provided by Hall and Taylor above, this thesis 
regards political institutions as “rules, compliance procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals”280. 
As such, they define the participants in different political processes, and the 
rules and procedures according to which these processes are carried out. As 
a consequence, political institutions define how power can and should be 
exercised and by whom, i.e. provide pointers as to what is feasible and 
allowed. This, the thesis argues, has a bearing on levels of corruption, as can 
be seen from figure 5 below.  
Figure 5: Proposed linkage between institutions, behaviour and corruption 
 
The extent to which political institutions in fact shape the behaviour of 
individuals as well as key outcomes has, however, been debated also within 
the institutionalist camp. Goldmann, Pedersen and Østerud distinguish 
between strands of institutionalism, which see actors as either primarily 
rule-abiding or rational utility-maximizing creatures: 
(i) The first strand of institutionalists regards individuals as primarily 
“guided by norms rather than consequences or interest”281. This strand 
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seems to argue that institutions are able to determine the actions of 
actors. 
(ii) The latter strand argues that individuals are guided by interest, 
although “formal and informal institutions […] restrict [their] strategic 
behaviour”282. This strand seems to take a more moderate stance with 
regards to whether institutions determine behaviour, claiming the co-
existence and co-influence of personal interest and a normative 
framework. 
The thesis subscribe to the latter point of view and will be considering 
actors as influenced by structural factors (rules and norms) within society, 
as well as personal interest and consequence. By making this choice, it 
acknowledges that particular ends cannot be attained by institution-building 
alone. Institution-building is, however, regarded as a powerful tool towards 
achieving particular ends. 
3.2.2 Entities categorized as political institutions  
If defined as formal rules, compliance procedures and operating practices 
(see chapter 3.2.1), political institutions may come to include a variety of 
different entities. According to Goldmann, Pedersen and Østerud, early 
political scientists regarded the concept as encompassing political structures 
such as “voters, political parties, parliament, popularly elected authorities at 
a regional and local level, administration in a broader sense, supranational 
political and administrative organizations, courts of law, the ombudsman, 
the state auditor, interest groups and the media”283. Later, however, political 
institutions have often come to include an even broader range of entities, i.e. 
formal as well as informal structures.284 
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As can be seen above, even the narrower lot of entities listed by Goldmann et 
al. includes a fairly broad range of political entities. The question remains: 
should all the entities listed by Goldmann et al. be regarded as formal 
political institutions? 
Any effort to specify the entities to be included under the definition should 
make the distinction between government and civil society. Whereas 
government encompasses “the formal institutions, offices, processes and 
personnel through which the day-to-day running of a country, the 
maintenance of public order and the distribution of resources is managed 
and maintained”285, civil society can be defined as “the realm of social 
activity that is not to do with the state or the market”286. It goes without 
saying then, that institutions within civil society should not be included 
under formal political institutions of the state. The thesis also argues that 
“intermediaries” between government and civil society should be regarded 
as separate from the government machinery: 
Figure 6: Distinction between civil society and state 
 
As can be seen from figure 6, voters are regarded as part of civil society, and 
interest groups, the media and political parties as intermediaries in that they 
channel inputs provided by civil society. A similar distinction is also made by 
Hague and Harrop (who distinguish between society and government) and 
Axford, Browning, Huggins and Rosamond (who separate people and 
government).287  
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286 Axford, B., Browning, G., Huggins, R. and Rosamond, B. (1997, 123).  
287 See Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2007) table of contents; and Axford, B., Browning, G., 
Huggins, R. and Rosamond, B. (1997, vii). It should be mentioned, however, that 
these authors categorize the political entities listed by Goldmann et al. (1997) 
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3.2.3 Research into linkages between political institutions and 
corruption 
Having discussed the different views on what political institutions are and 
the extent to which they might affect conduct and outcomes, attention is 
turned to the very linkages between political institutions and levels of cor-
ruption. In the following, the focus will lie on (i) research which points to a 
significant relationship between political institutions and levels of corrup-
tion, as well as certain pathways between the two variables, and (ii) the 
political institutions of interest to the thesis.  
The linkages between political institutions and levels of corruption have 
been studied to a certain extent. Recent comparative research has, however, 
for the most part been quantitative. Although pathways between the 
variables often are alluded to or discussed briefly, little systematic, in depth 
research exists with regards to the mechanisms through which political 
institutions affect levels of corruption. This is particularly the case when it 
comes to how the political institutions in a given national context affect the 
prevalence of corruption.288 
Much of existing research has focused on political institutions such as the 
executive, the legislature, electoral rules, the vertical division of power 
within the state, the bureaucracy, and anti-corruption commissions, as can 
be seen from table 2. 
  
                                                 
 
288 Exceptions exist, however. These include e.g. an analysis of exchanges between 
agents and corrupters in an Italian context, see della Porta, D. & Vannucci, A. (1999); 
and studies of corruption in a number of Swedish counties, see Andersson, S. 
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Table 2: Focus of earlier research  
Political Institutions Aspects studied 
The executive  
Presidentialism / Parliamentarism / Semi-
presidentialism 
The legislature 
Male / Female representation 
Unicameralism / Bicameralism 
Electoral systems 
Open / Closed proportional representation (PR) 
Interaction between electoral rules and district 
magnitude 
Vertical distribution of power 
Federalism / Unitarism 
Centralization /Decentralization 
The bureaucracy  
Size of the public sector 
Wages 
Anti-corruption commissions 
Mandate 
Independence 
Legal context 
Some of the findings of scholarly research into the linkages between political 
institutions and corruption are rendered below.  
3.2.3.1 Executives 
Parliamentary systems and corruption 
Parliamentary systems are often, but not always, associated with lower 
levels of corruption. Gerring and Thacker, find that parliamentarism reduces 
levels of corruption and argue that this is due to the fact that parliamenta-
rism centralizes political power.289 The authors explore a number of causal 
pathways between (i) political institutions which foster centralization and 
(ii) levels of corruption. They find that these institutions are characterized 
by a number of traits likely to counteract corruption. These traits include (i) 
abstract standards and universalistic norms, i.e. broad rules that apply to all 
actors and which cannot be remodelled according to taste, (ii) focus on a 
national constituency and issues of national importance, something that 
renders the polity “less susceptible to special interests and personalistic 
pressures”290, (iii) strong parties at the national level, the argument being 
that partisanship can be linked to an avowed public obligation rather than 
individual interests, (iv) fewer veto points, which reduces the possibilities 
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for corrupt actors to block processes and decisions, and (v) fewer collective 
action problems since political power is concentrated “in the hands of 
national party leaders and central government bureaucrats”291. According to 
Gerring and Thacker parliamentarism thus affects levels of corruption 
“through multiple channels”292.  
Also Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares find that parliamentarian systems 
reduce levels of corruption.293 The authors are not explicit with regards to 
the pathways through which parliamentarism does so, however. They rather 
speak in general terms about political institutions which promote (i) 
political competition, (ii) checks and balances and (iii) transparency as 
contributing to improved accountability and thus reduced levels of 
corruption.294  
Shugart, finally, finds that parliamentary systems engender strong parties 
which force politicians to “subordinate their pursuits to the party’s broader 
interests”295. As a consequence, Shugart argues, politicians are more likely to 
“provide policies aimed at broad national constituencies rather than at 
particularistic sectoral or regional constituencies”296, which reduces ten-
dencies towards pork barrelling297. This said, Shugart does not regard par-
liamentarism as a panacea against particularism and corruption. Instead, he 
stresses that parliamentarism does not always engender parties which focus 
on a national constituency. According to him, large countries characterized 
by great regional disparities or income inequality may in fact be characte-
rized by weak parties, focused on more limited constituencies. In such 
countries, Shugart argues, presidentialism may be the key to curbing pork 
barrel politics and corruption since presidentialism is characterized by a 
president with “strong reactive and sometimes proactive powers through 
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which particularistic tendencies of a fragmented legislature can be partially 
counteracted”298.  
Presidential systems and corruption 
What does earlier research say regarding the relationships between 
presidentialism and corruption, or pathways between the two? In a study 
focusing on the causes of corruption, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman regard 
presidential regimes as more prone to corruption than parliamentarian 
regimes. They see this as a function of centralized control and poor 
opportunities for monitoring. More precisely, they stress that a president 
who controls the executive branch faces an abundance of possibilities to 
engage in activities for personal gain, and is more able to act upon these 
possibilities since monitoring of the executive by the legislature is more 
difficult than in a parliamentarian system.299 Given their conclusion that 
closed list electoral systems are likely to engender increased levels of 
corruption, they state that presidentialism combined with closed lists should 
be an unfortunate combination when trying to curb corruption. This is 
tested and confirmed through statistical analyses.300 
As already mentioned, Shugart highlights the importance of analysing the 
country context (and issues such as inequality and regional disparities in 
terms of development) when determining how best to counteract pork 
barrel, patronage and corruption.301 He stresses that presidentialism may be 
the best option for countries characterized by parties which do not focus on 
a national constituency, especially if the country in question faces problems 
such as the uneven distribution of wealth and development.302 
Some researchers, including Kaufmann et al., caution against hasty 
conclusions with regards to the relationship between presidentialism and 
corruption, however.303  
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Semi-presidential systems and corruption 
Linkages between semi-presidential systems and corruption have not been 
studied to the same extent as those between parliamentarian and 
presidential systems, on the one hand, and corruption, on the other. Jung-
Hsiang, however, points to a positive relationship between the two 
variables, something that the author attributes to the legislative powers of 
the president.304 
Table 3: Sample of research into the linkages between executives and 
corruption 
Institution Authors Effect on corruption detected 
Parliamentarism  
Gerring &Thacker ? 
Lederman, Loayza & Reis 
Soares ? 
Shugart 
? in systems with strong 
parties focused a national 
constituency 
Presidentialism 
Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman 
presidential systems + closed 
list proportional 
representation ? 
Shugart 
? in countries with weak 
parties + regional disparities 
+ inequality 
Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-
Lobatón ? (plausibly) 
Semi-
presidentialism 
Jung-Hsiang ? 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
3.2.3.2 Legislatures 
Female representation 
Swamy, Knack, Lee and Azfar study the relationship between gender and 
corruption. They operationalize gender in a number of ways including the 
proportion of women in Parliament and the proportion of women in senior 
positions within the bureaucracy, and find that the greater the percentage of 
both, the less corruption, and find women to be engaged in corruption to a 
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lesser extent than men.305 Although not explicitly focusing on causal 
pathways between gender and levels of corruption, the authors speculate 
that the relationship may be linked to differences in terms of socialization, 
access to network of corruption, or knowledge of how to engage in corrupt 
activities.306 
Bicameralism 
Testa examines the impact of bicameralism on levels of corruption among 
elected officials. She finds that the effects of bicameralism on levels of 
corruption depend on the division of power between chambers as well as 
the polarization of the elections. More specifically, the author maintains that 
bicameralism increases the cost of “buying” legislators, thus reducing levels 
of corruption. This does not, however, apply across the board. According to 
Testa, bicameralism only has this effect on levels of corruption when the 
“same party controls the two chambers and party polarization is high”307. 
Bicameralism has the opposite effect, however, “if the two chambers are 
controlled by different parties”308. Testa also maintains that amendment 
rights on the part of the second chamber have a negative effect on levels of 
corruption.  
Table 4: Sample of research into the linkages between legislatures and 
corruption 
Institution Authors Effect on corruption detected 
Female 
representation 
Swamy, Knack, Lee & 
Azfar ? 
Bicameralism 
Testa 
 
? if high party polarization + the 
same party controls both 
chambers + amendment rights 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
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3.2.3.3 Electoral systems  
Open / closed lists and corruption 
A number of scholars have studied the linkages between open or closed 
proportional representation (PR), on the one hand, and corruption, on the 
other. Their results are, however, at times contradictory.  
Chang takes an interest in electoral systems with open-list PR, arguing that 
candidates in these face greater uncertainty with regards to the electoral 
outcome as well as increased pressure to amass personal votes due to intra-
party competition. As a result, he argues, candidates are in a dire need of 
resources to finance their campaigns, which in turn increases the risk of 
candidates engaging in corrupt activities. Chang finds support for his 
hypothesis through statistical analyses, which also show that the 
relationship between uncertainty and levels of corruption may in fact be U-
shaped, i.e. those engaging in corrupt activities being either very uncertain 
or very certain about their chances for re-election.309 Whereas intra-party 
competition has an increasing effect on levels of corruption, Chang finds that 
inter-party competition serves to discipline candidates. As a result, 
corruption becomes less prevalent.310 Chang thereby overthrows the view 
that electoral competition in any shape and form serves to reduce levels of 
corruption. Instead, he shows that the very type of electoral competition 
matters when it comes to whether a candidate is likely to engage in corrupt 
acts or not.311  
This is in line with Carey and Shugart, who link electoral systems which 
force candidates to cultivate a personal rather than a party reputation to 
increases in terms of pork barrel and corruption.312 According to the 
authors, the value of a personal reputation tends to be high in systems with 
intra-party competition, and increases as district magnitude increases. The 
degree of intra-party competition, in turn, remains a functions of the extent 
to which (i) party leaders have control over access to the ballot and are able 
to rank candidates, (ii) candidates are elected on individual votes indepen-
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dent of co-partisans, and (iii) “voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of 
multiple votes or part-level votes”313.  
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi maintain that the “details of electoral rules 
have a strong influence on political corruption”314. They find that systems 
with party lists exhibit higher levels of corruption, whereas systems where 
voters vote for individual candidates exhibit lower levels of corruption. This 
is due to the fact that the latter create a more “direct link between individual 
performance and reappointment”315, as a result of which representatives 
have an incentive to deliver and behave well. Under party lists, however, 
election outcomes depend on a candidate’s ranking on the list rather than 
his/her performance.316  
In a study focusing on the causes of corruption, Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman study (i) the opportunities for private gain, (ii) the incentives to 
engage in monitoring as well as (iii) the ability to monitor under different 
electoral systems. They come to the conclusion that the opportunities for 
incumbents to engage in activities for personal benefit are the greatest 
under plurality rule. In electoral systems characterized by closed list 
proportional representation, however, “opportunities for rent extraction are 
vested mainly with party leaders”317. Incentives and ability to monitor 
incumbents are, however, also found to be the strongest in systems based on 
plurality rule. As a result, the authors conclude that plurality rule should be 
most conducive towards stemming corruption.318 Statistical tests show that 
proportional representation in general and combined with presidentialism 
in particular, contribute towards increases in terms of corruption.319 
Rose-Ackerman takes an interest in the linkages between constitutional 
structures and their effect on (i) the provision of public goods and (ii) 
avoidance of corruption. She regards parliamentarian systems with party-
centred proportional representation and Westminster parliamentary sys-
tems as most able to avoid corruption. According to Rose-Ackerman, the 
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former are able to curb corruption due to the fact that politicians have the 
incentives to provide broad-based public goods. She stresses, however, that 
systems with party-centred PR lack local accountability, which may be a 
problem if party leaders are corrupt.320 Westminster parliamentary systems, 
on the other hand, are able to reduce levels of corruption if they produce 
two parties alternating in power. As a result, the need to form coalitions 
(and thus the extortionary power of third parties) is reduced.321  
Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares, however, find no significant correlation 
between closed lists and corruption.322 Manow also claims that the 
relationship between party lists and corruption (claimed by Persson et al.) 
“breaks down (with respect to significance and magnitude) when restricting 
the sample to more mature democracies or countries with a high level of 
political freedom”323.  
Interaction between electoral formula and district magnitude 
A number of scholars also find interaction effects between district 
magnitude and the electoral formula. Persson, Tabellini & Trebbi find that 
large voting districts contribute towards decreased levels of corruption, 
whereas smaller voting districts contribute towards increased levels of 
corruption. This, according to the authors, is due to the fact that, in a large 
district, “an honest candidate is always available, for all ideological 
positions”324. In a small district, however, voters do not have as much choice 
and may prioritize policy over honesty, which is why dishonest candidates 
may be re-elected. As stated above, they also find that systems with party 
lists exhibit higher levels of corruption, whereas systems where voters vote 
for individual candidates exhibit lower levels of corruption. Persson et al. 
therefore maintain that institution-builders who worry about corruption 
should opt for open-list PR as well as larger districts. The authors highlight, 
however, that electoral systems often tend to combine party lists with large 
district magnitude or plurality with small districts, which is why changing 
from the former to the latter or vice versa will not make a great difference in 
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terms of prevalence of corruption.325 This said, Persson et al. acknowledge 
that single features of the electoral system only provide partial answers and 
that the comprehensive design of the electoral system should be evaluated 
when discussing outcomes in terms of corruption.326 
The interaction between voting rules and district magnitude is also studied 
by Chang and Golden, who maintain that closed lists affect levels of 
corruption differently in countries with large voting districts and countries 
with small voting districts. Directly contrary to Persson et al., they maintain 
that systems which employ closed-list PR face lesser corruption problems as 
district magnitude increases, whereas systems employing open-list PR face 
greater corruption problems as district magnitude increases.327 Chang and 
Golden see this as a function of closed-list PR forcing politicians to take the 
reputation of the party as a whole into consideration.328 Furthermore, Chang 
and Golden identify a cut-off point of 15 in terms of district magnitude, 
where corruption becomes greater in systems with open-list PR than in 
systems with close-list PR. As a result, corruption is found to be greater in 
systems with open-list PR once district magnitude goes beyond 15, and 
higher in systems with closed-list PR when district magnitude remains 
under 15.  
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Table 5: Sample of research into the linkages between electoral rules and 
corruption  
Institution Authors Effect on corruption detected 
Open / closed 
lists 
Chang  
 Open list PR ? 
Carey & Shugart open lists ? 
Persson, Tabellini & 
Trebbi  Party lists ? 
Kunicová & Rose-
Ackerman  PR + presidentialism ? plurality ? 
Rose-Ackerman 
Party lists + parliamentarism ? 
Westminster parliamentarism ? if 
two parties alternate in power 
Lederman, Loayza & Reis 
Soares 
none 
Manow none 
Interaction 
between 
district 
magnitude 
and electoral 
rules 
Persson, Tabellini & 
Trebbi 
open lists + large district 
magnitude ? 
 
party lists + small district 
magnitude ? 
Chang & Golden 
Closed lists + increasing voting 
districts ? 
open list PR + increasing districts ? 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
3.2.3.4 Vertical division of power 
Federal states and corruption 
Research into the linkages between federalism and levels of corruption also 
produces results which are far from unequivocal. Certain researchers, firstly, 
maintain that federalism contributes to higher levels of corruption. These 
include Treisman, Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, and Gerring & Thacker.  
Treisman, firstly, finds that federal states are more susceptible to corruption 
than unitary or decentralized unitary states. He speculates that this might be 
due to different autonomous levels of government competing when it comes 
to extracting bribes, something that results in ‘overgrazing’, but 
acknowledges that more research is needed to understand the complex 
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linkage between federalism and levels of corruption.329 The finding that 
federal states are more prone to corruption than others is also corroborated 
by Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman. Their study only includes federalism as a 
control variable, however, as a result of which pathways between federalism 
and corruption are not brought up for discussion.330 
Also Gerring and Thacker find that federal states (especially presidential 
ones) are more susceptible to corruption than other states.331 The authors 
link federalism with a fragmented elective branch and public service, 
something that leads to divided authority, mixed messaged, overlapping 
jurisdictions, red tape and overall chaos. Gerring and Thacker argue that 
“malfeasance is easily buried in [this] chaos”332, which explains why 
corruption should be more rife in federal states.333 They also regard 
federalism as more prone to intimate contacts and personalized relations 
and therefore contributing to increased levels of corruption.334  
Certain studies, secondly, maintain that federalism only can contribute to 
lower levels of corruption as long as certain basic conditions are met. 
According to Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares units within a federal 
system must be able to compete with each other: “competition [among 
agencies may drive] corruption to zero just as perfect competition among 
firms drives prices to marginal costs”335. This, however, only occurs 
provided that power is “decentralized into units which can substitute (and 
compete with) one another”336.  
Centralized unitary states and corruption 
Gerring and Thacker find that (centralized) unitarism contributes to 
corruption levels being reduced. They see this as a function of centralism 
and argue that institutions which foster centralism counteract corruption. 
Unitarism stems corruption through the same channels as parliamentarism, 
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333 Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. (2004, 324-325).  
334 Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. (2004, 320).  
335 Lederman, D., Loayza, N. & Reis Soares, R. (2001, 10).  
336 Lederman, D., Loayza, N. & Reis Soares, R. (2001, 10).  
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namely by (i) providing for abstract standards and universalistic norms (ii) 
primarily being concerned with a national constituency and issues of 
national importance, (iii) engendering strong parties at the national level, 
(iv) a reduction in the number of veto points, and (v) collective action prob-
lems being done away with due to the “internalization of externalities”.337 
Also Gerring, Thacker and Moreno find that unitarism reduces levels of 
corruption. In their article, they operationalize corruption in two ways, 
namely the World Bank control of corruption (CC) measure and the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) measure. The results are not, however, unambiguous in 
that unitary systems are found to be correlated with only one of the 
corruption measures, namely the PRS measure.338 The authors are reticent 
to speculate upon the causal pathways between unitarism and variables of 
good governance and point to the need for research into these.339 
Decentralized unitary states and corruption 
Linkages between decentralization and corruption have also received some 
scholarly attention. Banfield, firstly, suggests that that “decentralized 
political systems are more corruptible, because the potential corrupter 
needs to influence only a segment of the government, and because in a 
fragmented system there are few centralized forces and agencies to enforce 
honesty”340. Also Fan, Lin and Treisman associate decentralization with 
increased levels of corruption. They maintain, however, that this is the case 
especially in decentralized systems with multiple government and ad-
ministrative tiers due to the complexity of the system and rent-seeking 
becoming uncoordinated.341 
Schleifer and Vishny suggest that states with a very centralized institutional 
structure and those with a very decentralized structure may experience less 
corruption than states at an intermediate level of institutional 
centralization.342 The view that very decentralized structures are less prone 
                                                 
 
337 Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. (2004, 316-325).  
338 Gerring, J., Thacker, S.C. & Moreno, C. (2007, 25).  
339 Gerring, J., Thacker, S.C. & Moreno, C. (2007, 24).  
340 Quoted in Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, O-H. et al. (2000, 85).  
341 Fan, C.S, Lin, C, & Treisman, D. at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty 
/treisman/Papers/pol%20dec%20and%20corruption.pdf (07.12.2012). 
342 In Andvig, J.C., Fjeldstad, O-H. et al. (2000, 85).  
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to corruption is corroborated by Fisman and Gatti, who point to a need for 
research into pathways through which this occurs.343  
Bardhan and Mokherjee, finally, stress that decentralization cannot be re-
garded as a panacea when it comes to improving accountability and safe-
guarding against corruption. Instead, more research should be conducted 
with view to the mechanisms through which decentralization might mitigate 
problems of corruption. The authors stress that factors such as literacy and 
information campaigns to empower community members, or improved 
monitoring by civic associations, the media and other actors are of 
importance to the effort of ensuring that decentralization does not increase 
corruption levels.344  
Table 6: Sample of research into the linkages between vertical division of 
power and corruption 
Institution Authors 
Effect on corruption 
detected 
Federalism 
Treisman ? 
Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman ? 
Gerring & Thacker ? 
Lederman, Loayza & Reis 
Soares 
Federalism + competing 
units ?  
Centralized 
unitarism 
Gerring & Thacker ? 
Gerring, Thacker & Moreno ? 
Decentralized 
unitarism 
Banfield ? 
 
 Fan, Lin & Treisman ? if many government and 
administrative tiers 
 Schleifer & Vishny 
? in very centralized or very 
decentralized systems  
? in semi-decentralized 
systems 
 Fisman & Gatti ? 
 Bardhan & Mokherjee ? if citizens are empowered 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
                                                 
 
343 Fisman, R. & Gatti, R. (year unknown) at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc 
/download?doi=10.1.1.196.1379&rep=rep1&type=pdf (07.12.2012). 
344 Bardhan, P. & Mokherjee, D. (2005).  
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3.2.3.5 Bureaucracies 
Large state bureaucracy and corruption 
Little consensus exists with regards to whether down- or upsizing the public 
sector reduces levels of corruption. Research points to (i) a positive re-
lationship between public sector size and levels of corruption, as well as (ii) 
the complete absence of connections between the two.  
Scott, first of all, stresses that “the larger the relative size and scope of the 
public sector, the greater will be the proportion of [corrupt] acts”345. This 
implies that corruption can be reduced by decreasing the size and scope of 
government. He receives support from Goel & Nelson, who relate the size of 
the public sector to the supply of opportunities for corruption. Their results 
point to “government size, in particular spending by state governments, 
[having] a strong positive influence on corruption”346. Also Scully regards 
large bureaucracies as relatively bigger suppliers of opportunities for cor-
ruption. Scully, however, questions whether the relationship is completely 
linear.347  
Lapalombara maintains that “the very size and scope of governments in the 
twentieth century have generated a cornucopia of opportunities to fall into 
corrupt behavior"348. He maintains that corruption always has existed, but 
“not on the scale that becomes possible in an era of the regulatory-and-
welfare state”349. Scandinavia excluded, he finds a positive relationship 
between levels of public expenditure and corruption. A large government 
apparatus, he highlights, entails large numbers of bureaucrats with access to 
and control over funds as well as possibilities for deviant behaviour. 
Furthermore, oversight of the bureaucracy tends to be hampered in many 
countries, (i) given the weakness of the legislature and ombudsmen, as well 
as (ii) civil society institutions, trade unions, the media and academic 
institutions being dependent on the state.350 Also Meier & Holbrook find a 
                                                 
 
345 Scott quoted in Gerring, J. & Thacker, S.C. (2005, 238).  
346 Goel, R.K. & Nelson, M.A. (1998, 117). This study operationalizes corruption as 
the number of public officials convicted of abuse of public office.  
347 Quoted in Goel, R.K. & Nelson, M.A. (1998, 111).  
348 Lapalombara, J. (1994, 337-338).  
349 Lapalombara, J. (1994, 338).  
350 Lapalombara, J. (1994, 338).  
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relationship between the variables. They operationalize public sector size as 
the number of government employees and find a positive relationship 
between this variable and levels of corruption. This, the authors argue, is 
likely to be due to two factors, including (i) large governments providing 
more opportunities for corruption, but also (ii) large governments being 
characterized by inertia, which must be overcome through corruption.351 
A number of researchers, however, question whether public sector size has 
an effect on levels of corruption. Elliot, firstly, concludes that “types of 
government activities may be more important than the size of the 
budget”352. Gerring and Thacker, secondly, test whether smaller public 
sectors contribute towards less corruption than bigger ones and find “no 
consistent relationship between the aggregate size of the public sector and 
political corruption”353 despite operationalizing public sector size in five 
different ways. Also Husted, finally, tests the hypothesis whether greater 
government expenditure as a share of GDP contributes to higher levels of 
corruption and concludes that government size is not related to 
corruption.354 
Wages 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder study the linkages between salaries in the civil 
service and corruption, and find that increasing salaries decreases corrup-
tion levels. They stress, however, that a “rather large increase in wages is 
required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages”355.  
  
                                                 
 
351 Meier, K.J. & Holbrook, T.M. (1992, 146). The study operationalizes corruption as 
the number of public officials convicted for violating laws against public corruption. 
352 Elliot, K.A. (1997).  
353 Gerring, J. & Thacker, S.C. (2005, 233).  
354 Husted, B.W. (1999, 354).  
355 Van Rijckeghem, C. & Weder, B. (2000, 307).  
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Table 7: Sample of research into the linkages between aspects of the 
bureaucracy and corruption  
Institution Authors Effect on corruption detected 
Large public 
sector 
Scott ? 
Goel & Nelson ? 
Scully ? 
Lapalombara ? 
Meier & Holbrook ? 
Elliot none 
Gerring & Thacker none 
Husted none 
Increased wages Van Rijckegheim & Weder ? 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
3.2.3.6 Anti-corruption commissions 
Research into the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies shows that it has 
been mixed, at best.356 Doig, Watt and Williams stress that the creation of 
these institutions does not have to follow the pattern used in Hong Kong 
(commonly held as the model357) and that they should be allowed to develop 
their mandate and mature independently from their supporters (which 
oftentimes in a developing country context are the donors). As long as these 
conditions are not met, the authors stress, anti-corruption agencies cannot 
be successful.358  
De Maria studies anti-corruption agencies in an African context and 
concludes that they should diminish their corruption investigation roles and 
focus on anti-corruption education and prevention, thereby increasing their 
effectiveness. He stresses that these agencies and the entire “African anti-
corruption project [are] crafted offshore in social and economic contexts not 
sufficiently replicated in the African experience”359 and therefore do not 
function optimally.  
                                                 
 
356 Jennett, V. (2007).  
357 For instance when it comes to the mandate of the agency, including investigation, 
education and prevention. 
358 Doig, A., Watt, D. and William, R. (2006, 171).  
359 De Maria, B. at http://www.benafrica.org/downloads 
/demaria_africa_anticorrupt.pdf (27.05.2012). 
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Heilbrunn, finally, stresses that anti-corruption agencies, in order to be 
successful, must be independent and that their work must be supported by 
an adequate legal framework.  
Table 8: Sample of research into the linkages between the establishment of 
anti-corruption agencies and corruption 
Institution Authors 
Effect on corruption 
detected 
Establishment of anti-
corruption agencies 
Doig, Watt and Williams In their current form ?  
De Maria In their current form ? 
Heilbrunn If criteria are met ? 
? = reducing effect, = ? increasing effect 
3.2.4 Political institutions of interest to the thesis 
Much in line with previous research, the thesis at hand, takes an interest in 
the linkages between the executive, the electoral system, the bureaucracy 
and the vertical division of power, on the one hand, and corruption, on the 
other. This by no means ground-breaking approach is justified with the fact 
that the thesis at hand aims to build on existing research by systematically 
scrutinizing not only whether a relationship exists between the variables, 
but also the mechanisms through which institutions have a bearing on levels 
of corruption. This is done in the form of qualitative case studies, grounded 
in particular national contexts (see chapter 5). Such qualitative analyses are 
warranted since quantitative analyses of the relationship – as seen in the 
overview provided above – tend to provide contradictory results and since 
they shed little light on the fascinating interface between institutions and 
corruption.  
As can be seen from table 9, the thesis takes an interest in the parlia-
mentarian, presidential or semi-presidential nature of executives, as well as 
vertical division of power from the point of view of federalism, centralized 
unitarism or decentralized unitarism. Electoral systems are studied with 
regards to their candidate- or party-centredness, and bureaucracies with 
regards to their size.  
Presidentialism, parliamentarism, federalism, unitarism and the size of the 
public sector are included in the study due to the prominent role these insti-
tutional variables play in existing research and the significant relationships 
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uncovered between them and levels of corruption. Previous research also to 
a certain extent points to significant relationships between semi-
presidentialism and decentralized unitarism, on the one hand, and levels of 
corruption, on the other, wherefore these are included. The inclusion of 
candidate and party-centred electoral systems, finally, stems from research 
pointing to (i) the type of vote cast, and (ii) the influence of party leaders 
over candidates as having a bearing on levels of corruption (see table 5).  
 
Table 9: Potential institutional determinants of corruption, of interest to the 
study 360 
Political institutions Categorization 
The executive  
Presidentialism / Parliamentarism / Semi-
presidentialism 
Electoral systems  Candidate / Party-centred 
Vertical division of power Federal / Unitary / Decentralized Unitary  
The bureaucracy Size of the public sector 
As can be seen, the proposed set of institutional determinants does not 
include a number of institutions listed in table 2 or a number of other 
political institutions listed by Goldmann et al.361 On what grounds are these 
not included among the potential institutional determinants of corruption? 
Although some of them could be included as such, they are omitted because 
of the structure and the purpose of the research assignment at hand. The 
study, first of all, takes an interest in the national rather than the supra-
national level, which explains why supranational political and administra-
tive organizations are sidelined. Regional and local level authorities, 
secondly, are regarded as covered through the “vertical division of power”-
dimension, whereas legislatures – although excluded as separate inde-
pendent variables – are discussed as part of institutional lines of accounta-
bility inherent to the executive. Courts of law, anti-corruption agencies and 
the state auditor, finally, are excluded as potential determinants or indepen-
dent variables but analysed within the framework of the broader qualitative 
analysis.  
                                                 
 
360 For definitions, see appendix 1. 
361 See Goldmann, K., Pedersen, M.N. & Østerud, Ø. (red.) (1997, 98).  
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3.3 Solving problems of delegation through institution-building 
As can be seen from the discussion above, scholarly work points to 
significant relationships between a number of political institutions and 
levels of corruption. These relationships can and have been attributed to a 
number of pathways and mechanisms, such as particular institutions con-
tributing towards (i) facilitating / hampering monitoring and accountability, 
(ii) increasing / decreasing the number of veto points, (iii) producing 
stronger / weaker parties, (iv) increasing / decreasing inter- or intra-party 
competition, (v) increasing / decreasing opportunities for malfeasance, (vi) 
contributing towards localism, personalized relationships or increased dis-
cretion at the local level as opposed to universalistic norms, or (vii) clari-
fying / blurring lines of authority.362 
In the following, the interface between political institutions and corruption 
will be discussed, with a focus on the intervening factor of interest to this 
thesis, namely accountability. 
3.3.1 The importance of accountability  
The thesis at hand regards political institutions as entities capable of solving 
many of the problems arising through processes of delegation. As 
established in chapter 3.2.1, the thesis regards political institutions as “rules, 
compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals”363. As such, they structure the relationship 
between principals and agents in different ways, rendering corruption more 
or less practicable and attractive.  
In order to overcome principal-agent problems and minimize agency loss in 
the form of corruption, the principal must (i) reduce opportunities for 
corrupt behaviour by acquiring more and better information about the agent 
and his actions, and (ii) reduce incentives to engage in corruption by 
introducing sanctions (see figure 2). This, according to Schedler and Strøm, 
can be realized through political accountability, the guiding idea of which is 
to control power by bounding, restraining and disciplining it.364 The 
                                                 
 
362 See chapters 3 (under other determinants) and 3.2.3. 
363 Hall quoted in Bell, S. (2002, 2), see also Lane, J.E. (2008, 20).  
364 Strøm, K. (2003, 62); and Schedler, A. (1999, 18-19).  
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argument is thus, that political institutions can contribute towards 
containing corruption if they enhance accountability, see figure 7 below. 
Figure 7: Proposed pathways between political institutions and levels of 
corruption 
 
The linkage between political institutions, accountability and corruption has 
generated a fair amount of scholarly interest. A number of scholars 
subscribe to the very line of thinking of this thesis, namely that institutions 
which enhance accountability are likely to contribute towards lower levels 
of corruption. These include Lederman & al., firstly, who maintain that one 
of the channels through which political institutions affect corruption is that 
of political accountability, i.e. by making information available and 
encouraging punishment of corrupt individuals.365 Lederman & al.’s study is 
quantitative by nature and does not discuss the concept of accountability or 
its different components to a great extent. Neither is the study anchored in 
any particular country-context. Lindstedt and Naurin, secondly, study the 
linkages between transparency and corruption and conclude that trans-
parency in itself is not sufficient to counteract corruption. The authors 
suggest that institutional circumstances ensuring that (i) the information is 
reached by the principal(s) and (ii) principals have access to sanctions are 
needed in order for transparency to have a reducing effect on corruption. 
This argument, which brings accountability to the fore, is substantiated 
through quantitative analyses.366 Tavits, thirdly, argues that institutions 
                                                 
 
365 Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Reis Soares, R. (2001, 3).  
366 Furthermore, the authors distinguish between agent-controlled transparency 
(agents controlling the release of information) and non-agent-controlled 
transparency (non-agents, such as the press, controlling the release of information), 
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which allow for greater clarity of responsibility and thereby improve the 
ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians, exhibit lower levels of 
corruption.367 Finally, the relationship between accountability, on the one 
hand, and government performance and corruption, on the other, has been 
studied by Adserà, Boix and Payne. The authors operationalize accounta-
bility as democratic mechanisms of control (regular free and fair elections) 
and information (newspaper readership) and find that access to these 
enable citizens (as principals) to hold policy-makers (as agents) to account, 
which in turn reduces levels of corruption.368 Adserà et al. include 
institutions as control variables in some of their models but do not study 
accountability as a function of institutional design. The study also differs 
from the one at hand through its quantitative approach as well as the fact 
that it does not anchor the findings in a particular country context other 
than in passing.  
According to Schedler, the concept of accountability has two dimensions, 
namely (i) an informational and explanatory dimension and (ii) an enforce-
ment dimension.369 By the former, Schedler refers to the right of the princi-
pal to get adequate information, as well as the obligation of the agent to 
justify his actions vis-à-vis the principal. By the latter, Schedler refers to the 
possibility of principals to punish evil-doers. Strøm moves along the same 
lines when stipulating that accountability entails the right of the principal to 
(i) demand information, and (ii) impose sanctions when needed.370 Also 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, as well as Bergman et al., subscribe to the 
linkage between access to information and sanctions on the one hand, and 
reduced agency losses on the other. Whereas the former point out that “if 
detection and punishment are sufficiently likely, and the magnitude of the 
punishment sufficiently great, a non-complying action can be deterred”371, 
the latter state that an accountability mechanism is a “device by which a 
principal can get info and sanction the agent”372, see figure 8. 
                                                                                                                         
 
arguing that the latter seems to be less effective, see Lindstedt, C. & Naurin, D. 
(2010, 316).  
367 Tavits, M. (2007, 218).  
368 Adserà, A., Boix, C. & Payne, M. (2000, 3 and 41).  
369 Schedler, A. (1999, 14).  
370 Strøm, K. (2003, 62).  
371 McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987, 249).  
372 Bergman, T., Müller, W.C., Strøm, K. and Blomgren, M. (2003, 110). 
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Figure 8: Basics of accountability depicted 
 
How then, do these dimensions of the concept contribute towards over-
coming principal-agent problems? The problem of agents (due to 
asymmetric information) having the opportunity to engage in corrupt 
practices, firstly, is likely to be reduced since accountability gives the 
principal the right to ask for and receive, not just information about the 
character and the actions of the agent, but also justifications regarding the 
agent’s reasons for choosing to act in a certain manner. The problems of 
agents (due to divergent interests) having the incentive to engage in corrupt 
practices, secondly, are likely to be reduced given the principal’s right to 
sanction agents which deviate from their mandate (see figure 2).  
Given the line of argument above, adverse selection (the likelihood of 
selecting a corrupt agent) and moral hazard (the agent engaging in corrupt 
activities) should be reduced by ensuring that the principal (i) has sufficient 
and reliable information about the agent and his actions, and (ii) can use 
(the threat of) sanctions ex ante to deter or change the incentives of a 
potential agent, or ex post to punish transgressions.  
3.3.2 Accountability mechanisms 
As discussed above, accountability entails the right to demand information 
and justifications, and to sanction evil-doers. However, (i) acquiring the 
information to establish what the agent’s preferences are and what he or she 
is doing, and (ii) identifying the appropriate sanctions, are another thing 
altogether. A number of different strategies and techniques can be used to 
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acquire information about the agent. These techniques, (which, un-
fortunately, often are costly as well as inexact)373 are often called accounta-
bility mechanisms or control mechanisms since the guiding idea of ac-
countability is to control power.374 Within the framework of this paper, the 
former term will be used.  
Lupia, Strøm, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, and Kiewiet and McCubbins 
discuss such accountability mechanisms.375 All of the scholars – although 
more or less explicitly – differentiate between mechanisms available to hold 
the agent accountable before entering into the principal-agent relationship, 
so called ex ante mechanisms, and mechanisms to be employed after the fact, 
namely ex post mechanisms.  
The lines of reasoning as well as the accountability mechanisms listed by 
Strøm, Kiewiet and McCubbins, and Lupia differ little from one another. 
According to Lupia’s account, problems of adverse selection can be tackled 
using different kinds of ex ante (proactive) accountability mechanisms, 
whereas moral hazard problems can be tackled using ex post (reactive) 
mechanisms.376 How corruption could be reduced by introducing such 
mechanisms is depicted in figure 9 below.  
  
                                                 
 
373 McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987, 253).  
374 See e.g. McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987, 249); Strøm, K. 
(2003, 63); and Schedler, A. (1999, 18-19).  
375 Strøm, K. (2003, 63); Lupia, A. (2003, 44); McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & 
Weingast, B. R. (1987, 249); and Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 28-36). 
376 Lupia, A. (2003, 45).  
103 
 
Figure 9: Accountability mechanisms as solutions to principal-agent problems 
and agency loss in the form of corruption 
Given the importance attributed to accountability mechanisms aimed at 
solving principal-agent problems, an overview of such devices is of impor-
tance to the thesis.  
3.3.2.1 Ex ante accountability mechanisms  
Ex ante mechanisms refer to efforts aimed at (i) acquiring and sharing 
information about a potential agent before entering into the principal-agent 
relationship, as well as (ii) affecting the incentives of a potential agent 
through the threat of sanctions. These mechanisms, firstly, include the 
possibility of a “contract” between the principal and the agent, the aim being 
to rule out uncertainty, and align preferences. The contract may be explicit 
or implicit, strict (giving the agent little leeway) or loose (allowing him 
considerable freedom of action), and the details included differ from one 
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delegational relationship to another.377 It can include clauses aimed at risk-
sharing between the principal and the agent378, or specify rewards and 
sanctions (such as the risk of removal from office, or prosecution, should the 
agent deviate from the path outlined by the principal).379 Kiewiet & al., 
however, signal that sanctions may be a costly affair, and that rewards may 
backfire. Principals, therefore, always have to consider whether applying 
them is worth the effort.380  
Ex ante mechanisms also include undertaking what the authors call 
screening and selection to sort out suitable agents from unsuitable ones.381 
Here, screening refers to the investigative activities undertaken by the 
principal to establish whether an agent is suitable or not, whereas selection 
refers to activities undertaken by the agent to demonstrate his suitability 
and willingness to work in accordance with the wishes of the principal.382 
Kiewiet & McCubbins stress that all parties benefit from principals being 
able to “identify those individuals who possess the appropriate talents, skills 
or other personal characteristics prior to the establishment of the 
principal/agent relationship”383. Ex ante (proactive) mechanisms are there-
fore of great importance when trying to avoid agency losses more generally, 
and contain corruption more specifically. Acquiring requisite information 
without being able to observe the agent's performance is, however, likely to 
be a cumbersome task. Kiewiet & McCubbins stress that principals as well as 
agents have an incentive to embellish their character and misrepresent their 
level of competence and their preferences. The two therefore often have to 
rely on signals from the other actor rather than hard facts, and base their 
judgements on these.384 
                                                 
 
377 See, for instance, Brito Vieira, M. & Runciman, D. (2008, 66).  
378 Lane, J-E. (2008, 6).  
379 McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987, 249).  
380 Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 28).  
381 See, for instance, Strøm, K. (2003, 63).  
382 Strøm, K. (2003, 63).  
383 Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 30).  
384 Such signals include general appearance, apparent enthusiasm for the job etc. 
and often end up saying little about the suitability of a candidate, see Kiewiet, D. R. & 
McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 30).  
105 
 
3.3.2.2 Ex post accountability mechanisms 
Ex post mechanisms refer to after the fact efforts at gathering information to 
establish whether transgressions have occurred and sanctions are needed. 
These mechanisms, first of all, include reporting by the agent, which 
according to Kiewiet and McCubbins logically would be the easiest way to 
avoid agency problems. The authors remind us, however, that such 
accountability devices are difficult to manage since the information ema-
nating from the agent risks being untruthful, too meagre or too abundant. 
There's also the imminent risk of agents putting more effort into reporting 
than into the work itself.385 
Subjective information emanating from the agent, therefore, has to be 
supplemented by information gathered by other means and from other 
sources. These include direct and more or less constant monitoring by the 
principal (also called “police patrols”386 oversight), which may take the form 
of e.g. evaluations, audits and investigations, or more ad hoc monitoring by 
outsiders who come into contact with the agent in question and who may 
report irregularities to the principal (also called “fire alarm”387 oversight). Ex 
post mechanisms also include institutional checks by another agent, who has 
the mandate to veto the actions of the agent of interest.  
Sanctions, as already stated, form an integral part of holding actors 
accountable. Ex ante mechanisms, on the one hand, are linked to sanctions in 
that they may specify the consequences of misuse of power, with the aim of 
changing the incentives of the agent before the establishment of the 
principal-agent relationship. Sanctions can also be used ex ante by the 
principal to keep potentially corrupt agents from entering the P/A relation-
ship. Ex post mechanisms, on the other hand, are linked to sanctions in that 
unwanted behaviour, when detected, can be punished. According to Stuart, 
sanctions differ in terms of their level of coerciveness.388 The least coercive 
sanctions may involve the mere threat of public disclosure, whereas the 
most coercive ones may involve criminal prosecution and conviction (see 
figure 10).  
                                                 
 
385 Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 32).  
386 See e.g. Lupia, A. (2003, 49); or Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 33).  
387 Strøm, K. (2003, 63).  
388 Stuart quoted in Klitgaard, R. (1988, 81).  
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Figure 10: Typology of sanctions (based on Stuart) 
 
Between these extremes, variants such as the corrupt agent being fired, 
facing fines or deteriorated job prospects can be found. Klitgaard empha-
sizes that very often corrupt officials tend to lose their job.389  
Bergman et al. provide another perspective on sanctions available to punish 
corrupt individuals. According to them, the principal has at his disposal 
three types of sanctions: “(a) blocking or amending decisions made by the 
agent (veto power), (b) deauthorizing the agent (remove him from office or 
curtail his authority), and (c) imposing specific (monetary or other) 
penalties on the agent”390. The very sanctions provided for by the political 
institutions of interest to this thesis will be analysed within the framework 
of the country-specific analyses, see chapter 5. 
As can be seen from the discussion above, principals have at their disposal a 
wide array of tools aimed at increasing insight into the character and actions 
of the agent as well as altering his incentives. Some of the tools are costly to 
use, however, and most provide approximate information at best. When 
choosing accountability mechanisms, the principal therefore has to weigh 
his options, deciding how much time, money and effort he is willing to 
expend to reduce agency losses. He may also have to change his approach 
from time to time since agents are likely to discover ways of circumventing 
his attempts to control them.391  
  
                                                 
 
389 Klitgaard, R. (1988, 78).  
390 Bergman, T., Müller, W.C., Strøm, K. and Blomgren, M. (2003, 110).  
391 Kiewiet, D. R. & McCubbins, M. D. (1991, 35).  
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3.3.3 Accounting parties 
Due to the wide array of power structures established by the political insti-
tutions of interest, as well as the varying nature of the different accounta-
bility mechanisms, a multitude of actors are engaged in holding those in 
power accountable. Some of these actors are able to hold agents to account 
more directly whereas others do so more from the sidelines. These accoun-
ting parties will be discussed in more detail within the framework of the 
country-specific analyses.  
The accountability-holders or accounting parties of interest to this study can 
be categorized in accordance with Schedler, O’Donnell, Diamond, Schmitter 
and Sklar, who distinguish between actors undertaking vertical and 
horizontal accountability.392 Vertical accountability, Schedler, Diamond and 
Sklar emphasize, is exercised by non-state actors such as citizens, non-
governmental organizations and the mass media, i.e. to a certain extent 
those affected by the decisions made by office-holders.393 Horizontal 
accountability, on the other hand, is exercised by state or semi-state agents, 
independent of the accountable party. These include the three branches of 
government (the legislature, the executive and the judiciary) as well as 
institutions such as Ombudspersons, Electoral Commissions, Human Rights 
Commissions, and Central Banks etc.394 The mandates of these accounting 
parties naturally vary. Some are empowered to use sanctions, whereas 
others only have a mandate to request information and/or justification.395  
  
                                                 
 
392 See Diamond, L. et al. (1999, 3); Schedler, A. (1999, 23); O’Donnell, G. (1999, 38); 
Sklar, R.L. (1999, 53): and Schmitter, P.C. (1999, 60). 
393 See Diamond, L. et al. (1999, 3); Schedler, A. (1999, 25); and Sklar, R.L. (1999, 
53).  
394 See Diamond, L. et al. (1999, 3); Schedler, A. (1999, 25); O’Donnell, G. (1999, 39); 
Sklar, R.L. (1999, 56); and Schmitter, P.C. (1999, 60).  
395 Schedler, A. (1999, 18).  
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4 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE LINKAGES BETWEEN POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND CORRUPTION 
 
Political institutions have been introduced as having a bearing on levels of 
corruption, an argument that should be examined closer. In the following, 
therefore, the relationship is analysed using statistical method, namely 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis is 
considered to be a suitable method given the intention to study the effect of 
a number of institutional (and other) independent variables on a single de-
pendent variable (corruption).396 More precisely, multiple regression ana-
lysis allows for a study of (i) the total effect of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable, (ii) the effect of individual independent variables in 
separation from one another, and (through the hierarchical model) (iii) the 
relative importance of the institutional variables as opposed to the control 
variables. Before proceeding to the statistical analysis itself, however, the 
corner stones of the analysis as well as its solidity are discussed.  
4.1 The corner stones of the analysis  
4.1.1 Countries included 
The underlying assumption of this dissertation is that political institutions 
are more than mere façades and that they, in so being, play an actual role in 
shaping values and behaviour. Such political institutions can be expected to 
exist primarily in democratic countries397, as a consequence of which the 
study focuses on these exclusively. Why are political institutions (as rules, 
                                                 
 
396 Allison, P. D. (1999, 1-2).  
397 Karvonen, L. (2003, 16).  
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procedures and operating practices) more likely to have a bearing on 
behaviour in democratic states than in other types of regimes? The thesis 
argues that non-democratic states, firstly, often exhibit political institutions 
(rules and procedures) which do not apply in practice, which also means 
that they do not influence the behaviour of actors. When more than mere 
façades, secondly, these rules and procedures tend to influence the few only, 
since broad-based participation has not (yet) been ensured. Also, thirdly, in 
a non-democratic state these same rules can be altered arbitrarily and ad 
hoc by those in power wherefore their effects may not be consistent. 
Fourthly, democratic states with their emphasis on elections, the rule of law 
and the constitutional state, ensure that those who refuse to follow the 
procedures or abide by the rules can be held to account, which also means 
that these same rules and procedures do not remain mere empty boxes.  
Democratic countries are identified using Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World categorization of countries as free, partly free or not free.398 Countries 
which have belonged to the first-mentioned category during the period of 
interest (2000-2005) as well as one year prior to the year in which political 
institutions are recorded are included in the study.399 A number of articles 
studying the causes of corruption have used the Freedom in the World Index 
for this purpose.400 Few of the studies, however, acknowledge the fact that 
levels of corruption are taken into consideration within one of the sub-
components of the index. Given that levels of corruption only constituted a 
                                                 
 
398 See Karatnycky, A. (ed.) (2001).  
399 A number of countries (including the Dominican Republic, India, Thailand and El 
Salvador) meet these criteria, but have entered the category of “free countries” only 
2-3 years prior to the period of interest to the thesis. This may affect the efficiency 
of institutions, something that the thesis makes note of by conducting separate 
regression analyses (i) excluding these four countries, and (ii) including only 
countries which have been democratic for more than ten years. These analyses do 
not exhibit results which are radically distinct from those of the main analysis (see 
chapter 4.3) but rather a slight weakening of the explanatory power of the variables 
for federalism and party-centredness.  
400 See e.g. Chang, E. & Golden, M. at http://www.golden.polisci.ucla.edu 
/recent_papers/elec_systems_05_04.pdf (7.12.2012); Kunicová J. & Rose-Ackerman, 
S. (2005, 591); or Tavits, M. (2007, 222).  
111 
 
minor issue in the overall index for the year 2000, the index is, nevertheless, 
deemed suitable for the purposes of the study.401  
The study further only includes democracies which, during the time frame of 
interest, have exhibited stable executives, electoral systems, vertical division 
of power, and bureaucracies. Stable in this context refers to countries not 
having crossed the borders between institutional categories, for instance by 
moving from a candidate-centred electoral system to a party-centred one. 
Countries exhibiting such changes during the period of interest or one year 
before institutions are recorded, have been excluded from the analysis. 
Countries exhibiting stable political institutions in line with the criteria 
listed above have been identified using data from Statistics Finland as well 
as the Comparative Data Set of Political Institutions (CDSPI), produced by 
Åbo Akademi University.402 
Given the criteria listed above, 62 countries qualify for inclusion in the 
statistical analysis. These appear in appendix 2. Some of the analyses include 
fewer countries, however, mainly due to missing values. This results in the 
analysis at times including between 40 and 50 countries only, something 
that has to be taken into account when interpreting the results.  
4.1.2 Variables 
4.1.2.1 Institutional variables 
The independent variables of the study include institutional as well as 
control variables. As mentioned above, the study takes an interest in politi-
cal institutions such as executives, electoral systems, the vertical distri-
bution of power and bureaucracies. These are operationalized based on 
previous research and access to data. Executives are divided into 
parliamentarian, presidential and semi-presidential, whereas the vertical 
                                                 
 
401 In the index for 2000, corruption was included in 1/14 questions on the civil 
liberties checklist and 1/22 questions of the overall index, see Karatnycky, A. (ed.) 
(2001).  
402 Public sector expenditure data is used to operationalize the size of the 
bureaucracy, see Statistics Finland at http://tilastokeskus.fi/index_en.html 
(16.10.2008); and Lundell, K. & Karvonen, L. (2003).  
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distribution of power is operationalized as states being federal, centralized 
unitary or decentralized unitary. Electoral systems are studied with regards 
to their candidate- or party-centeredness, and bureaucracies with regards to 
their size.  
Data on electoral systems, executives, and the vertical division of power 
within states, originates from the Comparative Data Set of Political Insti-
tutions (CDSPI)403, whereas data on the bureaucracy originates from Statis-
tics Finland.404 The former three constitute categorical variables, whereas 
the last-mentioned is a continuous variable. In order to be able to include 
the categorical variables in the regression analysis, institutional dummy 
variables are created.405 Information about the included variables is found in 
table 10. 
  
                                                 
 
403 Lundell, K. & Karvonen, L. (2003).  
404 Public sector expenditure data used to operationalize the size of the bureaucracy, 
see Statistics Finland at http://tilastokeskus.fi/index_en.html (16.10.2007).  
405 Including all dummies belonging to the same category will, however, result in a 
situation of extreme multicollinearity, wherefore at least one dummy from each 
category must be excluded from any given analysis, see Allison, P. D. (1999, 29).  
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Table 10: Description of institutional independent variables 
  
Type of 
variable 
Categories /  
operationali-
zation 
Values 
406 
Year 
recorded 
Source 
Executive Categorical Parliamentarism 0-1 2000 CDSPI 
  
Semi-
Presidentialism 
0-1 2000 CDSPI 
Presidentialism 0-1 2000 CDSPI 
Electoral 
system 
Categorical 
Candidate-
centred 
0-1 2000 CDSPI 
    Party-centred 0-1 2000 CDSPI 
Vertical 
division of 
power 
Categorical Federal state 0-1 2000 CDSPI 
  
Decentralized 
unitary state 
0-1 2000 CDSPI 
  
Centralised 
unitary state 
0-1 2000 CDSPI 
Bureaucracy Continuous 
Public sector 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
13.3-
57.1 
2000  SF 
Abbreviations: CDSPI – Comparative Data Set of Political Institutions, SF – Statistics 
Finland 
4.1.2.2 Control variables 
Based on theory, a number of control variables are considered for inclusion 
in the analysis. Research, first of all, points to a strong, reducing relationship 
between wealth, democracy and Protestantism, on the one hand, and levels 
of corruption on the other.407 These variables, operationalized in different 
ways, therefore form part of the greater part of scholarly quantitative 
analyses. They are also included in the analysis at hand, given that bivariate 
regression analyses confirm their significant effect on levels of corruption.408 
                                                 
 
406 Only values for the cases included in the study are reflected in the table. 
407 See e.g. Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. (2004); Kunicová, J. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001); 
Kunicová J. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005); Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Reis Soares, R. 
(2001); Persson, T., Tabellini, G & Trebbi, F. (2003); Tavits, M. (2007); Swamy, A., 
Knack, S., Lee, Y. & Azfar, O. (2001); and Treisman, D. (2000).  
408 The bivariate regression analysis indicates that Protestantism and GDP/capita 
(ln) are positively correlated with the corruption variable (indicating that they 
contribute to lower levels of corruption), whereas democracy is negatively related 
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Within the scope of this piece of research, wealth is operationalized as 
GDP/capita (ln)409, Protestantism as the share (%) of the population being 
Protestant, and democracy as the values for political rights and civil liberties 
from the Freedom in the World Index410.  
The continuous control variable for democracy is added despite the fact that 
only democracies are included in the study, the aim being to study (i) the 
very nature of political institutions, and (ii) the democratic context in which 
they exist, separately.411 This is warranted (i) given that a number of studies 
point to a relationship between levels of democracy and levels of corrup-
tion412, and (ii) to ensure that the political institutions of interest have an 
effect independent of that of their democratic context. In line with the 
discussion in chapter 3, the thesis expects levels of democracy as well as the 
political institutions (set within a democratic context) to have a bearing on 
levels of corruption. If departing from a description of liberal democracy 
provided by Diamond413, democracy – firstly – should affect levels of corrup-
                                                                                                                         
 
to corruption (also indicating that the variable contributes to lower levels of 
corruption), p < 0.01.  
409 In line with the articles listed above, the analysis employs the logarithmic value, 
which also exhibits a higher standardized coefficient (B) than the non-logarithmic 
value.  
410 The variable is constructed as follows: (Value for Political Rights + Value for Civil 
liberties). Previous research has operationalized democracy as mere political rights 
or civil liberties scores, averaged Freedom in the World (PR or CL) scores over time 
as well as years of uninterrupted democracy (democratic history). When included in 
the quantitative analysis at hand, however, democratic history exhibits less 
explanatory power (lower standardized coefficients, B) than the Freedom in the 
World value, wherefore the latter is selected. 
411 Regression analyses show that adding the continuous democracy variable as a 
control does not alter the R2 or p-values of the overall model, or the unstandardized 
coefficients (B) or p-values of the individual institutional variables a great deal.  
412 See e.g. Adserà, A., Boix, C. & Payne, M. (2000, 53); Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and 
Reis Soares, R. (2001, 26); and Tavits, M. (2007, 227).  
413 Diamond emphasizes the fact that (i) elected officials have control over the state, 
(ii) executive power is constrained, (iii) electoral outcomes are uncertain and 
groups are allowed to freely contest elections, (iv) minority groups are allowed to 
express their interests and practice their culture, (v) citizens have channels through 
which they can express their interests and values beyond parties and elections, (vi) 
information is accessible, (vii) freedom of belief, opinion, speech, assembly etc. 
prevail, (viii) citizens are politically equal under the law, (ix) liberties are protected 
by an independent and non-discriminatory judiciary, and (x) the rule of law 
prevails. Furthermore, Diamond emphasizes the importance of the Rechtsstaat or 
constitutional state, see Diamond (1999, 11-12).  
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tion e.g. through its repudiation of monopoly powers, and its emphasis on 
accountability, competitive elections, access to information, the rule of law, 
freedom of speech, and participation. Political institutions, secondly, should 
contribute towards safeguarding against corruption by providing rules and 
procedures outlining and specifying how, more precisely, actors may hold 
actors to account, participate, restrain etc.  
Some research also points to a strong relationship between British colonial 
heritage and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on the one hand, and corruption, 
on the other.414 These control variables are not, however, included in the 
present analysis since bivariate regression analyses do not confirm these 
relationships.415 More information on the included control variables can be 
found in table 11. 
Table 11: Description of control variables 
  
Type of 
variable 
Categories /  
operationalization 
Values 
Year 
recorded 
Source 
Democracy 
Ordered 
categorical 
FH (Political Rights 
+ Civil Liberties) 
2-5 416 2000 FH 
Wealth Continuous 
GDP/capita 
(logarithmic value) 
USD 
6.67 -
10.43 
1995 QOG 
Protestants Continuous 
% of Protestants / 
entire population 
0-97.8 2000 QOG 
Abbreviations: FH – Freedom House (Freedom in the World), QOG – Quality of 
Governance Database (non-logarithmic value) 
                                                 
 
414 See e.g. Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Reis Soares, R. (2001); Kunicová, J. & Rose-
Ackerman, S. (2001); Kunicová J. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005); Swamy, A., Knack, S., 
Lee, Y. & Azfar, O. (2001); and Treisman, D. (2000).  
415 In the bivariate analysis, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is operationalized as 
“total fragmentation”, i.e. ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation, and British 
colonial heritage as a dummy variable where the value 1 indicates that the country 
at some point in its history has been a British colony. 
416 The original variable ranges from 2-14, with low values indicating higher levels 
of democracy. Since only democracies are included in the study, however, the actual 
values range from 2-5. 
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4.1.2.3 Dependent variable 
The study looks at the effects of political institutions on corruption. As 
already discussed in chapter 2.2.2.3, the quantitative analyses are conducted 
using the control of corruption (CC) component of the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI) as the dependent variable. The variable has already 
been discussed at length (see chapter 2.2.2). Some further information about 
the variable is, however, found in table 12.  
Table 12: Description of the dependent variable 
 
Type of 
variable 
Categories /  
operationalization 
Values 
Year 
recorded 
Source 
Corruption Continuous 
Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators 
(corruption com-
ponent) 
1.841-
4.993 417 
2005 WB 
Abbreviations: WB – World Bank (WGI) (scale changed from a -2.5 to +2.5 scale to a 0-5 
scale) 
4.2 The solidity of the analysis 
When conducting regression analyses certain issues must be considered and 
assumptions met in order for the results to be reliable and correct. These 
include, among others, the normality assumption being respected (the distri-
bution of residuals being normal at each value of the dependent variable), 
the absence of heteroscedasticity (i.e. the heterogeneous variance of resi-
duals), the linearity assumption being respected, the absence of auto-corre-
lation (dependence between cases), and independent variables not being too 
strongly correlated (multicollinearity).418 These issues and assumptions are 
discussed below, before proceeding to the analysis itself. 
  
                                                 
 
417 High values indicate low levels of corruption, and vice versa.  
418 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 85-109 and 113-135), see also UCLA Institute for 
Digital Research and Education at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/webbooks 
/reg/chapter2/spssreg2.htm (04.05.2012). 
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4.2.1 The normality assumption 
Potential violations of the normality assumption are first examined. Accor-
ding to Miles and Shevlin, outliers may constitute a source of non-normality, 
wherefore these have to be identified.419 The regression analysis shows that 
a number of cases constitute outliers.420 Based on the influence statistics 
(standardized DFBeta values), the case of Mongolia does exercise undue 
influence on the model.421 Deleting this case in order to achieve greater 
normality is not an option, however, since the study takes an interest in 
cases which fit the model as well as cases which constitute outliers (see 
discussion in chapter 5.1). The study does, however, take note of this 
influential case. 
Another way of checking whether the normality assumption is being 
respected is by observing the distance of the residuals from the line of best 
fit. This can be done by creating a scatter plot to check whether the distri-
bution of residuals is normal at each value of the dependent variable.422 “If 
the residuals are normally distributed, the residuals scatter plot will show 
the majority of residuals at the center of the plot for each value of the 
predicted score, with some residuals trailing off symmetrically from the 
center”423. 
This scatter plot, when generated for the analysis in question, shows that the 
distribution of residuals is not completely normal, since the residuals above 
the zero line are more spread out than the ones below. The deviation from 
normality is, however, regarded as minor.  
4.2.2 The absence of heteroscedasticity 
Violations of the assumption of homoscedasticity are also identified using a 
residual plot to observe the variance of the residuals at the different values 
                                                 
 
419 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 86).  
420 See analysis in chapter 4.3. The outliers detected in the overall analysis include 
Chile, Mongolia and the United Kingdom.  
421 This is particularly the case with regards to the country’s GDP/capita (ln) value 
(DFBeta -1,235) and bureaucracy value (DFBeta 1,043). 
422 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 89).  
423 Princeton University Data and Statistical Service at http://dss.princeton.edu 
/online_help/analysis/regression_intro.htm (11.05.2012). 
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of the dependent variable. “Data are homoscedastic if the residuals plot is 
the same width for all values of the predicted [dependent variable], whereas 
heteroscedasticity is […] shown by a cluster of points that is wider as the 
values for the predicted [dependent variable] get larger”424. The plot points 
to minor heteroscedasticity being present since the variance of the residuals 
seems to be slightly higher at the lower end of the predicted values and 
lower at the other end of predicted values. Miles and Shevlin point out that 
this is not of great concern from a statistical point of view. Instead, such 
patterns should be taken into consideration when developing the model 
since they may be a sign of, for instance, undetected interaction effects.425  
4.2.3 The linearity assumption 
Linearity is also studied using residual plots. A positive, although not per-
fectly linear, relationship can be detected from the graphs. 
4.2.4 The absence of auto-correlation 
The Durbin-Watson test is used to establish whether the independence 
assumption is being violated. Based on the observed value on the Durbin-
Watson statistic (2.179), the conclusion is drawn that little or no auto-
correlation distorts the analysis.426  
4.2.5 Collinearity and multicollinearity 
Potential relationships between continuous independent variables as well as 
continuous and categorical independent variables are first analysed using 
                                                 
 
424 Princeton University Data and Statistical Service at http://dss.princeton.edu 
/online_help/analysis/regression_intro.htm (11.05.2012). 
425 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 103).  
426 The Durbin-Watson test for correlated residuals has a range from 0-4, with a 
midpoint of 2. Values around 2 point to there being no autocorrelation in the 
sample. Values approaching 0 indicate positive autocorrelation and 
values approaching 4 indicate negative autocorrelation, see UCLA Institute for 
Digital Research and Education at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/webbooks 
/reg/chapter2/spssreg2.htm (04.05.2012); and Investopedia at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/durbin-watson-statistic.asp#axzz1tts2pxJE 
(04.05 2012). 
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correlation analysis. The analysis shows that moderate to strong 
relationships exist between certain independent variables. The strongest 
relationships are exhibited between the democracy and the GDP/capita (ln) 
variables (r = -0.794, p < 0.01), public sector expenditure and the 
GDP/capita (ln) variables (r = 0.637, p < 0.01), and the democracy and the 
public sector expenditure variables (r = -0.546, p < 0.01).427  
Potential relationships between categorical independent variables are 
analysed using the chi-square (χ2) test of association. These independent 
variables are not correlated, however. The relationship between parlia-
mentarism and party-centred electoral systems is weak or non-existent with 
a χ2 value of 0.975 and an associated probability value of 0.323 (df = 1). 
Cramer’s V (showing the effect size) is also found not to be significant. As for 
the relationships between parliamentarism and federalism on the one hand, 
and federalism and party-centred electoral system on the other, these are 
analysed using the Fisher’s Exact test.428 The analysis shows a weak or non-
existent relationship between the respective variables with p = 0.406 and 1 
(two-tailed hypotheses) respectively, and Cramer’s V for both being non-
significant.  
Multicollinearity is checked by looking at tolerance and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) values in the main multivariate regression analysis. Most inde-
pendent variables do not exhibit multicollinearity, the exceptions being the 
variables for GDP/capita and democracy. The former exhibits tolerance and 
VIF values of 0.286 and 3.495 respectively, whereas the latter exhibits 
tolerance and VIF values of 0.336 and 2.973. Although these values are 
considered to constitute minor breaches of the cut-off points suggested by 
Allison429, separate models temporarily excluding the control variables 
concerned, are tested (see chapter 4.3). 
                                                 
 
427 The relationship between a number of other independent variables is also 
significant (p < 0.01). 
428 This is done since 50% of cells have an expected frequency of less than five, see 
Dancey, C. P. & Reidy, J. (2004, 276).  
429 Tolerance values range from 0-1 with high values indicating low 
multicollinearity. Allison recommends that researchers beware of tolerance values 
below 0.4. Tolerance values of 0.4 correspond to VIF values above 2.50, see Allison, 
P. D. (1999, 141).  
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4.3 The bivariate and multivariate regression analyses  
The elements and the solidity of the regression analysis thus discussed, 
attention is shifted to the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. An initial comparison of countries exhibiting high 
levels of corruption with countries exhibiting low levels of corruption 
reveals an interesting pattern; these two groups have different political 
institutions. Whereas the majority of the 10 most corrupt democracies in the 
world430 are presidential and unitary with candidate-centred electoral 
systems and small public sectors431, the majority of the 10 least corrupt 
democracies432 are parliamentary and unitary with party-centred electoral 
systems and a large public sector, see table 13.  
  
                                                 
 
430 Using the WGI CC component for 2005 (and including only democratic countries 
with stable political institutions, see chapter 4.1.1), these include (in alphabetical 
order) the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Mali, Marshall 
Islands, Mongolia, Panama and the Philippines.  
431 Institutional characteristics for the year 2000 have been used. 
432 Using the WGI CC component for 2005 (and including only democratic countries 
with stable political institutions, see chapter 4.1.1), these include (in alphabetical 
order) Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 13: The institutional structure of the least and the most corrupt 
democracies with stable political institutions 
Institution Categorization 
Least corrupt 
2005 (N) 433 
Most corrupt 
2005 (N) 434 
Executive  Parliamentary 10 3 
 Semi-presidential 0 0 
 Presidential 0 7 
Geographical 
division of 
power 
Federal 3 1 
 
Decentralized 
unitary 
3 2 
 Centralized unitary 4 7 
Electoral 
system  
Party-centred 7 3 
 Candidate-centred 3 7 
Bureaucracy  
Large public 
sector435 
9 1 
 Small public sector 1 6 
Sources: The Comparative Data Set of Political Institutions (Åbo Akademi), Statistics 
Finland and World Bank (WGI) 
The table points to potential relationships between levels of corruption and 
political institutions, something that is confirmed through bivariate regres-
sion analyses, the result of which can be seen in table 14.  
  
                                                 
 
433 The political institutions of the ten least corrupt countries (in accordance with 
the WGI CC for 2005 and the list of countries included in this study) are mapped. 
434 The political institutions of the ten most corrupt countries (in accordance with 
the WGI CC for 2005 and the list of countries included in this study) are mapped. 
435 Defined as having public sector expenditure larger than the mean value of 35% of 
GDP. 
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Table 14: Bivariate regression analysis of the relationship between single 
political institutions and corruption 
  
      
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar-
dized 
Coeffi-
cients 
t Sig. 
N R2 Sig. B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
  
Parliamenta-
rism  
61 0.194 0.000 0.801 0.213 0.440 3.765 0.000 
Semi-
presidentia-
lism 
61 0.014 0.362 -0.345 0.375 -0.119 -0.919 0.362 
Presidentia-
lism 
61 0.163 0.001 -0.810 0.239 -0.403 -3.386 0.001 
Candidate-
centred 
61 0.073 0.035 -0.467 0.217 -0.270 -2.154 0.035 
Party-
centred 
61 0.073 0.035 0.467 0.217 0.270 2.154 0.035 
Federalism  61 0.087 0.021 0.802 0.337 0.296 2.377 0.021 
Decentra-
lized unitary 
61 0.000 0.933 -0.023 0.268 -0.011 -0.085 0.933 
Centralized 
unitary 
61 0.036 0.146 -0.343 0.233 -0.189 -1.475 0.146 
Public sector 
expenditure 
44 0.392 0.000 0.052 0.010 0.626 5.204 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: WGI CC  
As can be seen, some of the institutional variables exhibit significant 
relationships with the corruption variable when analysed in isolation from 
other variables, whereas others do not. The significant institutional 
variables include parliamentarism (p < 0.01), presidentialism (p < 0.01), 
candidate- and party-centred electoral systems (p < 0.05), federalism (p < 
0.05) and the size of the bureaucracy (operationalized as public sector 
expenditure) (p < 0.01). These are included in further attempts to construct 
a sound model of the relationship between institutions and corruption. The 
non-significant variables include semi-presidentialism, decentralized unita-
rism and centralized unitarism. These are, based on the results of the 
bivariate analysis, excluded from the modelling attempts. According to the 
bivariate analysis, parliamentarism, party-centredness, federalism and a 
large public sector exhibit positive relationships with the corruption 
variable which (due to the inverted scale of the latter) means that they seem 
to have a reducing effect on levels of corruption. Presidentialism and 
candidate-centredness, however, exhibit a negative relationship with the 
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corruption variable, which points to them possibly having an increasing 
effect on levels of corruption.  
The bivariate analyses illustrate the relationship between single institutions 
and levels of corruption. The total effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable (when these are combined in one model), as well as the 
effect of individual independent variables in comparison to each other are 
also of interest to the study, however. These relationships are scrutinized 
using hierarchical multiple regression analysis, the aim also being to study 
the relative importance of the institutional variables as opposed to the 
control variables. 
The hierarchical analyses consist of two models, the first of which includes 
the institutional variables only to establish their effect on the dependent 
variable. The second model includes the institutional independent variables 
as well as the control variables in order to study whether the inclusion of the 
control variables alters the effect of the institutional variables. 
The results of the main hierarchical regression analysis (A) can be seen in 
tables 15 and 16. Model 1, which includes 43 countries, points to a 
significant relationship between the institutional variables436 and the 
dependent variable. Adjusted R2 is 0.438 (p < 0.01), indicating that 44% of 
the variation on the corruption variable is accounted for by the institutional 
variables.437 A glance at the individual institutional variables included shows 
that they all are positively correlated with the corruption variable, indicating 
that they contribute towards lower levels of corruption438, see table 16. The 
strongest relationship is that between public sector expenditure and 
corruption (p < 0.01), followed by the relationship between parliamentarism 
and corruption (p < 0.05). The relationships between federalism and party-
centred electoral systems, on the one hand, and corruption on the other, are 
                                                 
 
436 This first and main model includes those institutional variables found to have a 
significant, reducing effect on the corruption variable, see the bivariate analysis in 
table 14. The effect of the variable for presidentialism is tested in a separate 
analysis. As for the effect of the variable for candidate-centredness, it is not tested 
separately since it constitutes the reflected image of the variable for party-
centredness. 
437 Adjusted R2 is used due to the relatively large number of independent variables 
included in the analysis, see Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 33).  
438 Since high values on the corruption variable indicate low levels of corruption. 
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non-significant. They are, however, included in the second model given that 
their p-values remain close to 0.10. 
The second model (model 2) tests whether the effect of the institutional 
variables changes when the admittedly powerful control variables are 
included in the model. As expected, adding the control variables improves 
the model (adjusted R2 increasing from 0.438 to 0.836, p < 0.01), indicating 
that, having added the control variables, about 84% of the variation on the 
corruption variable is accounted for, see table 15. 
Table 15: Model summary of the main hierarchical regression analysis A (N = 
43) 
Model R R2 Adj. 
R2 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .701a .492 .438 .702305 .492 9.194 4 38 .000 
2 .929b .863 .836 .380055 .371 31.587 3 35 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism, % Protestants, Democracy (FH), GDP/capita (ln) 
c. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
A look at the individual variables included in the second model shows that 
the coefficients (standardized Beta) and the significance levels of the 
institutional variables change when the control variables are included. To a 
certain extent this can be expected when variables with great explanatory 
power such as democracy, GDP/capita (ln) and Protestantism are included 
in the model. Whereas parliamentarism and the size of the bureaucracy 
(operationalized as public sector expenditure) lose explanatory power (p > 
0.10), federalism and party-centred electoral systems become significant (p 
< 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively). With regards to the control variables, 
democracy remains negatively correlated with the corruption variable (p < 
0.05) and Protestantism and GDP/capita (ln) are positively correlated with 
the corruption variable (p < 0.01 in both cases), see table 16. 
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Table 16: Results from the main hierarchical regression analysis A 
(coefficients, N = 43) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.565 .355   4.404 .000 
Parliamentarism .534 .258 .275 2.072 .045 
Federalism  .498 .304 .199 1.637 .110 
Party-centred 
system 
.350 .251 .183 1.398 .170 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.034 .012 .410 2.873 .007 
2 
(Constant) -2.471 1.505   -1.642 .109 
Parliamentarism .236 .144 .122 1.636 .111 
Federalism  .353 .166 .141 2.125 .041 
Party-centred 
system 
.263 .136 .137 1.936 .061 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
-.002 .008 -.026 -.291 .773 
Democracy (FH)  -.202 .094 -.232 -2.146 .039 
% Protestants .007 .002 .231 3.367 .002 
GDP/capita (ln) .650 .145 .523 4.469 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
Due to the apparent instability (changes in coefficients and significance 
levels exhibited by certain institutional variables) of the main analysis, as 
well as the risk of multicollinearity distorting it, additional analyses 
(referred to as analyses B - E) are carried out.  
The first two additional analyses (B and C) exclude the control variables 
exhibiting high levels of multicollinearity (democracy and GDP/capita (ln)), 
one at a time.439  
Omitting the democracy variable (analysis B), first of all, leads to the adjus-
ted R2 for model 2 dropping to 0.819 (p < 0.01) but generates higher tole-
rance values and lower VIF-values across the board as a result of which no 
                                                 
 
439 The democracy aspect is, however, still taken into consideration in that all 
countries included are democracies, see chapter 4.1.1. 
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variable exhibits tolerance values below 0.486 and VIF-values above 2.056. 
Apart from multicollinearity being less of a problem, the results do not 
change a great deal. Yet again, parliamentarism and the size of the 
bureaucracy lose explanatory power (p > 0.10) when the control variables 
are included. Again, federalism and party-centred electoral systems become 
significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively). As before, federalism, party-
centredness, Protestantism and GDP/capita (ln) are positively correlated 
with the corruption variable (p < 0.01 in the latter two cases), see tables 17 
and 18. 
Table 17: Model summary of the additional hierarchical regression analysis B 
(N= 43) 
Model R R2 
Adj.  
R2 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2  
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .701a .492 .438 .702305 .492 9.194 4 38 .000 
2 .919b .845 .819 .398631 .353 40.974 2 36 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism, % Protestants, GDP/capita (ln) 
c. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
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Table 18: Results from the additional hierarchical regression analysis B 
(coefficients, N = 43) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.565 .355   4.404 .000 
Parliamentarism .534 .258 .275 2.072 .045 
Federalism  .498 .304 .199 1.637 .110 
Party-centred 
system 
.350 .251 .183 1.398 .170 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.034 .012 .410 2.873 .007 
2 
(Constant) -5.138 .890   -5.774 .000 
Parliamentarism .214 .151 .110 1.415 .166 
Federalism  .366 .174 .146 2.098 .043 
Party-centred 
system  
.266 .143 .139 1.868 .070 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
-.002 .008 -.018 -.192 .849 
GDP/capita (ln) .864 .111 .695 7.793 .000 
% Protestants .009 .002 .273 3.950 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
Omitting the GDP/capita (ln) variable (analysis C), secondly, also results in a 
reduction of adjusted R2 for model 2, which now remains at 0.749 (p < 0.01). 
In this analysis, no tolerance value remains below 0.539 and no VIF-value 
exceeds 1.856. As for the institutional variables included in model 2, 
parliamentarism and federalism are significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, res-
pectively), whereas party-centred electoral systems exhibit p = 0.106. As 
before, democracy and Protestantism remain correlated with the corruption 
variable (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively), see tables 19 and 20.440 
                                                 
 
440 Although not identified as a source of multicollinearity, an additional model 
excluding the public expenditure variable is also tested due to the instability 
exhibited by the variable. This reduces adjusted R2 to 0.757. Tolerance values 
remain above 0.454 and VIF-values below 2.204. Yet again, federalism remains 
significant (p < 0.10). Parliamentarism and party-centred electoral systems, 
however, lose explanatory power (p > 0.10). The control variables, however, remain 
strongly correlated with the dependent variable (p < 0.01 for all three). 
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Table 19: Model summary of the additional hierarchical regression analysis C 
(N= 43) 
Model R R2 
Adj.  
R2 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2  
Change 
F 
Change 
df
1 
df
2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .701a .492 .438 .702305 .492 9.194 4 38 .000 
2 .886b .785 .749 .469633 .293 24.490 2 36 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism, % Protestants, Democracy (FH) 
c. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
Table 20: Results from the additional hierarchical regression analysis C 
(coefficients, N = 43) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.565 .355   4.404 .000 
Parliamentarism .534 .258 .275 2.072 .045 
Federalism  .498 .304 .199 1.637 .110 
Party-centred 
system 
.350 .251 .183 1.398 .170 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.034 .012 .410 2.873 .007 
2 
(Constant) 4.026 .479   8.409 .000 
Parliamentarism .384 .174 .198 2.212 .033 
Federalism  .403 .205 .160 1.964 .057 
Party-centred 
system 
.278 .168 .145 1.656 .106 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.008 .009 .100 .951 .348 
Democracy (FH)  -.491 .085 -.563 -5.804 .000 
% Protestants .006 .003 .189 2.252 .031 
a. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
 
When comparing analyses B and C to the main analysis (A), deviations in 
terms of the explanatory power of individual independent variables can be 
detected between models as well as between analyses. Analyses B and C 
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exhibit lower adjusted R2 values than the main analysis (A), however, 
wherefore they are not superior in terms of overall explanatory power.  
An additional analysis (D) including the variable for presidentialism is also 
tested due to the significant relationship between presidentialism and the 
corruption variable (see table 14). Again, the institutional variables alone 
are included in the first model, the presidentialism variable replacing the 
parliamentarism variable. The second model includes the altered set of 
institutions as well as the control variables. As expected, adjusted R2 
increases from 0.399 in model 1 to 0.826 in model 2, both models being 
highly significant (p < 0.01). The individual effect of presidentialism on 
corruption remains non-significant in both models, however, wherefore it is 
concluded that the model including the parliamentarism variable holds 
greater explanatory power, see tables 21 and 22. 
Table 21: Model summary of the additional hierarchical regression analysis D 
(N= 43) 
Model R R2 
Adj.  
R2 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2  
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .676a .457 .399 .726171 .457 7.985 4 38 .000 
2 .925b .855 .826 .390520 .399 32.131 3 35 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Presidentialism, Party-centred, Federalism, Public sector 
expenditure % of GDP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Presidentialism, Party-centred, Federalism, Public sector 
expenditure % of GDP, % Protestants, Democracy (FH), GDP/capita (ln) 
c. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
  
130 
 
Table 22: Results from the additional hierarchical regression analysis D 
(coefficients, N = 43) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.940 .468   4.148 .000 
Federalism  .545 .314 .217 1.737 .091 
Party-centred  .266 .254 .139 1.049 .301 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.037 .013 .449 2.942 .006 
Presidentialism -.374 .299 -.176 -1.248 .220 
2 
(Constant) -2.735 1.538   -1.778 .084 
Federalism  .370 .171 .147 2.167 .037 
Party-centred  .224 .137 .117 1.638 .110 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
-.001 .008 -.016 -.166 .869 
Presidentialism -.136 .164 -.064 -.827 .414 
% Protestants .008 .002 .239 3.383 .002 
GDP/capita (ln) .692 .146 .557 4.733 .000 
Democracy (FH)  -.187 .097 -.215 -1.940 .060 
a. Dependent Variable: WGI CC 
Due to criticism of the WGI as a measure of corruption (see chapter 2.2.3.2), 
the main analysis (A) is also tested using another measures of corruption, 
namely the Corruption Perception Index (2005) by Transparency Inter-
national (model E). When including the CPI as the dependent variable, ad-
justed R2 for the second model remains at 0.798 (p < 0.01). In the second 
model, no institutional independent variable is found to be significant (p > 
0.10) and when it comes to the control variables only Protestantism and 
GDP/capita (ln) prove to be significant (p < 0.01). When compared to the 
main analysis, this analysis points to similar but weaker relationships 
between the institutional (and control) variables and the corruption 
variable, see tables 23 and 24.  
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Table 23: Model summary of the additional hierarchical regression analysis E 
(N= 42) 
Model R R2 Adj.  
R2 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2  
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .712a .507 .454 1.6899 .507 9.524 4 37 .000 
2 .913b .833 .798 1.0267 .326 22.081 3 34 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Public sector expenditure % of GDP, Federalism, Party-centred, 
Parliamentarism, % Protestants, Democracy (FH), GDP/capita (ln) 
c. Dependent Variable: TI CPI 
Table 24: Results from the additional hierarchical regression analysis E 
(coefficients, N = 42) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.244 .896   1.387 .174 
Parliamentarism 1.055 .639 .224 1.651 .107 
Federalism  1.165 .735 .192 1.585 .121 
Party-centred 
system 
.743 .605 .158 1.229 .227 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
.098 .030 .470 3.284 .002 
2 
(Constant) -9.162 4.069   -2.252 .031 
Parliamentarism .637 .397 .135 1.604 .118 
Federalism  .709 .453 .117 1.566 .127 
Party-centred 
system 
.426 .370 .090 1.153 .257 
Public sector 
expenditure % of 
GDP  
-.007 .022 -.034 -.317 .753 
Democracy (FH)  -.377 .259 -.177 -1.453 .155 
% Protestants .021 .006 .277 3.589 .001 
GDP/capita (Ln) 1.655 .394 .551 4.201 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: TI CPI 
Against the above, it is concluded that model 2 in the main analysis (A) holds 
greater explanatory power than model 2 in the additional analyses con-
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ducted, and thus constitutes the best fitting statistical model. This said, the 
discrepancy between analyses is acknowledged.  
To what extent do the findings of the main analysis correspond with 
research already undertaken? A glance at previous scholarly work (chapter 
3.2.3) shows that the findings of the main analysis both confirm and 
contradict previous research findings. This cannot be regarded as surprising 
as such, however, given that previous research into the causes of corruption 
tends to point in different, at times contradictory, directions.  
The finding that federal states should be less prone to corruption, first of all, 
does not find support in previous research which, for the most part, points 
to federalism in fact contributing to increased levels of corruption (see table 
6). The fact that party-centredness is regarded as potentially having a 
reducing effect on levels of corruption, secondly, finds more support in 
previous research (see table 5). Interestingly, previous work particularly 
highlights candidate-centred electoral systems as more susceptible to cor-
ruption, something that also constitutes an indirect finding of the analysis at 
hand since the variable for candidate-centredness constitutes a “reflected 
image” of the variable for party-centredness. The finding that parliamenta-
rism should have a reducing effect on corruption, finally, goes hand in hand 
with previous research (see table 3). 
4.4 Discussion regarding the results 
As can be seen from model 2 of the main analysis (A), the institutional 
independent variables for federalism and party-centredness exhibit a posi-
tive, significant relationship with the corruption variable, whereas the 
variable for parliamentarism exhibits a positive relationship with a p-value 
of 0.111. These results could be interpreted as federalism, party-centredness 
and – although to a lesser extent – parliamentarism having a reducing effect 
on levels of corruption. Additional analyses executed, however, point to 
these relationships not being completely robust and reliable. As seen from 
table 25, the significance levels of the individual institutional independent 
variables tend to vary from one analysis to another. Even in the case of 
federalism – the variable which produces the most regular patterns in terms 
of explanatory power – significance levels vary between p < 0.05 and p > 
0.10.  
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Table 25: Overview of the institutional independent variables included in 
model 2 of analyses A-E (p-values) 
  Analyses 
Institutional 
Variables 
Main analysis  
A 
B C D E 
Parliamentarism 0.111 0.166 0.033 n/a 0.118 
Federalism 0.041 0.043 0.057 0.037 0.127 
Party-centredness 0.061 0.070 0.106 0.110 0.257 
Public Sector 
Expenditure 
0.733 0.849 0.348 0.869 0.753 
Based on these analyses, therefore, it is impossible to claim that an overall 
stable causal relationship exists between the institutional variables and the 
corruption variable. This assertion is based on the small population included 
in the analysis as well as an assessment of the models against Miles and 
Shevlin’s criteria for establishing causal relationships. According to Miles & 
Shevlin three criteria have to be satisfied in order to establish a causal 
relationship. These include association, direction of influence and isolation. 
The authors also stress the link to theory and previous research in order to 
determine causality.441  
How does the main model as well as additional models fare on these three 
issues? As far as association is concerned, most of the institutional variables 
are correlated with levels of corruption when control variables are excluded 
from the picture. The introduction of control variables blurs the picture, 
however, pointing to relationships which are far from stable and reliable. 
Since “causation does imply correlation”442, the first criterion cannot, there-
fore, be considered to be met.  
According to the second criterion, the cause (political institutions) must 
precede the effect (corruption). In the design of the statistical analyses this 
has been taken into account by ensuring temporal priority, i.e. institutional 
features being recorded prior to levels of corruption. This criterion is thus 
considered to be met.  
                                                 
 
441 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 113-115).  
442 Miles, J. & Shevlin, M. (2001, 113).  
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The third criterion is that of isolating the influence of the selected inde-
pendent variables. Within the scope of the analysis, this is done by control-
ling for the influence of other potentially influential variables. Attempts are 
also made to avoid multicollinearity distorting the analysis. This said, certain 
multicollinearity still influences the model.  
Although a stable, causal relationship cannot be established with certainty, 
the fact remains, however, that many of the independent institutional 
variables included in the main model do exhibit significant relationships or 
relationships bordering on significance with the corruption variable. These 
results, it is argued, cannot be disregarded since they – although equivocal – 
point to an interplay of some sort between the political institutions studied 
and levels of corruption. The thesis argues that this interplay merits further 
attention.443 As a consequence, in-depth case studies of the interplay 
between the political institutions in question444 and levels of corruption in 
two country contexts are carried out, the aim being to obtain a clearer 
picture of the relationship and the mechanisms through which it might 
operate at a micro-level.  
 
  
                                                 
 
443 This is in line with Treisman, who argues that “given the significant problems of 
measurement and imperfections of the [corruption] data, it is possible that results 
that do not seem significant or robust are actually correct”, see Treisman, D. (2007, 
222). 
444 These being federalism, party-centredness and parliamentarism. 
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5 
 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LINKAGES 
BETWEEN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
CORRUPTION 
 
5.1. The rationale behind the qualitative case studies and the selection 
of cases 
As seen in chapter 4.3, the statistical analyses failed to provide an 
unequivocal picture of the relationship between the political institutions 
included and levels of corruption. This could be due to the relatively small 
population included in the analysis, certain problems of multicollinearity, as 
well as the fact that measures of corruption as a rule tend to provide 
imperfect signals of corruption levels, at best. Given that the statistical 
analyses nevertheless pointed to a relationship between the variables, 
further scrutiny of their interplay is felt to be warranted. This is also due to 
the ambition of the thesis to study the mechanisms through which the 
variables interact.  
This scrutiny is undertaken in the form of case studies. According to Gerring 
and Thacker, case studies may – if well constructed – “allow one to peer into 
the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some 
structural cause and its purported effect. Ideally, they allow one to “see” X 
and Y interact.”445 The case studies undertaken are aimed at doing just that, 
namely to map out pathways between political institutions and corruption 
in two national contexts, gaining a clearer picture of the relationship in the 
process. 
                                                 
 
445 Gerring, J. (2007, 45).  
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The cases are selected with a point of departure in the quantitative analysis. 
Although not providing clear-cut results, the quantitative analysis, first of all, 
points to certain political institutions (federalism, party-centred electoral 
systems and parliamentarism) possibly qualifying as “corruption-reducing”. 
This provides an opportunity to examine the relationship between these 
institutions and corruption at a closer range by selecting a case which is 
“well predicted by the best fitting statistical model”446. Lieberman suggests 
that “[c]ountry cases that are on, or close to, the 45-degree line (plotting 
actual dependent variable scores against regression-predicted scores) 
should be identified as possible candidates for in-depth analysis”447. In line 
with the recommendation made by Lieberman, the first case – Austria – is 
selected deductively given its proximity to the line of best fit.448 This 
proximity points to the political institutions of interest to the thesis being an 
important part of the answer to why the country has managed to keep levels 
of corruption low. In line with the theoretical foundation of the thesis, the 
case study sets out to (i) identify principal-agent relationships within the 
political institutions of interest449, (ii) scrutinize these from the point of view 
of the accountability mechanisms450 available to principals, and (iii) 
establish links between the strength of these lines of accountability and 
accounts of corruption, the aim being to establish whether accountability 
constitutes the pathway through which the political institutions affect 
corruption. 
The statistical analyses conducted also show that many cases remain at a 
certain distance from the line of best fit, however, some even constituting 
downright outliers. This distance from the line points to outcomes in terms 
of corruption not always depending on the independent variables included 
                                                 
 
446 Lieberman, E.S. (2005, 444).  
447 Lieberman, E.S. (2005, 444).  
448 The case of Austria (as well as the case of Botswana, discussed below) has been 
selected from a statistical analysis including the institutional independent variables 
of interest only, excluding the control variables, so as to identify cases with a certain 
institutional profile. 
449 These are the ones found to be significant in the main statistical analysis (A) 
which also constitutes the best fitting model, see table 16. 
450 As outlined in chapter 3.3.2, these include mechanisms to hold agents 
accountable ex ante (contract, screening, selections and different sanctions) as well 
as mechanisms to hold agents accountable ex post (reporting, monitoring and 
sanctions).  
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in the statistical analysis. In these cases, factors other than the institutions 
included in the analyses must be scrutinized, it seems, if an answer is to be 
found with regards to corruption levels. Quite logically, Lieberman recom-
mends that such analyses should focus on a case “that has not been well 
predicted by the best-fitting statistical model”451, i.e. a case situated at 
considerable distance from the line of best fit.  
In accordance with Lieberman’s recommendation, the second case – Bots-
wana – is selected inductively due to its status as an outlier at a considerable 
distance from the line of best fit, which points to the political institutions of 
interest to the thesis not holding the main answer to the country exhibiting 
low levels of corruption. As a consequence, the case study focuses on a broad 
range of factors with the potential of influencing outcomes in terms of cor-
ruption. These also include the political institutions included in the main 
statistical analysis, however, so as to verify the quantitative analysis and 
ensure that these institutions (as explanatory variables) are not discarded 
hastily.  
5.2 Case study of Austria 
The first case study focuses on a country well predicted by the best fitting 
statistical analysis, namely Austria. The study starts with a glance at the 
Austrian corruption landscape, looking at institutional arrangements made 
to directly counteract corruption, as well as the prevalence, forms and 
history of corruption in this country context. The discussion then turns its 
attention to the politico-institutional framework, lines of accountability 
inherent to the political institutions examined as well as linkages between 
these and levels of corruption. 
 
  
                                                 
 
451 Lieberman, E.S. (2005, 445).  
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Table 26: Basic fact sheet for the Republic of Austria452 
(i) PR = political rights, CL = civil liberties (1-7 scale, 1 indicating the highest degree of 
freedom) 
(ii) 0 to 10 scale, (10 being the least corrupt) 
(iii) -2.5 to +2.5 scale (+2.5 being the least corrupt). Within the statistical analysis, a 0-5 
scale has been used. 
5.2.1 Corruption in Austria 
5.2.1.1 Institutional arrangements to directly counteract corruption 
During the era of interest to the analysis, Austria did not have a single anti-
corruption law but offences related to corruption were included in the penal 
code or other legislation.454 Neither did legislation related to corruption 
provide a definition of corruption applicable to all branches and contexts.455 
                                                 
 
452 Sources: CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/au.html (19.11.2012); Transparency International at 
http://www.transparency.org/ (2.10.2008); Freedom House at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports (1.9.2008); and the World Bank at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (2.10.2008). 
453 This year is recorded due to the time frame of the thesis (2000-2005). 
454 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
455 European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre 
/crime/docs/study_corruption_in_the_public_sector_in_eu_ms_en.pdf (23.2.2013). 
Independence 12 November 1918 (republic proclaimed) and 1955 
(after annexation by Germany) 
Constitution 1 October 1920 (and later revisions) 
Head of State and 
Government 
Head of State: Federal President  
Head of Government: Federal Chancellor 
Parliament Bicameral Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung) 
consisting of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) and the 
National Council (Nationalrat) 
Electoral system  Proportional representation with partly-closed party 
lists and possibility to cast preference vote 
Government structure Federal 
Freedom House Freedom in 
the World rating 2000453 
Free (PR 1, CL 1) (i) 
Transparency International 
CPI rating 2005 
8.7 (ii) 
World Bank Institute WGI 
rating 2005 
1.989 (iii) 
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Instead, specific forms of corruption were criminalized. Corruption-related 
offences covered by, for instance, the penal code (section 302 onward) 
included the abuse of official authority, the acceptance of an advantage by 
public officials, the acceptance of an advantage by senior executives of a 
public enterprise, and the acceptance of an advantage by experts, bribery, 
and illicit intervention. Corruption-related offences such as fraud and 
embezzlement/breach of trust were included in other sections of the penal 
code.456 Legislation aimed at counteracting corruption also singled out cor-
rupt acts on the part of political actors. According to the Federal Incompati-
bility Act (Unvereinbarkeitsgesetz - UnvG) a member of, for instance, the 
National Council could be deprived of his/her office should he/she abuse 
his/her position for gain.457 The UnvG also listed a number of incompati-
bilities with regards to membership on boards or side-occupations on the 
part of the Federal President, ministers and state secretaries.458 In addition, 
political actors / representatives were guided by parliamentary rules and 
procedures, which emphasized the importance of transparency, anti-
corruption principles, incompatibility with certain commercial activities, 
and the declaration of interests.459 
During the era of interest to the thesis, anti-corruption efforts in Austria 
were spearheaded by the Federal Bureau of Internal Affairs under the 
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI-BIA). The BMI-BIA was origi-
nally established to investigate police misconduct and police corruption. Its 
mandate was, however, later expanded to deal with all kinds of corruption in 
the public sector. The Bureau thus assumed something of a “coordinating 
role by organizing the fight against corruption in the public sector in 
Austria”460.  
The mandate of the BMI-BIA included undertaking investigations into 
alleged misconduct (including corruption) of public officials, prevention, 
education and international cooperation. Purely private sector corruption, 
however, fell outside the mandate of the BMI-BIA and was instead dealt with 
                                                 
 
456 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 4).  
457 European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre 
/crime/docs/study_corruption_in_the_public_sector_in_eu_ms_en.pdf (23.2.2013). 
458 European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre 
/crime/docs/study_corruption_in_the_public_sector_in_eu_ms_en.pdf (23.2.2013). 
459 Williams, V. (2001). 
460 European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC) (2008, 13).  
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by the Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt).461 With regards to 
investigations, the BMI-BIA reacted upon requests coming from (i) other 
department within the Ministry of the Interior, (ii) prosecutors and the 
courts, and (iii) the general public. These requests originated from all parts 
of the country, although a majority was from Vienna since this was where 
ministries and other important national institutions were located.462  
The staff members of the BMI-BIA were drawn from the police force and 
received police training. Yet, the BMI-BIA fell outside the regular police 
hierarchy.463 This, it was felt, was needed to ensure that that agency could 
act independently.464 The BMI-BIA was, however, always financially 
dependent on the Ministry of the Interior.465 
An evaluation undertaken in 2008 by the Group of States Against Corruption 
(GRECO) of the Council of Europe deemed that the BMI-BIA had “the 
potential of playing a significant role in the fight against corruption”466. The 
evaluation commended the fact that the BMI-BIA remained a dedicated and 
fairly independent institution falling directly under the authority of the 
Ministry of the Interior rather than within the police hierarchy. The 
evaluation stressed, however, that this also rendered the BMI-BIA 
vulnerable in that “the legal possibility remain[ed] for the Minister to give 
instructions to drop a case”467. The GRECO evaluation also expressed 
concern about (i) “the views of the BIA-BMI […] not [being] supported by 
many other institutions”468, (ii) “the BIA-BMI’s jurisdiction [not being] 
totally clear and accepted”469 and (iii) “the lack of clear legislation and 
coordination of the competences of the various police forces in corruption 
                                                 
 
461 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria 3.9.2009. 
462 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria 3.9.2009. 
463 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria 3.9.2009. 
464 International Network for the Independent Oversight of Policing (INIOP) at 
http://prelive.iniop.org/steering-group-profiles/martin-kreutner (12.11.2012). 
465 European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC) (2008, 11).  
466 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 15).  
467 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 16).  
468 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 16).  
469 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 16).  
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investigations”.470 All in all, GRECO maintained that “Austria [was] at an 
early stage in the area of the fight against corruption”471 and that (i) a 
specific governmental anti-corruption programme, (ii) detailed information 
about the scale and nature of corruption, and (iii) concerted efforts and 
coordination were needed.  
In 2010, in an effort to render the BMI-BIA more effective, the department 
was transformed into the Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (Bundesamt zur 
Korruptionsprävention und Korruptionsbekämpfung, BAK). The mandate of 
the BAK is broader than that of its predecessor.472 
5.2.1.2 Prevalence and forms of corruption in the Austrian context 
In 2005, the final year of interest to this thesis, Austria was assigned a score 
of 8.7 (on a 0-10 scale) on Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ception Index, ranking Austria as one of the least corrupt countries in the 
world. The Worldwide Governance Indicators of the same year also pointed 
to Austria being perceived as fairly non-corrupt, the corruption score 
assigned being approximately 2 (on a scale between -2.5 and +2.5).473  
In-country interviews confirm that corruption, although occurring, is a 
relatively rare phenomenon in Austria. The Austrian Anti-Corruption Agency 
(BMI-BIA) confirms that the data emanating from the CPI is a true reflection 
of the Austrian corruption landscape. It confirms that petty corruption is 
rare in Austria, but acknowledges that developed countries tend to exhibit 
more elusive forms of corruption and that this affects their ranking in 
international statistics. This is the case also in Austria, which means that 
Austria “still has homework to do”474 when it comes to fighting corruption. 
                                                 
 
470 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 16).  
471 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 6).  
472 Wenk, R. at http://www.acauthorities.org/aca/sites/default/files/countrydoc 
/Austrian%20Federal%20Bureau%20of%20Anti-Corruption.pdf (12.11.2012). 
473 See Transparency International at http://archive.transparency.org 
/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (19.11.2012); and the World Bank 
Group WGI at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (19.11.2012). Within the 
statistical analysis, the WGI scale has been transformed into a 0-5 scale to facilitate 
the interpretation of the quantitative analyses.  
474 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
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These facts are also corroborated by Transparency International Austria.475 
At a very general level, most respondents stress that corruption used to be 
much greater a problem during the decades immediately after the Second 
World War, and that the situation has improved considerably since. When 
going into detail, however, some stress the many grey-zones in terms of 
behaviour that formally may not be regarded as corrupt, but in the eyes of 
citizens should be qualified as such.476  
Official data provides little information about the prevalence and forms of 
corruption in the Austrian context. Data from the police authorities, for 
instance, says little about the very nature of offenses related to corruption 
since these, for the most part, are categorized under broad headings such as 
“abuse of official authority”, a heading which also includes offences un-
related to corruption.477 Furthermore, data is based on reported cases only, 
and therefore do not provide a full picture of the prevalence of corruption. 
Surveys, research reports and interviews with experts and practitioners, 
however, make it possible to form a slightly more detailed opinion of the 
prevalence and forms of corruption as well as actors involved.  
According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) of 2005, firstly, 
Austrians perceive corruption to be a problem within society. Whereas 43% 
of Austrians regard grand corruption as a very or quite big problem in 
society, 36% regard petty corruption as a very or quite big problem.478 
These findings can, however, due to the ambiguity of the survey question, be 
interpreted both as citizen regarding (i) corruption as very prevalent or (ii) 
corruption as very harmful to society. The fact that only four per cent of 
respondents indicate that they have paid a bribe in the past 12 months479, 
                                                 
 
475 Interview 2 – Board member of Transparency International Austria, Vienna, 
Austria (1.9.2009). 
476 See e.g. Interview 2 – Board member of Transparency International Austria, 
Vienna, Austria (1.9.2009); Interview 3 – Senior official with the Austrian 
Ombudsman Board, Vienna, Austria (2.9.2009); Interview 7 – Researcher with the 
University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria (4.9.2009); and Interview 6 – Senior official of 
the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009).  
477 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2008, 5).  
478 Global Corruption Barometer quoted in Sickinger, H. (2006, 564).  
479 Transparency International at http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research 
/surveys_indices/gcb/2005 (full data) (27.11.2012). The main reason for paying a 
bribe has been to avoid problems with authorities (according to 49% of 
respondents who claim having paid a bribe). 
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points to the latter interpretation being more plausible when it comes to the 
prevalence of petty corruption. The fact that 17% of Austrians perceive 
political life to be affected by corruption to a large extent480, however, point 
to the former interpretation being more plausible when it comes to grand 
corruption.  
Experts and practitioners point to the construction sector, military 
procurement, health care, tele-communications, and garbage disposal being 
particularly affected when it comes to corruption.481 With regards to pro-
fessional groups, institutions and other entities regarded as corrupt, citizens 
point to judges, lawyers, public prosecutors, policemen, parliamentarians 
and political parties as being the biggest scapegoats.482 
Views differ, however, with regards to whether corruption is more prevalent 
at the federal or the provincial / local levels. Whereas some maintain that 
the level of government makes no difference when it comes to the preva-
lence of corruption483, others claim that corruption is less prevalent at the 
sub-national level.484 The third and also largest category of respondents, 
however, maintains the very opposite, namely that the risks in fact are the 
greatest at the sub-national level.485 These include a researcher, who points 
to party patronage being strongest at the provincial and the municipal levels 
and less so at the federal level.486 Data from the BMI-BIA, however, points to 
most complaints originating from Vienna and being linked to the federal 
ministries and other national institutions. This may, however, also be linked 
                                                 
 
480 Transparency International at http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research 
/surveys_indices/gcb/2005 (full data) (27.11.2012). 
481 Interview 7 – Researcher with the University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria 
(4.9.2009); and Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, 
Ministry of the Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
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486 Interview 7 – Researcher with the University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria 
(4.9.2009). 
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to the BMI-BIA being situated in Vienna and knowledge about its work and 
mandate therefore being greatest there.  
An overview of the faces and prevalence of corruption in the Austrian 
context must, however, also take historical facts into account since the 
corruption landscape of today is rooted in the development of Austrian 
society since the Second World War. The discussion below, therefore, shows 
how the seeds of some of the more elusive forms of corruption, discernible 
during the era of interest to the analysis, in fact were sown decades earlier. 
5.2.1.3 History of corruption 
Austria came out of the Second World War highly divided, lacking a national 
identity and a conception of what defined the country. In fact, citizens 
tended to identify more with national subcultures or Lager487 than with the 
nation.488 The leaders of the time therefore agreed that measures were 
needed to minimize political conflict, safeguard independence and stability, 
and ensure economic prosperity. As a result, the so called Austrian post-war 
model saw the light of day.489  
The model included (i) elements encouraging actors to cooperate and strive 
for consensus on issues of importance to the nation, as well as (ii) deliberate 
power-sharing to ensure that the major (political) groups were included in 
decision-making.490 These elements came to mould Austrian society and the 
behaviour of Austrians for many decades, until the gradual demise of the 
model starting in the 1980s.  
  
                                                 
 
487 These include the Catholic-Conservative, the Socialist and the German-National-
Liberal subcultures. These were traditionally associated with particular political 
parties: the SPÖ was the party of choice for people within the Socialist sub-culture, 
the ÖVP was the political party of the Catholic-Conservative sub-culture, and the 
FPÖ was the party of choice for Austrians within the German-National-Liberal sub-
culture, see Müller, W.C. (1996a, 60-61).  
488 Heinisch, R. (2002, 177-184).  
489 Heinisch, R. (2002, 177-184).  
490 Heinisch, R. (2002, 177-184).  
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Cooperation and consensus as factors affecting the corruption landscape 
What were the consequences of the Austrian post-war model from the 
perspective of corruption? Efforts to encourage collaboration and consen-
sus, first of all, had the effect of bringing decision-makers together under 
what came to be known as the social partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft), 
described as “the specifically Austrian manifestation of […] corporatism”491. 
The social partnership was based on voluntary cooperation between the 
state and employers’ and employees’ organizations, particularly in the field 
of “income policies and certain aspects of economic and social policies”492. 
The cooperation between social partners (chambers, unions etc.) and the 
state was at times direct, in that certain interest groups were legally entitled 
to influence proposed legislation due to their inclusion as experts in 
committees and working groups within the legislature.493 Cooperation was 
also indirect in that interest groups acted through the political parties, to 
which they had close ties.494  
This cooperation resulted in close contacts between actors in leading 
positions. As such, the contacts built through the partnership should not be 
regarded as corruption. After all, networking remains an important part of 
(political) life. These networks were, however, oftentimes linked to corrupt 
behaviour in that actors exploited their contacts to get undue advantages, or 
to make important decisions “among friends” while forgetting about formal 
rules and regulations.495  
The unethical behaviour resulting from such close ties can be seen, not least, 
through a number of corruption cases unearthed during the period of 
interest to this thesis. These cases have oftentimes involved representatives 
                                                 
 
491 Eurofond at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/AUSTRIA/ANCHOR-
SOZIALPARTNERSCHAFT-AT.htm (20.11.2012). 
492 Including “industrial safety regulations, agrarian market legislation, labour 
market policies and principles of equal treatment”, see the Austrian Foreign 
Ministry at http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/austria/government-and-
politics/social-partnership.html (20.11.2012). 
493 Austrian Foreign Ministry at http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-
ministry/austria/government-and-politics/social-partnership.html (20.11.2012). 
494 Müller, W.C. (2003, 225).  
495 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
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of the private sector bribing political actors and civil servants to obtain 
political and economic benefits.496 
Moser highlights that corrupt deals between interest groups or private 
interests, on the one hand, and politicians or parties, on the other, to a 
certain degree could be avoided through increased insight into and clearer 
rules with regards to, for instance, party financing.497 This is corroborated by 
Sickinger, according to whom there are numerous ways of circumventing 
current reporting requirements.498 The European Commission also substan-
tiates this observation, highlighting that contributions often are channelled 
through organizations affiliated with the political parties, rather than to the 
parties themselves as a result of which the “true” donor cannot be identi-
fied.499 A lack of effective control mechanisms and sanctions against non-
compliers also has a negative impact on the willingness to report. As a result, 
the public knows little about the actual amounts paid, the real sources of 
funding or the possible linkages between funding and decisions made.  
The fact that the Austrian state funds political parties should, however, 
reduce the need to raise funds by other means, especially since financial 
support is provided not just to parties represented in the National Council 
but also based on electoral success in previous elections.500 This is corrobo-
rated by Sickinger, who acknowledges that party financing by the state has 
reduced the need for contributions from interest organizations, the private 
sector etc.501 This, logically, should reduce at least the extent to which 
political parties are forced into corrupt deals to make ends meet. 
  
                                                 
 
496 Sveriges Radio at 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=1637&artikel=5072025 
(7.11.2012). 
497 Moser quoted by Sveriges Radio at http://sverigesradio.se/sida 
/artikel.aspx?programid=1637&artikel=5072025 (7.11.2012). 
498 Sickinger, H. (2006, 569 and 571).  
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/crime/docs/study_corruption_in_the_public_sector_in_eu_ms_en.pdf (23.2.2013). 
500 O’Regan, V. (2006, 75); and Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 61).  
501 Sickinger, H. (2006, 571). Sickinger also enumerates the other sources of funding 
of Austrian political parties, namely membership fees, minor donations from 
members and sympathizers, “party taxes” (paid by MPs, ministers etc.), donations 
from businesses and entrepreneurs, and loans. 
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Power-sharing as a factor affecting the corruption landscape 
The Austrian post-war model also entailed efforts to divide power so as to 
ensure the inclusion of the major (political) groups within society. The key 
feature of this effort came to be known as Proporz502, which referred to 
power and influence being shared according to relative political strength. 
With time, this led to the greater part of the country being divided between 
the major parties. Austria thus ended up having red (SPÖ503) and black 
(ÖVP504) spheres, characterized by their own institutions, organizations, 
religious groups and systems of patronage.505 Government departments – 
for instance – ended up being divided between the leading political parties 
on a more or less permanent basis, regardless of whether a certain party 
was in power or not.  
The fact that the political parties controlled entire spheres of society meant 
that they had access to and control over resources of considerable interest 
to citizens. Citizens soon realized that belonging to a political party bene-
fitted them. This gave rise to what Sickinger calls Parteibuchwirtschaft506, i.e. 
an economy based on party membership, whereby individuals became 
members of and voted for political parties at least partly in order to access 
resources distributed by them in an arbitrary fashion.507 These resources 
included jobs at all levels of the bureaucracy, housing, permits and licenses, 
government contracts etc.508  
According to Sickinger, the political system of patronage started to fall apart 
in the 1980s, one of the reasons being that the parties realized that the 
percentage of (potential) supporters alienated by the patronage system was 
far greater than the portion benefitting from the system.509 Towards the end 
of the era of interest, therefore, party membership no longer played an im-
portant part when, for instance, apartments were distributed or positions 
                                                 
 
502 Heinisch, R. (2002, 183).  
503 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria). 
504 Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party). 
505 Sickinger, H. (2006, 566).  
506 Sickinger, H. (2006, 565).  
507 Sickinger, H. (2006, 566).  
508 Sickinger, H. (2006, 566), see also Müller, W.C. (1996a, 80).  
509 Müller, W.C. (1996a, 88); and Sickinger, H. (2006, 565 and 567).  
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within the lower levels of the bureaucracy were filled.510 The demise (or at 
least decline) of the partisan patronage system, in turn, resulted in decrea-
sing party membership. Whereas about 25% of Austrians were members of 
the SPÖ or the ÖVP in the late 1970s, only 12% of the population were 
members 30 years later.511 
 5.2.2 Politico-institutional lines of accountability and linkages to 
corruption 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the Austrian corruption 
landscape, including the most typical forms of corruption, actors (perceived 
to be) involved in corrupt behaviour, as well as institutions geared directly 
towards combating corruption. The overview pointed to acts of corruption 
having been common in Austria during the decades after the Second World 
War, but considerably less so in Austrian society of today. The subsequent 
analysis takes an interest in factors contributing to corruption being rare in 
today’s Austria, the focus lying on some of the country’s political institutions 
and the extent to which these contribute towards making corruption less 
practicable and/or attractive.  
The institutional analysis proceeds institution by institution, first focusing 
on the key traits of each institution. Based on the traits, principal-agent 
(P/A) relationships are identified, see figure 11. 
  
                                                 
 
510 Higher level positions are, however, still often distributed based on political 
membership, see Sickinger, H. (2006, 567).  
511 Plasser, F. & Bischof, G. (2008).  
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Figure 11: Structure of the institutional analysis 
 
These P/A relationships are illustrated in accordance with figure 12 below, 
with a line running from the principal to the agent to show that the former 
holds the latter to account. 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of a basic principal-agent relationship 
 
The analysis then scrutinizes these very principal-agent relationships from 
the point of view of accountability, the aim being to unravel the strength of 
the lines of accountability between principals and agents i.e. the extent to 
which principals are able to hold their agents accountable and the mecha-
nisms used when doing so. 
Lines of accountability are then categorized as strong (depicted in green), 
semi-strong (depicted in orange) or weak (depicted in red) depending on 
the extent to which accountability mechanisms and sanctions are available 
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to principals de jure, the extent to which accountability mechanisms and 
sanctions are accessible in practice, and the extent to which accountability in 
fact takes issues related to corruption into account, see table 27. Lastly, 
these lines are juxtaposed to data on corruption to establish whether weak 
lines of accountability tend to result in greater corruption problems and vice 
versa. The terms ‘resonate’ and ‘resonance’ are used to describe cases where 
ease of / strong accountability results in low levels of corruption (or vice 
versa), whereas the term ‘dissonance’ is used to describe cases where ease 
of / strong accountability results in high levels of corruption (or vice versa).  
Table 27: Categorization of lines of accountability  
 Weak 
line ■ 
Semi-strong line 
■ 
Strong 
line ■ 
Accountability mechanisms 
(without sanction) available de jure 
X X X 
Accountability mechanisms and 
sanctions available de jure 
 X X 
Accountability mechanisms (incl. 
sanctions) accessible in practice 
  X 
Accountability mechanisms (incl. 
sanctions) accessible in practice 
take issues related to corruption 
into consideration512 
  (X) 
5.2.2.1. Lines of accountability inherent to the executive, and linkages 
to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest 
Austria is a parliamentary state with an executive consisting of a separate 
Head of State (the Federal President) and Head of Government (the Federal 
Chancellor). The Federal Chancellor is formally appointed by the President 
although in practice the Chancellor tends to be the leader of the party having 
                                                 
 
512 This is not considered a necessary condition but rather a bonus, the reason being 
that also accountability more generally is likely to deter actors from engaging in 
corrupt activities and allow principals to detect corrupt acts which have been 
undertaken. 
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received a majority of votes in the parliamentary elections. Cabinet is 
appointed by the President, upon the advice of the Chancellor.513  
The Chancellor leads Cabinet, and the Chancellor as well as Cabinet remain 
dependent on the confidence of the lower house of Parliament (the National 
Council). Also the President can dismiss the Chancellor, the entire Cabinet or 
individual Cabinet members. Furthermore, the President has the authority 
to dissolve the National Council.514 Given the authority assigned to the 
Federal President by the Constitution, Austria has – by some – been cha-
racterized as a semi-presidential state. The fact that the President in practice 
almost without exception has refrained from using this authority, however, 
means that Austria in reality has more of a parliamentarian than a semi-
presidential system.515  
The popularly elected Federal President, for his part, can be held accoun-
table by the voters on election day as well as – while in office – through a 
popular referendum.  
Given the parliamentarian traits516 of the Austrian executive, the analysis 
takes an interest in a number of principal-agent relationships. These include 
Parliament (the National Council) as a principal to Government, the Federal 
Chancellor as a principal to Cabinet and the executive branch as a whole, and 
the Federal President as a principal and agent to different actors within the 
system, see figure 13.517  
  
                                                 
 
513 As opposed to many other parliamentarian systems, Cabinet members are not 
recruited from Parliament only but also from interest groups, provincial 
governments and private industry, see Müller, W.C. (2003, 234).  
514 Solsten, E. (ed.) at http://countrystudies.us/austria/ (6.11.2012). 
515 See Müller, W.C. (2003, 244). The President furthermore has the authority to 
appoint judges and public prosecutors, tasks that he also has relinquished, this time 
in favour of the Minister of Justice, see Bundesministerium für Justiz (2009, 26-27). 
516 The separation between Head of State and Head of Government, Government for 
the most part being appointed from within parliament, and being dependent on the 
confidence of parliament. 
517 The principal-agent relationship between voters and Parliament has been 
excluded from this analysis, since it will be dealt with in connection with the 
electoral system, see chapter 5.2.2.2. 
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Figure 13: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the Austrian executive 
 
Analysis of accountability and corruption 
a. Parliament as a principal to Government 
The federal Government, led by the Federal Chancellor, remains dependent 
upon the confidence of the National Council. The National Council therefore 
engages in constant monitoring of ministers and their departments to 
ensure that Government does not exceed or abuse its mandate. Should this 
occur, the National Council can sanction Government. The Government 
programme can be regarded as a benchmark or a contract in this regard, 
specifying the priorities of Government and the issues and areas it should 
focus its attention on. National legislation also creates a framework within 
which Government must act.  
The National Council has at its disposal a plethora of tools to acquire 
information about and justification for the actions of the executive branch. 
Parliamentary control, first of all, includes the right to put questions or 
interpellations to the administration or an individual minister, the aim being 
to acquire written or oral accounts directly from ministers or other 
members of the executive branch.518 Questions are common: between 1996 
and 1999 more than 6 700 questions were addressed to members of the 
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executive.519 Parliamentarians must, however, be selective when putting 
questions to members of Government since only a limited number of 
questions and interpellations may be submitted.520  
Subjective information provided by the ministers or civil servants 
themselves is complemented with more objective information emanating 
from different committees tasked with holding the executive accountable. 
Committees provide members of the National Assembly with an opportunity 
to examine and discuss, but also propose amendments to bills proposed by 
the executive, wherefore they provide an opportunity to sanction the 
executive.521 Such monitoring and sanctioning is, however, hampered by the 
fact that (i) the ruling party tends to have a majority on the committees, (ii) 
the chairpersons of the committees tend to belong to the same party as the 
minister under scrutiny, and (iii) “parties see[ing] their role above all as 
supporting, not as attacking, government and its policies”522.  
Objective information can also be acquired through so called investigative 
committees, appointed by the National Council. These are usually appointed 
to look into major abuses of power, and tend to “work under the same rules 
as criminal courts”523. Investigative committees can, however, only be ap-
pointed if a majority of parliamentarians support the initiative. This is a 
problem given that the majority often coincides with the object under 
scrutiny, i.e. Government. As a result, no investigative committees were 
appointed between 1990 and 2000524, something that points to this type of 
monitoring and accountability being a challenge. 
Continuous monitoring of the executive branch is also exercised by two 
independent auditing bodies of the National Council. These include the 
Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof) and the Austrian People’s Attorney 
(Volksanwaltschaft or Ombudsman).525 
                                                 
 
519 Interview 4 – Senior officials with the Federal Chancellery, Vienna, Austria 
(2.9.2009). 
520 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 133); and Müller, W.C (2003, 236).  
521 Republik Österreich – Parlament at http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK 
/GES/WEG/WEGNR/index.shtml (11.4.2013). 
522 Fallend, F. (2009, 50-51).  
523 Müller, W.C. (2003, 238).  
524 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 133).  
525 Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 62); and Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 134), 
among others. 
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The Court of Audit performs continuous financial and performance audits of 
administrative bodies (including companies owned by the state) at the local, 
regional and federal levels. The Court is regarded as a parliamentary insti-
tution in that its President and Vice-President are elected by the National 
Council.526 As such, the Court reports and remains accountable to the 
National Council and the legislatures of the provinces.527 A special 
committee within Parliament scrutinizes the audit reports by the Court, and 
a parliamentary majority decides on the course of action (if any) with 
regards to the entity audited.528  
Audit reports can also be accessed by actors outside the legislature. 
According to an official of the Court, the press takes a keen interest in the 
audit reports, and media coverage is broad. In 2008, audit reports were 
covered in the press 5 500 times, and during the first half of 2009 2 500 
times.529 This is corroborated by Müller, who states that from the 1970s on-
ward, the investigative journalists have given priority to “popularizing the 
findings of the audit office”530. Sickinger emphasizes the key role of the Court 
of Audit in unearthing corrupt behaviour and making it public.531  
This said, the court has also faced its share of criticism. According to Müller, 
the Court of Audit (as well as the Ombudsman, described below) “can only 
bark but not bite”532, i.e. cannot sanction wrong-doers. This is corroborated 
by Fallend and Robbers, who acknowledge that the Court only has the 
authority to “make recommendations for improving the efficiency of the 
administration”533 and that “reports […] rarely lead to political conse-
quences”534.  
                                                 
 
526 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 43).  
527 When cases of corruption are detected, these are also reported straight to the 
prosecutors, see Interview 8 – Senior official of the Austrian Court of Audit, Vienna, 
Austria (22.9.2009). 
528 Müller, W.C. (2003, 237).  
529 Interview 8 – Senior official of the Austrian Court of Audit, Vienna, Austria 
(22.9.2009). 
530 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 45).  
531 Sickinger, H. (2006, 573).  
532 Müller, W.C. (2003, 238).  
533 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 60).  
534 Fallend, F. (2009, 51).  
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Monitoring is also exercised by the Austrian equivalent of the Scandinavian 
Ombudsman, the People’s Attorney. The Austrian Ombudsman’s Board 
actually consists of three persons, elected by the National Council for a six-
year term, renewable once. 
The People’s Attorney monitors and controls the public administration at 
the federal, regional and municipal levels in all of the Laender, with the 
exception of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. It also investigates cases of mal-
administration reported by citizens, companies, and associations.535 Accor-
ding to the People’s Attorney, about 3% of complaints received tend to be 
linked to corruption.536  
Cases of maladministration are reported to the National Council and the 
Federal Council. The People’s Attorney also issues a “recommendation to the 
competent administrative body, which must act according to the recom-
mendation or explain its refusal to act”537. Since the People’s Attorney 
cannot sanction wrong-doers, its powers are in practice limited.  
If provided with information that points to serious transgressions or 
arbitrary execution of laws, the National Council can pass a vote of no 
confidence against the executive as a whole or against an individual 
minister. Such a sanction must be initiated by at least five members of the 
National Council and must receive the support of a majority of MPs.538 A 
successful vote of no confidence results in a minister or the entire Cabinet 
being forced to resign.539 The authority to cast a vote of no confidence, 
therefore, provides the National Council with a powerful tool to sanction 
Government while in office, i.e. ex post. 
The formal powers of the National Council are thus considerable. It should 
be noted, however, that – to date – no successful votes of no confidence have 
                                                 
 
535 Austrian Ombudsman Board at http://www.menschenrechtsbeirat.at/en/the-
austrian-ombudsman-board (13.11.2012). 
536 Interview 3 – Senior official with the Austrian Ombudsman Board, Vienna, 
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539 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 27).  
156 
 
been passed by the National Council.540 This is attributed to Austria tra-
ditionally having had broad coalition governments with majority support in 
the National Council, and these coalitions having dominated the political 
scene over many decades.541 Party discipline has also traditionally been 
strict, (i) forcing parliamentarians to “implement […] party leaders’ de-
cisions”542 and (ii) keeping MPs from acting at will.  
Of interest is also the fact that Austria, as discussed, exhibits an overall 
political culture of consensus-building rather than open conflict.543 Müller, 
and Pelinka and Rosenberger, describe the National Council as a forum 
where actors are brought together and a levelling-out of their different 
points of view is achieved. As a result, criticism by the opposition and other 
stakeholders is taken into consideration at an early stage and agreements 
are made with regards to remedies.544 This means that legislation oftentimes 
has been passed unanimously. Conflicts, therefore, rarely arise and when 
they do, they seldom escalate to a point where a vote of no confidence is the 
only way out.  
Unanimity within the National Council seems to be on the wane, however. 
This trend is visible, among other things, through a steady decrease in 
legislation being passed unanimously. Whereas 80% of legislation was 
passed unanimously in 1986, only 27% fell in the same category in 1994.545 
                                                 
 
540 Interview 4 – Senior officials with the Federal Chancellery, Vienna, Austria 
(2.9.2009); and Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, 
Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
541 Of interest in this context is also the fact that members of Government, although 
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to keep legislative and executive powers separated, see Fish, M.S. & Kroenig, M. 
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Over this period of time, which more or less coincides with the start of the 
era of interest to the thesis, Government tended to put less emphasis on 
broad consultations and pre-empting conflicts.546 Party discipline was also 
loosened, and members of the National Council became more active and also 
more willing to vote against the party line.547 This manifested itself in MPs 
increasingly tabling “critical parliamentary questions to ministers of their 
own party”548. Müller even renders a case where members of the Austrian 
People’s Party passed a vote of no confidence against their own minister.549 
These tendencies are corroborated by Pelinka and Rosenberger, who state 
that “[l]angfristig zeigt der Nationalrat eine steigende Tendenz, die an sich 
hoch entwickelte Fraktionsdisziplin zu durchbrehen”550.  
The developments accounted for above resulted in critical and diverse 
voices increasingly being heard, and the National Council being less of a 
“rubber-stamp for decisions previously made in Cabinet, the coalition 
committee, or within the institutions of social partnership”551. As a result, 
therefore, the National Council entered the period of interest as an actor of 
increased importance and with an improved ability to hold the executive 
branch to account. 
b. The Federal Chancellor as a principal to Cabinet and (indirectly) to the 
administration as a whole 
The Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) is one of the members of the federal 
Government (Bundesregierung), which also consists of the Vice-Chancellor, 
other ministers and the state secretaries (Staatssekretären). The Federal 
Chancellor is appointed by the President from the political party having 
received a majority of votes in the elections for the National Assembly. 
federal ministers, in turn, are appointed by the President upon advice from 
the Chancellor. Given the fact that the Chancellor heads the executive branch 
as a whole, he also has the authority to nominate staff to a number of 
positions within the administration.  
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Although described as the central and dominant figure of the polity552, the 
authority of the Chancellor is not as straightforward as one would expect. 
More precisely, his powers depend on the sphere of authority, the compo-
sition of Cabinet as well as his very personal qualities.  
The extent to which the Chancellor is able to hold members of Cabinet 
accountable ex ante – i.e. before nomination - depends on whether he is 
heading a one-party or a coalition government. When heading a one-party 
government the Chancellor (candidate) is mandated to nominate all 
ministers within Cabinet. These will most probably hail from the same party 
as the Chancellor, which means that the Chancellor is able to screen them 
thoroughly and make an informed decision. Most governments of Austria 
over time have, however, been coalition governments. When heading a 
coalition government the Chancellor only appoints a portion of the 
ministers, whereas the rest are appointed by the Vice-Chancellor (and the 
heads of other coalition partners, when applicable). The Chancellor 
candidate cannot veto the ministers put forward by the coalition partner(s) 
given that partners, once the portfolios have been divided, have the 
discretion to appoint individual ministers as they see fit. The fact that 
Cabinet appointments made by coalition partners must be accepted by all 
parties in Government has at times been referred to as the “monkey 
principle”553. This is due to the fact that coalition partners seemingly would 
have to accept even a monkey for a minister if this was the desire of the 
party to whom a particular portfolio was assigned. This is of interest from 
the perspective of accountability ex ante, since coalition partners will have 
little say even in situations where the minister proposed by the partner is 
felt not to exhibit a clean track record.  
Within the political parties, different procedures are applied and actors 
involved when choosing individual ministers. In certain parties, such as the 
SPÖ, party leaders dominate the selection process, whereas parties like the 
ÖVP involve party structures such as the leagues (sub-organizations) and 
the provincial party organizations. At the onset of the period of interest to 
this thesis, however, party leaders and chairmen assumed increasing 
powers in terms of (sometimes single-handedly) appointing members of 
Cabinet. This points to very few actors being able to hold members of 
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Cabinet accountable ex ante.554 State secretaries are appointed using the 
same procedures as those used when appointing ministers.555 
As opposed to the recruitment of ministers, clear guidelines exist with 
regards to the recruitment of members of the administration. These include 
instructions with regards to the overall ethical standards to be met, the 
procedures to be followed and the actors involved. Recruitments, first of all, 
must be based on merit, and those involved in the recruitment process must 
be un-biased. The most competent candidates are identified by means of 
aptitude tests and interviews, which provide applicants with an opportunity 
to “market” themselves (selection). Recruitments are generally conducted 
by an independent human resource department.556 Thanks to these rules 
and procedures, among others, the share of positions filled politically rather 
than based on merit has decreased. This said, certain appointments to key 
positions still reflect political affiliation.557  
As the head of the executive branch, the Chancellor also holds a number of 
actors accountable ex post, directly or indirectly. Holding members of 
Cabinet accountable while in office (ex post) seems to be a challenge. As the 
Head of Government, the Federal Chancellor is a primus inter pares or first 
among equals, which in practice means that he is the first among mi-
nisters.558 As such, he is more of a coordinator of the work within Cabinet, 
and may not instruct the other ministers or influence their activities. Müller 
goes as far as talking about a principle of non-interference within Cabinet.559 
Within Cabinet, therefore, the Chancellor is forced to cooperate with the 
other ministers and has one vote only, just like other members. At times, this 
requires flexibility and bargaining from his side since decisions in Cabinet 
are made collectively and unanimously.560 Due to the requirement for 
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555 Bundeskanzleramt Österreich at http://www.bka.gv.at/site/6602/default.aspx 
(11.4.2013). 
556 Frauscher, C., Görtz, A., Haschmann, R. & Nikolov-Bruckner, E. at 
http://www.austria.gv.at/2004/4/23/pubserv.pdf (22.11.2012). 
557 Müller, W.C. (2003, 243).  
558 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 140); and Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 140).  
559 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 34), see also Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute 
of Conflict Research, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). The latter confirms that the 
Chancellor only has limited and informal authority over ministers.  
560 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 140); Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 140); and 
Müller, W.C. (1996b, 34).  
160 
 
unanimity, the Chancellor’s suggestions may also be vetoed by other 
members of Cabinet.561  
Formally, individual ministers are thus independent from the Chancellor. 
This is particularly so in spheres of authority assigned to the individual 
ministers and not to the Cabinet. In reality, however, all ministers cannot be 
described as completely independent from the Chancellor. As the head of the 
largest party in Government and the National Council, the Chancellor does 
have certain leverage over ministers belonging to his own party. Against this 
background, he may influence them informally despite his limited formal 
powers in this regard.562 This means that he – at least informally – is able to 
hold ministers belonging to his own party accountable ex post.563  
As the Head of Government, the Chancellor constitutes the principal of not 
just of members of Cabinet but of the executive branch as a whole, holding 
staff to account ex post. In practice, however, members of the administration 
are held accountable ex post by the federal ministers and other superiors. 
Formally, ministers have considerable authority over their respective 
Ministries. This manifests itself, among other things, in the fact that 
ministers may issue orders (Weisungen) to civil servants and force policy 
decisions.564  
Müller, however, emphasizes that the bureaucracy (and bureaucrats) by no 
means can be described as weak, and that ministers depend on its/their 
cooperation.565 If members of the bureaucracy oppose the policies or 
priorities of the minister, they can put spokes in the minister’s wheel by 
over- or under-informing the minister, or by limiting their advice to what 
Müller calls the “conventional wisdom”566 of the department. As such, they 
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limit the minister’s room for manoeuvre, something that may constitute an 
agency loss for the minister.  
Ensuring that civil servants act in the interest of their principals (the 
ministers and the general public) has, at times, been a challenge in the 
Austrian polity. One reason for this has been that many civil servants, 
although formally required to be neutral, are allowed to and do belong to 
political parties and engage in party politics. As such, they have at times 
acted in accordance with their own (political) convictions rather than those 
of their principals, the ministers and the public. The have also at times been 
enticed by their political parties or contacts within the private sector to act 
against the interests of their principals.567 However, many citizens, civil 
servants included, have been members of political parties for non-
ideological, pragmatic reasons, and may not have a political agenda at odds 
with that of their ministers. Still, they may act contrary to the wishes of their 
principals for other reasons, including self-benefit.  
Awareness about the fact that members of the administration at times 
tended to forget about the interests of their principals increased in the 
1990s. As a result, a number of processes aimed at finding remedies were 
initiated. One such process culminated in a revision of the Mission Statement 
for Federal Employees, adopted in 1999.568 The Statement serves as a 
common denominator and guideline for all federal employees with regards 
to attitudes and the performance of tasks. Moreover, the Statement – which 
highlights the importance of respect for the law, reliability, accountability, 
the responsible use of resources, impartiality, and transparency – consti-
tutes something of a springboard when federal employees are monitored 
and appraised by means of annual appraisal interviews, which focus on e.g. 
the strengths, weaknesses, objectives and interests of staff members as well 
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as the expectations from supervisors.569 This is so given that administrative 
staff, when appointed, commit to respecting the values set forth in the 
Statement. The Statement can thus be likened to a sort of contract between 
the principal and the agent.  
Staff members (i) perceived not to embody the attitudes highlighted by the 
principal, (ii) whose performance is of a poor standard, or (iii) who abuse 
their authority may face sanctions. Sanctions are decided upon by an 
independent commission, and include reprimands or fines, and – in the case 
of more severe breaches of duty – termination of service.570  
Wrong-doers can thus be sanctioned through dismissal, which allows the 
minister to recruit staff members more attuned to the interests of the 
minister and the general public. Large-scale recruitments to this end are not, 
however, possible. This is due to the fact many Austrian career civil servants 
enjoy security of tenure.571 Leadership positions within the civil service are, 
however, since 1996 time-bound.572  
The question remains, however, whether the above mentioned principals 
take issues related to corruption into account when holding agents 
accountable. The Chancellor (as well as the leaders of coalition partners), 
firstly, can only be assumed to reject ministerial candidates with a track 
record of corruption. As highlighted in an interview, they are likely to do this 
out of self- or party interest since appointing a minister whose intentions or 
credentials are questioned by the public, tends to reflect badly upon the 
party and the whole of Government.573 The same applies to accountability ex 
post, to the extent that the Chancellor is able to exercise it. 
It is equally unknown whether applicants to positions within the public 
service are screened with regards to their corruption track record. Given the 
emphasis on issues such as accountability, the responsible use of resources, 
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impartiality, and transparency, these issues are, however, likely to be at least 
touched upon when applicants are evaluated and ranked.  
Appraisal interviews are, however, likely to take federal anti-corruption 
guidelines into account.574 These were only published at the end of the 
period of interest to the thesis, however, which means that they were 
probably not taken into account during the entire period of interest.  
c. Voters as principals to the President 
The Federal President is directly elected by the people for a period of six 
years, and his mandate cannot be extended beyond two terms in office.575 
Candidates for the presidency must be “eligible to vote in the National 
Assembly election”576, and must also be at least 35 years of age. Interestingly 
enough, “[m]embers of ruling dynasties or such families that have reigned in 
the past”577 cannot stand in the election, so as to avoid the monarchy being 
brought in “via the Presidency of the Republic”578. Anyone who can vote in 
National Council elections is also entitled to vote in presidential elections.579  
The Presidency is regarded as a non-partisan office. For the most part, 
Austrian presidents, therefore, have abstained from intervening in every-
day politics.580 The President does, however, have certain formal powers. 
These include appointing the Federal Chancellor and Cabinet (to be 
discussed further down).  
Voters are able to hold the President (to be) accountable ex ante by 
screening candidates and allowing them to demonstrate their suitability and 
willingness to work in line with the wishes of their (future) principals 
(selection). Voters acquire information about the presidential candidates 
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through the media and through electoral campaigns, which allow voters to 
obtain subjective information provided by the candidates themselves, as 
well as more objective information. If dissatisfied with a particular 
candidate, they may vote for another one. Voter turnout in presidential 
elections has generally been fairly high. Whereas 74% of eligible voters cast 
a ballot in the presidential elections of 1998, 72% did so in 2004.581 Voting 
in presidential elections was mandatory in 2/9 provinces during the era of 
interest, however.582 Little points to voters taking issues related to 
corruption into account when casting their ballot. 
Voters also hold the President accountable while in office. When doing so, 
promises made during his election campaign as well as powers outlined by 
the Constitution could be regarded as a contract between the President and 
his principals, and a benchmark against which he can be evaluated.  
Voters acquire information about the actions of the President through 
speeches delivered by him, audit reports583, TV appearances, newspaper 
articles etc. The information gathered is thereby subjective as well as 
objective by nature. If dissatisfied with the actions of the Federal President, 
voters may sanction him by voting for someone else, come the next 
elections, or by removing him through a referendum. Arriving at a 
referendum requires an elaborate process, however, involving a number of 
actors. The National Council, first, has to convoke the Federal Assembly (the 
two houses of Parliament meeting jointly), something that can only be done 
by a 2/3 majority. Secondly, the Federal Assembly must vote on a 
referendum to remove the President, something that requires a simple 
majority of the votes. Thirdly, in order for the President to be removed, a 
majority of the votes cast in the referendum must be in favour of dismissing 
the President. If a majority of the votes cast expresses support for the 
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President, he is considered re-elected.584 If the President is re-approved 
through a referendum, this is considered a vote of no confidence against the 
National Council, however, which is dissolved and new elections have to be 
arranged.585  
This procedure is complex, and members of the National Council are likely to 
think twice before jeopardizing their own mandate. The fact is also, 
however, that the President, despite having dissociated himself from party 
politics, has been brought to office on a party ticket. And, as expressed by 
Müller, “it is […] unlikely that that his sponsoring party would be prepared 
to initiate dismissal procedures against him”586. The President can thus 
formally be held accountable ex post by means of a referendum. The proce-
dures involved are, however, complex and parliamentarians may be reluc-
tant to put a spoke in the wheel out of personal or party interest.587  
d. The President as a principal to the Chancellor and Cabinet  
The President also assumes the role of principal to a number of actors 
within the system. Appointing the Federal Chancellor and Cabinet is 
formally the task of the President. When appointing the Chancellor, the 
President, firstly, designates what Müller calls a Chancellor candidate to 
form Government. In theory, the President has considerable discretion when 
designating the Chancellor candidate. Federal Presidents have, however, up 
until the present tended to relinquish their right588 to appoint a Federal 
Chancellor of their own choice since such actions would create a 
Government not enjoying the confidence of the National Council: “Denn auch 
wenn es ihm rechtlich erlaubt ist, eine Bundesregierung zu ernennen, die 
dem Mehrheitswillen des Nationalrates nicht entspricht, so würde eine 
solche Regierung – wegen ihrer politischen Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber 
dem Nationalrat – sehr rasch durch ein Misstrauensvotum “gestürzt” 
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Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 136).  
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werden"589. In practice, therefore, the President has acted in accordance 
with the outcome of the elections, assigning the task of forming Government 
to the leader of the strongest party in the National Council.  
Depending on the results of the election, the Chancellor candidate has then 
either been able to form a one-party government or, in cases where the 
party of the Chancellor candidate has not been strong enough to rule alone, a 
coalition government. As pointed out in this chapter, most Austrian 
governments have tended to be coalitions. Regardless, ministers have been 
appointed by the Federal President in line with the recommendations by the 
Chancellor candidate.  
Pelinka and Rosenberger highlight the symbolic role of the Federal 
President in the appointment of the Federal Chancellor and the ministers: 
“Auf diesem Grunde kommt der Wahl des Nationalrates und nicht der Wahl 
des Bundepräsidenten die entscheidende Bedeutung für die Bildung der 
Bundesregierung zu”590. This points to the Federal President not being in a 
position to hold the Chancellor candidate or ministers accountable ex ante. 
The President is also authorized to sanction the Chancellor and ministers ex 
post by dismissing the entire federal Government or individual ministers. He 
can do this single-handedly when it comes to the Chancellor or the entire 
Cabinet. The dismissal of individual ministers can only be done if 
recommended by the Federal Chancellor, however.591 This provides the 
President with a formal tool to hold the federal Government to account ex 
post. This notwithstanding, it has never been used.592 According to experts, 
this is related to the challenge of finding substitutes backed by a majority 
within the National Council. Experts also highlight that “the written consti-
tution is in the shadow of the living constitution which limits the power of 
the President in favour of the power of the majority in parliament”593.  
                                                 
 
589 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 136).  
590 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 137).  
591 Legislationline (Constitution of Austria, art. 70(1)) at http://legislationline.org 
/documents/section/constitutions (19.11.2012). 
592 Müller, W.C. (2003, 244); and Communication 2 - Senior official with the Institute 
of Conflict Research, Vienna, Austria (9.1.2013). 
593 Communication 2 - Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (9.1.2013). 
167 
 
e. The President as a principal to the National Council 
The President also has certain powers vis-à-vis the National Council. 
According to the Constitution, which can be likened to a contract guiding the 
relationship between the two institutions, the President may convoke and 
prorogue the National Council. Proroguing the National Council can only be 
done upon proposal by Cabinet, however, and under extraordinary 
circumstances.594 As a consequence, the President cannot use this accoun-
tability mechanism as he sees fit. The President has, in fact, never used his 
authority to dissolve the National Council.595 
Presidential powers also include countersigning laws before these enter into 
force. Robbers discusses whether this authority actually gives the President 
influence over the legislative process or whether it should be regarded as a 
mere formality. According to Robbers, some would argue that the President 
has the right or the duty to sanction the legislature by refusing signature and 
that he, thereby, has actual authority over the legislature.596 Pelinka and 
Rosenberger, however, insist that the President only has the authority to 
veto legislation should the drafting of a bill not have been done in 
accordance with the Constitution: “Sein Veto gillt dann nicht dem Inhalt, 
sondern dem Verfahren”597. This would indicate that the President’s 
authority over the legislative process as well as his powers to hold the 
legislature accountable using this tool, remain limited.598  
  
                                                 
 
594 Interview 9 – Senior official with the Office of the Federal President, Vienna, 
Austria (4.9.2009); and Müller, W.C (2003, 239).  
595 Müller, W.C. (2003, 244).  
596 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 60).  
597 See Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 137).  
598 Members of the National Council who abuse their mandate “for example by 
granting special privileges to a business in which they are employed” can be taken 
to the Constitutional Court, see Republik Österreich – Parlament at 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/PARL/POL/ParluVfGH/Index.shtml 
(14.4.2013). Through the Constitutional Court, (opposition) MPs can also challenge 
laws passed by the parliamentary majority if these laws are perceived to be 
unconstitutional. This, however, requires that those calling for a review hold at least 
1/3 of the seats in the National Council, see Republik Österreich – Parlament at 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/PARL/POL/ParluVfGH/Index.shtml 
(14.4.2013). 
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Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
As can be seen from the analysis, lines of accountability within the executive 
differ from one another in terms of the accountability mechanisms and 
sanctions available to principals de jure, the extent to which accountability 
mechanisms and sanctions are accessible in practice, and the extent to which 
accountability in fact takes issues related to corruption into account. With a 
point of departure in these differences, lines of accountability – as already 
outlined – are categorized as strong (depicted as green), semi-strong 
(depicted as orange) and weak (depicted as red) (see table 27), the ultimate 
aim being to establish weather strong lines of accountability tend to result in 
lesser corruption problems and vice versa.  
The analysis shows that members of the National Council are able to hold 
Government to account ex post through a number of accountability 
mechanisms. These include self-reporting on the part of ministers and 
bureaucrats as a result of written and oral questions, a mechanism that is 
commonly used. MPs can also monitor the work of ministers and 
bureaucrats through committees and investigative committees. These are, 
however, often dominated by the largest party in the National Council and 
Government, wherefore sanctions are not imposed. Actors such as the 
People’s Attorney and the Court of Audit are also included in the monitoring 
effort. These submit reports to the National Council, allowing the latter to 
scrutinize actions taken within the executive branch. If dissatisfied with 
decisions made within the executive branch, the National Council can 
sanction the latter by passing a vote of no confidence. For a long time, this 
sanction was inaccessible due to broad coalitions with majority support in 
the National Assembly as well as strict party discipline. Of late, however, 
party discipline is loosening, which allows for critical assessment also of 
members of the same party, as a result of which the sanction is deemed 
accessible and the overall line of accountability is perceived as strong. 
The mechanisms available to the Chancellor when holding ministers to 
account depend on the circumstances. When heading a one-party govern-
ment, the Chancellor is able to screen candidates, who also demonstrate 
their suitability to him. The Chancellor may sanction ill-fitted candidates by 
not appointing them. These sanctions are accessible to and used by the 
Chancellor, except in cases where the Chancellor may have to involve other 
party structures in the decisions, which means that he alone cannot decide 
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on the use of sanctions. When heading a coalition government, the Chancel-
lor has even less power over screening, selection and the use of sanctions ex 
ante in that the heads of coalition parties assume these tasks. Under such 
circumstances, therefore, accountability mechanisms as well as sanctions 
remain inaccessible.  
The Chancellor also has limited possibilities to hold ministers to account ex 
post. He may monitor them through meetings, audit reports and the media, 
but he cannot formally demand information or justification from them or 
instruct them to act in a certain way. Informally, as the head of his party, he 
may have certain leverage with regards to ministers from his own party, 
however. Against the above, the line of accountability between the Chancel-
lor and ministers is deemed to be semi-strong only.  
Bureaucrats are politically accountable to their ministers and administra-
tively to their supervisors within the civil service. In practice, however, ex 
ante accountability remains the task of independent entities such as human 
resource departments, which screen candidates and sanction unsuitable 
ones by not appointing them. These sanctions are accessible and in use. 
These same bureaucrats are held to account ex post by their superiors within 
the executive branch. Here, national legislation as well as, for instance, the 
Mission Statement for Federal Employees function as something of a 
contract between principals and agents. The performance of bureaucrats is 
assessed ex post through annual appraisal interviews, audits and output in 
general. If agents do not live up to the expectations of the principal, they can 
be sanctioned using reprimands, fines and dismissal. These sanctions are 
accessible to the principal and in use. Against the above, the line of 
accountability between ministers / other principals, on the one hand, and 
bureaucrats, on the other, is deemed to be strong.  
Voters are able to and do screen presidential candidates who, through their 
rallies and campaigns, try to convince voters about their suitability. If 
unconvinced, voters can sanction candidates by voting for another candi-
date. These mechanisms and sanctions are accessible to and used by voters. 
Little points to voters taking issues related to corruption into account when 
casting their vote, however. Voters are also able to hold the incumbent 
President to account ex post. In this context, electoral promises can be 
considered to be something of a contract between principals and agent. 
Voters monitor the President e.g. through the newspaper articles, and audit 
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reports. The President also reports to voters through speeches and other 
appearances. Dissatisfied voters can sanction the President by casting their 
vote for someone else on election day. These mechanisms and sanctions are 
accessible to voters and used by them. The same cannot be said about 
another sanction formally available to voters, however, namely removing 
the President through a referendum. This sanction is deemed to be 
inaccessible due to complicated procedures involving a number of other 
actors. Given that voters can access at least one form of sanctions, however, 
the overall line of accountability is regarded as strong. 
The President also constitutes a principal to a number of actors and 
institutions. He is formally mandated to appoint the Federal Chancellor. This 
is, however, regarded as more of a formality since the President always has 
appointed the leader of the largest party in the National Council. As a result, 
no ex ante screening, selection and sanctioning on the part of the President 
takes place. The President also appoints members of Cabinet. These powers 
are also deemed to be more of a formality since appointments in practice 
tend to be based on the selection made by the Chancellor and in line with the 
outcome of parliamentary elections. Possibilities to sanction these actors ex 
ante are therefore virtually non-existent. The President is also authorized to 
sanction the Chancellor and minister ex post. He is likely to monitor these 
through government reports, the media and reports from the Court of Audit, 
and may sanction the Chancellor or the entire Cabinet single-handedly by 
dismissing them should he be dissatisfied with their performance. This said, 
such sanctions are not deemed to be accessible in reality since the President 
is aware of the fact that he is unlikely to find “substitutes” with majority 
support in the National Council. Against the above, these lines of accounta-
bility are deemed to be weak.  
Lastly, the President constitutes a principal to the National Council, whose 
actions he monitors though the media, reports and meetings as well as 
information about proposed bills. Should he be dissatisfied he may not, 
however, dissolve the National Council single-handedly, since the initiative 
must be taken by Cabinet. These sanctions are thus not deemed to be fully 
accessible to the President. The President is also mandated to countersign – 
and if need be veto – legislation. The President only has authority to veto 
legislation if the drafting has not been done according to the procedures. As 
a result, these sanctions – although accessible – cannot be regarded as a very 
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powerful. In the light of these facts, the overall line of accountability is 
judged to be semi-strong, bordering on weak.  
Figure 14: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the Austrian executive 
 
As can be seen from figure 14, executive structures seem to enhance as well 
as hamper accountability.  
How does this resonate with data on corruption in the national context? The 
fact that the line of accountability between the President and the National 
Assembly is described as semi-strong, bordering on weak, first of all, could 
be interpreted as MPs being particularly susceptible to corruption. This 
resonates well with data on corruption in that (i) grand corruption is 
perceived to be a greater problem than petty corruption, (ii) parties and MPs 
are considered to be engaged in corrupt activities to a greater extent than 
other entities and professional groups, (iii) corruption scandals during the 
era of interest in fact have involved MPs, and (iv) most reports on corruption 
originate from Vienna and are related to national institutions. This line of 
accountability does not, however, provide a full picture of the extent to 
which MPs are held to account since this process also involves voters and 
parties, something that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The multiple lines of accountability including ministers as agents, secondly, 
mostly point to also these actors being vulnerable to corruption. This 
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resonates with the facts that (i) reports made to the anti-corruption agency 
of the time mostly were related to national institutions, including federal 
ministries, (ii) ministers being perceived as corrupt and also in practice 
being implicated in corruption scandals, (iii) parties being perceived as 
engaging in corrupt activities, and (iv) grand and “more elusive forms” of 
corruption, according to many, being more prevalent than official statistics 
indicate.  
The lines of accountability including the Chancellor as an agent are 
ambiguous, pointing to vulnerability as well as lack thereof. Data on cor-
ruption points to Chancellors having been implicated in corrupt practices, 
however, which resonates well with the weak line of accountability between 
the President and the Chancellor. It does not, however, resonate with the 
strong line between the National Council and the Chancellor, wherefore it is 
concluded that the National Council may not be able to hold the Chancellor 
to account efficiently enough. The strength of the line is therefore only found 
to resonate moderately with data on corruption.  
The strong line of accountability between voters and the President also 
points to the President not being particularly susceptible to corruption, 
which resonates well with the fact that neither official statistics, scholarly or 
media reports, nor surveys on corruption make mention of the President as 
a culprit. 
The line of accountability including members of the bureaucracy as agents, 
finally, is described as strong. This resonates well with (i) petty corruption 
by most experts being described as uncommon and (ii) experienced-based 
data pointing to few citizens engaging in bureaucratic corruption.  
In the light of these facts, the strength of lines of accountability is deemed to 
resonate well with data on corruption.  
5.2.2.2 Lines of accountability inherent to the electoral system, and 
linkages to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest 
Austrians elect representatives directly and indirectly to institutions at the 
federal, provincial and municipal levels of the state. At the federal level, 
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elections are held for the National Council (which has 183 members with a 
five-year term), the State Presidency (six-year term) and the European 
Parliament (five-year term). At the provincial level, voters elect repre-
sentatives to the provincial legislatures (Landtage, 5-6 year terms depen-
ding on the province) and at the municipal level votes are cast in municipal 
elections (5-6 year terms, depending on the province). Indirect elections are 
held for the upper house of the legislature, the Federal Council (Bundesrat), 
which has 62 representatives elected for five years by the provincial 
(Länder) legislatures.599  
In 1992, Austria lowered the voting age from 19 to 18 years of age.600 This 
applies to elections in all provinces and at all levels.601 Austrian voters do 
not need to register ahead of elections since “all citizens with a permanent 
residence in the country are kept in a permanent register, maintained by the 
municipalities”602.  
Austria is divided into nine constituencies, coinciding with the nine 
provinces. These are further divided into 43 regional constituencies. The 
threshold for winning a seat in the National Council is “4% of votes (or 
winning a parliamentary seat in one of the regional constituencies)”603.  
Elections for the National Council are conducted using a proportional 
electoral system with partly-closed party lists. Parties submit lists of candi-
dates, and voters vote for the party of their choice. Voters may, however, 
also cast a preference vote for a particular candidate, thus increasing the 
chances of this candidate to be elected.604  
                                                 
 
599 See Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 129); Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 59); 
Bundespressedienst (no year, 59); and GRECO (2011, 4).  
600 In 2007, Austria, as the first country in Europe, furthermore lowered the voting 
age to 16 years of age, see Republik Österreich – Parlament at 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/PARL/DEM/NRWAHL/ (3.12.2012). 
This, however, falls outside the era of interest to the thesis. 
601 Interparliamentary Union (IPU) at www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2017.htm 
(18.11.2010); and Reference.com at www.reference.com/browse/voting+age 
(18.11.2010). 
602 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2011, 4).  
603 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (2011, 4-5).  
604 Interview 1 – Senior officials with the Federal Election Commission, Ministry of 
the Interior, Vienna, Austria (1.9.2009). 
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Proportional electoral systems with closed lists are often described as party-
centred.605 In line with a classification by Shugart, a party-centred electoral 
system in its most “refined” form is characterized by (i) ballot access being 
determined in-house, within the party, and voters being unable to influence 
the order of candidates on the lists, and (ii) list-based voting pre-
dominating.606 Party-centred electoral systems are thus characterized by 
parties determining whether individual candidates may stand in the 
election, and voters casting their ballot for a party rather than for an 
individual candidate. Given that (i) Austrian voters vote for a party list but 
may cast preference votes, and (ii) Austrian parties dominate the nomi-
nation process, the electoral system can be described as only moderately 
party-centred. 
Given the listed traits of the Austrian electoral system (the list-based vote, 
the possibility to cast a preference vote, and the fact that parties dominate 
the nomination process), the analysis takes an interest in a number of 
principal-agent relationships. These include the voters as principals to 
candidates and parties, and parties as principals to candidates, analysing 
whether and how these principals are able to and do hold their agents to 
account, see the figure 15. 
Figure 15: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the Austrian electoral 
system 
 
  
                                                 
 
605 This is in line with – for instance - Shugart, M. S. (2001, 183).  
606 The exact definitions adopted can be found in appendix 6. See also Shugart, M. S. 
(2001, 183).  
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Analysis of accountability and corruption 
a. Parties as principals to candidates  
In order to be eligible in parliamentary elections, a person must be an 
Austrian citizen and 18 years of age.607 Independent candidates may run in 
the elections608, but for the most part candidates tend to be affiliated to 
political parties and ranked on their lists. Political parties, therefore, have 
considerable authority with regards to ballot access and the electoral 
success of individual candidates.  
Parties are only allowed to put forward twice as many candidates as there 
are seats to be filled in the electoral district.609 They are thus likely to select 
their candidates carefully, i.e. put a lot of effort into accountability ex ante. 
The different parties go about nominating candidates in different ways, 
however. The general rule seems to be that key decisions with regards to 
nominations are made by elites at different levels of the party organizations, 
and that the average party members have little say with regards to ballot 
access and the initial ranking of candidates. This is corroborated by 
Krouwel, who describes the nomination procedures applied by Austrian 
parties as highly exclusive, as opposed to other European countries.610  
The procedures through which the political parties nominate candidates 
merit some attention. In the SPÖ, most candidates are put forward by the 
party organization at the provincial level. The central party organization, 
however, has the prerogative of nominating 20% of the candidates “for 
central necessities”611. A special party council convened by the party leader, 
                                                 
 
607 Incompatibilities include the Federal President, members of the Federal Council, 
the European Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the 
Administrative Court, the President of the Audit Office, the Parliamentary 
Commissioners (Ombudsmen), and executives of joint stock companies, banking, 
commercial, transport and industrial private limited companies, provincial credit 
institutes and mutual insurance companies, see Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) at 
www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2017.htm (18.11.2010). 
608 Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (3.9.2009). 
609 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) at http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/2017_B.htm (15.11.2012); and Stirnemann, A. (1989, 404).  
610 Krouwel, A. (1999, 6).  
611 Krouwel, A. (1999, 8).  
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finally, is responsible for the final selection and ranking of candidates.612 In 
the ÖVP, the district party organization proposes candidates, while the 
provincial level ranks them. This process can, but does not have to, involve 
broader layers of party members.613 The national party organization can 
veto the candidates and rankings proposed, but the provincial level has the 
prerogative of nominating 5% of the candidates.614 In the FPÖ615, the party 
organization in the provinces draws up party lists, which the national 
central party organization approves or rejects. Within the Green Party, 
finally, party members vote on candidates and rankings. Final decisions are, 
however, made by the provincial and national party organizations.616 
Parties naturally favour candidates which are able to attract votes. Loyalty 
to the party and respect of party discipline also seem to carry a lot of weight 
when (re-)nominations are made, however. As a result of the importance 
attached to loyalty and discipline, many candidates tend to be not just party 
members but professional politicians, in tune with the aims and procedures 
of the party. This means that parties are able to screen them thoroughly and 
that candidates, for their part, are able to ensure that the leadership is aware 
of their competence and commitment (selection). 
Political parties also hold representatives to account ex post. When doing so, 
party statutes can be compared to a contract or an agreement between 
parties and representatives in that the latter commit to the priorities, rules 
and regulations set forth in the statutes. Plenary sessions, parliamentary 
committees and party caucus meetings provide political parties with 
opportunities to monitor representatives ex post. Representatives which do 
not live up to the expectations of the party can be sanctioned in a number of 
ways. According to Müller, they can be excluded from positions of trust or 
interesting assignments. They may also be assigned a poor ranking on party 
lists, excluded from the ballot or expelled from the party altogether.617 
                                                 
 
612 O’Regan, V. (2006, 77).  
613 Stirnemann, A. (1989, 408). Müller, furthermore, highlights that many parties 
changed their statutes in the 1990s to allow for increased influence of party 
members over candidate selection. Parties have hardly applied these rules, 
however, see Müller, W.C (2003, 226).  
614 Krouwel, A. (1999, 8); and O’Regan, V. (2006, 79).  
615 Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs). 
616 Krouwel, A. (1999, 8).  
617 Müller, W.C. (2003, 230).  
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The fact that parties monitor their representatives is important not least for 
the voters, many of which do not have the time to monitor and interact with 
their representatives on a regular basis. Due to the fact that contacts 
between voters and their representatives often are sparse, representatives 
risk becoming alienated from the electorate and lose “an understanding of 
what average voters think”618, forgetting about their duties towards the 
electorate in the process. As a result, representatives may end up focusing 
more on living up to the expectations of their secondary principal, the party, 
and less on their obligation to their primary principals, the voters. Parties, 
according to Müller, tend to be better at keeping abreast with the needs of 
the electorate and can therefore assume a mediating role, reminding repre-
sentatives about the need to take the interests of the party as well as those 
of the electorate into consideration. 
The extent to which parties take ethical issues into account when selecting, 
ranking and monitoring candidates and representatives is, however, 
unknown. Some argue that parties tend to test the effect of candidates on the 
electorate ahead of elections. Parties do this out of self-interest, and should 
they get the impression that a candidate ranked highly is frowned upon by 
the voters, this candidate will be degraded on the list or, depending on the 
circumstances, removed altogether.619 (Subjective) voter sentiments (also 
with regards to corruption) are thus likely to affect ballot access and ranking 
as well as access to other rewards by the party.  
During the period of interest to the thesis parties seemed to lack a more 
systematic, objective approach to dealing with issues related to corruption, 
however. This is clear from the facts that (i) the fight against corruption was 
more or less absent from their programmes, and (ii) few of them had codes 
of conduct outlining unaccepted behaviour, and sanctions.620 Only after the 
                                                 
 
618 Müller, W.C. (2003, 229).  
619 Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (3.9.2009). 
620 See SPÖ at http://www.spoe.at/bilder/d281/spoe_statut_2012.pdf (16.11.2012); 
and ÖVP at http://www.oevp.at/Common/Downloads/Organisationsstatut.pdf 
(16.11.2012). After the decade of interest, however, at least the ÖVP has embarked 
on a project of fighting corruption within the party. This has been done through the 
drafting of a detailed Code of Conduct (Verhaltenskodex), and the establishment of 
an Ethics Board, which may impose sanctions, see ÖVP at http://www.oevp.at 
/index.aspx?pageid=59523 (16.11.2012). 
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era of interest did some of the political parties in fact seem to become 
conscious of the need to engage in the fight against corruption more 
systematically, internally as well as externally. This points to accountability 
rarely having taken corruption into account.  
As can be seen, nominations and rankings very much remain the prerogative 
of the select few, i.e. the party leaders at the national and provincial levels. 
Candidates are therefore dependent on the party (leadership) for their 
political career, and need to remain loyal in order to be re-nominated. 
Stirnemann goes as far as talking about “permanence of membership of 
parliament”621, to illustrate the fact that MPs which are able to maintain the 
trust and support of their party also know they will retain their parliamen-
tary seat. According to Krouwel, disobedience and conflict with the party 
leadership ruins not only a politician’s political career but also (due to the 
prominent role of parties in society at large) chances to build a career 
outside politics.622  
This puts the parties in a powerful position vis-à-vis candidates and 
representatives, a position that could be used to identify and reject actors 
with a clear “track record of corruption” or to identify and punish actual 
transgressions. During the period of interest, authority did not seem to be 
used to this end, however, something that can be attributed to (i) a lack of 
awareness on the part of the party organizations as well as (ii) a lack of 
guidelines to go by. 
b. Voters as principals to parties and candidates  
As outlined, Austrian voters cast their votes for partly-closed party lists. The 
electoral reform of 1992 introduced the possibility to cast a personalized 
(preference) vote, the argument being that this would (i) reduce the power 
of party leaders to impose certain pre-selected candidates, (ii) give voters 
more power to influence the election outcome, and (iii) improve the 
relationship between voters and their representatives.623  
                                                 
 
621 Stirnemann, A. (1989, 419).  
622 Krouwel, A. (1999, 8).  
623 Solsten, E. at http://countrystudies/austria/116.htm (18.11.2010); and Müller, 
W.C. (1996a, 59).  
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Few voters cast preference votes, however, and the general opinion also 
seems to be that preference votes – when cast – have little bearing on the 
overall outcome of the election.624 This is so, since they usually are cast for 
candidates at the top of the list, i.e. individuals who are likely to be elected 
irrespective of the preference votes.625 
Stirnemann is thus of the opinion that “the make-up of the legislative bodies 
is mainly decided by candidate nomination and not by the voter casting his 
ballot”626. He stresses that once candidate lists have been fixed, the “compo-
sition of the National Council has been decided with far more than 90% 
certainty”627. Also Müller states that the 1992 electoral reform made little 
practical difference in terms of parties’ power over rankings and thus 
candidates obtaining a seat in Parliament.628 Müller, however, highlights that 
parties do take note of preference votes cast when preparing lists of 
candidates for elections to come.629  
This points to voters not exercising their possibility to hold individuals 
accountable by casting preference votes. One possible explanation for this is 
that candidates quite simply are perceived as completely dominated by the 
parties, and toeing the party line rather than that of the voters. Punishing 
individual candidates, therefore, has little effect on the behaviour of 
politicians. The preference vote, also, does not “permit an unpopular 
candidate to be eliminated or ranked down by the voter”630, something that 
surely affects its attractiveness.  
This said, voters did cast party list votes and voter turnout during the era of 
interest was approximately 85%.631 Voting patterns, however, tended to be 
                                                 
 
624 Müller highlights that “[t]o win a seat at the regional district level it is sufficient 
for a candidate to win either half as many preference votes as votes are required for 
a seat, or preference votes amounting to a sixth of the party vote – provided that the 
party wins enough votes to get a seat in a relevant regional electoral district”, see 
Müller, W.C. (2003, 228).  
625 Müller, W.C. (1996a, 71).  
626 Stirnemann, A. (1989, 401).  
627 Stirnemann, A. (1989, 421).  
628 Müller, W.C. (2006, 410).  
629 Müller, W.C. (2006, 409).  
630 Stirnemann, A. (1989, 406).  
631 According to Hofinger et al., the percentage of non-voters stood at 6% between 
1979 and 1983, but had increased to 15% in 2002-2006, see Hofinger, C., Ogris, G. 
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different from those of decades prior. Much points to a decrease in class 
voting, and socio-cultural factors on the whole having less impact on voting 
decisions.632 Voters also tended to be less interested in ideology and more 
interested in issues and personalities than before.633 This is interesting from 
the point of view of accountability in that voters, who previously faithfully 
voted for the same parties, seemingly started to view parties and politicians 
in a new light. Interviews conducted by Plasser and Ulram indicate that 69% 
of respondents in 1989 (as opposed to 38% in 1979/1981) regarded 
politicians as corrupt and open to bribery. Not only did voters express these 
views, however, they also acted upon them by casting protest votes against 
oversized coalitions, the establishment as a whole, the Proporz system and 
political patronage.634 This shows that Austrian voters started taking issues 
related to corruption into account when casting their ballot. It was not the 
individual candidates who were sanctioned, however, but rather the political 
parties felt to embody the undesired traits. Of interest is also the fact that 
the political parties to a certain extent responded to this outcry from the 
electorate. According to Mantl, the parties themselves increasingly 
recognized that voters were alienated by patronage and corruption. As a 
result, many parties have declared that their focus henceforth will lie on 
political work.635  
In order to be able to sanction candidates, representatives and parties, 
Austrian voters need information about their actions. How do they acquire 
this information? Voters, first of all, acquire (subjective) information straight 
from their representatives, who say they value close contacts to 
constituents, and “practice a direct communication style with them (rather 
than via the media)”636. Through direct meetings and election campaigns, 
voters are able to screen candidates who, in turn try to convince voters 
                                                                                                                         
 
and Zeglovits, E. (2008, 80). The decline in voter turnout seems to be due to (i) 
voting having been mandatory in certain provinces up until 1992, and (ii) a certain 
level of disenchantment with politics and politicians among some citizens, see 
Communication 1 - Senior official with the Federal Election Commission, Ministry of 
the Interior, Vienna, Austria (20.11.2012); and Austrian Times at 
http://www.austriantimes.at/?id=8058 (16.11.2012). 
632 Traar, K. & Birk, F. (1989, 117).  
633 Müller, W.C. (1996a, 74).  
634 Plasser, F. & Ulram, P.A. (2000); and Müller, W.C. (1996c, 327).  
635 Mantl, W. (1996, 285); Müller, W.C. (1996c, 348); and Müller, W.C. (1996a, 83).  
636 Müller, W.C. (2006, 411).  
181 
 
about their capability. Voters also acquire information through external 
actors such as the media and different authorities. The media is an 
important source of information to citizens. 75% of Austrians read 
newspapers on a daily basis, and 61% watch programs by the national state 
broadcasting company daily.637 By and large, the media can be regarded as 
free and “daily newspapers, both national and regional, have significant 
circulation and compete intensely”638. The media, furthermore, takes a keen 
interest in and ensures broad press coverage of reports from for instance 
the Audit Board. Sickinger in fact regards investigative journalism as an 
important factor when it comes to restraining corruption.639  
Access to relevant information is also likely to be enhanced by rules related 
to transparency and the fact that “public officials must provide information 
or facts within the sphere of activity of their department or office”640. Access 
to information is, however, also obstructed by the fact that the Criminal 
Code includes paragraphs emphasizing public secrecy. This, oftentimes, 
prevents public officers from releasing information. If a public officer 
refuses to provide information he/she must, however, provide an official 
reason to this refusal.641 
The question remains, however, whether citizens and the media have 
sufficient information to capture the more subtle forms of corruption. The 
fact that Austrian voters and other accounting parties tend to know little 
about the interests, linkages and financiers of their candidates and 
representatives, points to more elusive forms of corruption often not being 
captured.   
                                                 
 
637 Winter-Ebmer, R. (2009, 43).  
638 Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2005 
/austria (16.11.2012). 
639 Sickinger, H. (2006, 573).  
640 United Nations (2006) at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public 
/documents/un/unpan023301.pdf (29.3.2013). 
641 Interview 6 – Senior official of the Bureau for Internal Affairs, Ministry of the 
Interior, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
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Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
As demonstrated by the analysis, political parties have considerable 
authority when it comes to holding candidates to account ex ante. 
Candidates often undergo screening by multiple actors at different levels of 
the party and must prove their worth to all of these (selection). This also 
means that sanctions in the form of refusing ballot access can be applied by 
different actors. These sanctions are deemed most accessible to the national 
party organization, which often may overthrow decisions made by other 
entities within the party. Issues related to corruption seem to affect 
nominations to the extent that voters express their condemnation of 
candidates involved in such activities.  
Parties also hold candidates/representatives to account ex post. 
Representatives are monitored through a number of fora, and wrong-doers 
are punished using a wide array of sanctions. These accountability 
mechanisms and sanctions are felt to be accessible to the principals. 
Accountability (during the era of interest) did not, however, seem to take 
issues related to corruption into consideration in a systematic way. All the 
same, this line of accountability is considered to be strong. 
Voters are able to screen candidates who, in turn demonstrate their 
competence and suitability to voters through a number of different fora. 
Information about incumbents who seek re-election is obtained through 
monitoring, and self-reporting by incumbents. Unsuitable candidates can be 
sanctioned by casting a preference vote for a more suitable or trustworthy 
alternative. The analysis shows, however, that voters do not make use of the 
possibility to cast such a vote. As a result, the line of accountability is 
considered to be semi-strong only.  
The analysis also shows that, to the extent that voters do sanction 
representatives perceived as corrupt, these sanctions are directed at the 
political parties rather than the individual representatives. As a result, the 
line of accountability between voters and political parties is deemed to be 
strong.  
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Figure 16: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the Austrian electoral system 
 
As can be seen from the visualization of lines of accountability (figure 16) 
these range from strong to semi-strong. How does this resonate with data on 
corruption in the national context?  
The line of accountability between parties and candidates, firstly, is 
described as strong which points to candidates and representatives being 
restrained and thus unlikely to engage in corrupt activities. This does not, 
however, resonate with perceptions-based survey data which points to MPs 
(and thus also MPs to be) and political actors in general being perceived as 
the greatest culprits. This discrepancy can be explained in a number of ways. 
One possibility is that candidates and representatives are held to account, 
but not with a strong enough emphasis on issues related to corruption. This 
is confirmed by the fact that parties – prior to 2005 – did not seem very 
aware of the need to tackle corruption and therefore also did not use their 
leverage vis-à-vis candidates and representatives to this end. As a result, 
corruption was neither condemned explicitly nor sanctioned in a systematic 
way, which probably allowed actors to get away with at least certain types of 
corrupt practices. Another plausible explanation, however, is that 
perceptions are based more on past experiences than the current situation. 
As a result, one could – in line with the historical overview of corruption in 
Austria – argue (i) that the line of accountability indeed is strong, (ii) that 
corruption amongst representatives as a result has diminished (but that 
people’s perceptions have not yet changed accordingly) and (iii) that a 
certain resonance can be discerned between the strength of the line and data 
available.  
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The line of accountability between voters and candidates/representatives is 
deemed to be semi-strong. This is resonant with the fact that corruption 
among candidates and representatives has diminished but not completely 
vanished from Austrian society, as can be seen from corruption scandals 
during the era of interest.  
The line of accountability between voters and parties, finally, is considered 
to be strong, which points to political parties being restrained by voters and 
therefore unlikely to engage in corrupt practices. This is not resonant with 
perceptions-based survey data, which points to corruption being common in 
political life and amongst political parties. The overview provided above 
shows, however, that the extent of such practices has decreased. As a result, 
the analysis draws the conclusion that perceptions may be lagging behind 
also in this regard. As a consequence, the strength of the line of accounta-
bility is regarded as fairly resonant with the corruption landscape during the 
era of interest.  
In the light of these facts, the strength of lines of accountability is deemed to 
resonate fairly well with data on corruption.  
5.2.2.3 Lines of accountability inherent to the vertical distribution of 
power, and linkages to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest  
Austria is a federal state, consisting of a four-tiered administrative structure. 
The first tier is that of federal Government under the leadership of the 
Federal Chancellor, the federal ministers and the Federal President, among 
others. The second tier is that of the provinces (also called states or 
Bundesländer) under the leadership of provincial legislatures and governors. 
The final two tiers are those of districts and municipalities (or local com-
munities, Gemeinden), led by district commissioners and councils, 
respectively. Given that powers at the sub-national level for the most part 
are concentrated with the States / Provinces, the analysis will focus on these 
entities; principal-agent relationships (i) within them and (ii) between them 
and federal Government. Such an approach is also justified given that “the 
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Austrian Constitution only allocates legislative and executive powers 
between the Federation and the States”642.  
Austria is made up of nine provinces.643 According to the so called residual 
clause of the Constitution, powers not specifically assigned to the central 
level are assigned to the provinces, each of which also has a Constitution of 
its own as well as a popularly elected legislature (Landtag)644. Executive 
powers are held by a provincial government (Landesregierung), which 
consists of a governor (Landeshauptmann or -Frau) and councillors 
(Landesräte).645 There are no ministers as such within the provinces but 
rather a common State Government Office.646 The governor has a dual role 
within a province in that he/she, on the one hand, is the (political) head of 
the provincial executive and the administrative head of the State 
Government Office, but on the other also acts as the top federal represen-
tative at the provincial level.647  
Legislative and executive powers are divided between federal Government 
and the provinces in a number of ways. Certain policy areas fall exclusively 
within the competence of federal Government. These include “foreign policy, 
the military, immigration, the constitution, the judiciary, criminal and civil 
law, and law enforcement”648. A second category649 of policy areas fall within 
the competence of federal Government with regards to policy formulation, 
but execution remains the responsibility of the provinces. These include 
“housing, education, social welfare, land reform, population policy, and 
matters concerning electrical power”650. There are also, however, policy 
                                                 
 
642 Stelzer, M. (2011, 153).  
643 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 58). 
644 Erk, J. (2004, 2); Sturm, R. (2005, 48); and Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 128).  
645 Banks, A.S., Muller, T.C. & Overstreet, W.R. (eds.) (2007, 73); and Kurian, G.T. 
(ed.) (2007, 130).  
646 Bundeskanzleramt (no year, 27).  
647 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 48), see also Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2010, 146).  
648 O’Regan, V. (2006, 69), see also Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 128).  
649 This category actually consist of two different spheres of competence, namely a) 
policy areas where the federation legislates and the provinces execute and b) policy 
areas where the federation passes framework legislation, based on which the 
provinces pass implementing laws, whereupon execution is the responsibility of the 
province, see Sturm, R. (2005, 49).  
650 O’Regan, V. (2006, 69), see also Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 128).  
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areas which are the competence of the provinces alone in terms of legisla-
tion as well as execution. These include “zoning and regional planning, hun-
ting, land transfers, conservation, and local law enforcement issues”651. The 
provinces rely on tax income and financial transfers from federal Govern-
ment for the execution of provincial as well as federal laws.652 According to 
the OECD, “[a]pproximately 28% of all public financial resources flow to 
Länder and municipalities”653. 
Austria does not constitute the most typical of federal states due to the 
prominent role of federal Government within the system. Robbers maintains 
that, over the years, more and more power has passed from the provinces to 
the federation and that most important powers now reside with federal 
Government, which dominates the system.654 This is corroborated by Kurian, 
who describes federal supervision, control and regulations as pervasive, 
leaving other entities little freedom of action.655  
Erk, for his part, highlights the presence of federation (an institutional form) 
in the Austrian polity, but the absence of federalism (a value concept). By 
this, he wishes to emphasize the fact that Austrian society in fact is very 
homogenous, and lacks the “territorially based social diversity [which is] a 
sine qua non for a federal frame of mind”656. According to Erk, political 
parties, provincial governments, voters, courts, civil society organizations 
and trade unions in fact all seem to condone centralization and seek 
nationwide policies.657 Bußjäger also maintains that the provinces take little 
interest in shouldering new competencies since this would increase their 
work load and intensify accountability.658 Even the Federal Council, 
designated to represent provincial (Länder) interests, has become part of 
nationwide politics. Erk lays stress upon the fact that voting patterns in the 
Federal Council correspond more to the party affiliation than the 
geographical background of the members.659  
                                                 
 
651 O’Regan, V. (2006, 69), see also Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 128).  
652 Sturm, R. (2005, 48).  
653 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010, 150).  
654 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 59), see also Erk, J. (2004, 1).  
655 Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 130).  
656 Erk, J. (2004, 1-3).  
657 Erk, J. (2004, 9 and 11).  
658 Bußjäger, P. (2010, 15 and 26).  
659 Erk, J. (2004, 7-8).  
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Scholars maintain, however, that the provinces should not be regarded as 
weak and uninfluential. They stress that the provinces may not be strong 
constitutionally but that political realities and structures enable them to 
promote their own interests and prevent federal reforms which are un-
desirable from their point of view. This is often done through the institution 
of the governor, who remains the power house within the province.660  
Although not the most typical of federal states, (i) the Austrian territory is 
divided into autonomous regions, (ii) there are different layers of govern-
ment, and power is divided between these and, perhaps most importantly, 
(iii) the centre is not able to alter the competencies of the regions against 
their will. Given these trait, Austria is regarded as a federal state despite the 
fact that federal Government plays a relatively prominent role within the 
system.  
The analysis thus takes an interest in a number of principal-agent 
relationships of relevance to the division of power between the centre and 
the periphery. These include (i) a number of actors (including the voters, the 
Federal President and the Cabinet) as principals to the provincial legislature 
(Landtag), (ii) a number of actors (including the provincial legislature and 
the Cabinet) as principals to the provincial government (Landesregierung), 
(iii) the governor (Landeshauptmann or –Frau) as a principal to the council-
lors (Landesräte), (iv) the Federal Council as a principal to the National 
Council, and (v) the provincial legislature as a principal to the Federal 
Council, see figure 17. 
  
                                                 
 
660 Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (3.9.2009). 
188 
 
Figure 17: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the Austrian vertical 
division of power 
 
Analysis of accountability and corruption 
a. Voters as principals to the provincial legislature  
Members of the provincial legislatures are popularly elected, using the same 
electoral principles as those used for the election of representatives to the 
National Council.661 The number of representatives in the provincial 
legislatures varies from 36 to 65, depending on the province. The Province 
of Vienna, however, exceptionally has as many as 100 deputies due to its 
sizable population.662 Elections to the provincial legislature are organized 
every 5 years.663 During the period of interest to the thesis, the voting age in 
elections to the provincial legislature was 18 years.664 In 2003, the voter 
turnout in elections to the provincial legislature ranged from 65% to 95%, 
depending on the constituency.665 For the most part this was slightly lower 
                                                 
 
661 Communication 1 - Senior official with the Federal Election Commission, Ministry 
of the Interior, Vienna, Austria (20.11.2012), also see Bußjäger, P. (2010, 14).  
662 Solsten, E. (ed.) at http://countrystudies.us/austria/ (6.11.2012). 
663 Except for Upper Austria, where they occur every six years, see Solsten, E. (ed.) at 
http://countrystudies.us/austria/ (6.11.2012). 
664 It has since been lowered to 16 years of age, see Government Burgenland at 
http://wahl.bgld.gv.at/wahlen/lt.nsf/Wahlvorgang.htm (14.11.2012). 
665 Oberösterreich Landesregierung at http://www.land-oberoesterreich.gv.at 
/cps/rde/xbcr/ooe/StatPol_LT2003_Gesamt2.pdf (14.11.2012). 
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than voter turnout in elections for the National Council.666 This said, voters 
were mobilized on election day, which remains an important prerequisite 
for holding candidates accountable.  
Another prerequisite for successful accountability is that of voters taking an 
interest in politics and society, and being informed enough to engage in 
monitoring. Scholars confirm that Austrians do exhibit an interest in 
politics.667 Dachs, for his part, provides an overview of citizens’ access to 
information at the provincial level. According to him, reporting by the ORF 
(the public broadcasting company) from the provinces has improved in 
terms of quality as well as quantity from the 1970s onward. He describes the 
regional broadcasting as “objective and balanced”668, which points to citi-
zens being able to make informed decisions. Access to newspapers reporting 
on provincial matters has furthermore improved in that many provinces 
have several regional newspapers which do not hesitate to criticise decision-
makers and discuss delicate matters.669 Many provinces also have communi-
cation strategies in place to make sure that information is shared systemati-
cally and to the relevant actors.670 
Voters also gain (subjective) information about candidates during election 
campaigns, which constitute fora where candidates strive to make their 
priorities (and personal qualities) known to the voters (selection). The 
extent to which these campaigns enable voters to gain knowledge about the 
true intentions of the candidates is, however, hard to establish. This is 
particularly so since many provincial politicians, according to Dachs, tend to 
regard election campaigns as an “inconvenient necessity”671, portraying 
competition, conflict and ideological differences between parties, whereas in 
reality, once the politicians have assumed office, a more consensual 
approach, void of ideology, often is adopted.  
                                                 
 
666 Communication 1 - Senior official with the Federal Election Commission, Ministry 
of the Interior, Vienna, Austria (20.11.2012). 
667 Austrians do, however, exhibit a lesser tendency for party affiliation and party 
loyalty, see Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, 
Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
668 Dachs, H. (2008, 93).  
669 Dachs, H. (2008, 94).  
670 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010, 152).  
671 Dachs, H. (2008, 93).  
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Voters at the provincial level are thus active, interested in politics and fairly 
informed about political and social issues. The question remains, however, 
whether voting is associated with accountability, and whether issues related 
to corruption are taken into account on election day. Much points to the 
answer on both accounts being affirmative. Provincial elections in the 1980s 
and 1990s serve to illustrate this point in that voters at the provincial level 
(just like those at the federal level) started showing increased discontent 
with the system and corrupt behaviour by politicians and political parties. 
This resulted in increased voter mobility and “the former two-party systems 
in the Länder [being] transformed into multi-party-systems”672. Provinces 
which had been ruled by the same parties over decades also saw the 
emergence of new majorities. From the perspective of accountability and 
combating corruption, this turned the tide in that sanctions were employed, 
which meant that politicians, accustomed to being re-elected without an 
effort and not being held accountable for their actions, were reminded about 
their duties vis-à-vis their principals, the voters.  
b. The Federal President as a principal to the provincial legislature  
The Federal President constitutes another principal to the members of the 
provincial legislatures. According to the Austrian Constitution (which also in 
this case may be compared to a contract stipulating the rights and duties of 
principals and agents), the Federal President may – upon the request of the 
federal Government and with the (2/3 majority) assent by the Federal 
Council – sanction the provincial legislature ex post by dissolving it. The 
President may only dissolve the legislature once for the same reason673, 
however, and may not act at will in this regard. A scholar highlights that the 
Federal President never has dissolved a provincial legislature and that these 
usually are dissolved by a majority resolution by the Landtag itself. The 
same scholar attributes this to “de facto parliamentarism [being] stronger 
than the legal powers the President has”674.  
  
                                                 
 
672 Bußjäger, P. (2010, 28).  
673 Legislationline (Constitution of Austria, art. 100(1)) at http://legislationline.org 
/documents/section/constitutions (19.11.2012). 
674 Communication 2 - Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (9.1.2013). 
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c. The federal Cabinet as a principal to the provincial legislature 
When the execution of a provincial law “depends on the co-operation with 
federal authorities”675, the law in question must be scrutinized by the 
relevant federal ministers. According to the Constitution of Austria, the 
provincial legislature must, after passing such a law, inform the Federal 
Chancellery. The federal Government then has eight weeks to object to the 
enactment if it is felt to jeopardize federal interests. 676  
The federal Government may oppose the proposed law but it may 
“nevertheless come into force if the state Parliament passes it a second time 
with a vote of at least half of its membership” and a 2/3 majority of the votes 
cast.677 As a consequence, this sanction cannot be regarded as an efficient 
tool to hold the provincial legislature accountable, but rather as more of a 
formality. If the law is perceived to be unconstitutional, the federal Govern-
ment may, however, challenge it by bringing the matter before the Consti-
tutional Court.678  
d. The provincial legislature as a principal to the provincial government 
Members of provincial governments are appointed from within the provin-
cial legislatures according to different rules and procedures, depending on 
the province.  
The governor, first of all, is appointed by the provincial legislature. In 
practice, the governor tends to be the head of the party which has received a 
majority of votes in the elections for the Landtag, wherefore little screening 
is undertaken by the provincial legislature. Due to this “automation”, the 
provincial legislature has little veritable authority when it came to selecting 
the governor. As a result, ex ante accountability is left to the voters who, 
when electing the provincial legislature also in practice elect the governor. 
Voters are also able to hold the governor to account ex post, come the next 
election.  
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The provincial legislature also has rather limited possibilities to hold the 
governor and the councillors accountable ex post, particularly in certain 
provinces. In 2/9 (and after 1998 4/9) provinces the majority principle 
guides the appointment of members in the provincial governments. 
Governments in these provinces are thus formed by members from the party 
which has received a majority of votes in the elections to the provincial 
legislature. When no party has obtained a majority of votes cast – or when 
the governor wants to ensure broader support – coalition governments are 
formed.679 Parties unrepresented in the provincial government form an 
opposition, more or less capable of holding the provincial government to 
account. 
Most provincial governments are, however, formed according to so called 
Regierungsproporz, which means that all parties represented in the provin-
cial legislature also are included in the provincial government.680 Such 
“governments of state unity”681 have a number of consequences for the 
provinces, not least from the point of view of accountability and efficiency.  
Regierungsproporz, first of all, means that all parties represented in the 
Landtag are included in the provincial government, regardless of their 
“willingness to cooperate and the compatibility of the different political 
programs”682. This means that provincial governments oftentimes include 
parties with highly divergent views and priorities. This does not, however, 
mean that the provincial government becomes paralyzed in terms of 
decision-making since the governor may force policy-decisions, thus 
assuming a prominent and powerful role within the province.683  
Another consequence of Regierungsproporz is that of doing away with an 
opposition strong enough to control the provincial government. Those 
parties left out of the provincial government (if any) are in fact usually small 
parties with very limited influence over decision-making.684 This is of 
importance from the point of view of accountability ex post, since members 
of the provincial government in general – and the governor in particular – 
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end up not being challenged by its principal, the provincial legislature. This, 
naturally, means that sanctions in the form of votes of no confidence, if 
tabled, are unlikely to be successful. An expert confirms that votes of no 
confidence by the provincial legislature against the provincial governments 
are rare, and can only recollect one successful case, namely the Landtag of 
Carinthia passing a vote of no confidence against the Governor of Carinthia 
of the time, forcing him to leave office.685  
Governors thus tend to have a powerful position within the province. The 
fact that they tend to be popular further adds to their strength. There are 
many reasons for their popularity, including the fact that they have 
privileged access to the local media as a result of which they can cultivate an 
image of themselves as the “provincial patriarch (Landesvater)”686. Given the 
division of power between the federal and the provincial level, they also 
tend to shoulder tasks which involve benefitting community members 
rather than “taking” from them. As expressed by Müller: “they only spend, 
but do not tax”687. As a consequence of the above, governors tend to face 
little political criticism and have often “stayed in office for decades”688.  
Holding governors to account is thus a challenge for most principals 
discussed above. One exception, however, is that of the (federal or 
provincial) audit offices, which cannot be circumscribed. This also provides 
members of the provincial legislature with important information about 
activities within the executive branch since the Court of Audit, when 
auditing institutions within the provinces, “acts as body of the laender 
parliament concerned”689.  
e. The federal Cabinet as a principal to the provincial government  
As discussed above, the provincial government is tasked with the execution 
of (i) laws passed at the provincial level as well as (ii) laws passed at the 
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federal level. The latter task is often called indirect federal execution 
(Mittelbaren Bundesverwaltung).690 When executing federal laws, the gover-
nor of the province constitutes the “top representative of the federal govern-
ment in the Land”691. As such, he is dependent on instructions from the 
federal Cabinet or individual federal ministers, and remains accountable to 
these.692 This points to federal Government having considerable powers 
over the governor and the provincial government, especially since failure on 
the part of the governor to behave in accordance with the instructions from 
federal Government may lead to him being “brought before the Constitutio-
nal Court, which may declare the behaviour of the governor unconstitutio-
nal, deprive him of his office, or deprive him temporarily of his political 
rights”693. The Constitution constitutes a powerful benchmark against which 
the governor is evaluated. Compliance with instructions, rules and regu-
lations is monitored and ensured through a wealth of meetings, reports and 
conferences.  
A leading scholar, however, stresses that federal authority over the governor 
and the provincial government has its limitations. This has been illustrated 
by a number of cases involving governors defying the instructions of the 
federal Government. One such case is that of the state of Carinthia at one 
point not respecting minority rights, namely not ensuring road signs in two 
languages. This was required by the Constitution, wherefore the federal 
Government should have forced the Governor of Carinthia to act, but did no 
such thing. The reason, according to an expert, was that the Chancellor’s 
party was dependent on the political support of majority groups within 
Carinthia.694 This example goes to show that party politics also influence 
whether the provincial government is held accountable by the federal 
Government.  
Müller stresses that governors sometimes even have the upper hand vis-à-
vis federal Government. A governor who defies instructions from federal 
Government tends to be regarded as a hero of the province and a “defender 
                                                 
 
690 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 242).  
691 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 48).  
692 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 242); and Dachs, H. (1996, 240).  
693 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 48).  
694 Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (3.9.2009). 
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of the rights of his Land”695, whereas a governor punished by the federal 
Government becomes something of a “martyr for his Land”696. As long as the 
governor is in command of a majority within the provincial legislature, he 
may in fact not suffer very much from sanctions imposed by federal 
Government in that he always may dissolve the provincial legislature, hold 
new elections, and – given the respect earned by defying federal 
Government – count on being re-elected.697 A politically strong governor, 
therefore, can be sanctioned ex post by federal Government, but is unlikely 
to suffer greatly from these sanctions. His position may in fact be 
strengthened by the sanctions imposed. 
Pelinka and Rosenberg, as well as Dachs, finally, maintain that provinces 
carry certain clout vis-à-vis federal Government through what they call 
collective federalism. They refer to cooperation between provinces within 
the framework of informal governors’ conferences (Landeshauptleutekon-
ferenzen). At these conferences, common interests are discussed and 
identified as well as ways of approaching federal Government with joint 
demands.698 As such, they represent a tool through which the provinces can 
approach federal Government as a united – and thus more powerful – front. 
The tool can be used – for instance – to gain influence with regards to EU 
policy: “[i]f the Länder agree on a certain position concerning their auto-
nomous sphere of competency, the federal Government has to accept this 
position and has to vote accordingly on the European level”699.  
The above shows that federal Government may hold the governor and the 
provincial government to account ex post, but that sanctions may not have 
the desired effects. The analysis also shows that party politics at times 
influences whether actors are held to account, and that the authority of 
federal Government is reduced if the provinces act jointly.  
  
                                                 
 
695 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 49), see also Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute 
of Conflict Research, Vienna, Austria (3.9.2009). 
696 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 49).  
697 Such a procedure, however, presupposes that the governor has not been 
deprived of his political rights, see Müller, W.C. (1996b, 49).  
698 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 243); and Dachs, H. (1996, 243).  
699 Sturm, R. (2005, 52).  
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f. The governor as a principal to the councillors  
Provincial governments are headed by a governor, who appoints councillors 
or members of the provincial government (Landesräte).700 If the party of the 
governor rules alone, he is able to screen and appoint all councillors. If part 
of a provincial coalition government, however, he screens and appoints a 
portion of the councillors, whereas coalition partners appoint the rest. 
Candidates selected by the governor are likely to be known to him 
beforehand in that many of them tend to be part of the same party 
organization. They will thus have been able to convince the governor about 
their capabilities and interests (selection). This enables the governor to hold 
at least part of the councillors accountable ex ante. No information is 
available with regards to the criteria against which councillor candidates are 
evaluated, however. One can thus only assume that it would be in the 
governor’s (as well as coalition partners’) interest to select councillors of 
high standing, i.e. (from the point of view of this thesis) persons perceived to 
put the interests of the province before their personal interests.  
The governor’s authority with regards to holding councillors accountable ex 
post also depends on circumstances. As already mentioned, governors hold 
an interesting dual role within the provinces. On the one hand provincial 
governments are tasked with executing laws passed at the provincial level. 
Within this area of competence, the governor remains one member of the 
provincial government among others. As a result, he has no authority over 
other members of the provincial government,701 and is unable to hold 
councillors to account ex post.  
Provincial competencies aside, provincial governments are also tasked with 
executing laws passed by the National Council. These tasks usually go by the 
term indirect federal execution, and have been discussed above. When 
acting within this area of competence, the governor “acts as the 
administrative authority, […] authorised […] to give instructions to the other 
                                                 
 
700 Zsilincsar, W. (2012, 13).  
701 The Austrian Foreign Ministry at http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-
ministry/austria/government-and-politics/the-laender-administration.html 
(19.11.2012). 
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government members”702. In this capacity, he is able to monitor and sanction 
councillors ex post.  
The governor also acts as the chair of the State Government Office. In this 
capacity, he holds administrative staff accountable. This process is likely to 
be enhanced by the fact that administrative staff has relatively speaking 
clearer terms of reference than political actors. Many provinces also have 
detailed guidelines for administrative procedures.703 Both serve as bench-
marks (or contracts) against which staff members are evaluated.  
g. The Federal Council as a principal to the National Council 
Federal systems usually have a second parliamentary chamber, tasked with 
ensuring that representatives of the regions/provinces may participate in 
federal decision-making, and make their voices heard. This is the case also in 
the Austrian polity. The second chamber in Austria, the Federal Council 
(Bundesrat), however, is described as “weak both constitutionally and 
politically”704. This is corroborated by a leading scholar, who sees the 
authority of the provinces as springing from the governor rather than the 
Federal Council, which tends to be guided more by party politics at the 
federal level than the interests of the provinces.705 Sturm confirms that 
members of the Federal Council first and foremost remain loyal to their 
respective parties rather than to their provinces. This is a consequence of 
member of the Federal Council belonging to a joint party group with 
members of the National Council, and following the instructions provided by 
this group. Sturm further states that “the political parties believe it would 
damage their political image if their representatives in the Second Chamber 
held views different from those of their colleagues in the First Chamber”706. 
The powers of the Federal Council over the National Council are outlined in 
the Constitution which thus constitutes something of a contract between the 
                                                 
 
702 The Austrian Foreign Ministry at http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-
ministry/austria/government-and-politics/the-laender-administration.html 
(19.11.2012); and Dachs, H. (1996, 241).  
703 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010, 153).  
704 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 47).  
705 Interview 5 – Senior official with the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna, 
Austria (3.9.2009). 
706 Sturm, R. (2005, 50).  
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institutions. The powers of the Federal Council include a suspensive veto to 
delay legislation by the National Council. Such a veto can, however, be 
overridden by a simple majority within the National Council. As highlighted 
by Pelinka and Rosenberger, “das Veto des Bundesrates ist damit außer 
Kraft gesetzt”707.  
The Federal Council has a stronger position, however, when it comes to 
constitutional legislation aimed at altering the powers of the provinces or 
affecting “the functions of the Federal Council itself”708. Such changes require 
the support of 2/3 of the members of the Federal Council.709 This means that 
the Federal Council can hold the National Council to account by vetoing 
legislation. Given that the voting patterns of members of the Federal Council 
tend to reflect those within the National Council it is, however, uncertain 
whether it will.710 
h. The provincial legislature as a principal to the Federal Council 
Members of the Federal Council are elected by the provincial legislatures. 
The number of representatives elected from a given province depends on 
the population of the province. As a result, the largest provinces elect 12 
members to the Federal Council whereas the smallest elect three, this being 
the minimum of representatives per province.711  
Members of the Federal Council are elected through proportional elections 
and remain in office for as long as the members of the provincial legislature 
do. This means that the former also relinquish their mandate when the latter 
do. Regardless of the election results, at least one seat (out of the total of 
seats to be filled by the province) must be assigned to the second largest 
party in the provincial legislature.712 
Given that members of the provincial legislature have the authority to 
appoint the members of the Federal Council, they also screen them and may 
                                                 
 
707 Pelinka, A. & Rosenberger, S. (2007, 118).  
708 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 60).  
709 Müller, W.C. (1996b, 47).  
710 Erk, J. (2004, 9 and 11).  
711 Legislationline (Constitution of Austria, art. 34(2)) at http://legislationline.org 
/documents/section/constitutions (27.11.2012). 
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sanction candidates which are perceived as unsuitable by refusing to 
appoint them. They may not, however, instruct members of the Federal 
Council ex post, which limits the influence of the provincial legislature over 
members of the Federal Council. The provincial legislature may, however, 
sanction wrong-doers by refusing to re-appoint them.  
As pointed out above, members of the Federal Council seem to be more 
susceptible to the opinions within and instructions from their political party 
and the joint party group than to those of the provincial legislature. This 
points to the party organization having more clout than provincial actors 
when it comes to exercising accountability ex post.713 
Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
As shown by the analysis, preconditions for accountability differ from one 
P/A relationship to another.   
Voters are able to and do screen candidates who, in turn, demonstrate their 
competence to the voters. Voters are also able to monitor incumbents see-
king re-election. Furthermore, voters may sanction unsuitable candidates by 
casting preference votes for candidates perceived to be better suited for the 
task. Preference votes are not more common at the provincial level than at 
the federal level, however, which points to such sanctions, although 
accessible, not being used extensively. Voters seem to sanction parties 
perceived as engaging in or condoning corrupt practices, however. Given the 
important role of parties as intermediaries between voters and their 
representatives, it is argued that the presence of these strengthens the line 
of accountability between voters and candidates, as a result of which the line 
is deemed to be strong.  
The Federal President also constitutes a principal to the provincial legisla-
ture and is formally authorized to dissolve the legislature. He cannot, 
however, use such a sanction single-handedly and at his own initiative, 
wherefore (i) the sanction is deemed to be inaccessible and (ii) the line of 
accountability is regarded as semi-strong.  
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Federal Government (Cabinet) constitutes a principal to the provincial 
legislature in situations where execution of provincial legislation requires its 
cooperation. The Federal Chancellery is notified about such legislation and 
may sanction the provincial legislature by objecting to the legislation. Such 
sanctions are accessible to the principal but rather toothless in that the 
provincial legislature itself may override objections by voting on the 
legislation once more. Federal Government may, however, bring such an 
issue before the Constitutional Court, but only should the law be perceived 
as unconstitutional. As a result, this line of accountability is considered to be 
semi-strong.  
As discussed, the provincial legislature constitutes a principal to the 
provincial government. Holding the latter to account appears to be a 
challenge, however. The governor, firstly, is appointed by the party which 
receives a majority of votes in the elections for the provincial legislature, 
which means that no screening or selection is undertaken on the part of the 
provincial legislature, which also cannot apply sanctions ex ante. The 
procedures applied when appointing members of the provincial government 
vary from one province to another. Regardless of the procedures applied, 
however, members are appointed by the governor and/or the heads of 
coalition partners, which means that the legislature does not screen candi-
dates and is unable to sanction candidates ex ante.  
Accountability ex post is also demanding. The provincial legislature can 
demand written or oral reports/statements from members and is also able 
to monitor the provincial government through committees. Actors such as 
the Court of Audit also monitor the provincial government and report 
directly to its principal. Should members of the provincial legislature be 
dissatisfied with actions taken or decisions made, they may pass a vote of no 
confidence against the provincial government. Such sanctions are not, 
however, deemed accessible to the principal since many provincial govern-
ments are formed according to Regierungsproporz, which means that all or 
most parties represented in the provincial legislature are included in the 
provincial government. In some cases, therefore, no opposition exists to hold 
the provincial government to account. Against the above, the overall line of 
accountability between the provincial legislature and the provincial govern-
ment is deemed to be weak.  
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The liberty of action of the provincial government is also limited by federal 
Government / Cabinet. When executing laws passed at the federal level, the 
governor and his government are forced to report to the federal Cabinet. If 
displeased with actions taken, the federal Cabinet may instruct the 
provincial government or sanction it by taking matters to the Constitutional 
Court. Such sanctions are deemed accessible to the principal and are also 
used in practice. The analysis shows, however, that such sanctions may not 
be very harmful if the governor has strong political support within the 
province, which means that sanctions carry little clout in practice. As a 
result, the line of accountability is regarded as semi-strong only.  
Members of the provincial government are held to account by the governor 
using a number of accountability mechanisms. The extent to which these can 
be used depends on the circumstances, however. When heading a one-party 
provincial government, the governor is able to screen all potential members 
of the provincial government and have them prove their worth to him 
(selection). This also means that he alone engages in ex ante sanctioning of 
candidates who do not meet his approval. When heading a coalition 
government, however, he only screens and sanctions candidates belonging 
to his own party, whereas the heads of coalition partners hold other 
candidates accountable ex ante. Since most provincial governments tend to 
be broad coalitions, the governor is deemed to have limited authority only 
when it comes to holding members of government accountable ex ante.  
The governor’s authority to hold members of the provincial government to 
account ex post depends on the area of competency. In relation to the 
execution of provincial laws, the governor is unable to hold members of the 
provincial government to account since he constitutes one member of the 
provincial government, among others. In relation to the execution of federal 
laws, however, the governor is authorized to instruct, monitor and sanction 
members. As a consequence the overall line of accountability between the 
governor and the members of the provincial government is regarded as 
semi-strong.  
As seen through the analysis, the Federal Council also constitutes a principal 
to the National Council, the aim being to ensure that the provinces are part 
of decision-making and that their voices are heard. The Federal Council is 
formally mandated (i) to delay legislation perceived to run contrary to 
provincial interests through a suspensive veto, and (ii) to veto legislation 
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altering the powers of the provinces or those of the Federal Council itself. 
Members of the Federal Council are able to monitor proposed bills, and 
sanctions are deemed to be accessible to them. Yet, their use may be affected 
by the fact that members of the Federal Council belong to joint party groups 
with members of the National Council and tend to vote along party lines 
rather than geographical ones. As a consequence, this line of accountability 
is considered to be semi-strong.  
The provincial legislature constitutes a principal to the Federal Council in 
that members of the latter are elected by the former. As a result, members of 
the provincial legislature screen candidates and sanction those perceived as 
ill-suited for the task. Members of the provincial legislature may not, 
however, instruct members of the Federal Council ex post and can only 
sanction these by refusing to re-elect them. As a result, this line of ac-
countability is deemed to be semi-strong only.  
Figure 18: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the vertical distribution of power 
 
 
Figure 18 shows that lines of accountability within the sub-national level, 
and between the national and the sub-national levels, range from strong to 
weak. How does this resonate with data on corruption in the national 
context?  
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The extent to which actors and institutions are able to hold members of the 
provincial legislature to account differs, sending mixed signals with regards 
to the likelihood of corruption amongst members of the Landtag. Some 
sources claim, however, that party patronage is a problem particularly at the 
sub-national level, which does not resonate well with the strong line of 
accountability between voters and the provincial legislature.  
These seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled, however. The 
analysis shows, first of all, that the political parties – through patronage – 
only have been able to benefit the few and that losses in terms of political 
support have been greater than benefits due to citizens becoming 
increasingly critical of party patronage. As a result, parties have dissociated 
themselves from patronage. Patronage has not, however, been done away 
with completely, which explains why many still regard corruption as a 
problem at this level and among these actors. Furthermore, the analysis 
points to voters in fact increasingly using their powers to sanction political 
representatives as a result of this discontent.714 Political patronage at the 
sub-national level has thus resulted in many voters becoming more active 
when it comes to accountability, which explains the strong line of accounta-
bility between voters and the provincial legislature. This points to resonance 
between the line of accountability and data on corruption. It is also possible 
that this line in fact is strong enough to compensate for weaker lines 
including the provincial legislature as an agent.  
Opportunities to hold the provincial government to account also differ from 
one principal to another. As can be seen from figure 18, lines of accounta-
bility range from semi-strong to weak, pointing to the governor and 
councillors being susceptible to corruption. Data on corruption does not 
single out these actors as engaging in corrupt practices to a greater extent 
than others, however, but does point to corruption at the sub-national level, 
although decreasing, being a problem. As a result, these lines of accounta-
bility are considered to resonate with data on corruption.  
The semi-strong line of accountability between the governor and the 
councillors, thirdly, points to the latter being vulnerable to corruption. This 
runs contrary to statements that bureaucratic corruption is rare but does 
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voting for different parties rather than different representatives. 
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resonate with corruption being more common at the sub-national level, as a 
result of which the line is found to resonate somewhat with data on 
corruption. 
The line of accountability between the provincial legislature and the Federal 
Council, fourthly, is described as semi-strong, which conveys the impression 
that members of the latter are likely to engage in corrupt practices to a 
somewhat greater extent than others. Data on corruption does not point to 
this being the case, however.  
The line of accountability between the Federal Council and the National 
Council is deemed to be semi-strong, which points to members of the 
National Council being prone to corruption. This is particularly so since 
previous analyses point to many other principals being unable to hold MPs 
to account. As already seen, data on corruption shows that political 
corruption, although apparently decreasing, is a problem and that MPs have 
been implicated in corruption scandals. The line of accountability is 
therefore found to resonate with data on corruption.  
In the light of these facts, the strength of lines of accountability is deemed to 
resonate fairly well with data on corruption.  
5.2.3 Discussion 
The above shows that institutional lines of accountability in the Austrian 
context on the whole range from strong to weak. Strong lines – i.e. veritable 
access to different accountability mechanisms – for the most part go hand in 
hand with low(er) levels of corruption and vice versa, which point to a 
relationship between (i) ease of accountability among principals, and (ii) 
levels of corruption among agents. The political institutions do not just 
reduce levels of corruption, however. Rather, they hamper as well as 
enhance accountability, thus increasing as well as reducing the prevalence of 
corruption, something that will be discussed further in chapters 5.4 and 6.2.  
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Throughout the analysis, the importance of institutions such as the Court of 
Audit and the People’s Attorney has been highlighted.715 It is quite clear that 
especially the Court of Audit constitutes an important accountability-holder 
throughout the system, especially in cases where few other actors are able to 
hold decision-makers to account. The overall legal and regulatory 
framework, the independence of the judiciary as well as the fact that actors 
in general are committed to the rule of law716, are also likely to have 
contributed to the fact that corruption in Austria remains rare, since this 
means that (fair) legal proceedings can be taken against perpetrators, and – 
if need be – the most coercive sanctions applied. As seen, the Constitution 
(and other legislation) can, in fact, be regarded as important contracts 
between a number of principals and agents, specifying their mandates and 
obligations as well as sanctions available to principals.  
The direct or indirect influence of the political parties must also be empha-
sized, especially due to the prominent role of these in Austrian society, and 
the fact that they seem to have penetrated virtually every fibre of society. 
Their effect on processes of accountability is, however, rather ambiguous, as 
also pointed out by Müller.717 On the one hand, parties contribute towards 
actors being held to account in that candidates or representatives who do 
not fulfil certain criteria or live up to certain expectations cannot access the 
ballot, be ranked highly on party list or reach positions of trust within the 
party or the parliamentary organisation. This accountability is of vital 
importance since voters usually cannot engage in more regular or thorough 
monitoring of candidates and representatives, and therefore have to rely on 
parties in this regard. As has been seen throughout the analysis, political 
parties also hamper accountability, however. This is the case e.g. when party 
loyalty ends up being an impediment to the executive being held accoun-
table through a vote of no confidence, when investigative committees cannot 
be appointed due to opposition from the ruling party in the National Council, 
or when party politics prevent federal Government from holding governors 
accountable.718 
                                                 
 
715 In the capacity of independent auditing bodies of the National Council, these have 
been discussed in connection with the National Council and mechanisms through 
which it holds actors to account. 
716 Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 61).  
717 Müller, W.C. (2003, 221).  
718 See chapter 5.2.2.3 which renders and example from the Province of Carinthia. 
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5.3 Case study of Botswana 
As explained in chapter 5.1, this thesis also takes an interest in countries 
whose low levels of corruption – according to the main statistical analysis – 
cannot be explained by the political institutions included in the regression 
analysis. In an effort to trace the determinants of corruption in one such 
country, Botswana, a case study is undertaken. The case study scrutinizes 
Botswana’s institutional and other characteristics, seeking to understand 
how these have affected vulnerability to corruption or the absence thereof.  
The discussion starts with a glance at the corruption landscape of Botswana, 
looking at the faces of and actors involved in corruption in this country 
context as well as institutions established to directly combat corruption. The 
analysis then turns its attention to other factors with a bearing on levels of 
corruption within this country context. 
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Table 28: Basic fact sheet for the Republic of Botswana719 
Independence 30 September 1966 (from Great Britain) 
Constitution March 1965; effective 30 September 1966 
Head of State and 
Government 
President  
Parliament Unicameral Parliament (the National Assembly) with 
a House of Chiefs. The latter has an advisory role only 
and consists of traditional chiefs from different tribes.  
Electoral system  First Past The Post (FPTP), with single member 
constituencies  
Government structure Unitary 
Freedom House 
Freedom in the World 
rating 2000720 
Free (PR 2, CL 2)(i) 
Transparency 
International CPI rating 
2005 
5.9 (ii) 
World Bank Institute 
WGI rating 2005 
1.100 (iii) 
(i) PR = political rights, CL = civil liberties (1-7 scale, 1 indicating the highest degree of 
freedom) 
(ii) 0 to 10 scale, (10 being the least corrupt) 
(iii) -2.5 to +2.5 scale (+2.5 being the least corrupt). Within the statistical analysis, a 0-5 
scale has been used. 
5.3.1 Corruption in Botswana 
In 2005, the final year of interest to this thesis, Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index assigned Botswana a score of 5.9 (on a 0-10 
scale), ranking Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of the same year also pointed to 
Botswana being perceived as fairly non-corrupt, the corruption score 
assigned being 1.1 (on a scale between -2.5 and +2.5).721 
                                                 
 
719 Sources: Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007); CIA World Fact Book at https://www.cia.gov 
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (27.08.2010); 
Transparency International at http://www.transparency.org/ (2.10.2008), Freedom 
House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports (1.9.2008); and the World Bank at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (2.10.2008). 
720 This year is recorded due to the time frame of the thesis (2000-2005). 
721 See Transparency International CPI at http://archive.transparency.org 
/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (19.11.2012); and the World Bank 
Group at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (19.11.2012). Within the 
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Different sources confirm that, as opposed to some other countries in the 
region, corruption is a relatively rare phenomenon in Botswana. In its 
annual report for 2003, the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC), for instance, points to corruption existing but not having become 
entrenched in the country.722 This is confirmed by Charlton, who calls 
corruption the “missing dimension”723 in Botswana’s politics. According to 
Charlton, this applies regardless of the level of government, and to the 
political as well as the bureaucratic spheres.724 
For the most part, in-country interviews conducted seem to corroborate this 
view. At a very general level, most respondents agree that Botswana should 
be regarded as an exceptional case in that corrupt activities occur only 
rarely.725 When going into details, however, some stress that there might be 
more to the picture than what meets the eye, referring to more elusive forms 
of corruption which tend to remain undetected.726 The discussion below 
focuses on the reported and said faces of corruption in Botswana, the actors 
involved in corrupt activities as well as the institutional framework for 
combating corruption. 
5.3.1.1 Forms of corruption in the context of Botswana 
Although not a hotbed for corruption, corrupt activities do occur in 
Botswana. These assume different shapes and forms, as can be seen from the 
enumeration provided by Sebudubudu, who states that corruption in 
Botswana materializes as “fraud, bribes, […] inflating government tenders, 
cost overruns, […] inflating allowances, misleading tender boards, forging 
                                                                                                                         
 
statistical analysis, the WGI scale has been transformed into a 0-5 scale to facilitate 
the interpretation of the results.  
722 See Gbadamosi, G. at http://eprints.worc.ac.uk/88/ (2.12.2011); and the 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (2005) at www.dcec.gov.bw 
/download/1245400697_AR_2003_Write_up.pdf (04.03 2013). 
723 Charlton, R. (1990, 6).  
724 Charlton, R. (1990, 6).  
725 See e.g. Interview 10 - Senior official of the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana 
(3.10.2012); and Interview 14 – Staff member with the Lutheran Mission, Gaborone, 
Botswana (5.10.2012). 
726 Interview 15 – Senior Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012); and Interview 18 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
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documents, obtaining money by false pretences, illegal sale of passports, 
embezzlement of trust funds, misappropriation of money, money 
laundering, unnecessary travel and travel claims, and general unethical 
behaviour”727. According to Charlton, political patronage728 also occurs in 
Botswana. Charlton specifies that such practices usually revolve around 
elections, which means that rewards are used as an electoral incentive. He 
emphasizes, however, that rewards are tightly rationed by the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) leadership and that rewards tend to be evenly 
distributed, disregarding whether an area is controlled by the ruling party or 
the opposition.729 Charlton also accounts for what could be likened to a small 
scale spoils system730 whereby supporters of the winning party are 
rewarded in different ways. All in all, however, he stresses that “the bulk of 
government expenditure […] is targeted in such a way as to seriously 
undermine any attempts to define the BDP as a mainly patronage-focused 
party or to delineate Botswana’s politics in patron-client terms”731. He 
attributes this to a number of factors, including “a remarkable unity or 
purpose and continuity of policy choices in relations to corruption and spoils 
limitation”732. This is confirmed by von Soest, who maintains that 
“neopatrimonial tendencies always [have] existed in Botswana” 733, but to a 
limited extent.  
This said, the country has not escaped major corruption scandals. Most 
sources analysing corruption in the Botswana context focus on a number of 
scandals dating back to the 1990s. These include (i) a corrupt tendering 
process related to the procurement of schoolbooks, which ended up being 
the centre of attention of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry in 1991, (ii) 
the abuse of power to acquire land in Mogaditshane outside Gaborone, 
                                                 
 
727 Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 126).  
728 “The distribution of jobs and favors on a political basis, as to those who have 
supported one's party or political campaign”, see Dictionary.com at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/patronage (14.3.2013).  
729 Charlton, R. (1990, 7).  
730 “The postelection practice of rewarding loyal supporters of the winning 
candidates and party with appointive public offices”, see Free Dictionary by Farlex 
at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/spoils+system (14.3.2013). 
731 Charlton, R. (1990, 10).  
732 Charlton, R. (1990, 21-22).  
733 Von Soest, C. (2009, 6). Von Soest understands neopatrimonialism as a mixture 
between patrimonialism (patrons offering gifts in order to obtain loyalty and 
support) and Weberian legal-rational rule. 
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investigated by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry in the same year, and 
(iii) the misuse of high office within the Botswana Housing Cooperation, 
looked into by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry in 1992.734 Good and 
von Soest also account for a scandal related to loans granted to high level 
officials by the National Development Bank (NDB). According to Good, many 
of these officials did not qualify for loans from the NDB in the first place. He 
also quotes the interim general manager of the NDB (appointed after the 
scandal) according to whom political pressure seems to have influenced 
lending decisions. Furthermore, many of these officials failed to service the 
loans granted, as a result of which the NDB nearly faced bankruptcy.735  
Sebudubudu discusses potential linkages between these scandals (as well as 
smaller incidents), on the one hand, and the 1982 Presidential Commission 
on Economic Opportunities, on the other. Prior to the Presidential 
Commission on Economic Opportunities, civil servants and ministers were 
prohibited from being involved in business other than traditional 
agriculture. The Commission ruled, however, that civil servants and 
ministers should be allowed to engage in business like other citizens, as long 
as they declared their assets and interests. The verdict resulted in a 
multitude of ministers and civil servants engaging in business ventures.736 
Contrary to the recommendations of the Commission, however, no formal 
mechanism was put in place to ensure that the parties concerned declared 
their assets. Efforts by the opposition to table a Bill on the Declaration of 
Assets and Liabilities have at several occasions failed since the initiative by 
some is felt to be against Tswana culture and a violation of the fundamental 
rights of every citizen, as granted by the Constitution.737 As a result, a 
blurring of the distinction between public and private roles has occurred, 
something that increases the risk of conflicts of interest, and thereby 
corruption. 
                                                 
 
734 For further information, see Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 126-128).  
735 Von Soest, C. (2009, 16); and Good, K. (1994, 511-512).  
736 Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 134).  
737 Botswana Gazette (27.7.2011) at http://www.gazettebw.com 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10650%3Amasisi-says-no-to-
declaration-of-assets&catid=18%3Aheadlines&Itemid=2 (9.12.2011).  
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5.3.1.2 Actors involved in corrupt practices 
Corrupt activities occur at different levels of society and involve different 
actors. Mbao and Komboni maintain that corruption in Botswana is 
something that mainly elites engage in. This is corroborated by Good,738 who 
describes corruption in Botswana as “pale and restricted”739, and almost 
exclusively an elite phenomenon. Where corruption includes other layers of 
society, Good states, “it is under conditions seemingly sanctioned by some 
participating government leaders and officials”740. Von Soest, for his part, 
speaks of “old-boys networks” at the highest level, and the fact that 
“boundaries between public and private interests [within these] are 
blurred”741. More specifically, he refers to the ”close integration of 
Botswana’s political and economic elite”742, namely the fact that members of 
Government often wear many hats, including being “owners or directors of 
commercial companies and farming enterprises”743 alongside their public 
functions. 
A closer look at reported cases, however, mainly points to instances of petty 
corruption. Gbadamosi744 states that most reported instances of corruption 
are perpetuated by junior employees such as clerks, receptionists, teachers 
and guards, something that is confirmed by the Directorate of Corruption 
and Economic Crime (DCEC), which states that although senior officials 
sometimes are implicated in corruption scandals, the majority of reported 
cases involve officials at lower levels.745  
Public awareness surveys conducted in Botswana in 2001/2, finally, point to 
citizens regarding the public sector and the sub-national (council) level as 
most prone to corruption.746 Data from the DCEC shows that corruption 
cases indeed are common within the Ministry of Local Government (the 
                                                 
 
738 Mbao, M.L.M & Komboni, G.G. (2008, 63); Good, K. (1994, 516); see also Interview 
15 – Senior Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012). 
739 Good, K. (1994, 516).  
740 Good, K. (1994, 516).  
741 Von Soest, C. (2009, 17).  
742 Von Soest, C. (2009, 16).  
743 Von Soest, C. (2009, 16).  
744 Gbadamosi, G. at http://eprints.worc.ac.uk/88/ (2.12.2011).  
745 The Director of the DCEC quoted in Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 134).  
746 Gbadamosi, G. at http://eprints.worc.ac.uk/88/ (2.12.2011).  
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parent ministry of sub-national entities), and that the Gaborone City Council 
has been particularly exposed.747 
As is the case in many countries, it seems that national statistics mainly 
capture the more tangible forms of corruption such as bribes offered or 
taken by lower level officials. Forms of corruption which are more difficult 
to discern, however, are rarely reported and therefore by many perceived as 
a lesser problem.  
5.3.1.3 Institutional arrangements to directly counteract corruption  
In response to the incidents of corruption of the early 1990s, the state scaled 
up its efforts to counteract corruption by enacting the Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act (1994) which provides an important national 
benchmark when determining whether a certain type of conduct constitutes 
corruption or not. The officially adopted definition of corruption as the 
“[a]buse of official position for personal gain or offering, accepting or 
soliciting a valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or 
not doing an act which amount to abusing one’s official position”748 cannot, 
however, be found in the Act. Instead, the Corruption and Economic Crimes 
Act lists a number of “valuable considerations” which may be used in 
different contexts to affect decisions made by public officials in a corrupt 
manner.749 The Act stipulates that receiving as well as offering or promising 
such valuable considerations constitute a corruption offence and that these 
offences may be active as well as passive i.e. enforcing rules in an arbitrary 
manner or failing to enforce rules and regulations altogether. As such, the 
Act can be interpreted as covering a variety of different forms of 
corruptions, with the reservation that one party should be a public officer.750  
                                                 
 
747 Mfundisi, A. (2008, 62 and 65).  
748 Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) at http://www.gov.bw 
/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/State-President/Department-of-Corruption-
and-Economic-Crime-DCEC/About-the-DCEC1/History-and-Mandate/What-is-the-
DCEC/ (25.2.2013). 
749 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) at 
http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Botswana/Laws/Botsw
ana%20Corruption%20and%20Economic%20Crime%20Act%201994.pdf 
(25.2.2013). 
750 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) “Botswana Corruption and 
Economic Crime Act 1994”, Part I, paragraph 2 at http://www.track.unodc.org 
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Soft law is also used to deter actors from corrupt behaviour, and to punish 
offenders. Actors within the public service are guided by a code of conduct 
which urges public servants to show honesty, fairness, openness, and 
efficiency, give equal treatment to citizens, act in accordance with the public 
interest and accountability standards, and avoid situations where private 
interests may come into conflict with the exercise of their public duty. The 
code also specifies that the same behaviour is expected from counterparts in 
their dealings with the public service.751 Furthermore, the Public Service 
Charter specifies not only the above virtues but also that public officers 
should be on their guard against corruption, abuse of office and influence 
peddling, as well as actively participate in the fight against corruption by 
reporting incidents.752  
In 2005, the final year of interest to the analysis, a code of conduct for 
political actors was being discussed but had not yet been finalized.753 During 
the era of interest to the thesis, the behaviour of parliamentarians was 
therefore guided by parliamentary rules of procedure754, whereas that of 
ministers (and assistant ministers) at least partly was guided by the so 
called Green Book. According to the Green Book, ministers (and assistant 
ministers) should (i) resign from positions which might put them in situa-
tions of conflict of interest, (ii) disclose any private business activities or 
financial interests to the President upon assumption of office, and (ii) refrain 
from using official information for private profit or that of friends or 
family.755 
As can be seen from the above, Botswana has chosen to define corruption in 
much the same way as many other countries and has also put in place 
                                                                                                                         
 
/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Botswana/Laws/Botswana%20Corruption%20and
%20Economic%20Crime%20Act%201994.pdf (25.2.2013). 
751 Government of Botswana at http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities 
/Ministries/State-President/Department-of-Corruption-and-Economic-Crime-
DCEC/Policies/Codes-of-Conduct-in-the-Public-Service/Code-Principles/ 
(26.2.2013). 
752 Republic of Botswana “Public Service Charter” at http://www.gov.bw/Global 
/DPSM/public%20service%20CHARTER.pdf?epslanguage=en (28.2.2013).  
753 Obubeng, M. at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-137420127 
/mixed-feelings-draft-code.html (27.2.2013). 
754 Barei, G. (2008, 23).  
755 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 43).  
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similar legal provisions and other formal rules as those of many other 
countries.  
The country’s commitment to fight corruption is also visible from the 
establishment of an anti-corruption agency, the Directorate of Corruption 
and Economic Crime (DCEC).756 The Directorate was modelled after the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, 
perceived to be highly successful in its anti-corruption efforts.757 Much like 
the ICAC, the DCEC was made into an “operationally autonomous law 
enforcement agency”758, whose mandate extends to investigating, preventing 
and educating the public about corruption.  
The establishment of the DCEC was a contentious issue. Upon the creation of 
the Directorate, critics described its powers as “draconian”759, referring to 
the fact that the Director has the powers to investigate suspected offenses, 
demand and obtain information related to the investigation, arrest suspects, 
use reasonable force, search suspects and premises, and seize evidence and 
travel documents.760  
Due to the powers vested in the Directorate it has, however, seen certain 
successes and its workload has increased steadily over time. Whereas only 
254 reports of corruption were received by the Directorate in 1994, this 
number increased to 1775 in 2003. The increased number of cases has been 
a challenge for the DCEC, however. The Directorate does not have the 
necessary manpower to handle cases swiftly and effectively and finds it 
difficult to recruit skilled staff, as a result of which investigators remain 
overburdened with work: “the current case load of investigators is about 
three times higher [12 active cases per investigator] than the recommended 
                                                 
 
756 Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) at http://www.gov.bw 
/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/State-President/Department-of-Corruption-
and-Economic-Crime-DCEC/About-the-DCEC1/About-the-DCEC/ (29.11.2011). 
757 Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 129).  
758 Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, 13), also see Republic of Botswana Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) at http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--
Authorities/Ministries/State-President/Department-of-Corruption-and-Economic-
Crime-DCEC/About-the-DCEC1/Overview-of-the-DCEC/ (22.8.2012).  
759 Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 129).  
760 Bank of Botswana (Corruption and Economic Crime Act) at 
http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/Corruption%20and%20Econo
mic%20Crime%20Act.pdf (08.12.2011).  
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optimum”761. Another factor which further contributes to the slow pace of 
punishing wrong-doers is that of the DCEC not having the powers to 
prosecute offenders. Instead, the DCEC is forced to pass cases over to the 
Attorney General’s Office for prosecution. The establishment of the DCEC has 
in fact considerably increased the workload of the Attorney General’s Office; 
according to the Annual Report by the DCEC, “cases produced by the [DCEC] 
constitute over 50% of the work of the Prosecution Division [of the Attorney 
General’s Office]”762. The establishment of the DCEC has also increased the 
number of cases tried at the Magistrates’ Courts.763  
The Directorate has also been criticized on other accounts, however. On the 
one hand, the independence of the institution has been questioned, the main 
issue being the fact that the Director is appointed by and reports directly to 
the President. As part of the public service, the Director and all staff also 
remain accountable to the head of the public service, who is the Permanent 
Secretary to the President.764 Theobald and Williams highlight the risk that 
“a president might use the Directorate under a weak and compliant Director 
to intimidate or silence critics”765 but also stress that placing the DCEC at the 
very centre of government rather than at its fringes is likely to send a strong 
message to other government entities.  
Sebudubudu, finally, highlights another stumbling-block which could ham-
per the efforts by the DCEC, namely the presidential prerogative to call a halt 
to processes or activities perceived to jeopardize national security. Should 
the President regard corruption investigations as a threat to national 
security, DCEC officials may be denied access to information or premises, or 
forced to abandon cases altogether. It goes without saying, that this could 
increase executive control over the DCEC and corruption investigations, and 
hamper accountability.766 
                                                 
 
761 Theobald, R. & Williams, R. (1999, 124).  
762 Quoted in Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 136).  
763 Quoted in Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 136).  
764 Mbao, M.L.M & Komboni, G.G. (2008, 64); and Theobald, R. & Williams, R. (1999, 
125).  
765 Theobald, R. & Williams, R. (1999, 125).  
766 Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 131).  
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5.3.2 Politico-institutional lines of accountability and linkages to 
corruption 
The above analysis has briefly discussed the corruption landscape of 
Botswana, institutions geared directly towards combating corruption, and 
some of their strengths and weaknesses. It pointed out that instances of 
corruption, despite certain weaknesses, remain rather rare in Botswana. The 
subsequent analysis takes an interest in factors contributing to corruption 
being uncommon in Botswana, the area of interest being some of the 
country’s political institutions and the extent to which these contribute 
towards making corruption less practicable and/or attractive.  
As in the case of Austria, the analysis at hand proceeds institution by 
institution, first focusing on the key traits of each institution. Based on the 
traits, principal-agent (P/A) relationships are identified. The analysis then 
scrutinizes these principal-agent relationships through an accountability 
lens, the aim being to establish whether and how principals are able to hold 
their agents to account. Finally, the strength of lines of accountability is 
juxtaposed to data on corruption to establish whether ease of accountability 
goes hand in hand with low(er) levels of corruption and vice versa.  
5.3.2.1 Lines of accountability inherent to the executive, and linkages 
to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest 
In scholarly literature, Botswana is alternately described as having (i) a 
parliamentary form of government767 and (ii) a presidential system768. 
Fombad, however, describes the polity as a cross between the two: “the 
Botswana model mixes British parliamentarism with elements of the U.S. 
presidential system”769. This view is shared by Maundeni.770 
The executive is thus, on the one hand, characterized by presidential traits 
such as that of the President simultaneously acting as Head of State and 
                                                 
 
767 Kurian, G.T. (ed.) (2007, 298); and Robbers, G. (ed.) (2007, 121).  
768 Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008, 750).  
769 Fombad, C.M. (2005, 319).  
770 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 29).  
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Head of Government771. The President of Botswana thus appoints and leads 
Cabinet, but is not obliged to follow the advice offered by colleagues in 
Cabinet.772 The President is a strong figure also in other respects. According 
to the Constitution of Botswana the President can in fact act almost at will in 
many respects: “In the exercise of any function conferred upon him by this 
Constitution or any other law the President shall, unless it is otherwise 
provided, act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to 
follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority”773. 
Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe are of the opinion that “the constitution gives 
too much power to the President and […] if such power is exercised 
arbitrarily, it has the potential to dent the democracy the country is 
internationally acclaimed for. 774 
The polity also has parliamentarian traits, however. Like prime ministers in 
a parliamentary system, the President of Botswana is elected indirectly in 
connection with parliamentary elections775, his appointment being depen-
dent on the number of seats in Parliament won by his party. As will be dis-
cussed further down, the President and his Cabinet also remain dependent 
on parliamentary confidence.  
Given the presidential776 and parliamentarian777 traits of the executive, the 
analysis takes an interest in a number of principal-agent relationships. 
                                                 
 
771 Dale, R. (2006, 159).  
772 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana, § 47(2)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (07.09.2012); and Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 10).  
773 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana §47(2)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (23.8.2012). 
774 Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe go as far as stating that “the constitution gives too 
much power to the President and […] if such power is exercised arbitrarily, it has 
the potential to dent the democracy the country is internationally acclaimed for”, 
see Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 34).  
775 Dale, R. (2006, 159). Parliamentary candidates endorse their party’s presidential 
candidate and, as a parliamentary candidate wins in a particular constituency, the 
presidential candidate endorsed by him/her automatically receives a vote. For a 
more thorough description of the election process, see the line of accountability 
between the National Assembly (principal) and the President (agent). 
776 The President simultaneously acting as head of state and head of government, 
appointing and leading Cabinet, see discussion above. 
777 Government being dependent on parliamentary confidence, and the President 
not being popularly elected (like the PM in a parliamentary system). 
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These include the Parliament (the National Assembly) as a principal to 
Government (the President and ministers), the President as a principal to 
ministers, and the President as a principal to the National Assembly, see 
figure 19. 
Figure 19: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the executive of Botswana 
 
Analysis of accountability and corruption 
What implications might these structures and relationships have in terms of 
holding key actors to account?  
a. Parliament (the National Assembly) as a principal to the President and 
ministers  
The analysis of mechanisms through which the National Assembly is able to 
hold the executive to account, starts with an overview of the procedures 
through which the President is nominated and elected. The nomination 
process, first of all, seems to be the exclusive prerogative of one person, 
namely the incumbent President. According to Good, presidential candidates 
(at least lately and within the BDP) have been hand-picked by the incumbent 
President who, when choosing his Vice-President, also in practice chooses 
his successor.778 Maundeni states that the President’s choice of candidate 
can be questioned, but that those opposing the candidate preferred by the 
President will face stiff resistance.779  
                                                 
 
778 Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008).  
779 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 87).  
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The election process, secondly, entails parliamentary candidates signing 
forms endorsing the presidential candidate of their party. As these same 
parliamentary candidates secure seats in Parliament, this automatically 
translates into a vote for the presidential candidate they have endorsed.780 
The question remains whether parliamentary candidates can sanction a 
presidential candidate by refusing to endorse someone perceived as un-
suitable? Such refusal, unfortunately, seems fraught with problems. A 
scholar emphasizes that “MPs must sell and toe the party line”781, indicating 
that it would be difficult to refuse to endorse the presidential candidate put 
forward by one’s party and still stay in the good graces of the party 
leadership.  
Formally, MPs also have tools through which the newly nominated President 
can be held accountable. In the first sitting of Parliament, a majority of the 
elected members of Parliament can “announce that the President does not 
enjoy their support”782, thus opening up for the election of another Presi-
dent. This may, however, in practice be just as problematic as refusing to 
endorse a presidential candidate, and is (again) likely to put recalcitrant MPs 
at a collision course with the leadership of their party. This shows that 
screening the presidential candidate for the most part is the responsibility of 
one person only, namely the incumbent President and that this also is the 
person that the candidate has to convince about his suitability for the task 
(selection). Maundeni links the lack of (i) real competition for the 
presidency, and (ii) popular involvement in the presidential nomination and 
election process to old Tswana tradition, highlighting that chieftaincy in 
traditional pre-independence Tswana states was hereditary, and that the 
chief could not be nominated or elected.783 Instead, the throne was 
constitutionally reserved for the first son of the great wife (of the chief). The 
chief usually married the great wife late in life, which meant that the heir, 
upon the chief’s death, usually was very young. This was a way of hindering 
power struggles between the chief and the heir. Since the heir (upon the 
chief’s death) often was too young to rule, a system of regency was put in 
                                                 
 
780 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 85). Poteete notes that a formal vote by the National 
Assembly is required only if no party obtains a majority of votes in the 
parliamentary elections, see Poteete, A. (2011, 3). 
781 Interview 17 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(9.10.2012). 
782 Danevad, A. (1993, 99).  
783 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 80 and 84).  
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place. This meant that an important member of the royal family was 
appointed to act until the heir was old enough to rule. This way, attempts by 
other sons of the chief to assume power, were hindered.784 
At least formally, ex post accountability of the President seems to be 
somewhat more straightforward. MPs can monitor the President e.g. 
through speeches delivered by him, statements, appearances in Parliament 
or on TV/radio, and government and audit reports. If dissatisfied with the 
work of the President, MPs may sanction the President by moving a vote of 
no confidence against the executive which, if successful, also affects the 
tenure of the President. Since votes of no confidence tend not to be 
submitted – something that is discussed below – the incumbent President 
tends to complete his two terms of five years in office before new elections 
are needed.785 Should the President die in office or become incapacitated, 
the Vice-President automatically assumes power without the National 
Assembly being able to vote on the matter.786 
Should the President be suspected of having engaged in corrupt practices, he 
can be investigated by, for instance, the DCEC but no criminal or civil 
proceedings can be brought against him: “Whilst any person holds or 
performs the functions of the office of President no criminal proceedings 
shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything done or 
omitted to be done by him either in his official capacity or in his private 
capacity and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in respect 
of which relief is claimed against him in respect of anything done or omitted 
to be done in his private capacity”787. Furthermore, the DCEC cannot start 
investigations against members of Cabinet without authorization from the 
executive branch.788 
                                                 
 
784 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 82).  
785 Molutsi, P. (2005, 26).  
786 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 87), see also Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 2).  
787 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (23.8.2012), see also Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 131).  
788 Poteete, A. (2011, 13). 
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The President and ministers can also be held accountable ex post by the 
National Assembly, whose confidence they must enjoy.789 Members of the 
National Assembly are thus engage in constant monitoring of the executive 
to ensure that the executive does not exceed or abuse its mandate.  
Members of the National Assembly acquire information about actors and 
actions within the executive branch through a number of means. They may 
summon officials to testify before the legislature, and can also submit 
questions which officials answer in writing. Fish and Kroenig confirm that 
officials within the executive branch are submitted to such control on a 
regular basis.790 
The executive is also monitored through different committees. The most 
central of these from the point of view of this thesis is probably the 
parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC), tasked with the 
monitoring of public finances.791 The PAC consists of members from both the 
ruling party and the opposition, and its mandate covers all government 
ministries, departments and parastatals. Among other things, the PAC 
examines reports and statements emanating from the Office of the Auditor 
General792 pertaining to e.g. the Police, the Defence Force, the Directorate of 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), Parliament, the Judiciary and the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). If the PAC suspects or discovers 
irregularities it can require testimonies from accounting officers and 
recommend sanctions, i.e. hold the ministry, department or official ac-
countable ex post.793 The impact of the PAC is, however, hampered by the 
fact that few of its members – according to Theobald and Williams - have the 
“education […] or support staff to challenge complex administrative 
decisions”794. As a result, the PAC has, by some, been described as more of a 
rubber stamp of policies proposed and decisions made by the Govern-
ment.795  
                                                 
 
789 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana §50(1)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (07.09.2012).  
790 Fish, M.S. & Kroenig, M. (2009, 90).  
791 Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, 6).  
792 Lekorwe, M. H. (2008, 84).  
793 Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, 6).  
794 Theobald, R. & Williams, R. (1999, 128).  
795 Theobald, R. & Williams, R. (1999, 128).  
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The executive can also be monitored through so called investigative 
committees and commissions of inquiry. The National Assembly cannot, 
however, appoint such committees or commissions itself. In accordance with 
the Ombudsman Act, these are appointed by the President or ministers, who 
also decide whether information emanating from such inquiries is to be 
made public796, something that may hamper accountability. Parliamentary 
oversight is also limited to certain policy areas only. The National Assembly 
it not, for instance, able to monitor the military, the police or the intelligence 
service, which all report directly to the President.797 
In addition to questions and oversight by committees, the work of the 
executive can be scrutinized through the national budget speech delivered 
by the Minister of Finance and Development. The budget speech, which is 
delivered once a year, provides members of Parliament with an opportunity 
to scrutinize how funds have been spent, and what expenditure is envisaged 
for the coming year. As part of the process, individual line ministers also 
provide details with regards to funds spent by their particular ministries, 
justifying spending and allocations made.798 The President, for his part, can 
be held accountable ex post through the yearly State of the Nation address 
through which actions by Government are outlined and defended. According 
to Barei, issues brought up in (or omitted from) the address are debated 
extensively by Parliament, the media, academia and the general public.799 
If dissatisfied with the work of the executive, the National Assembly may 
sanction the executive by moving a vote of no confidence. Should such a vote 
be successful, Government has to step down, and the President faces two 
options. He can either (i) step down (forcing the National Assembly to elect a 
new President) or (ii) dissolve Parliament, which means he can be his 
party’s presidential candidate in the coming elections and become President, 
should his party win a majority of the vote. His party may, however, opt for 
another candidate or may be defeated in the elections, which means his time 
in power comes to an end.800  
                                                 
 
796 Fish, M.S. & Kroenig, M. (2009, 90).  
797 Fish, M.S. & Kroenig, M. (2009, 90).  
798 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 34).  
799 Barei, G. (2008, 16).  
800 Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012), see also Danevad, A. (1993, 99).  
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The prerogative of Parliament to sanction Government by submitting it to a 
vote of no confidence can be regarded as a counterpoint to executive 
predominance, As such, it places “parliament in a position to be final 
legislative authority over the government system”801. A number of 
circumstances seem to hollow out this formally valid provision, however, 
rendering it an almost inaccessible tool in the context of Botswana. 
Maundeni acknowledges that the “predominance of one party and the 
existence of a weak opposition, combine to weaken the position of 
parliament”802. Good agrees with the observation that the Parliament of 
Botswana in reality has limited power over the executive.803 
Also others attest to the executive dominating Parliament, rather than the 
other way round. The reasons for this are manifold, including the fact that, 
once in office, the President remains an ex officio member of Parliament 
with the right to speak and vote in parliamentary proceedings.804 The Vice-
President, ministers, and assistant ministers also retain their parliamentary 
seats.805 Fombad highlights that the executive makes up nearly one third of 
the members of the National Assembly806, and Transparency International 
emphasizes that the executive, as a result, in fact “controls and drives the 
legislative process”807, something that affects the likelihood of votes of no 
confidence being initiated and passed.  
From the point of view of accountability, ministers and assistant ministers, 
therefore, end up having something of a double role. On the one hand, they 
remain members of Parliament and are, as such, mandated to hold the 
executive to account. On the other hand, however, they lead and control 
their own ministries and shoulder the ultimate responsibility for execution 
                                                 
 
801 Maundeni, Z. (2007, xvii).  
802 Maundeni, Z. (2007, xvii).  
803 Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2007, 275).  
804 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 10). The President being an ex officio MP means that 
he has become a member “by virtue of holding the office of the presidency”. This 
does not, however, mean that he has contested elections in a particular 
constituency. see Poteete, A. (2011, 3).  
805 Fombad, C.M. (2005, 320).  
806 Fombad, C.M. (2005, 321).  
807 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 11).  
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of government programmes.808 As such, they are accountable to Parliament, 
i.e. themselves. Under such circumstances, the provision for holding the 
executive accountable is almost null, something that has been lamented by 
parliamentarians themselves.809 Given the above, some scholars question 
whether the system is characterized by a separation of powers.810  
Votes of no confidence are also, according to Maundeni, fairly toothless in a 
system dominated by one party. This is the case in Botswana, where the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated the political scene, 
winning national elections since independence. One-party predominance 
has a number of causes, one being the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral 
system. In 2007, for instance, the two opposition parties together obtained 
41.78% of the popular vote but yet only secured 13 out of 57 parliamentary 
seats811 (the equivalent of 23%). Other factors underlying one-party 
predominance are (i) a weak and fragmented opposition, (ii) a weak and 
conflict averse civil society, dependent on government sponsorship and 
therefore unlikely to express criticism, (iii) unwavering support for the BDP 
in rural areas and amongst the majority Tswana groups812, and (iv) a track-
record of economic growth and prudent economic management813 giving 
rise to complacency, and leading citizens to think that the incumbent 
Government is best suited to lead the country. One-party predominance of 
the executive and the National Assembly is also furthered by the fact that the 
President is empowered to appoint four so called “specially elected 
members of Parliament” apart from those popularly elected. These specially 
                                                 
 
808 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 52) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (07.09.2012).  
809 Barei, G. (2008, 17).  
810 Maundeni, Z. (2007, xvi); and Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 28).  
811 Maundeni, Z. (2007, 15).  
812 Botswana’s founding President as well as the incumbent President are/were 
both chiefs of the largest of these groups, see Bertelsmann Stiftung at 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/bti/laendergutachten 
/laendergutachten/oestliches-und-suedliches-afrika/botswana/ (07.09.2010). 
813 See e.g. Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 54); Holm, J.D. (1999, 297-300); Bertelsmann 
Stiftung at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/bti/laendergutachten /laendergutachten/oestliches-und-suedliches-
afrika/botswana/ (07.09.2010); Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008, 755); and Molomo, M.G., 
(2004, 57).  
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elected members tend to be key BDP activists, who often also are appointed 
as Cabinet ministers814.  
Votes of no confidence not being passed and overall criticism of Government 
by parliamentarians being rare, is also linked to party discipline, which is 
manifested, for instance, in “recalcitrant” backbenchers (willing to vote with 
the opposition) being reminded about their “duty” vis-à-vis the party.815 
Poteete highlights, however, that the period 1998-2009 saw the intensify-
cation of factionalism within the ruling party, which meant that individuals 
and groups within the party repeatedly deviated from the party line.816  
Tradition also plays a crucial part in this context. Tswana custom empha-
sizes the importance of deference, unity and showing respect for your 
elders, making it difficult to criticize and question the decisions and actions 
of leaders. Holm points out that political conflict in general tends to be 
regarded as “socially unacceptable, […] vulgar, disrespectful and a waste of 
time”817, which means that those challenging the actions or policies by the 
ruling party are perceived as engaging in unacceptable behaviour.  
b. The President as a principal to Government 
The second major trait of the executive is that of the Head of State also being 
the Head of Government, appointing and leading Government. The 
President’s dual role as Head of State and Head of Government means that 
he has what Hague and Harrop call a “ceremonial” role as a symbol of the 
state, as well as an “efficient” role aimed at ensuring that the polity runs 
smoothly.818 Hague and Harrop note that many countries have chosen to 
separate the two aspects, the aim being to allow the Prime Minister (as the 
Head of Government) to focus on the running of the country whereas the 
Head of State (a president or monarch) shoulders duties related to 
representation. Botswana has, however, chosen to combine the two, as is the 
custom in presidential states. Combining the two roles is likely to confer 
even more power and influence on an already dominant president, 
rendering this actor the powerhouse of the state and the very symbol of it.  
                                                 
 
814 Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008, 759).  
815 Barei, G. (2008, 8).  
816 Poteete, A. (2011, 7). 
817 Holm, J.D. (1999, 288).  
818 Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2007, 343).  
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As the Head of Government, the President of Botswana appoints and leads 
Government. As discussed above, the appointment powers of the President 
are extensive.819 The President more or less single-handedly appoints a 
number of key actors such as Cabinet ministers, the Auditor General, the 
Chief Justice, the Secretary of the Independent Electoral Commission, the 
Commander of the Army, the Attorney General, the Ombudsperson and the 
head of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC).820 
Furthermore, the President can be considered to indirectly participate in (or 
at least being able to influence) the appointment of a number of other 
important officials such as permanent secretaries and directors (appointed 
by the Permanent Secretary to the President)821 and (central level) officers 
below the level of director (appointed by the Directorate of Public Service 
Management822, the Director of which is appointed by the President).823  
Some deem the powers of appointment of the President to be too extensive 
in that he oftentimes does not have to consult or take the advice of anyone in 
the process.824 This applies, for instance, to the appointment of Cabinet 
ministers.825 A task force has recommended that “the role of Parliament 
                                                 
 
819 See Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 10, 25 and 44); and Fombad, C.M. (1999).  
820 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 10, 25 and 44); Fombad, C.M. (1999); Embassy of the 
Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the Republic of Botswana 
§ 42 and §43) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (07.09.2012); and the Democracy Web at 
http://www.democracyweb.org/accountability/botswana.php (19.9.2012). 
821 Kebonang, Z. & Maundeni, Z. (2008, 165), see also Hodges, Aeberhard, J. (2001, 
31); and Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of 
the Republic of Botswana § 112) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (07.09.2012). 
822 Since 2010, human resource management for both local as well as central level 
civil servants is handled by the Directorate for Public Service Management (DPSM), 
see Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 10). Personnel functions for local government 
are, however, handled by the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS), see Hope, 
K.R. (Sr.) (1995, 51).  
823 Hodges, Aeberhard, J. (2001, 31).  
824 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 13), see also Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008, 759); and 
the Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana §47(2)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (23.8.2012). 
825 The President’s discretion is, however, more restricted for instance when it 
comes to the appointment of judges, who are appointed based on a recommendation 
from the so called Judicial Service Commission, see Fish, M.S. & Kroenig, M. (2009, 
90 and 93).  
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should be extended to include the ratification of appointment and removal 
of certain high offices [and that] these offices [should] ‘report’ to Parliament 
in [the] future”826.  
Given that the President – often single-handedly – appoints key actors, he 
also undertakes the screening of these. Screening is facilitated by the fact 
that candidates for ministerial posts are likely to belong to the same party as 
the President and therefore are known to him. The same applies to 
candidates for many other important positions. Should candidates not 
belong to the same party as the President, they (and their strengths as well 
as weaknesses) are likely to be known to the President simply due to the fact 
that Botswana is a small country where people in leading positions tend to 
know one another. Given the prominent role of the President in terms of 
nominations, candidates for different positions for the most part only have 
to convince him about their competence and dedication (selection). The 
extent to which ethical behaviour is taken into consideration as part of this 
ex ante accountability is, however, uncertain. Whereas little is known about 
the benchmarks against which some of these appointees are evaluated, 
candidates below the level of director (appointed by the DPSM) are screened 
using established guidelines, something that points to slightly higher levels 
of objectivity surrounding these appointments.827 Interviews with public 
officials, however, point to management within the ministries nevertheless 
being able to manipulate recruitment processes from time to time, 
something that results in public officers occasionally being appointed or 
promoted in an arbitrary fashion, based on personal or political ties rather 
than based on merit.828 
Directly or indirectly, the President also engages in holding a broad array of 
actors within the executive branch to account ex post. With regards to 
Cabinet ministers, accountability ex post is direct. The President monitors 
ministers through meetings, public appearances and day-to-day output as 
well as media reports. He also receives subjective information in that 
                                                 
 
826 Barei, G. (2008, 19).  
827 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 10), see also the Directorate of Public Sector 
Management at http://www.dpsm.gov.bw 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=61&Itemid=256 
(5.3.2013).  
828 Kebonang, Z. & Maundeni, Z. (2008, 166-167).  
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ministers are obliged to inform and consult Cabinet whenever new policies 
or reforms are envisaged. Members of Cabinet are expected to show loyalty 
to the President and are obliged to act in accordance with the President’s 
decisions. Maundeni maintains that “those who strongly disagree [with the 
President’s decisions] have the option to resign”829. If they do not, the 
President can and does sanction them by removing them from office.830 
Formally, the President is also authorized to exercise direct accountability ex 
post with regards to members of the armed forces831 as well as e.g. 
ambassadors, high commissioners, the secretary to the Cabinet, permanent 
secretaries, the Commissioner of Police, and the Attorney General.832 The 
latter can, however, only be removed once a tribunal – appointed to advise 
the President – has recommended such a course of action.833 Some of these 
actors (e.g. permanent secretaries and directors) are, however, in practice 
held to account by the Permanent Secretary to the President, tasked with 
holding non-political staff to account.834  
Ex post accountability amongst bureaucrats appears to be a challenge. 
Experts point to complex hierarchies which lead to situations where actors 
do not know who their principals/agents in fact are.835 Furthermore, 
although many public officials are appraised as part of so called 
performance development plans, principals often appear to be reluctant 
when it comes to the use of sanctions when rules have been broken. This is 
attributed to Tswana culture where confrontation and conflict are to be 
avoided.  
                                                 
 
829 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 30).  
830 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 43(c)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (13.4.2013). 
831 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 48 (2a)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (13.4.2013). 
832 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 112 (1-2)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (13.4.2013). 
833 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 113 (3-4)) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (13.4.2013). 
834 Kebonang, Z. & Maundeni, Z. (2008, 165).  
835 Interview 19 – Senior official with the Office of the Ombudsman, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
229 
 
Some also perceive ex post accountability of bureaucrats as being a challenge 
due to the powerful role of the bureaucracy and bureaucrats, and the lack of 
clout of political actors with regards to the latter. Holm states that civil 
servants seem to be of the opinion that politicians should leave policy-
making as well as execution to senior civil servants and planners, and goes 
on by stating that the civil service does not feel accountable for its policies 
and behaviour.836 Stedman, for his part, confirms that some regard the 
powers of the bureaucracy as a threat to democracy.837  
Charlton, however, provides a more nuanced view on the division of power 
between senior politicians and bureaucrats. He maintains that the state 
generally is viewed as technocratic but highlights that civil servants are 
powerful because the “political elite allow[s] the civil servants to play a 
policy-dominant role”838. He highlights that the ruling party is perfectly 
capable of reining in civil servants if it so wishes and that this can and has 
happened “at any or all stages of the policy-making process, to secure and 
enforce its strategic policy priorities”839. Charlton also stresses that “[i]f 
politically necessary, or politically expedient, the political leadership will, 
although rarely, define and impose a major policy departure without its 
usual prior consultation with the bureaucracy”840. This goes to show, that 
leading politicians are able to sanction members of the bureaucracy by 
reining them in and forcing policy-decisions. 
 A number of benchmarks or contracts can be used when holding the above-
mentioned agents to account. Apart from the political expectations specified 
by the principals, agents should be held accountable against existing rules 
and regulations, including the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, the 
Public Service Charter and the code of conduct for public officers. Maundeni 
also highlights the importance of the so called Green Book, discussed in 
chapter 5.3.1.3. Maundeni maintains that higher officials from time to time 
have been sanctioned due to violations of these principles, something that 
                                                 
 
836 Holm, J.D. (1999, 300).  
837 Stedman, S.J. (1991, 113).  
838 Charlton, R. (1991, 266).  
839 Charlton, R. (1991, 273).  
840 Charlton, R. (1991, 277).  
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points to ethical behaviour at least to a certain extent being taken into 
consideration during the accountability process.841  
c. The President as a principal to the National Assembly 
The President also acts as a principal to Parliament. As outlined in the 
Constitution, bills passed by the National Assembly must be submitted to the 
President and only become law if the President assents to them. If he does 
not, they are returned to the National Assembly for discussion and – when 
applicable – amendment.842 Given his capacity as member of Parliament, the 
President has first-hand information about bills passed by the National 
Assembly, which means he is able to monitor the actions of the latter. As 
such, and due to his party’s dominant position in the National Assembly, he 
(and other ruling party MPs) are also likely to be able to block unwanted 
legislation already within Parliament, which means that this sanction need 
not be used if the ruling party stands united. 
The President is also authorized to dissolve the National Assembly.843 The 
dissolution of Parliament is a standard procedure before general elections, 
which means it is an accessible sanction. However, dissolution has also been 
used as a threat by Presidents in order for them to have their way under 
different circumstances.844  
  
                                                 
 
841 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 44).  
842 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 87) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (13.4.2013). 
843 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana § 91) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
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844 See Afrol News at http://www.afrol.com/articles/13885 (14.3.2013); 
WeekendPost at http://www.weekendpost.co.bw 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3090:is-the-president-too-
powerful&catid=49:analysis (1.3.2013); and the New York Times at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/22/world/botswana-expected-to-pick-new-
parliament-later-in-year.html (1.3.2013). 
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Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
As can be seen from the analysis, lines of accountability within the executive 
differ from one another with regards to the accountability mechanisms and 
sanctions available to principals, as well as with regards to the extent to 
which these mechanisms and sanctions are accessible de facto. With a basis 
in these differences, lines of accountability are again categorized as strong, 
semi-strong and weak (see table 27). These are visualized in figure 20, 
where strong lines of accountability are depicted in green, semi-strong lines 
are depicted in orange and weak lines are depicted in a red. These lines are 
then compared to data on corruption in the context of Botswana.  
Members of the National Assembly are mandated to hold the presidential 
candidate to account ex ante. In so doing, they have access to a number of 
accountability mechanisms, including the possibility to screen the candidate 
put forward by their party, and sanction the candidate by refusing 
endorsement or withdrawing support. Due to strict party discipline, such 
sanctions are not regarded as accessible in reality, however.  
As seen, the National Assembly has at its disposal a wide array of 
mechanisms aimed at holding the President and ministers to account ex post. 
These include reporting from members of the executive, and monitoring 
carried out by committees, individual parliamentarians or actors such as the 
Office of the Auditor General. The National Assembly also has access to 
sanctions in the form of the vote of no confidence. Whereas accountability 
mechanisms are accessible to members of Parliament and actively used, 
sanctions in the form of votes of no confidence are deemed not to be 
accessible. Against the above, the lines of accountability between the 
National Assembly, on the one hand, and the President and ministers, on the 
other, are regarded as semi-strong. In the case of the President as an agent, 
lines border on weak.  
In his capacity as the Head of Government, the President has at his disposal a 
number of accountability mechanisms which can be used ex ante. These 
include the possibility to screen candidates to different key positions and 
force them to prove their worth to him (selection). The President can 
sanction agents ex ante by refusing to appoint them, a sanction that is 
accessible in practice and also used. The President is also able to hold a 
number of agents accountable ex post through reporting and monitoring. In 
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many cases he is able to and does sanction agents ex post for example by 
removing them from office. Ex post accountability within the bureaucracy, 
especially when not involving the President directly, seems to be a challenge, 
however, in that officials are monitored but sanctions not always applied. 
This said, the overall line of accountability appears to be fairly strong. 
The President is able to reject bills passed by the National Assembly and is 
also authorized to dissolve the latter. Both sanctions are deemed accessible 
to the President, wherefore this line is regarded as strong.  
Figure 20: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the executive of Botswana 
 
As can be seen from figure 20, executive structures seem to provide oppor-
tunities for as well as impediments to accountability.  
How does this resonate with data on corruption in the national context? The 
fact that the line of accountability between the National Assembly 
(Parliament) and the President is described as semi-strong only could, first 
of all be interpreted as the President to a certain extent being susceptible to 
corruption. This resonates with data on corruption at a very general level in 
that “elites” by some are regarded as the main culprits. Since presidential 
corruption does not seem to be the order of the day or even common, it does 
not, however, resonate with statistics at a more specific level.  
The line of accountability between the National Assembly and ministers is 
also categorized as semi-strong. This could be interpreted as vulnerability to 
corruption among ministers. This resonates with the fact that some experts 
point to corruption amongst (political) elites being more prevalent than 
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official statistics suggest, as well as ministers having been involved in some 
of the major national corruption scandals. Since major scandals involving 
ministers nevertheless remain an exception, however, the line is deemed to 
resonate only somewhat with data on corruption.  
The line of accountability between the President and ministers is deemed to 
be strong. This points to ministers not being particularly vulnerable to 
corruption, something that runs contrary to information about actors 
involved in the major corruption scandals seen during the 1990s. Again, 
since these only constitute a limited number, the line of accountability is 
found to resonate with data on corruption.  
The line of accountability between the President and the National Assembly 
is regarded as strong, which points to parliamentarians not being particular-
ly vulnerable to corruption. This runs contrary to information from the 
handful of corruption scandals of the 1990s also well as expert opinions that 
official statistics fail to capture corruption among elites. Even these experts, 
however, highlight that problems of this kind appear to be restricted, where-
fore the line of accountability is found to resonate with data on corruption. 
As can be seen from the above, only 2/4 of the lines of accountability are 
found to resonate with data on corruption. This points to factors other than 
the accountability mechanisms inherent to political institutions also having 
a bearing on levels of corruption. 
5.3.2.2 Lines of accountability inherent to the electoral system, and 
linkages to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest 
Botswana’s electoral law provides for a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral 
system. This means that parties field candidates in single member 
constituencies and voters cast nominal ballots for one candidate. The 
winning candidate is the one receiving most votes in the constituency in 
question: “[a] party’s representation in the legislature then consists of those 
of its candidates who win these constituency votes”845.  
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FPTP electoral systems are generally perceived as contributing to strong 
single-party governments. In the context of Botswana this has been the case, 
and many have emphasized the fact that the FPTP system has engendered 
stability and ease of accountability, encouraging candidates to deliver while 
in office.846 The system has also, however, been criticized as unsuitable for a 
country like Botswana, one argument being that it disfavours smaller 
parties, excludes minorities from representation, and keeps returning the 
same party to office. Voices have therefore been raised for electoral reform 
aimed at having a more representative system.847  
First-Past-The-Post electoral systems are often described as candidate-
centred.848 In line with Shugart’s classification, a candidate-centred electoral 
system in its most “refined” form is characterized by (i) candidates having 
virtually unrestricted ballot access, and (ii) nominal voting predomina-
ting.849 These systems are thus characterized by it being more or less up to 
the individual candidate whether he/she wishes to stand in the elections, 
and voters being able to choose a candidate of their liking when casting the 
ballot. Extremely party-centred systems, on the other hand, are characte-
rized by party elites monopolizing ballot access (i.e. candidates needing the 
approval of the party leadership to gain access to the ballot) and voters 
voting for a fixed list rather than an individual candidate. Given that voters 
in Botswana cast nominal votes, and party leaders as well as party members 
may affect the nomination process, the electoral system can be described as 
only moderately candidate-centred.  
The Constitution of Botswana recognizes the respect for political rights, 
including the right to vote and stand in elections at different levels. 
According to the Constitution, citizens who have attained the age of 18 are 
                                                 
 
846 Molomo, M. at http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/viewFile 
/39378/30303 (14.08.2012), see also Molomo, M. (2005, 37); and Interview 11 – 
Senior Official with the Office of the President, Gaborone, Botswana (4.10.2012). 
847 See e.g. Molomo, M. at http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/viewFile 
/39378/30303 (14.08.2012); and Reynolds, A., Reilly, B. & Ellis, A. (2005, 37).  
848 This is in line with, for instance, Shugart, M. S. (2001, 183). Shugart, however, 
points out that FPTP remains at the crossroads between party- and candidate-
centredness and therefore could be regarded as moderately candidate-centred.  
849 The exact definitions adopted can be found in appendix 6. See also Shugart, M. S. 
(2001, 183).  
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allowed to register as voters.850 Statistics show, that voter turnout generally 
is fairly high with, for instance, 77% of registered voters participating in the 
1999 general elections. However, such statistics hide the fact that a large 
portion of the voting age population has not been registered. Data on the 
1999 elections, for instance, shows that only 42% of those entitled to vote in 
fact did.851 The level of voter turnout is also partly linked to a certain degree 
of voter apathy, which cuts across demographic groups, and which in turn 
stems from illiteracy, socio-economic factors, the absence of democracy 
during the colonial era, a lack of voter education, a lack of civic education, 
and unaccountable politicians.852 
Certain limitations apply with regards to running for political office. 
According to the law, government employees (who constitute a large portion 
of the educated, informed and articulate population) cannot run for political 
office.853 The same applies to teachers in state schools, high school students 
and employees of parastatals.854 Traditional chiefs are equally prohibited 
from running for office unless they resign their position. Furthermore, 
candidates must be highly proficient in English, a provision which excludes 
large numbers of citizens. As a consequence of these provisions, the 
potential “pool” to nominate candidates from remains limited.  
The country has 57 constituencies, all covering a population of 15 000-
38  000 inhabitants.855 A Delimitation Commission, appointed by the Judicial 
Service Commission, is in charge of altering constituency boundaries.856 
Decisions to alter constituency limits are generally linked to changes in 
                                                 
 
850 Embassy of the Republik of Botswana in Washington D.C. (Constitution of the 
Republic of Botswana) at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files 
/constitution_of_botswana.pdf (14.8.2012). 
851 Molutsi, P. (2005, 18).  
852 Molutsi, P. (2005, 19); and Mfundisi, A. (2005, 164 and 166).  
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parastatals, see Holm, J.D. (1987, 23).  
854 Maundeni, Z. (2005, 89).  
855 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in South Africa (EISA) (2004).  
856 See Botswana Gazette at http://www.gazettebw.com 
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population size in a given area. The last amendment to the number and size 
of constituencies (of relevance to the analysis) was made in 2004.857  
Given the listed traits of the electoral system of Botswana (the nominal vote 
and the fact that party leaders as well as party members affect the 
nomination process), the analysis takes an interest in a number of principal-
agent relationships. These include the voters, political parties and party 
members as principals to candidates, analysing whether and how these 
principals are able to and do hold their agents to account, see the figure 21. 
Figure 21: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the electoral system of 
Botswana 
 
Analysis of accountability and corruption 
What implications might these structures and relationships have in terms of 
holding key actors to account?  
a. Party leaders and party members as principals to candidates 
In line with the key traits of candidate-centred electoral systems, the discus-
sion proceeds from issues related to ballot access. As stated above, party 
members are able to influence the process of nominating candidates ahead 
of elections. This means that e.g. 322 487 members of the BDP and 150 000 
members of the BNF were able to influence nominations ahead of the 2004 
general elections.858 Members are able to influence nominations through 
                                                 
 
857 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in South Africa (EISA) (2009, 16).  
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primary elections, allowing members to screen candidates and sanction 
them by refusing political support. Potential candidates also have to 
convince card holding members about their suitability and willingness to 
work in accordance with the interests of the party and the electorate 
(selection). Parties handle primaries differently, however, which means that 
the leverage accorded to card holding members also varies. The procedures 
and rules of primary elections have also changed over time within a number 
of parties.  
According to Somolekae, the BDP introduced primaries in 1984. Initially, an 
“Electoral College system” was used, whereby delegates selected electors 
who, in turn, voted for potential candidates. The party leadership then 
scrutinized the outcome of the primaries and made the final candidate selec-
tion. The system was heavily criticized, however, since it allegedly opened 
up possibilities to buy votes from members of the Electoral College.859  
In 2001, the BDP revised its primary election rules following criticism of the 
procedures. Since then, all card holding party members have been able to 
vote in the primaries, without the Central Committee having the mandate to 
change the outcome of the elections.860 However, prospective candidates go 
through a strict “vetting” process by the Central Committee ahead of the 
primaries to make sure that those standing in the primary elections are in 
the good graces of the party leadership.861 This means that party members in 
some cases appear to have the last word, but that key decisions in fact have 
been made by the party leadership ahead of the primaries.  
Primary elections within the main opposition party, the Botswana National 
Front (BNF) differ somewhat from those within the BDP. The BNF intro-
duced open primaries already in 1989.862 The general membership of the 
party has the right to vote in BNF primaries but final power to approve or 
reject candidates remains with the Central Committee in line with party 
rules and regulations.863 Smaller parties do not organize primaries due to 
                                                 
 
859 Somolekae, G. (2005, 21-22), see also Lekorwe, M. (2005, 136-137).  
860 Interview 11 – Senior Official with the Office of the President, Gaborone, 
Botswana (4.10.2012). 
861 Lekorwe, M. (2005, 143-144).  
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the limited number of potential candidates. These include the Botswana 
People’s Party (BPP) and the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM).864  
Data on the extent to which card holding member of different parties in fact 
vote in primary elections could not be accessed, wherefore it is difficult to 
know whether this sanction is being used. An interviewee stresses, however, 
that party members do not regard primaries as fora for sanctioning wrong-
doers865 but rather as a tool for showing support for the candidate of one’s 
own political faction or other. This points to card holding members not 
engaging in weeding out potential corrupt candidates ahead of elections.  
As seen, much points to party leaders being the main actors when it comes 
to nominating candidates since they, through pre-primary vetting and post-
primary sanctioning, are able to determine who the candidates in fact are. 
This means that party leaders are the key actors when it comes to screening 
candidates and sanctioning them by refusing ballot access. The criteria used 
by these leaders when screening and sanctioning potential candidates are 
therefore of interest. Party statutes, firstly, are likely to be used as 
benchmarks when potential candidates are evaluated, and can therefore be 
regarded as a sort of a contract between the party and potential candidates, 
ensuring that candidates share the political vision of the party. Party 
statutes as well as party codes of conduct also in certain cases outline the 
party’s expectations and requirements with regards to ethical behaviour as 
well as potential consequences of engaging in corrupt practices. A scholar 
maintains that many parties in Botswana do have codes of conduct which 
raise issues related to corruption.866 This points to the parties being at least 
somewhat prepared when it comes to guiding candidates and representa-
tives, and holding them accountable in a systematic way. Another inter-
viewee stresses, however, that parties would not reject candidates light-
heartedly and that unethical behaviour in general, or corruption offenses 
more specifically, probably would have to be severe for this to occur: “time 
                                                 
 
864 Primaries are organized by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana 
National Front (BNF) and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), but not by the 
Botswana People’s Party (BPP), the Botswana Unity Movement (BUM), the New 
Democratic Front (NDF), MELS Movement of Botswana (MELS), see Lekorwe, M. 
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865 Interview 18 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana (9.10.2012). 
866 Interview 17 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
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in prison may be argument enough not to appoint someone”867. This is cor-
roborated by an interviewee who states that only “demonstrably corrupt”868 
candidates tend to be rejected.  
Also Maundeni highlights that vetting in fact often has other purposes than 
to identify and weed out corrupt or misbehaving candidates. Maundeni 
stresses that vetting in fact often is aimed at ensuring “smooth 
transitions”869 between (i) incumbent members of the National Assembly 
and (ii) newcomers seeking to challenge the incumbent. In an effort to 
ensure party coherence and avoid clashes between candidates of the same 
party, the party leadership (especially within the BDP) at times brings forth 
contenders only at a stage when the incumbent member of Parliament is 
retiring or for other reasons ready to step down. As a result, it is not 
uncommon for (i) capable candidates to be prevented from standing in the 
elections, and (ii) incumbent MPs to dominate their constituency for decades 
and even hand-pick their successors. This has the downside of sidelining 
newcomers interested in standing for political office870 and also means that 
coherence and harmony within the party are prioritized above 
accountability.  
Newcomers thus often fight a losing battle when trying to access the ballot. 
This is particularly so if they are young and/or women. Young people, firstly, 
tend to be sidelined in terms of nominations since they are seen as 
“belonging to the future”871 and having a lower social status than elders.872 
This is confirmed by Somolekae, who states that young people, according to 
Tswana culture, “should be seen but not heard”873. Ntsabane regards this 
custom as a vestige from traditional Tswana society, where women, minori-
ties and youth were restricted and controlled, and viewed as incapable of 
making major decisions.874 Power was therefore the prerogative of elders, 
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males and citizens representing the dominant tribal groups.875 Ntsabane also 
criticizes the educational system, emphasizing that the belittling of young 
people starts already at school through authoritarian teachers, who 
discourage critical thinking and prefer passive, disengaged students.876  
Women, secondly, also tend to be sidelined in the political arena in general, 
and when nominations are made more specifically. The limited political 
opportunities of women in Botswana stem from lack of party support as well 
as women still often being regarded as socially inferior and minors to 
men.877 As a result, women – when participating in party activities – tend to 
shoulder minor chores or fund-raising activities rather than standing for 
office and addressing political rallies.878 This seems to be changing slowly, 
however. Three of the main political parties (the BCP879, the BDP and the 
BNF) have established women’s wings and all of them indicate having 
women on their central committees.880 Ahead of the 1999 elections, the BCP 
and the BNF also committed themselves to fielding 30% female candidates, a 
promise that later was not honoured, however.881 The road towards ballot 
access and being elected, therefore, remains filled with hurdles: whereas in 
17% of members of the National Assembly were women in 1999, the 
percentage fell to 11% in the 2004 elections and dropped further to 8% in 
2009.882  
The above points to accountability ex ante being exercised, although not 
always with view to renewing the party, bringing in new voices or punishing 
wrong-doers. Rather, accountability ex ante oftentimes seems to be a 
mechanism used to maintain the status quo. This is of interest in a country 
like Botswana where many young people are critical of politicians, arguing 
that these only serve their own interests at the expense of those of the 
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public.883 Involving this layer of society in political activities might therefore 
engender important debates about governance.  
The above examples of limited ballot access are not very surprising in the 
light of how political parties actually operate when selecting their own 
leaders. Parties in Botswana differ in this respect, the BNF seemingly 
exhibiting more intra-party democracy than other parties in that the party 
allows for competition for all positions of the central committee, and elects 
members of the committee at the party congress every three years.  
The BDP also provides for leadership elections but has, as Maundeni 
interestingly points out, never had to resort to such measures since “no 
competition for the party presidency has occurred”884. This, according to 
Sebudubudu, is related to the fact that “it is generally believed that holding 
elections for executive positions is divisive”885. Party leaders are thus identi-
fied through pre-congress bargaining. As Maundeni explains: “in preparation 
for the 2005 congresses, the BDP leadership was working on a compromise 
so that positions in its central committee would not be open for contest”886. 
The above indicates that party leaders in most cases are identified by other 
means than elections and that party members rarely have a say when such 
decisions are made. Bearing in mind that party leaders – specifically the 
ones of the BDP – have extensive powers, this is of interest since mis-
behaving actors cannot be held to account by broader layers of party 
members. Somolekae confirms that many party leaders do not face compe-
tition, and that they therefore often end up having a life-time mandate.887  
Refusal of ballot access is not, however, the only sanction available to parties 
when it comes to holding candidates to account ex ante. Parties may also 
withdraw funding, which is likely to provide agents with an incentive to act 
in accordance with the wishes of and the rules outlined by the principal. Not 
all parties in Botswana are able to support candidates financially, however. 
In fact, the BDP seems to be in a better position than other parties in this 
regard, since the party receives major donations from the private sector and 
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abroad. Since state-funding of political parties is not provided for in 
Botswana, other political parties have to raise funds by other means. These 
include membership fees, constituency fees, fees paid by members of the 
National Assembly, proceeds from party events, the sale of party documents 
and by raising funds from private donors.888 As a result, minor parties are 
less able to support candidates financially and therefore also risk having 
relatively speaking less leverage with regards to candidates and their 
behaviour.  
b. Voters as principals to candidates  
A second aspect of candidate-centred electoral systems is that of the very 
kind of vote cast by voters. In highly party-centred systems, voters cast party 
list votes only, whereas voters in highly candidate-centred systems cast a 
nominal vote, targeting a particular candidate.889 In this respect, Botswana 
remains an example of a highly candidate-centred system in that the elec-
toral system allows voters to target the candidate of their choice, a provision 
that should empower voters by allowing them to hold candidates accoun-
table.  
When casting their ballot, voters target individual candidates, which means 
that voters also know whom to hold accountable ex post. In order to be able 
to hold their representatives to account ex ante and ex post, however, voters 
need reliable information about the behaviour and activities of their 
representatives, as well as mechanisms or fora through which they can 
engage with their representatives.  
Information about candidates and representatives seeking (re-)election can, 
firstly, be acquired through so called freedom squares, i.e. “places of free 
speech”890. These were established after independence with the aim of 
identifying a place where political actors could campaign ahead of elections 
and engage in political dialogue with the population. According to Holm, 
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freedom squares are spaces where political actors can be heard and 
questioned, i.e. held accountable.891 
Another forum for engaging with and acquiring information about decision-
makers if that of the kgotla (or village assembly), which dates back to the 
pre-colonial era. Today, kgotla meetings provide community members with 
an opportunity to meet decision-makers, and demand information about and 
justification for decisions made and programmes embarked upon.892 The 
kgotla is also a forum for soliciting input and approval from communities on 
projects to be implemented in their area. Although consent in the kgotla, 
according to Holm, tends to be “easily forthcoming”893, it does constitute an 
arena for holding decision-makers accountable. 
Questioning and engaging with decision-makers at the kgotla may not, 
however, be as straightforward as one would assume. Good, for instance, 
emphasizes that not everyone has (had) access to the kgotla, drawing 
attention – for instance – to the San community, which also at times has 
been excluded from other decision-making structures such as Village 
Development Committees.894 Furthermore, “women, young people and 
[other] minorities were excluded or expected to remain silent”895 in the 
kgotla. Machangana stresses that even those included in the kgotla 
traditionally could not easily question the chief or other figures of authori-
ty896 since it was not appropriate to question or criticize authority. This still 
applies today, hindering the emergence of a vibrant civil society.897 Theobald 
and Williams, finally, confirm that “whilst elders and chiefs [are] required to 
listen to the views of kinsmen entitled to speak (that is senior males) custom 
decrees that it is the views of elders and chiefs that should always 
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prevail”898. The statements made above point to only certain citizens being 
able to make their voices heard in the kgotla, whereas the many cannot 
participate in the accountability process. Some also criticize the kgotla as 
imposing ideas on participants rather than constituting a forum for genuine 
consultation.899  
Citizens and political representatives also interact (i) through constituency 
offices (established “to allow easy access for MPs to their constituents”900), 
and (ii) during more informal events such as weddings, funerals, and school 
award ceremonies etc.901 This points to community members to a certain 
extent being able to acquire subjective information about the priorities, 
activities and behaviour of candidates and representatives. These events 
also provide candidates with an opportunity to prove their worth to voters 
(selection).  
The question remains, however, whether voters are able to acquire 
information beyond what is presented to them by the candidates / repre-
sentatives themselves? Does the media, for instance, provide independent 
and critical information needed to hold decision-makers accountable and 
can citizens access information by other means?  
The Constitution of Botswana guarantees access to information and 
provides for freedom of expression which, according to Balule, is interpreted 
as also covering media freedom.902 Furthermore, the long-term vision for 
Botswana, the Vision 2016, acknowledges the importance of improved 
access to information and the adoption of freedom of information legi-
slation.903  
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This said, freedom of expression and access to information are restricted in 
a number of different ways. Government and the public institutions of Bots-
wana, firstly, are characterized as highly secretive904, something that at least 
partly is likely to be linked to legislation (e.g. the Public Service Act, the 
National Security Act) prohibiting public servants from sharing information 
related to their position, or which they have come across as part of their 
duties. This, according to Balule, has “fostered a culture of secrecy”905 within 
government. 
Most actors also question whether the media, secondly, is completely free to 
speak its mind. Whereas Transparency International (with certain reser-
vations) categorizes the press in Botswana as free906, Freedom House points 
to political influence exercised by the state to influence journalists.907 The 
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), a non-governmental organisation 
focusing on promoting free media and the free flow of information, confirms 
this view and also lists a number of cases where media workers have been 
arrested or assaulted.908 Balule, however, seems to link assaults to 
individuals who are dissatisfied with the way they have been portrayed in 
the media, rather than actions on the part of the state.909  
Maripe, for his part, highlights the increase in pieces of legislation “whose 
effect is to muzzle the press”910. This is corroborated by Minnie, who states 
that Botswana’s statutes include a number of “anti-media freedom laws that 
are rarely used, but which the Government so far refuses to repeal. It can 
therefore be concluded that the state is shoring them up in case a situation 
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arises in which they would want to use them”911. Balule highlights that the 
presence of these laws has resulted in considerable self-censorship amongst 
media workers, something that also is linked to the private media relying on 
advertising revenue from government and the private sector, i.e. being 
financially dependent on these entities.912 Balule also lists a number of 
concrete restrictions when it comes to freedom of expression and media 
freedom. These include the liberty of action of media workers being limited 
e.g. in situations where the independence of courts, the reputation or rights 
of another person, or the public order, morality, health or security are 
perceived to be at risk.913  
The media is also restricted when it comes to the reporting on corruption 
cases. As stipulated in section 44 of the DCEC Act, the press may not, for 
instance, report on DCEC investigations under way. Representatives of the 
press perceive this restriction as a violation of their freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, stressing that the two pieces of legislation 
contradict one another.914  
The DCEC itself, fourthly, is in fact affected by difficulties in terms of 
accessing information of importance to its investigations. Theobald & 
Williams describe how the DCEC occasionally has to drop corruption cases 
altogether due to banks and other key institutions being unable to provide 
necessary information.915 
The above provides a sombre picture of Botswana in terms of freedom of the 
media and access to information. It may not, however, tell the whole truth. 
Molutsi accounts for a number of dailies and weeklies as well as local radio 
stations taking a critical stand against government on different issues.916 
This is corroborated by a senior official with the Office of the President, who 
confirms that media practitioners are free to criticize decision-makers, also 
highlighting that citizens are quite well informed in that 70% of citizens 
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acquire information by watching TV, and 73% do so by listening to the radio 
on a daily basis.917 Maundeni, for his part, suggests that the media, like civil 
society organizations, for a long time was regarded as unpatriotic and ended 
up being the target of legal and verbal attacks by Government. Thanks to the 
advocacy work undertaken by the Media Institute for Southern Africa 
(MISA), however, the media is today increasingly regarded as a stakeholder 
worth listening to.918 Zaffiro, finally, confirms that government also has 
become better at interacting with the media through interviews, briefings 
and by making information accessible.919 
The above points to information (including critical views) at least to some 
extent being expressed and shared with the public. Those sections of the 
public which read newspapers and listen to the radio should thus have an 
idea of, for instance, corruption scandals which have been unearthed. This 
said, corrupt practices of a more subtle nature may still escape the attention 
of different actors. This is so, since citizens tend to know little about the 
private interests and linkages of their representatives. Representatives do 
not, for instance, have to declare their assets, and information about their 
business and financial interests are not made public.920 As a result, citizens 
are often unable to determine whether decision-makers should be 
disqualified from certain processes, and whether private interests may have 
influenced decisions made.  
Neither is the public likely to know much about the forces, such as 
financiers, influencing politicians and parties from the sidelines. The 
Electoral Act of Botswana states that candidates (but not parties) are 
required to disclose their campaign expenses.921 This provision is not 
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enforced, however, and during the period covered by the analysis, actors 
seemed unwilling to comply with the provision.922  
Mere access to information is not enough, however, if principals do not use 
sanctions when transgressions are detected. As already mentioned, 
Botswana generally exhibits relatively high levels of voter participation. 
However, statistics hide the fact that many citizens remain unregistered, and 
therefore do not vote. Those unregistered are not the only citizens who do 
not have a part in the electoral process, however. Mfundisi highlights that 
certain citizens refuse to vote due to dwindling confidence in political 
institutions and leaders. Political leaders, he argues, are perceived as 
authoritarian and untrustworthy, serving their own interests at the expense 
of those of the public.923 Furthermore, some citizens do not see the need to 
vote “because, in their opinion, they determined who should lead them at 
the very first election in 1965. In their view, the tradition is [such] that once 
a chief has been confirmed, he occupies office until he dies”924.  
Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
As seen, political parties are able to and do screen candidates, either ahead 
of primaries or before actual nomination. As part of the process, candidates 
are forced to prove their capabilities and motivation to the party leadership 
(selection). By refusing access to primaries or by vetoing the decisions made 
at the primaries, party leaders can and do sanction candidates which are 
perceived as unsuitable. The political parties also ensure that MPs toe the 
party lines once elected, thus holding representatives to account ex post. The 
extent to which issues related to corruption are taken into account when 
screening candidates is, however, unknown. This said, the line of 
accountability is deemed to be strong.  
Through primary elections, party members also become part of the process 
of screening and selection. Party members do not seem to link the act of 
                                                 
 
922 Over the past few years, however, attitudes towards the declaration of assets and 
liabilities seem to have changed, something that bodes well with view to holding 
actors accountable, see Botswana Gazette at http://www.gazettebw.com 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10650%3Amasisi-says-no-to-
declaration-of-assets&catid=18%3Aheadlines&Itemid=2 (9.12.2011). 
923 Mfundisi, A. (2005, 167).  
924 Ntsabane, T. (2005, 214).  
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casting a vote in the primaries with a possibility to sanction wrong-doers, 
however. As a result, this line of accountability is estimated to be semi-
strong only. 
Voters are able to and do use a number of accountability mechanisms, 
including screening of candidates through fora such as freedom squares and 
electoral campaigns. These fora also provide candidates with an opportunity 
to prove their worth to voters (selection). Incumbents, for their part, are 
able to and do report to voters e.g. through events at the kgotla and 
meetings at constituency offices. Furthermore, voters can monitor in-
cumbents through media reports and reports from actors such as the Audit 
Office. If dissatisfied with a candidate, voters can sanction him/her by 
casting a vote for another candidate. However, the fact that a considerable 
portion of Batswana925 are unregistered as voters, or simply refrain from 
voting, means that sanctions at times are not used. As a consequence, this 
line of accountability is judged to be semi-strong. 
Figure 22: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the electoral system of Botswana 
 
As can be seen from figure 22, structures inherent to the electoral system 
both enhance and hamper accountability.  
How does this resonate with data on corruption in the national context? The 
fact that the line of accountability between political parties and candidates is 
described as strong could, first of all, be interpreted as “corruption-prone” 
candidates/incumbents-to-be being excluded from the ballot. This, in turn, 
                                                 
 
925 Term used for the citizens of Botswana. 
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should result in corruption not being that common amongst incumbents. 
This runs contrary the views of experts, which point to political and 
bureaucratic elites as those mostly engaging in corrupt behaviour. It also 
does not resonate with information emanating from a handful of corruption 
scandals pointing to politicians being engaged in private business ventures 
and therefore sometimes ending up in conflicts of interest. The contradicting 
results can be explained in a number of ways. One possibility is that of 
parties holding candidates to account but, despite having codes of conduct 
which condemn corruption, not sanctioning corrupt behaviour unless large 
scale and flagrant. Such tendencies were discernible from the analysis. It is, 
however, also possible that corruption amongst political actors in fact is a 
limited problem and that problems would be much greater, was it not for the 
fact that the political parties keep a tight rein on candidates and incumbents. 
Given that (i) political actors at the highest level in a few cases have been 
removed from office due to issues related to corruption926, and (ii) even one 
of the most critical voices927 perceives this type of corruption to be 
restricted, the analysis concludes that the line of accountability resonates 
with data on corruption.  
The lines of accountability between party-members and voters, on the one 
hand, and candidates, on the other, are deemed to be semi-strong. These 
weaknesses are, however, perceived to at least partly be offset by the fact 
that parties hold candidates accountable. It is also possible, however, that 
issues unrelated to the institutional structure of interest to the thesis and/or 
accountability offset these weaknesses, something that will be discussed in 
chapter 5.3.3.  
As can be seen from the above, certain lines of accountability resonate with 
data on corruption, whereas others do not fully. This points to a need to 
explore factors other than the institutions of interest to the analysis if 
hoping to gain a fuller picture of why corruption levels remain low. 
                                                 
 
926 Maundeni, Z. (2008b, 44).  
927 Good, K. (1994).  
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5.3.2.3 Lines of accountability inherent to the vertical distribution of 
power, and linkages to corruption 
Traits and P/A relationships of interest 
Already at independence in 1966, Botswana established local government 
structures alongside central government ones. These local structures stand 
on four pillars: (i) (district, town, and city) councils and township authori-
ties, (ii) district administrations, (iii) land boards, and (iv) tribal administra-
tions.928 These entities are complemented at the grassroots’ level by, for 
instance, village councils.  
(City, town and district) councils consist of elected and nominated 
councillors as well as administrative staff. The former councillors are elected 
by constituents, whereas the latter councillors are appointed by the Minister 
of Local Government. Councils have been endowed with certain powers, 
previously held by tribal chiefs.929 They are “in charge of overall district 
development, initiating and implementing programmes of local 
infrastructure and services, preparing of district development plans and 
budgets, and coordinating activities of some ministries at the local level”930. 
Councils also have certain more independent functions with regards to 
providing and overseeing primary education, social and community 
development, and construction and maintenance of tertiary roads. In later 
years, however, the responsibility for important functions such as primary 
health care and rural water supply has been transferred from the councils 
back to central government.931 The responsibility for recruiting teachers has 
also been recentralized.932 The tendency to recentralize certain functions 
may, at least partly, be due to the party in Government seeing 
                                                 
 
928 Sharma, K. C. (2010, 135).  
929 Some of these authorities in fact predate independence, see Poteete, A. R. & 
Mothusi, B. (2010, 16).  
930 Lekorwe, M. (2000, 26), see also Commonwealth Local Government Forum 
(CLGF) at www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/clgf/file/countries/Botswana.pdf 
(30.08.2010). 
931 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 7).  
932 The centralization of these functions was undertaken after pressures from the 
Teacher’s Unions, which felt that decentralized management of career paths meant 
that teachers could not transfer from one district to another, something that was 
perceived as a problem especially for teachers in remote, rural areas, see Maundeni, 
Z. (2007, 34).  
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“decentralization […] as favouring the opposition”933 since the opposition 
holds majorities in many councils.  
Executive power in districts is exercised by district administrations (DA), 
which consist of DA staff as well as the field officers from different line 
ministries within central government.934 The district administration is 
coordinated by the district commissioner (DC), described as the “eyes and 
ears of central government at the local level”935. The main function of the DC 
is that of coordinating “rural development activities at the district level, 
primarily as chairperson of the district development committee (DDC)”936. 
The Commissioner is appointed by the President, but remains administra-
tively accountable to the Ministry of Local Government (MLG)937, the 
“parent” ministry of local government institutions.  
Land boards are made up of elected and appointed members. These bodies 
shoulder responsibilities earlier held by traditional leaders, namely related 
to overseeing and allocating tribal land.938 Traditional leaders used to be 
“(ex oficio) members of both the district councils and the land boards when 
these local authorities were established, but lost representation on both 
bodies by 1993”939. 
Tribal administrations, finally, are led by traditional chiefs.940 Chiefs act as 
chairpersons at the kgotla where communities are consulted on issues 
pertaining to policy formulation and implementation as well as development 
                                                 
 
933 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 29).  
934 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, v); and Interview 16 – Academic, University of 
Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012). 
935 Lekorwe quoted in Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 8). The DC does not 
supervise all staff within the district administration since the DA also is made up of 
staff from a number of line ministries other than the Ministry of Local Government, 
whose official he is, see Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 18).  
936 “This committee has representation from the district council, land board and 
tribal administration, as well as district level representatives of various government 
ministries, and has a central role in coordination of district level development 
plans”, see Sharma, K. C. (2010, 136).  
937 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 8).  
938 Sharma, K. C. (2010, 136).  
939 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 3).  
940 In this function, the chief as well as his staff are paid by the Ministry of Local 
Government. 
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planning.941 Chiefs also preside over customary courts, which “handle more 
than 80% of cases tried in the country”942 and which constitute an important 
and low-cost way of solving disputes, especially for people in the rural 
areas.943 The powers of chiefs have, however, diminished in many ways. In 
the 1960s, their authority to levy and collect taxes was removed, as well as 
their powers to decide about stray cattle, both being modest but important 
sources of revenue for the chief and thus his community. Chiefs were also 
disempowered from allocating land in communal areas, a task that was 
given to the land boards.944 
As can be seen, local government authorities have a number of functions, 
which might convey the impression that power in fact lies with this level of 
government. Local government’s independence is, however, limited. Due to 
limited possibilities for raising funds locally945, as much as 80-90% of local 
government funding comes from central government.946 Central government 
in fact has powers to approve or reject policy decisions made at the local 
level, control and approve local budgets, and hire, promote, train, transfer, 
discipline and dismiss a large proportion of local staff.947 Local government 
is therefore very much part of and controlled by the central bureaucracy.948 
The local authorities could in fact be deprived of their powers altogether and 
even abolished. As highlighted by Hope and Lekorwe, local authorities were 
created through acts of Parliament rather than by the Constitution, which 
means that they are perceived to “exist at the mercy of the Minister of Local 
Government and the Minister of Lands and Housing. Legally, these two mi-
                                                 
 
941 Sharma, K. C. (2010, 136).  
942 Sharma, K. C. (2010, 136), see also Adamolekun, L. & Morgan, P. (1999, 590).  
943 Adamolekun, L. & Morgan, P. (1999, 589).  
944 Adamolekun, L. & Morgan, P. (1999, 590).  
945 Many councils raise funds primarily through fees and licences but are not 
themselves in a position to control fees for local services, since this is the 
prerogative of ministries at the central level. At times, councils, therefore, end up 
charging fees which are far below the market rate, see Wunsch, J.S. (1998); and 
Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 9).  
946 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 61). Part of the financial disparities between councils 
is also due to urban councils being allowed to collect property taxes, whereas 
district councils are not, see Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 24).  
947 Maundeni, Z. (2007, xviii and 35).  
948 In particular the Ministry of Local Government, which is regarded as the “parent” 
ministry of local government institutions in Botswana, see Wunsch, J.S. (1998).  
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nisters have the authority to recommend to Parliament to suspend or abo-
lish any district/urban council or land board if they deem it appropriate to 
do so”949. 
As can be seen from the discussion above, (i) local authorities have little 
autonomy or final say on key issues, (ii) their competencies are for the most 
part awarded by central government, and (iii) their powers can be with-
drawn if the centre so wishes. Botswana should thus rightly be classified as a 
unitary state. Given these traits, the analysis takes an interest in a number of 
principal-agent relationships of relevance to the division of power between 
the centre and the periphery. These include voters as well as a number of 
entities within central government as principals to entities part of local 
government (councils, district administrations, tribal administrations and 
land boards), see the figures 22-26.950 
  
                                                 
 
949 Hope quoted in Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 7); and Lekorwe, M. (2000, 
26).  
950 Sources for figures 22-26: Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, 
Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012); Sharma, K.C. (year unknown); Wily, L.A. at 
http://pubs.iied.org /pdfs/9304IIED.pdf (26.10.2012); Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. 
(2010); and Sietchiping, R. (2010). 
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Figure 23: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the vertical division of 
power of Botswana (councils) 
 
Figure 24: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the vertical division of 
power of Botswana (district administrations) 
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Figure 25: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the vertical division of 
power of Botswana (tribal administrations) 
 
 
Figure 26: Principal-agent relationships inherent to the vertical division of 
power of Botswana (land boards) 
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Analysis of accountability and corruption 
a. Central government as a key actor and a principal to institutions of 
local government 
Botswana can be described as a unitary state, where the executive 
dominates much of the system.951 This includes direct control over a number 
of sub-national institutions and actors. The President appoints the district 
commissioner (DC), who is regarded as the “link between the President and 
the district”952. The executive also has powers over sub-national institutions 
through (i) the Minister for Local Government, who is mandated to appoint 
nominated members of the councils as well as administrative staff to 
councils and tribal administrations, and (ii) the Ministers of Lands and 
Housing, Agriculture, and Trade and Industry, who have the authority to 
nominate members to the land boards. Given the considerable authority of 
the President and ministers over these nominations, they participate in the 
screening of many actors who also need to prove their worth to them. 
Nominees for certain positions are likely to hail from the party of the 
President and the ministers in question, which means that party statutes 
and the government program will be used as benchmarks when screening 
candidates. The principals then monitor their agents through performance 
assessments and a wealth of meetings and reports, and may, if needed, 
sanction them in different ways.  
Central control over the sub-national level does not limit itself to nomi-
nations made by the President and the ministers, however. Accountability is 
also exercised by a number of other principals using other accountability 
mechanisms. The most visible form of control from the point of view of the 
local institutions is probably that pertaining to finances and planning. As 
already stated, councils have little or no funding of their own. According to 
Sharma, most councils rely totally on central government when it comes to 
development funds (earmarked for development projects) and to 80-90% 
when it comes to meeting recurrent expenditure.953 As a result, central 
government has the upper hand when it comes to activities and projects 
                                                 
 
951 See Wunsch, J.S. (1998); Maundeni, Z. (2007); and Holm, J.D. (1987).  
952 Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012). 
953 Sharma, K. C. (2010, 138).  
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undertaken by local authorities. Poteete and Mothusi confirm that councils 
only have a nominal role when it comes to planning. Councils may submit 
plans to central government but final decisions on most issues remain the 
prerogative of the latter.954 Central government may in fact sanction local 
actors by overthrowing local plans with reference to funding being 
unavailable, other activities being more urgent, the local authority lacking in 
terms of competence or implementation capacity, or local authorities 
misusing resources.955 Such central dominance often results in local officials 
(professional/administrative as well as political) feeling sidelined and 
discouraged, unable to cater for the needs of their constituents.956  
Reports from the Auditor General, to whom local authorities must submit 
their accounts, confirm that financial management is a challenge in many 
local authorities, and that sanctions at times are justified. These reports 
indicate that for example in the year 2000, few local authority accounts were 
in order, many being in arrears of between 4-6 years. Reports also indicated 
that accounting did not maintain high enough standards.957 Mfundisi, for his 
part, maintains that corruption is perceived to be more common within 
councils than within central government.958 This is corroborated by the 
DCEC, which points to corruption cases being more common within the 
Ministry of Local Government than within other ministries, and that the 
Gaborone City Council has been particularly badly hit. The DCEC and 
Mfundisi attribute this to weak procurement systems, and councillors and 
staff not being prohibited from participating in tendering processes.959  
Poteete and Mothusi stress, however, that local authorities cannot be 
blamed for all these failures, accentuating the fact that local authorities are 
expected to deliver a number of essential services, while not always being 
allocated the funds and competent staff to shoulder responsibilities.960 
                                                 
 
954 Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, i).  
955 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 9 and 15), see also Gbadamosi, G. at 
http://eprints.worc.ac.uk/88/ (2.12.2011); and Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, ii).  
956 Wunsch J.S. (1998, 35).  
957 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 64); and Mfundisi, A. (2008, 62).  
958 Mfundisi, A. (2008, 62).  
959 Mfundisi, A. (2008, 65-66), also see the Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crime at www.dcec.gov.bw/download/1245400697_AR_2003_Write_up.pdf (04.03 
2013). 
960 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 9).  
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Lekorwe, for instance, stresses that the Ministry of Local Government has 
the powers to nominate additional councillors and that this provision could 
be used to ensure that councils have the human resources needed to 
function effectively. According to Lekorwe, however, the ruling party has 
used the provision to ensure political control of councils in which the party 
feels under-represented, rather than to improve the capacities of councils.961 
Government has also, according to Poteete and Mothusi, denied local 
government the right to “tap localized sources of revenue for local use on the 
grounds that doing so would exacerbate underdevelopment and undermine 
national unity”962. Local authorities therefore seem to be caught in an im-
possible position of being denied a chance to function properly and show 
their worth, and then being punished for not excelling.  
Different local authorities face particular types of challenges with regards to 
accountability. Actors within councils, firstly, are held to account by a 
multitude of different principals, as can be seen from figure 23. Councils are 
made up of political actors, councillors, as well as civil servants. Whereas 
elected councillors are chosen and held to account by voters, nominated 
councillors are selected and held to account by the Minister of Local Govern-
ment. Civil servants, for their part, are selected and held to account by the 
centre as well as the council itself, depending on their level: whereas pro-
fessional staff is selected and held to account by the Ministry of Local 
Government, industrial or unskilled staff is hired, assessed and disciplined 
by the council secretary or department heads.963  
In a report for Transparency International, Maundeni criticizes the practice 
of central government hiring and disciplining part of local staff, and local 
government holding the rest to account.964 This criticism is backed by 
Adamolekun and Morgan965. According to the authors, the practice creates a 
structure of double loyalty and may result in part of staff not having the 
interest of their district / town / city at heart but rather focusing on those of 
the parent ministry. Wunsch, for his part, highlights that town secretaries 
                                                 
 
961 Lekorwe, M. (2000, 28-29); and Somolekae, G. (2005, 25).  
962 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 28).  
963 Maundeni, Z. (2007, 35); Wunsch, J.S. (1998, 33); and Interview 16 – Academic, 
University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012). 
964 Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 61).  
965Adamolekun, L. & Morgan, P. (1999, 600).  
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and councillors express concerns about not being assigned “personnel 
committed to their goals and familiar with their particular needs and 
problems”966. This points to agents who work side-by-side being monitored 
and – if need be – sanctioned by different principals. Such a practice is 
problematic in that both categories of agents should have the interests of the 
council at heart. Agents hired by central government are, however, likely to 
be evaluated mainly with regards to the extent to which they live up to the 
expectations of their principals within central government.  
The challenges do not seem to stop there, however. Some principals also 
seem to be at a loss with regards to identifying the very agents that they are 
supposed to monitor and – if need be – sanction. An official speaks of “intri-
cate hierarchies which render supervision difficult”967, highlighting that 
actors often do not know who the principal of a particular agent in fact is.968 
The official also points out that actual supervision remains a challenge. Staff 
members are for the most part appraised as part of so called performance 
development plans, which analyse the attainment of objectives and personal 
attributes such as interaction with the public. Oftentimes, however, no 
action is taken by supervisors when irregularities are detected. This is 
attributed to Tswana culture where confrontation and conflict are to be 
avoided. As a result, supervisors fail to act and hope that problems will 
disappear by themselves.969 This points to principals within the 
administration being able to monitor their agents but being reluctant to 
sanction them despite deviations from the contract between the two. 
Issues of accountability are equally complex when it comes to other entities 
at the local level. Whereas chiefs previously held considerable powers over 
“land, natural resources, culture, tradition and the law and custom in their 
individual territories”970, they today remain paid civil servants, heading so 
called tribal administrations. As such, they are held to account ex ante by the 
Minister of Local Government who, in accordance with the Chieftainship Act, 
                                                 
 
966 Wunsch, J.S. (1998, 34).  
967 Interview 19 – Senior official with the Office of the Ombudsman, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
968 Interview 19 – Senior official with the Office of the Ombudsman, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
969 Interview 19 – Senior official with the Office of the Ombudsman, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
970 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 21).  
261 
 
may refuse to recognize a chief if the chief has been deposed by his tribe or if 
he “considers it to be in the public interest to do so”971, see figure 25. This 
means that the Minister screens the chief, and that the chief should prove his 
worth to the Minister. 
Although requiring recognition from the Minister of Local Government, 
chieftainship is still hereditary, however, and chiefs are appointed by the 
tribe assembled at the kgotla. The tribe, however, has limited powers when 
it comes to holding the chief to account ex ante due to the hereditary nature 
of chieftainship.  
The tribe has slightly more clout with regards to the chief ex post, however. 
The chief, firstly, is expected to be responsive towards tribe members and 
“have the interest of his people at heart”972, aware of the fact that he is “king 
by the grace of the people”973. Sharma states that a chief, before making 
important decisions affecting the community, traditionally “had to consult 
his advisers, those placed in leadership positions [within the tribe] and 
Kgotla”974. A chief who did not consult was faced with dissatisfaction and 
defiance. Furthermore, “he could be warned or reprimanded by his advisers 
or at public assemblies; if he ruled despotically or repeatedly neglected his 
duties, the people would begin to desert him”975. All of this points to chiefs 
being held to account ex post by their tribesmen.  
Chiefs are also accountable ex post to the Minister of Local Government on 
issues such as the administration of customary justice, participation in deve-
lopment planning and implementation.976 The Minister acquires information 
about decisions made by the chief through a wealth of reports and meetings, 
as well as the press. If dissatisfied with the decisions made or actions taken 
                                                 
 
971 Sharma, K.C. (year unknown, 8), see also the Government of Botswana 
(Chieftainship Act, part II, paragraph 4) at www.gov.bw/Global/MLG/... 
/Chieftainship.pdf (07.03.2013). 
972 Sharma, K.C. (year unknown, 14).  
973 Tlou, T. (1985, 21).  
974 Sharma, K.C. (year unknown, 14).  
975 Schapera quoted in Leith, J.C. (2005, 20).  
976 Sentences passed by the chief in a customary court have, for instance, been 
reviewed by the district commissioner (as the representative of central government 
at the local level) and cases have been transferred to magistrate’s courts, see 
Sharma, K.C. (year unknown, 8).  
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by the chief, the Minister may sanction him by withdrawing his recognition 
as a chief. 
The overview above shows that chiefs are held to account by principals with 
potentially diverging interests, something that may put the chief in a 
peculiar position of double loyalty and uncertainty with regards to which 
rules to give priority to.  
Land boards977 face similar challenges with regards to accountability in that 
members are accountable to different principals, see figure 26. Elected mem-
bers, firstly, are screened by community members through daily interaction 
as well as meetings at the kgotla. Candidates which are deemed to be un-
suitable can be (and are being) sanctioned by community members who 
refuse to endorse them. Elected members are also held to account ex post by 
community members through appearances at the kgotla and reports from 
the land boards. In this context, the Tribal Land Act constitutes something of 
a contract between principals and agents, and a benchmark against which 
the actions of agents are evaluated. If dissatisfied with the decisions made by 
(member of) the land board, community members can appeal against these 
to Land Tribunals, which means that sanctions are available to aggrieved 
individuals.978 
Land boards also consist of nominated members, appointed by the 
Ministries of Lands and Housing, Agriculture, and Trade and Industry.979 The 
respective ministers screen candidates for these posts and hold unsuitable 
candidates to account ex ante by not appointing them. Nominated members 
are also held to account ex post by the same ministries, which may sanction 
them by dismissal.  
  
                                                 
 
977 Land boards “hold the tribal land in trust and allocate it for residential, 
agricultural, industrial, commercial or general development purposes”, see Sharma, 
K.C. (year unknown, 3).  
978 Ministry of Lands and Housing at http://www.mlh.gov.bw 
/index.php?option=com_departments&id=16 (07.03.2013). 
979 Sietchiping, R. (2010, 14).  
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b. Voters as principals to institutions of local government 
The discussion has, thus far, focussed on relationships involving central 
government as an important principal to actors at the sub-national level, to a 
certain extent disregarding the relationship between voters and local rep-
resentatives. At the sub-national level, citizens elect and are represented by 
councillors. These are “elected for five-year terms and they can retire or 
stand for re-election”980. Council elections are organized simultaneously 
with parliamentary elections.981 Voter turnout in council elections was 
75.8% in 1999 and 76.2% in 2004, which points to voters being engaged in 
holding councillors accountable.982 It is, however, likely that also these 
figures fail to capture the fact that part of the voting age population has not 
been registered, which also means that these citizens do not participate.  
Voters acquire information about candidates through political rallies, 
informal meetings and – in the case of incumbents – through the kgotla 
where representatives can be heard and questioned. Community members 
tend to be interested in projects implemented in their vicinity and one 
would assume that proximity to decision-makers would enhance dialogue 
and access to information. This is not always the case, however. According to 
Poteete and Mothusi many issues are “deemed confidential [and] members 
of the public are denied access to information about decisions taken by their 
local representatives”983, something that confirms the statement by Mogapi 
that government and public institutions in Botswana remain highly 
secretive.984 Accountability is also rendered difficult for the simple reason 
that voters tend to have a limited understanding of the mandates of different 
local institutions and authorities, as well as the division of labour between 
the different levels of government. At times, however, accountability is also 
wanting for completely different reasons, one of these being that Batswana 
often see themselves as subjects of a chief or headman rather than citizens 
with the “right to call their leaders to account for decisions and be-
                                                 
 
980 Lekorwe, M. (2000, 27).  
981 A simple plurality electoral system is employed when electing councillors, see 
Lekorwe, M. (2000, 27).  
982 African elections database at http://africanelections.tripod.com 
/bw_2004local.html (28.11.2012). 
983 Poteete, A. R. & Mothusi, B. (2010, 20 and 29).  
984 Mogapi, R. (2010, 18).  
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haviour”985. As a result, voters at times do not engage in the process of 
demanding information, justification, or sanctioning wrong-doers.  
Connections between ease of accountability and levels of corruption 
The analysis above depicts the intricate web of relationships and lines of 
accountability between the national and subnational level, on the one hand, 
and at the sub-national level on the other. As seen, lines of accountability 
differ in terms of opportunities created for accountability.  
Agents within councils are held to account by different principals using a 
wide array of accountability mechanisms, see figure 27. Elected councillors, 
firstly, are screened by the voters and forced to demonstrate their 
competencies and motivation to them (selection). In this context, election 
platforms can be regarded as something of a contract between the principal 
and the agent. Councillors report to voters through meetings at the kgotla, 
informal events and official information. Voters, for their part, are also able 
to and do monitor councillors through the media, and may sanction wrong-
doers on election day by refusing to vote for actors who have engaged in 
corrupt activities. Voter turnout is fairly high in council elections, which 
points to voters in fact participating in the accountability process. Statistics 
do not, however, seem to capture the fact that many citizens remain un-
registered and therefore are excluded from the accountability process. 
Whether those who vote take issues related to corruption into account when 
casting their vote is uncertain. Against this background, the line of accounta-
bility is deemed to be semi-strong.  
Nominated councillors are appointed by the Ministry of Local Government 
(MLG), which screens candidates and forces these to show their qualifi-
cations and demonstrate their suitability for the task. Unsuitable candidates 
can be and are being refused appointment. The MLG also holds nominated 
councillors to account ex post. These councillors are monitored through staff 
appraisals and also report to their principal. Nominated councillors can be 
sanctioned ex post for instance through dismissal from office. Such sanctions 
are deemed to be accessible to principals but whether they are used in 
practice is uncertain. Nevertheless, the line of accountability is judged to be 
strong.  
                                                 
 
985 Holm, J.D. (1999, 299).  
265 
 
Administrative and industrial staff within councils is held to account by the 
MLG and council officials, who screen candidates and monitor them once in 
office. Wrong-doers can be sanctioned. The analysis shows, however, that 
principals often are reluctant to punish offenders. As a result, these lines of 
accountability are deemed to be semi-strong only.  
If decisions made or actors within the councils are found to be at fault, the 
MFDP and the MLG may and do impose sanctions applicable to the council as 
a whole. These include e.g. withdrawing funding, rejecting plans and 
policies, and withdrawing staff. In theory, central government could sanction 
councils by abolishing them altogether since they have been created through 
acts of Parliament rather than the Constitution. Needless to say, such sanc-
tions have not been used. This overall (general) line of accountability is 
nevertheless regarded as strong.  
Figure 27: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the vertical division of power (councils) 
 
Actors within the district administrations (DA) are held to account by the 
President, the Ministry of Local Government and other line ministries using 
different accountability mechanisms, see figure 28.  
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The President is mandated to appoint the district commissioner, wherefore 
the President also screens candidates who, in turn, try to convince him 
about their suitability (selection). Candidates deemed as unsuitable can be 
sanctioned by refusal to appoint them. Such sanctions are accessible to and 
used by the principal in practice. As a result this line of accountability is 
regarded as strong.  
The district commissioner is held accountable ex post by the Ministry of 
Local Government through staff appraisals and self-reporting. These mecha-
nisms are accessible and used. Sanctions in the form of penalties or dis-
missal, however, are not always applied due to reluctance on the part of 
principals to confront and punish agents, wherefore the line of accounta-
bility is perceived to be semi-strong.  
DA staff and line ministry staff within the DA are appointed by central 
government (Ministry of Local Government and other line ministries), who 
also have a number of accountability tools at their disposal. Principals hold 
agents to account ex ante through screening and selection, sanctioning 
unsuitable candidates by not nominating them. These mechanisms and 
sanctions are accessible and employed in practice. Principals rely on 
performance assessments and self-reporting when holding agents to 
account ex post. Sanctioning wrong-doers is a challenge, however, due to an 
overall reluctance to criticize and confront. These lines of accountability are 
therefore deemed to be semi-strong only.  
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Figure 28: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the vertical division of power (district administrations) 
 
Members of land boards are held to account by community members at the 
kgotla as well as the Ministries of Lands and Housing, Agriculture, and Trade 
and Industry, see figure 29. These principals have formal access to a number 
of accountability mechanisms.  
Community members screen elected candidates through daily interaction as 
well as the kgotla, where candidates also can prove their suitability for the 
task. Candidates perceived as inappropriate can be sanctioned by the kgotla 
by refusing to nominate them. These sanctions are accessible to and used by 
principals. Community members also hold elected members to account ex 
post through self-reports at the kgotla and information emanating directly 
from the land boards. In this context, the Tribal Land Act constitutes 
something of a contract between principals and agents, and a benchmark 
against which the actions of agents are evaluated. If dissatisfied with the 
decisions made by (members of) the land board, community members can 
appeal against these to Land Tribunals. This sanction is accessible to and 
used by principals. As a consequence, the line of accountability is regarded 
as strong.  
The Ministries of Lands and Housing, Agriculture, and Trade and Industry 
hold nominated members of Lands Boards to account ex ante as well as ex 
post. Ex ante accountability entails screening of candidates as well as 
selection. The principals are able to and do sanction ill-suited candidates by 
not nominating them. Members who act in contradiction with rules, 
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regulations and orders from principals can be sanction by dismissal. These 
mechanisms and sanctions are accessible to principals. The extent to which 
(i) they are being used in reality, and (ii) they take issues related to corrup-
tion into account is, however, unknown. This said, the lines of accountability 
are deemed to be strong.  
Figure 29: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the vertical division of power (land boards) 
 
 
Tribal administrations are headed by chiefs, appointed by their tribes 
assembled at the kgotla, see figure 30. Chieftainship is hereditary, wherefore 
ex ante accountability on the part of community members is more of a 
formality. Community members monitor the chief through appearances at 
the kgotla, rulings of the customary court as well as information provided by 
the tribal authority. If dissatisfied with the ways in which the chief exercises 
power, he can be confronted at the kgotla, warned, reprimanded or deserted 
by his subjects. Some of these sanctions are not accessible to all community 
members, however, but rather to the chief’s advisers or community mem-
bers who are allowed to speak in the kgotla. Against the above, this line of 
accountability, therefore, is deemed to be semi-strong, bordering on weak. 
Despite being nominated by their tribesmen, chiefs also need to be recog-
nized as such by the Minister of Local Government. Chiefs are screened and 
evaluated against the provisions of the Chieftainship Act and can, if deemed 
to be unsuitable, be (i) refused recognition, or (ii) recognized, but sidelined 
in terms of decision-making power. The Ministry also monitors chiefs ex post 
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and may withdraw recognition from the chief if the chief does not act in 
accordance with expectations, rules and regulations. These sanctions are 
accessible to the principals and have also been used. The line of accounta-
bility is therefore perceived as strong.  
Administrative staff within the tribal administrations is held to account by 
the Ministry of Local Government. Little is known about the accountability 
mechanisms used by principals when holding these agents to account. It can, 
however, be assumed that they follow the same procedures as elsewhere 
within the administration, which would point to ex ante accountability 
including thorough screening and selection, and the Public Service Act, and 
the code of conduct for the public service constituting “contracts” between 
principals and agents. Accountability ex post, on the other hand, would 
centre on performance appraisals. The fact that principals elsewhere within 
the administration shy away from punishing wrong-doers is likely to apply 
also in this case, wherefore the line of accountability tentatively is judged to 
be semi-strong. 
Figure 30: Visualization of the strength of lines of accountability inherent to 
the vertical division of power (tribal administrations) 
 
 
Entities at the (national and the) sub-national levels are also held to account 
by institutions such as the Auditor General, the DCEC and the Ombudsman 
(discussed in chapter 5.3.3). Whereas the Office of the Auditor General has 
access to all public sector accounts and may sanction wrong-doers by 
making corrupt acts public, the DCEC may investigate and forward cases to 
the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. The Office of the Ombudsman, for its 
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part, relies on negotiations rather than sanctions but may also bring cases 
before the National Assembly, i.e. make them public. 
As can be seen from figures 27-30, the lines of accountability at the sub-
national level, as well as between the sub-national and the central levels, 
range from strong to semi-strong, pointing to well-functioning as well as 
slightly less well-functioning accountability. How does this resonate with 
data on corruption in the national context?  
Due to lack of disaggregated data on corruption (focussing on corruption 
within particular institutions at the sub-national level), it is difficult to draw 
conclusions with regards to linkages between the strength of specific lines of 
accountability and levels of corruption amongst particular (groups of) 
agents. Conclusions, therefore, must be drawn at a fairly general level.  
At a very general level, the many strong and semi-strong lines of accounta-
bility depicted above resonate well with the fact that corruption is 
considered to be uncommon within society as a whole. Data on corruption 
points to problems being slightly greater at the sub-national level in general 
and within councils more specifically, however. This does not, as such 
resonate with lines of accountability, many of which remain strong. Data 
points to most corruption cases unearthed at the council level being related 
to procurement and tendering processes, however, something that could be 
explained by the fact that the semi-strong lines of accountability at the 
council level are those including bureaucrats as agents.  
The analysis only points to one line of accountability bordering on weak, 
namely the one between tribe members and chiefs. This runs contrary to the 
fact that no source points to chiefs being engaged in corrupt activities to a 
greater extent than others. This might, of course, be due to respect for 
elders, resulting in such cases not being reported to relevant authorities. It is 
also possible, however, that the weakness of this line is offset by the 
considerable power of the Ministry of Local Government over the tribal 
administrations in general and chiefs more specifically. Furthermore, it is 
conceivable that this weakness is compensated for by external factors 
discussed in chapter 5.3.3. 
Previous analyses of the extent to which lines of accountability resonate 
with data on corruption in the country-context of Botswana have pointed to 
a resonance as well as dissonance between the two. The above analysis 
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however, mainly points to resonance in that strong lines of accountability at 
a very general level seem to be accompanied by low levels of corruption. It is 
therefore concluded that political institutions and/or accountability do 
provide at least a partial answer to the virtual absence of corruption in the 
context of Botswana. Other explanations to this being the case will be sought 
in chapter 5.3.3.  
5.3.3 Other determinants of corruption in the context of Botswana 
The institutional analysis accounted for in chapter 5.3.2 was aimed at 
describing part of the institutional landscape of Botswana, as well as 
whether and how the political institutions of interest to the thesis contribute 
towards creating possibilities for accountability, thus reducing levels of 
corruption. The analysis was felt to be of importance to the overall 
discussion, despite the fact that the quantitative analysis (chapter 4.3) 
pointed to at least part of the answer to Botswana’s low levels of corruption 
lying in factors other than the institutions of interest to the thesis. The 
institutional analysis was included so as to check the findings of the 
quantitative analysis, making sure that the political institutions included in 
the statistical analysis would not be discarded as explanatory variables light-
heartedly, in favour of other types of explanations.  
As can be seen from the institutional analysis for Botswana, some of the 
political institutions of interest to the thesis do contribute towards strong 
accountability whereas others do not. Likewise, analyses of the strength of 
lines of accountability against levels of corruption point to resonance as well 
as dissonance986 between the two. Dissonance comes in the form of weaker 
lines of accountability at times being accompanied by lower levels of 
corruption, which points to the former not holding the answer to corruption 
levels in that context being low. It is therefore justified to look for answers 
also outside the institutional framework of interest to the thesis.  
The following discussion, therefore, focuses on other factors which are 
argued to have shaped the corruption landscape of Botswana. Here, the 
                                                 
 
986 Resonance referring to low levels of corruption going hand in hand with strong 
accountability or vice versa, and dissonance referring to low levels of corruption 
going hand in hand with weak accountability or vice versa. 
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importance of leadership987 is accentuated988, the emphasis lying on the 
background, priorities and style of leadership of the early leaders of the 
country. The thesis argues that these factors (elaborated upon below), 
among others, have allowed Botswana to reduce the practicability and 
attractiveness of corruption.  
The importance of early political leaders such as Presidents Seretse Khama 
and Quett Masire989 (among others) for Botswana’s development has been 
emphasized in numerous books and articles.990 The key role played by the 
national leadership in terms of setting Botswana on the path towards 
development was also emphasized in in-country interviews.991 The extent to 
which this early leadership also laid the foundation for good governance and 
the virtual absence of corruption has, however, been discussed to a lesser 
extent. The analysis below argues that the early leaders indeed affected the 
extent to which corruption is practicable and attractive in Botswana (i) 
through an inclusive, consultative approach to development, (ii) by 
personifying certain values and leading by example, (iii) by contributing 
towards the building of institutions, some of which enhance accountability 
and serve to counteract corruption, and (iv) by pursuing policies aimed at 
redistribution and increasing overall levels of welfare, see figure 31. 
  
                                                 
 
987 Defined as “the organization and mobilization of people and resources 
(economic, political and other) in pursuit of particular ends”, see Leftwich, A. (2010, 
103). 
988 This is in line with Leftwich, who deplores the fact that the human element often 
is forgotten at the expense of structures, stressing that analyses of political actors 
and individuals in general are key to development, see Leftwich, A. (2009).  
989 The first and second Presidents of Botswana, respectively. 
990 See e.g. Sebudubudu, D. & Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012); Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, 
P. (2011); and Leith, J.C. (2005). 
991 Interview 13 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana (5.10.2012); 
Interview 15 – Senior Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012); and Interview 18 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, 
Botswana (9.10.2012). 
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Figure 31: Proposed determinants of corruption in Botswana 
 5.3.3.1 The background of the early leaders 
African leaders are often associated with despotical behaviour, poor gover-
nance, violations of human rights, poor economic growth and corruption.992 
At times, it seems as if African leaders were expected to leave poverty and 
misery in their trail. As a result, democratic, capable and development-
oriented leadership (although not as rare as often imagined) tends to 
surprise and even confuse observers. Botswana, under the stewardship of a 
number of capable leaders, has proven that African (or other) leaders should 
not be treated as a block. Instead, leaders differ from one another in terms of 
e.g. their backgrounds, personalities and preferences and therefore also 
guide their countries onto certain paths rather than others, and leave their 
distinctive marks on the polity. The discussion below takes an interest in the 
early leaders of Botswana, analysing (i) why they chose the path of putting 
the nation and its people first, and trying to serve them in different ways993, 
as well as (ii) the factors shaping them into leaders which were different 
from many others on the continent and beyond. 
Sir Seretse Khama (the founding President of Botswana), first of all, was 
brought up to become a leader. His father, Sekgoma Khama II, was para-
mount Chief of the Bangwato people of central Botswana, and his grand-
                                                 
 
992 See for instance Rotberg, R.I. (2003, 28).  
993 One interviewee also stresses that the 1st President could have ruled like a 
monarch, but instead put the country first, as did the 2nd President, see Interview 18 
– Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana (9.10.2012), see also 
Rotberg, R.I. (2003, 30).  
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father was Kgosi (King) Khama III. Sekgoma Khama II died when Seretse 
Khama was just four years old, making him the Chief of the Bangwato.994 
Because of his young age, he could not rule, however, and a regent was ap-
pointed, but his upbringing was characterized by preparations for assuming 
power.  
The fact that Seretse Khama was of Bangwato origin already set him onto a 
path of interest to this thesis in that “Bamangwato chiefs […] were well 
regarded for their benevolence and integrity”995. Furthermore, Sir Seretse 
Khama, Quett Masire and Festus Mogae (the first three Presidents of Bots-
wana) were brought up according to Tswana custom, where the concept of 
botho was central to all behaviour and activities.996 A person who has botho 
is someone “with a rounded character, a person of great integrity, honesty, 
respectful, hardworking, obedient, caring, loving, with high self-esteem, 
exemplary in every way, not selfish, mindful of the needs of others, and well 
behaved in every possible way”997. Characteristics such as valuing equality, 
human relations, and showing humility are also associated with the concept 
of botho.998 In Tswana culture, botho is an important moral value, guiding 
people when it comes to interaction with others. The value of botho is part of 
children’s upbringing, not least through folktales showing the importance of 
good manners, compassion and integrity. The church, which constitutes an 
important institution and voice in Botswana and African society, also 
preaches botho, although in the form of the Golden Rule, which in certain 
respects contains the same message as the concept of botho.999  
The concept also naturally filters into systems of governance. Leaders are in 
fact expected to have botho and “subordinate their egos to the communal 
interest of the community so that they [can] survive successfully as a 
group”.1000 Leaders are thus expected to lead with the people, serving them 
                                                 
 
994 University of Botswana History Department at http://www.thuto.org/ubh/bw 
/skhama.htm (1.11.2012). 
995 Rotberg, R.I. (2003).  
996 Bishop Moenga quoted in Pöntinen, M. (2011, 159).  
997 Amanaze, J. (ed.) (2012, 259), see also Interview 19 – Senior official with the 
Office of the Ombudsman, Gaborone, Botswana (9.10.2012). 
998 Pöntinen, M. (2011, 161).  
999 Pöntinen, M. (2011, 163).  
1000 Moatlhaping, S.O.S. (2007, 44); and Shapera quoted in Moatlhaping, S.O.S (2007, 
84). Moatlhaping emphasizes, however, that many Batswana do not see botho as 
being as important a value in the 21st century. 
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and consulting them on matters of importance to the community. Leaders 
who impose decision on communities or misuse their powers are described 
as having lost their humanity or botho.1001  
The early leaders were thus brought up valuing integrity, honesty, 
unselfishness, humility and showing compassion for others, which is likely 
to have shaped their personality and behaviour. These values are also likely 
to have influenced citizens in general, since the concept of botho, in its 
essence, is about reciprocity and relations, i.e. showing people respect, 
honesty and integrity, and getting the same treatment in return. This is 
confirmed by an academic, according to whom the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled has been characterized by trust and unity, which has 
resulted in a mentality whereby stealing from the leader is considered 
unacceptable.1002 This can be interpreted as a condemnation of what today 
are considered to be forms of corruption. 
The personality and behaviour of Sir Seretse Khama and leaders such as 
Quett Masire, Festus Mogae and others are also likely to have been shaped 
by the fact that they were well-educated, and that many of them received 
part of their education outside Botswana. Prior to independence, those 
Batswana who could afford secondary and tertiary education often received 
it abroad, due to the limited possibilities in their own country. Sir Seretse 
Khama and Quett Masire, for instance, both attended the Tigerkloof Institute 
in South Africa. Sir Seretse then continued his studied at Fort Hare 
University in South Africa and Oxford University in Great Britain, and 
trained as a barrister at Inner Temple in London.1003 Festus Mogae, on the 
other hand, studied at North West London Polytechnic, the University of 
Oxford and the University of Sussex.1004 
Studies abroad gave these future leaders insights into developments in the 
region and elsewhere, as well as another perspective on what was taking 
place inside Botswana, and the path Botswana should (or should not) take. 
                                                 
 
1001 Interview 13 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana 
(5.10.2012), see also Amanaze quoted in Pöntinen, M. (2011, 160).  
1002 Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012). 
1003 Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997, 304).  
1004 Answers.com at http://www.answers.com/topic/festus-
mogae#ixzz2BMTiXSsm (5.11.2012). 
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Sir Seretse Khama, for instance, was deeply affected by and condemned the 
apartheid politics of South Africa, and came to realize that such conflict and 
differential treatment of citizens had to be prevented in Botswana.1005 
5.3.3.2 Inclusion and consultation  
The challenges faced by the leadership of Botswana at the eve of 
independence were enormous. The country’s entire viability as an indepen-
dent state was being questioned, something that might have discouraged 
actors with a lesser degree of commitment and determination. In the case of 
Botswana, this proved to be a rallying point, however. There was thus broad 
support for the ideas to build a democratic, multiracial and united state 
where human rights were respected, as for plans to ensure development for 
the nation as a whole.1006  
Given the situation that the new state found itself in, the leadership knew 
that important decisions had to be made, not just by the few, but through 
consultation and by involving actors outside the ruling party and the 
political arena. This also involved breaching tribal differences.1007 Uniting 
and gaining the trust of actors outside the inner circle could have been 
difficult, had it not been for the fact that many of these “outsiders” were the 
very people with whom the leadership had attended school and pursued 
university studies, and whose views and visions already were somewhat 
familiar to the leaders.1008 This facilitated the collaboration between actors 
who otherwise might have been antagonistic and who may have found it 
difficult to gain one another’s trust.  
From a developmental as well as an anti-corruption point of view this meant 
that actors which otherwise might have opposed the regime and its ideology 
were co-opted, i.e. united around the common goal of building a democratic 
nation and raising the standard of living of all citizens. This is likely to have 
reduced collective action problems in the form of actors exploiting their 
                                                 
 
1005 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012).  
1006 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 33-34).  
1007 Interview 13 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana 
(5.10.2012). 
1008 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 11).  
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newly gained powers, instead of working with the regime for the common 
good. 
Not all actors shared the visions of the Khama Government, however. These 
included the traditional leaders, which then as well as now constitute 
revered actors within Botswana society. Before independence, traditional 
leaders had great influence over communities and also to some extent over 
the affairs of the Protectorate through institutions such as the African 
Advisory Council established by the administration of the Protectorate.1009 
When the state of Botswana saw the light of day, therefore, the traditional 
leaders still regarded themselves as the rulers of the land, and also repre-
sented a different (traditional-authoritarian) world view from that of the 
(Christian-liberal) world view of the new democratically elected leaders.1010 
The traditional leaders thereby constituted a potential dividing force, and 
modern leaders “feared their possible direct and active involvement in 
politics”1011.  
The ambitions of traditional leaders and other key actors in Bechuanaland 
came out into the open during negotiations such as the Constitutional Talks 
of 1963.1012 The Talks, where the Constitution of the future state was 
negotiated, were a veritable tug-of-war between traditional and modern, 
authoritarian and democratic, radical and liberal elements within Bechuana-
land. They were attended by traditional leaders, representatives of political 
parties of different ideology, representatives of the white settler community, 
the administration and religious leaders.1013 Many of these saw themselves 
as key players in the future state and wanted to mould the Constitution 
accordingly. Many of the participants were also dissatisfied with the limited 
role finally accorded to them.  
Amongst the most disappointed were the traditional chiefs, who had seen 
themselves as the true and legitimate leaders of the new state.1014 They came 
out of the Talks with much less than they had hoped for, and over time, their 
                                                 
 
1009 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 12).  
1010 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 13 and 15).  
1011 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 36); and Sebudubudu, D. & 
Molutsi, P. (2011, 13).  
1012 This section draws heavily on Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 11-19).  
1013 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 15).  
1014 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 15).  
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powers have been even further circumscribed. Today, traditional leaders 
remain civil servants and subordinated to central government. As discussed 
in previous chapters, they retain some of their traditional roles (such as 
presiding over traditional courts) and have also been accorded limited 
influence over policy-making through the House of Chiefs1015, which was 
given an advisory role on matters pertaining to tribes, culture and land, and 
which is to be consulted on legislative matters of interest to their tribe and 
tribal organization.1016  
Of importance, however, is the fact that the traditional leaders were heard 
and consulted. Also, their powers were not removed altogether but reduced 
and transformed to fit within a modern, democratic state. With some 
exceptions, traditional leaders, although somewhat disgruntled, seem to 
have accepted their new roles and come to respect the rules of the new 
Government and the democratic state. Through the co-optation of traditio-
nal elites1017, the new leadership thus – at least to some extent - avoided 
collective action problems in the form of traditional leaders benefiting 
themselves and their communities at the expense of the nation as a whole, 
for example by engaging in corrupt activities. 
5.3.3.3 Personification of certain values and leadership by example 
Important, from the viewpoint of keeping corruption at bay, was also the 
emphasis laid on planning. The high command from the point of view of 
planning was the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) 
                                                 
 
1015 The House of Chiefs is comprised of the chiefs of the “eight principal subgroups 
of the Batswana [as well as] five members elected by the state President and 22 
members from designated regions”. Fakir highlights the exclusion of several 
Botswana tribes from the House of Chiefs. He quotes a submission by the 
Multicultural Coalition of Botswana to the 10th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (working group on minorities) whereby several minority and tribal 
groups remain excluded from decision-making processes in the political system, see 
Fakir, E. (2009, 3-4), see also the submission to the UN at Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at http://www2.ohchr.org/english 
/issues/minorities/group/10session.htm (9.12.2011). 
1016 Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, 3); and Embassy of Botswana, Japan at 
http://www.botswanaembassy.or.jp/gene_info/g_3.html (18.9.2012). 
1017 Ademolekun and Morgan have called this “the successful marriage of some of 
the traditional forms of political organization with those adapted from the West”, 
see Adamolekun, L. & Morgan, P. (1999, 584).  
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which remained in charge of the most important planning instruments, 
namely the multi-year national development plans. The preparation of these 
plans “engaged local and central government, private and public sectors, 
civil society and religious leaders and elites in an elaborate process of 
priority selection”.1018 Due to the limited resources available, only the most 
urgent and viable projects could be included in the plans, which meant that 
white elephant projects rarely or never were included.1019 Throughout 
planning and implementation, the importance of using resources wisely was 
preached to all parties, and Seretse Khama, who was “known to abhor 
corruption”1020, instructed civil servants not to grant any political or other 
favours to anyone.  
Monitoring of the implementation of projects and programmes was strict. 
Those tasked with implementation and policy-making were selected based 
on talent and merit, and voices calling for recruitments on other grounds 
were rebuked. As a consequence, the entire administration, (which at the 
time was fairly small) was imbued with a spirit of making the most of the 
limited resources available, which meant that misuse was rare and 
condemned throughout.1021 As expressed by Rotberg, the early leaders, led 
by Sir Seretse Khama, were in fact “able to forge a political culture – a system 
of values governing the conduct of political affairs – that has endured during 
the peaceful and increasingly prosperous presidencies of Sir Ketumile 
Masire and Festus Mogae, his successors”1022. The long-term strategies of the 
leadership as well as their unfaltering efforts were also recognized by the 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which in 2008 accorded the (then) President Festus 
Mogae the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership for his 
contributions to good governance.1023  
                                                 
 
1018 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 34); and Sebudubudu, D. & 
Molutsi, P. (2011, 32).  
1019 Raphaeli, N., Roumani, J. & MacKellar, A.C. (1984, 16); and Adamolekun, L. & 
Morgan, P. (1999, 599).  
1020 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 37).  
1021 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 35).  
1022 Rotberg, R.I. (2003, 30).  
1023 BBC News at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7679391.stm (5.11.2012). 
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5.3.3.4 Institution-building 
The early leaders were also key participants in the process of national 
institution-building, as a result of which many of the values that they 
personify/personified can be discerned from the institutional framework.  
The leaders, first of all contributed towards the building of a democratic 
state. As noted by Leith, Botswana is characterized by (i) free, fair and 
regular elections held in accordance with the Constitution, (ii) an active and 
articulate opposition with representation in the National Assembly and 
councils, (iii) a vigorous press, unafraid to criticize Government, (iv) orderly 
transitions between presidents, and (v) a judiciary which stands up to 
Government (and Government not attempting to change legislation so as to 
alter rulings).1024 This view is shared by Holm and also by Freedom House 
which, throughout the era of interest, has classified Botswana as free/demo-
cratic, although not with the very highest ratings.1025 One reason for not 
according Botswana the highest ratings has been that of minority rights not 
being fully respected, a view that is shared by Good.1026 Despite these short-
comings, however, the democratic framework has been important in terms 
of providing an environment where a relative freedom of opinion and the 
rule of law prevail, most basic rights are respected, and some level of 
emphasis is put on transparency and access to information, all of which can 
be regarded as instrumental for counteracting corruption. 
As part of the democratic framework, the early leaders also left their mark 
on formal national institutions by participating in institution-building. As 
shown by the analysis of institutional lines of accountability, many of these 
institutions are – at least to some degree – geared to enhance accountability, 
i.e. improving access to information, justification and sanctions on the part 
of principals, thereby rendering corruption less attractive and practicable. 
As seen from the analysis, this does not apply across the board, however, in 
                                                 
 
1024 Leith, J.C. (2005, 35).  
1025 Holm, J.D. (1987, 23); and Freedom House (1998) at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/botswana 
(12.03.2013).  
1026 Good quoted in Leith, J.C. (2005, 38). Good, however, criticizes Botswana’s 
categorization as a democracy on other accounts as well. Among other things, he 
points to the considerable powers of the President, control of the media and 
extreme income inequality, and categorizes the system as authoritarian liberal.  
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that accountability in certain cases remains inefficient. Nevertheless, politi-
cal institutions and lines of accountability do form part of the explanation to 
why Botswana has managed to keep corruption levels low. 
The early leaders also participated in the building of other formal insti-
tutions of importance from the point of view of safeguarding against 
corruption. These include the establishment of courts of law, and a legal 
system which ensures access to justice and fair trials by competent and 
independent judges.1027 The thesis argues that these form a vital part of 
counteracting corruption in that they render it possible to use what many 
see as the most coercive of sanctions, namely criminal prosecution and con-
viction in a court of law. Other formal institutions of importance include 
entities aimed at direct oversight such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the 
DCEC and the Office of the Auditor General. Although at times criticized for 
their lack of clout and their vulnerability to pressure from the executive,1028 
these institutions have contributed to (i) corrupt practices being brought to 
light, (ii) increased awareness about and condemnation of corruption and 
abuse, and (iii) the creation of channels through which citizens can exercise 
accountability. 
                                                 
 
1027 See, for instance, Olanrewaju, S.A. et al. (2009, i); and United Nations (2004) at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023251.pdf 
(29.8.2012). Not everyone, however, regards the judiciary as completely 
independent. Good, Fakir and Tshosa, for instance, claim that the boundary between 
the executive and the judiciary has been eroded and that the executive at times 
dominates the judiciary, see Good, K. (2008, 37); Fakir, E. (2009, 6); and Tshosa, O. 
(2008, 49 and 51).  
1028 The independence and neutrality of the Office of the Auditor General, firstly, has 
at times been questioned since (i) its head, the Auditor General, is appointed by the 
President (who, however, cannot remove the Auditor General from office), (ii) the 
Auditor General being accountable to the Permanent Secretary to the President, 
something that is regarded as compromising his independence, and (iii) the office 
reporting to the Ministry of Finance and Development planning, whom it also audits, 
see Maundeni, Z. et al. (2006/7, 26); and Lekorwe, M. H. (2008, 78 and 83). The 
institution of the Ombudsman, secondly, has been criticized for (i) lacking 
independence due to the Ombudsman being appointed by the President (in 
consultation with the leader of the opposition), (ii) remaining financially dependent 
on the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, and (iii) reporting 
to Parliament through the President, something that dents the office’s independence 
and room for manoeuvre, see Mpabanga, D. (2009, xvii and 22); Mpabanga, D. (2008, 
109); and Mbao, M.L.M & Komboni, G.G. (2008, 67).  
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Economic institutions have also played a part in counteracting corruption. 
These include a general respect for property rights, and provisions made to 
safeguard these.1029 Although some claim that this, at least partly, was done 
with the intention of benefiting the politico-economic elite itself1030, these 
provisions also benefited the country as a whole in that they have served as 
a reminder about the importance of non-interference with the property of 
others. This is likely to have forced people to differentiate between “mine” 
and “yours” also in other contexts, reducing the likelihood of engagement in 
corrupt practices and large-scale predation.  
Finally, the importance of the informal institution1031 of botho (discussed in 
chapter 5.3.3.1) is emphasized. This institution was not established by the 
early leadership. Neither was it always explicitly emphasized and preached. 
Instead, it was a principle and institution that the leaders emphasized impli-
citly through their work and style of leadership, and which also citizens lived 
by. This created a standard against which leaders were evaluated, something 
that affected behavioural patterns. It also made those engaging in corrupt 
practices the “odd ones out”, which is likely to have had a negative impact on 
the attractiveness of such activities.  
5.3.3.5 Policy-making aimed at redistribution and increased welfare  
An analysis of the factors contributing to Botswana’s successes in terms of 
counteracting corruption also needs to take economic and social policy into 
consideration. In the following, the developmental path of Botswana is 
discussed briefly, the argument being that the early leaders, by making 
certain (social) policy-choices rather than other, contributed towards 
reducing the need to engage in corrupt activities.  
During the Protectorate era (1885-1966), the British had made a conscious 
decision not to spend money on Bechuanaland since the country “offered 
                                                 
 
1029 Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana 
(8.10.2012). 
1030 Von Soest, C. (2009, 19).  
1031 Helmke and Levitsky (drawing on Brinks) define informal institutions as 
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”, see Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S. 
(2003).  
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very little or no opportunities for viable investments”1032. Only during the 
last decade of the colonial period did the British, who anticipated indepen-
dence and realized that the country lacked a national economy, start in-
vesting in Botswana and its development. This was mostly done through 
grants-in-aid which were provided until the protectorate / state was able to 
meet its own expenses.1033  
A few years prior to independence, a first five-year Development Plan was 
prepared, outlining the areas of focus from a development perspective. 
These included communications and cattle production, but also mineral 
exploration, social services, education and health. Some efforts to improve 
medical facilities, provide housing, and improve facilities for education and 
health were in fact made during this era1034, but altogether there was “no 
immediate large-scale development during the 1950s and 1960s”1035. As a 
consequence, the country found itself in a dire situation on the eve of 
independence: 90% of the population was categorized as poor, only 25% of 
the population was literate, infrastructure was non-existent and agriculture 
was the main livelihood.1036  
The new nation, born in 1966, was in fact one of the poorest countries in the 
world with a “per capita GNP of less than US$50”1037. Due to limited funds at 
the onset as well as a severe drought, little could be done straight after 
independence to raise the standards of living of the population. The first 
post-colonial Government made a conscious decision, however, to make 
Botswana self-reliant in as short a time as possible, thus creating the 
prerequisites for economic and social development. Key to this endeavour 
was investment in mining, the idea being that this sector would yield good 
(and rapid) enough returns to be used for the benefit of the population as a 
whole. Indeed, the first diamonds were found in Orapa in 1967 and mining 
started in the early 1970s. Copper-nickel was also discovered in Selebi-
                                                 
 
1032 Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, T. & Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998, 59).  
1033Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, T. & Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998, 59); and Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. 
(1997, 267). According to the latter, British grants to Bechuanaland in fact increased 
from GBP 140 000 in 1956/57 to GBP 3 378 000 in 1965/66. 
1034 Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, T. & Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998, 59). 
1035 Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997, 269).  
1036 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 31), see also Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, 
T. & Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998, 59).  
1037 Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, T. & Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998, 59).  
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Phikwe in the mid-1960s.1038 Since the 1980s, “the country has been the 
world's largest producer of gem-quality diamonds”1039. 
What is interesting from the point of view of this thesis is, firstly, that the 
Government ensured that all mineral rights very transferred to the state, 
which meant that the revenues from mining could be used for the benefit of 
the entire country and not just the areas where they were found. The fact 
that the first diamonds were found in Bangwato area1040, i.e. the tribal lands 
of Sir Seretse Khama is also of importance in this context. By relinquishing 
mineral rights to the state, the Bangwato tribe was able to set an important 
example with regards to putting the interests of the state above those of the 
tribe.1041 The second issue of importance is that of clever alliances to ensure 
that the state in fact benefitted to a maximum from the mineral re-
sources.1042 Thirdly, a large part of the profits from the mining industry have 
in fact throughout the history of Botswana been channelled into national 
development, and progress has been made.1043  
Although still facing problems of poverty and inequality1044, Botswana has in 
fact, since independence, made great strides when it comes to economic, 
political and human development. Tangible evidence of this being the case 
can be seen throughout the country: nearly all villages of a certain size now 
have clean water, rural health centres and clinics have been built in most 
villages, and larger hospitals have been constructed in urban centres. Clinics 
and hospitals are manned with trained public health officers. Free 
                                                 
 
1038 Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997, 349).  
1039 Michigan State University at http://globaledge.msu.edu/Countries/Botswana 
/Economy (30.10.2012). 
1040 Sebudubudu, D. & Molutsi, P. (2011, 27).  
1041 Some argue, however, that taking control over the mineral rights had less to do 
with a wish to benefit the country as a whole, and more do with the executive 
seeking to increase its own powers, see Poteete, A. (2011, 9). 
1042 Sebudubudu, D. and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. (2012, 38-39), see also Sebudubudu, D. & 
Molutsi, P. (2011, 36).  
1043 Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997, 349), see also Interview 15 – Senior Academic, 
University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012). 
1044 In 2009, 23% of Batswana were still categorized as poor, see Government of 
Botswana / UNDP quoted in Mupedziswa, R. & Ntseane, D. (2011). Some say these 
problems should not be as pronounced in a state with considerable mineral 
resources like the ones of Botswana, and that “the country should have come 
further”, see Interview 10 - Senior official of the United Nations, Gaborone, 
Botswana (3.10.2012). 
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immunization is provided against most childhood diseases, and the infant 
mortality rate has decreased from 100 in 1971 to 45 in 1991. Because of the 
high HIV/Aids prevalence (>35%) anti-retroviral drugs have been made 
available free of charge to most HIV positive citizens. Roads and schools 
have also been built, and free education was introduced in the late 1970s. 
Health care fees are nominal only and social safety nets such as old age 
pensions, feeding schemes, drought relief programmes and support to 
orphans and vulnerable children have been put in place. Those citizens who 
study at university receive full scholarships with living expenses from the 
state. This also includes students who are forced to study abroad since 
courses are not available in the country.1045 Grobbelaar and Tsotetsi thus 
stress that Botswana in fact should be regarded as a welfare state, providing 
for its citizens in a number of different ways.1046  
The welfare state could be regarded as one of the factors contributing to 
corruption levels being fairly low in Botswana. On the one hand, insti-
tutionalized and often virtually cost-free social services and protection have 
meant that the population has not been forced to engage in corruption to 
access services and assistance. As opposed to many other countries, citizens 
have also not been forced to engage in corrupt activities to afford services 
subject to charge.1047 
Improved standards of living are thus argued to have contributed to the 
Batswana not needing to engage in corruption to the same extent as people 
                                                 
 
1045 Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997, 370-378); Mwansa, L-K., Lucas, T. & Osei-Hwedie, 
K. (1998, 60-61); Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2010/septembe
r/20100921fsmdgbotswanaqa/ (29.10.2012); Mupedziswa, R. & Ntseane, D. (2011); 
World Health Organization (WHO) at http://www.who.int/countryfocus 
/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_bwa_en.pdf (30.10.2012). Although abolished in 
1980, school fees were reintroduced in 2006, see IRIN Humanitarian News and 
Analysis at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/53538/BOTSWANA-Reintroduction-
of-school-fees-draws-mixed-response (31.10.2012); and Spain Exchange at 
http://www.spainexchange.com/guide/BW-education.htm (29.10.2012). Data on 
HIV/Aids prevalence and access to IRVs is from World Health Organization (WHO) 
(2005) at http://www.who.int/hiv/HIVCP_BWA.pdf (5.11.2012). 
1046 Grobbelaar, N. & Tsotetsi, K. (2005), see also Interview 18 – Official with the 
United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana (9.10.2012). 
1047 This is in line with a statement by one of the interviewees, highlighting a linkage 
between the absence of scarcity, on the one hand, and corruption, on the other, see 
Interview 16 – Academic, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana (8.10.2012). 
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in some other countries where social services and safety nets are less 
available. It should be stressed, however, that social policy could be used 
even more effectively to combat corruption. Social services should, first of 
all, be accessible to all citizens in need, further decreasing the need to 
engage in corrupt behaviour to access or pay for services. Services and 
benefits should also to an even greater extent be accompanied by measures 
allowing people to escape poverty and vulnerability on a more permanent 
basis, decreasing dependency and vulnerability to corruption, should 
services become payable or be terminated altogether. Thirdly, social benefits 
should never be allocated arbitrarily, as occasionally has been the case in 
Botswana where the rural poor constitute an important electoral base of the 
ruling party1048, since this sends signals to the population that corruption is 
condoned by Government. Finally, Government should be cognisant of the 
fact that the support received from the state has generated deep-seated 
gratitude as well as “tolerance of much more than […] should [be] 
tolerate[d]”.1049 Such attitudes, although admirable, may hinder efforts to 
keep corruption at bay since gratitude has prevented and still prevents 
citizens from holding actors within government accountable when mistakes 
are made or power is misused.  
5.4 Discussion regarding the findings of the case studies 
As seen through the case studies, political institutions may consist of 
multiple lines of delegation and accountability of varying strength. In the 
case of Austria, the strength of the institutional lines of accountability 
resonates fairly well with data on corruption in that ease of (strong) 
accountability (i.e. real access to a number of accountability mechanisms 
and sanctions) indeed goes hand in hand with low(er) levels of corruption 
and vice versa. In the case of Botswana, institutional lines of accountability 
resonate somewhat with data on corruption, in that ease of accountability 
often goes hand in hand with lower levels of corruption and vice versa. 
Interestingly enough, however, Botswana also provides examples of 
corruption being kept at bay despite weak accountability, which is an 
                                                 
 
1048 Ulriksen, M.S. (2012).  
1049 Interview 18 – Official with the United Nations, Gaborone, Botswana 
(9.10.2012); see also Sebudubudu, D. (2003, 126).  
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interesting finding, pointing to also other factors having a major bearing on 
levels of corruption in this country context. 
The cases of Austria and – although to a lesser extent – Botswana show that 
the political institutions studied and the nature of the lines of accountability 
inherent to them do affect levels of corruption. This points to a pathway 
between political institutions and corruption. This finding does not, 
however, confirm the research hypotheses of the thesis, namely (i) that the 
political institutions of interest have a reducing effect only on levels of 
corruption and (ii) that they reduce levels of corruption by enhancing 
accountability. Instead, the political institutions – through the lines of 
accountability inherent to them – have reducing as well as increasing effects 
on levels of corruption. This is so since lines of accountability both enhance 
and impede accountability, thereby also counteracting as well as facilitating 
corrupt practices.  
This is visible from table 29, which shows that linkages between 
institutional lines of accountability and corruption in the case of Austria 
(and to a certain degree also in the case of Botswana) mostly can be found in 
categories 1 and 4 (characterized by resonance between lines and levels of 
corruption), whereas linkages between lines and corruption in the case of 
Botswana can be found in categories 1, 3 and 4, pointing to resonance as 
well as dissonance between the two.  
What does this mean in practice? Linkages falling into category 4, firstly, 
indicate that the political institutions have an effect on levels of corruption, 
and this effect being reducing. Linkages falling into category 1, secondly, 
point to certain levels of corruption existing in both societies, and weak 
institutional lines of accountability contributing to such corrupt practices, 
i.e. the political institutions of interest having an increasing effect on levels 
of corruption. Linkages falling into category 3, finally, indicate that factors 
other than the political institutions of interest (and the lines of 
accountability inherent to them) contribute towards corruption levels being 
low/reduced.  
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Table 29: Categorization resulting from the juxtaposition of lines of 
accountability and levels of corruption 
  Weak(er) accountability Strong(er) accountability 
High(er) 
corruption 
levels 
1. Resonance: Institutional line 
of accountability has 
increasing effect 
           
           ___________ 
 
Austria, Botswana 
2. Dissonance: Institutional line 
of accountability has no effect 
(other factors affect corruption 
levels) 
            __________ 
Low(er) 
corruption 
levels 
3. Dissonance: Institutional line 
of accountability has no effect 
(other factors affect corruption 
levels) 
            ____________ 
 
Botswana 
4. Resonance: Institutional line 
of accountability has reducing 
effect  
                     
             ___________ 
 
Austria, Botswana 
This shows that political institutions in fact should be regarded as producers 
of “mixed signals” when it comes to accountability and – in the extension – 
corruption. The nature of these signals is not the only thing of interest when 
trying to counteract corruption, however. Instead, the case studies show that 
attention also should be paid to the relationship between lines, since some 
lines seem to be more dominant than others. As a result, strong lines at 
times seem to counteract for weak lines and vice versa.  
This points to macro-level analyses not being optimal when trying to estab-
lish the effect of a given political institution on levels of corruption. Instead 
of approaching the relationship at a macro-level, the analysis suggests it 
should be approached at a micro-level using institutional lines of accounta-
bility rather than institutions as units, mapping whether these lines enhance 
or impede accountability, thereby obstructing or facilitating corrupt 
practices. Such analyses should also acknowledge that lines of accountability 
may dominate or counterbalance one another and that lines, therefore, at 
times should be accorded different weights or importance. This, in turn, 
means that the overall effect of a given institution cannot be established 
without in-depth analysis and knowledge about the context within which the 
institution is set. 
These findings are likely to at least partly explain why the macro-level 
quantitative analyses conducted (see chapter 4.3) failed to provide a clear-
cut picture of the relationship between the variables. For natural reasons, 
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these analyses failed to take the multifaceted nature of single political 
institutions into consideration, treating these institutions as one rule rather 
than a multitude of (sometimes contradictory) rules. As a result, the ana-
lyses ended up approaching political institutions – and thereby also their 
effects on levels of corruption – in a somewhat simplistic fashion. 
Also the case study of Botswana produced unexpected results when juxta-
posed to the main statistical analysis. As discussed, the main statistical 
analysis categorized Botswana as an outlier, as a result of which the political 
institutions included were expected to have little or no impact on the 
country’s low levels of corruption. The case studies showed, however, that 
the political institutions and the institutional lines of accountability inherent 
to them in certain cases did hold an answer to Botswana’s successes in 
terms of keeping corruption from becoming entrenched.  
The political institutions of interest to the thesis were not, however, the only 
institutions (or factors) to have contributed to Botswana exhibiting 
relatively low levels of corruption. Instead, the study pointed to a number of 
(formal as well as informal) institutions as having played a part with regards 
to counteracting corruption. This finding shows the importance of studying 
not only formal political institutions but also e.g. economic institutions, 
oversight institutions and informal institutions of importance in a given 
context, when seeking answers to why levels of corruption remain low.  
The case study of Botswana also emphasized the importance of studying the 
individuals and collectives which have contributed towards building these 
institutions, and who themselves influence the behaviour of others. More 
specifically, the case study stressed the importance of the early leaders of 
Botswana, arguing that these have helped reduce the opportunities for and 
the attractiveness of corruption in the context of Botswana through their (i) 
values and leadership styles, (ii) strategies and approaches, (iii) 
contributions to institution-building, and (iv) policy-making. As part of 
these, the following factors were brought to the fore: (i) the importance of 
an inclusive, consultative approach so as to unite actors around common 
goals and avoid collective action problems, (ii) a focus on accountability, 
talent, merit and a condemnation of corruption so as to avoid misuse and 
inefficiency, (iii) institution-building focused on openness, respect for basic 
rights, accountability, oversight, and respect for others, and (iv) (social) 
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policy-making aimed at redistribution of wealth and increasing the welfare 
of all citizens.  
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6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Representative democracy is characterized by the delegation of power and 
authority from the people to their representatives and beyond. As a conse-
quence, principal-agent relationships are established between citizens and 
their representatives, and between actors from/to whom power is further 
delegated. Delegation of power and authority from principals to agents has 
many advantages, including that of principals being able to rely on people 
with greater expertise than their own in a particular field. Delegation also 
involves risks, however, in that agents may choose to disregard the wishes 
of their principal, instead acting at will. Such disregard for the wishes of and 
instructions from the principal may take the form of corruption, i.e. 
engagement in behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role for personal benefit or that of family members, friends etc. This thesis 
regards political institutions as entities capable of solving many of the 
problems inherent to principal-agent relationships, including cases whereby 
agents engage in corrupt practices. 
In the following, the findings of the thesis will be discussed in the light of the 
research hypotheses formulated, namely (i) that the political institutions of 
interest have a reducing effect on levels of corruption and (ii) that they 
reduce levels of corruption by enhancing accountability. The overview starts 
with a discussion pertaining to the findings of the quantitative analysis of 
the relationship between the political institutions of interest to the thesis 
and corruption, and then proceeds to discussing the outcome of the case 
studies. Finally, the overview discusses the overall contribution by the thesis 
to the state of the arts. 
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6.1 The outcome of the quantitative analysis 
The relationship between the political institutions of interest and levels of 
corruption was first analysed using quantitative method, namely hierarchi-
cal multiple regression analysis.  
The main regression analysis, which included democratic countries with 
stable institutions, pointed to a relationship between political institutions 
and corruption, given that institutions accounted for about 44% of the 
variation on the corruption variable (see chapter 4.3). More specifically, the 
main analysis singled out federalism, party-centred electoral systems and 
(although to a lesser extent) parliamentarism as having a reducing effect on 
levels of corruption. Additional analyses executed, however, pointed to these 
relationships not being completely robust and reliable. Based on the 
statistical analyses conducted, therefore, a stable, unequivocal causal re-
lationship could not be established, which in turn meant that neither 
research hypothesis could be confirmed using this method.  
The analysis concluded, however, that although a stable and unequivocal 
causal relationship could not be established based on the analyses 
undertaken, the fact remained that many of the independent institutional 
variables included in the analyses did exhibit significant relationships or 
relationships bordering on significance. Such results, it was argued, could 
not be disregarded since they pointed to some sort of interplay between the 
political institutions studied and levels of corruption. An in-depth study of 
this interplay was felt to be warranted to obtain a more detailed picture of 
the true nature of the relationship between the variables and the mecha-
nisms through which such a relationship might operate at the micro-level.  
6.2 The outcome of the qualitative case studies  
Qualitative case studies were undertaken to form a clearer picture of the 
relationship between the political institutions of interest and levels of 
corruption, including pathways between the two. The first case, Austria, was 
selected with a point of departure in the statistical analysis due to its 
proximity to the line of best fit, i.e. the fact that the political institutions 
included in (model 2 of) the main statistical analysis seemed to form an 
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integral part of the answer to why the country had managed to keep levels of 
corruption fairly low. As a consequence, the case provided an opportunity to 
examine the relationship between these institutions and levels of corruption 
at a closer range, with a view to establishing the pathways through which 
such a relationship operated.  
The case study in question set out to (i) identify principal-agent 
relationships and institutional lines of accountability inherent to the natio-
nal political institutions of interest (parliamentarism, the party-centred 
electoral system and federalism), (ii) scrutinize these from the point of view 
of the accountability mechanisms1050 available to principals, and (iii) 
establish links between the strength of these institutional lines of accounta-
bility and accounts of corruption, the aim being to establish whether 
accountability constituted the pathway through which the political insti-
tutions affected corruption.  
The analysis generated some interesting findings. First of all, the analysis 
showed that the institutional lines of accountability ranged from strong to 
weak. Interestingly enough, secondly, these lines of different strength 
resonated well with data on corruption, with strong lines being associated 
with low(er) levels of corruption, and semi-strong and weak lines being as-
sociated with slightly higher levels of corruption. This confirmed the exis-
tence of a linkage between (i) the extent to which the political institutions 
examined enabled accountability and (ii) outcomes in terms of corruption.  
The analysis pointed to strong lines of accountability often including voters 
/ ordinary citizens as principals. These and other strong principals used a 
wide range of accountability mechanisms. Ex ante accountability (under-
taken before (s)electing an agent so as to avoid unsuitable candidates being 
contracted) often included screening through the media, electoral cam-
paigns, interviews, aptitude tests, work within the party organization, 
private interaction, and information from authorities. Some of these mecha-
nisms also provided agents with opportunities to “market” themselves vis-à-
vis potential principals (selection). Sanctions available ex ante mostly 
                                                 
 
1050 As outlined in chapter 3.3.2, these include mechanisms to hold agents 
accountable ex ante (contract, screening, selections and different sanctions) as well 
as mechanisms to hold agents accountable ex post (reporting, monitoring and 
sanctions).  
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included refusal to appoint unsuitable candidates, refusal of ballot access or 
a poor ranking on party lists.  
Accountability ex post (undertaken after (s)electing an agent so as to detect 
potential lapses), on the other hand, often included (i) monitoring through 
the media, committee work, meetings, reports from oversight bodies such as 
the Audit Office, and regular staff appraisals, and (ii) self-reporting through 
speeches, plenary sessions, and meetings with constituents. Sanctions avai-
lable ex post included fines, exclusion from positions of trust or interesting 
assignments, refusal to provide political support, termination of contract 
and expulsion from the party.  
Weak lines of accountability had one common denominator, namely the fact 
that mechanisms (including sanctions) to hold agents to account often 
existed formally but these being inaccessible in reality. One example was 
that of the formal powers of the provincial legislature to remove the provin-
cial government from office through a vote of no confidence, something that 
in practice could not be done in many provinces due to Regierungsproporz, 
i.e. the practice of including all parties in the provincial government.  
Strong as well as weak lines of accountability often entailed some sort of 
“contract” between the principal and the agent with regards to tasks, powers 
and responsibilities as well as the principles to be followed when executing 
these tasks. Such contracts included national legislation (the Constitution, 
anti-corruption legislation etc.), campaign promises, bureaucratic guidelines 
and party statutes. Due to the at times (i) vague, (ii) non-binding, (iii) non-
task- or agent-specific nature of these contracts, however, it was sometimes 
difficult for principals to enforce them.  
The case study of Botswana also pointed to a relationship between insti-
tutional lines of accountability and levels of corruption, with strong (lines of) 
accountability oftentimes contributing towards lower levels of corruption 
and vice versa. This was interesting, since the case of Botswana was selected 
due to its distance from the line of best fit, i.e. the fact that factors other than 
the political institutions included in the statistical analyses seemed to hold 
an important part of the answer to the country’s successes in terms of 
keeping corruption levels relatively low. In the context of Botswana, strong 
principals included a number of line ministries, the President and the 
voters/community members. These acquired information about their agents 
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ex ante and ex post by means of media reports, audit reports, formal 
documents, the kgotla (village assembly), informal events, staff appraisals, 
meetings, and information from authorities. Principals had access to 
sanctions such as e.g. (i) refusing appointment, recognition or political 
support, (ii) withdrawal of funding, (iii) dismissal, or (iv) rejection of plans 
and policies. Also in the case of Botswana, the lines of accountability which 
were evaluated often entailed some kind of “contract” between the principal 
and the agent. Such contracts included e.g. national legislation (the Consti-
tution, the Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Chieftainship Act etc.), 
the Public Service Charter, and party programmes and constitutions.  
The two case studies pointed to a relationship between the political insti-
tutions analysed and levels of corruption, and accountability being the 
pathway between the two. These findings did not, however, confirm the 
research hypotheses of the thesis, namely (i) that the political institutions of 
interest have a reducing effect on levels of corruption and (ii) that they 
reduce levels of corruption by enhancing accountability. Instead, the ana-
lysed political institutions – through the lines of accountability inherent to 
them – were found to have reducing as well as increasing effects on levels of 
corruption. This was so since lines of accountability both enhanced and 
impeded accountability, thereby also counteracting as well as facilitating 
corrupt activities.  
These findings served as an important reminder of the fact that single 
political institutions should be understood and studied as more than just 
one numerical value or rule. Instead, political institutions are made up of a 
multitude of rules, which vary in strength and often contradict each other. 
This was illustrated by the case studies, which pointed to political insti-
tutions often sending a multitude of (at times contradictory) signals with 
regards to accountability, thereby affecting the feasibility and attractiveness 
of corruption. The analysis highlighted the importance of understanding (i) 
the nature of these signals, but also (ii) their interrelationship, since certain 
lines – depending on the context – appeared to be more dominant than 
others. As a result, strong lines at times seemed to counteract for weak lines 
and vice versa. This highlights the need for context-based analyses of the 
ways in which lines interact with and sometimes dominate each other. Only 
then can the lines be “added together” and the overall effect of institutional 
lines of accountability estimated, the thesis suggests.  
296 
 
The case studies point to macro-level, quantitative analyses not necessarily 
being the most fruitful way of studying the linkage between political 
institutions and corruption. This is so since quantitative, macro-level studies 
are likely to reduce political institutions as well as corruption to “one digit”, 
losing out on the multifaceted nature of these phenomena in the process. 
Qualitative, micro-level studies, however, make it possible to see the many 
faces of institutions as well as corruption, and to delve into pathways 
between the two. This may also partly explain why the statistical analyses 
conducted within the framework of the thesis failed to provide a clear, stable 
picture of the relationship between the variables. After all, the statistical 
analyses only captured a portion of the multifaceted nature of political insti-
tutions and corruption, and was therefore unable to provide more than 
(unstable) pointers with regards to the nature of their interaction.  
Although just emanating from two cases, these findings should be of interest 
more generally (i) from a methodological point of view as well as (ii) with 
regards to accountability mechanisms as a pathway through which political 
institutions affect levels of corruption. Linkages between (i) the application 
of such mechanisms and (ii) the prevalence of corruption has rarely been 
studied at the micro-level, wherefore the thesis should provide new insights 
into the interaction between the variables. 
The case study of Botswana also provided findings beyond the research 
hypotheses. As a case selected due to its distance from the line of best fit, the 
country provided an opportunity to study not just the political institutions of 
interest to the thesis and their effect on levels of corruption, but also other 
potential determinants – institutional as well as non-institutional. 
The case study opened with an analysis of the linkages between institutional 
lines of accountability and prevalence of corruption. As mentioned, this 
analysis showed that the political institutions and the institutional lines of 
accountability examined at least partly explained the country’s fairly low 
levels of corruption. As expected, however, the institutional analysis 
exhibited greater dissonance between the strength of lines of accountability 
and levels of corruption than in the case of Austria. The case study, 
therefore, also delved into other (institutional and non-institutional) factors 
considered to have a bearing on levels of corruption.  
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This broader analysis brought a number of other determinants of corruption 
to the fore. As a starting point, the analysis emphasized the importance of 
scrutinizing not only institutions but also the individuals who have 
contributed towards their creation and who in turn influence the behaviour 
of other actors. More precisely, the case study of Botswana highlighted the 
pivotal role of the early leaders of Botswana in terms of setting the country 
on a course for development and ensuring that corruption would be an 
exception. The background, education and personal experiences of these 
early leaders were analyzed, as well as the fact that they were brought up 
valuing integrity, unselfishness, equality and respect for others. These values 
filtered into their personalities and styles of leadership. As a result, the 
thesis argues, they made decisions and chose paths which ended up having 
reducing, deterring or exposing effects with regards to corruption.  
The case study accounted for a number of such paths and decisions. During 
the critical years leading up to independence, firstly, the leaders recognized 
the importance of consultation and inclusion of different national actors in 
the process of state-building. As part of the process, many different groups 
and actors were given a voice and a role, and efforts were made to 
accommodate sometimes diametrically opposed views and aspirations. As a 
result, these actors were united around common visions and goals, including 
that of building a democratic state focused on increasing the welfare of all 
citizens. The thesis argues that this inclusive and consultative approach to 
state-building had a counteracting effect on corruption since actors were 
geared to work for the good of the nation and its people rather than that of 
their village, region, ethnic group (or similar) only. 
These same leaders, secondly, contributed towards the building of a number 
of important institutions. These include formal political institutions, many of 
which (at least to some extent) were geared to enhance, for instance, 
accountability, thereby having an exposing, deterring and reducing effect on 
levels of corruption. Other national institutions also rendered corruption 
less practicable and attractive, however. Among these, the case study 
highlights the importance of judicial institutions such as courts, economic 
institutions such as property rights, oversight institutions such as the Om-
budsman and the Auditor General, and informal institutions such as botho, 
i.e. the principle of being a person characterized by – among other things – 
integrity, honesty, unselfishness, and respect, and subordinating one’s 
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personal interest to those of the community. All of these institutions are 
believed to have had a deterring, exposing and reducing effect on corruption.  
Thirdly, the early leaders emphasized the importance of planning, moni-
toring, the wise use of resources, and competence. As a result, projects and 
programmes underwent meticulous scrutiny before as well as during 
implementation, and non-viable initiatives were rejected. It was also clear 
throughout that appointments and promotions were made based on merit. 
As a result, misuse was rare.  
Fourthly, the thesis argues that the early leadership contributed towards 
keeping corruption from becoming entrenched by emphasizing broad-based 
development. Institutionalized and often cost-free social services and 
protection meant that community members did not have to engage in 
corrupt practices to access or afford services or assistance. This is argued to 
have had a reducing effect on levels of corruption.  
Although just one case, the case of Botswana provides pointers of a more 
universal nature with regards to factors with a bearing on levels of 
corruption. More precisely, the case study highlights the need for: 
(i) Continued research into linkages between institutions and corrup-
tion, although with a more holistic approach to institutions, also 
taking the effect of informal institutions on corruption into account. 
(ii) Research into linkages between the set of values, strategies and 
preferences of key leaders, on the one hand, and the prevalence of 
corruption, on the other. 
The latter point is in line with Lyne de Ver and Leftwich, who stress that the 
political sciences often neglect issues of agency, leadership, elites and 
coalitions in favour of analyses into structures.1051  
  
                                                 
 
1051 Leftwich, A. (2010, 93; and Lyne de Ver, H. (2008, 27).  
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6.3 Contributions to the state of the arts 
In light of the above, how might these findings contribute to the state of the 
arts? 
As outlined above, the study, first of all, makes a methodological contri-
bution, by showing that quantitative, macro-level analyses have their 
limitations when it comes to studying the linkages between political 
institutions and levels of corruption. Instead, the thesis shows that case 
studies allow for the multifaceted nature of these variables to be studied, 
and the relationship between them to be better understood. Furthermore, 
the thesis shows that interesting insights into this relationship can be gained 
by delving into the nature of and relationship between lines of accounta-
bility inherent to political institutions. Despite considerable interest in the 
linkages between political institutions, accountability and corruption, such a 
method has rarely been applied before, especially at the level of detail and 
depth of the study at hand, wherefore the analysis should be of interest to 
researchers and practitioners with an interest in pathways between the two 
variables. This is so since the thesis shows that political institutions and the 
nature of the lines of accountability inherent to them do have a bearing on 
levels of corruption, and that access to a number of accountability 
mechanisms makes it possible for principals to keep agents in check, thus 
counteracting corrupt practices. The thesis also shows, however, that the 
lack of access to these same mechanisms has an increasing effect on levels of 
corruption. 
Secondly, the thesis makes a contribution by mapping the pathways bet-
ween political institutions and corruption in the country contexts of Austria 
and Botswana, scrutinizing principal-agent relationships, access to ac-
countability mechanisms and linkages to the prevalence of corruption. As 
such, it should be of interest to researchers and practitioners interested in 
linkages between the variables in these contexts. The study thereby builds 
on research undertaken by e.g. Müller and Maundeni.1052 
                                                 
 
1052 In the case of Austria, political institutions have been analysed from a principal-
agent perspective by Müller, W.C (2003) Müller does not, however, link these 
relationships to prevalence of corruption. In the case of Botswana, Maundeni, Z. 
(ed.) (2008a) analyses linkages between political institutions, accountability and 
corruption, without, however, looking at these issues through a principal-agent lens 
and discussing accountability mechanisms.  
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Through the case study of Botswana, thirdly, the thesis also scrutinizes 
determinants of corruption other than the political institutions of interest to 
the thesis. This analysis emphasizes the need for research into the effects on 
corruption of a broader range of institutions, including informal institutions 
which often remain poorly documented and understood. The analysis also 
highlights the importance of research into the actors who build, maintain, 
transform and operate within these (institutional) structures. This is in line 
with Leftwich, who maintains that institutions as rules remain empty boxes 
if actors are not taken into consideration.1053 The analysis highlights how the 
early leaders of Botswana shaped and maintained structures so as to achieve 
development. They did this, firstly, by joining hands with other key players 
within the state. Secondly, they built efficient formal institutions, provided 
for social security and safety nets, and forged a political culture of merit and 
integrity. In the process, the thesis argues, they took important steps to 
reduce the practicability and attractiveness of corrupt practices in society.  
  
                                                 
 
1053 Leftwich, A. (2010, 95).  
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SAMMANFATTNING PAǒ  SVENSKA 
 
 
Representativ demokrati karakteriseras av delegation av makt från folket till 
politiska representanter och från dessa vidare inom det politiska systemet. 
Som en följd, uppstår en uppsjö av relationer inom vilka den delegerande 
parten (principalen) anförtror makt till en delegat (agenten) och önskar se 
denna agera i överensstämmelse med regler och principer fastslagna av 
principalen. Delegation av makt har klara fördelar i det att makt kan 
anförtros till agenter med större sakkunskap än den som principalen själv 
besitter inom ett visst område. Delegation innebär emellertid också risker 
eftersom agenten inte alltid delar principalens preferenser eller syn på hur 
uppgifter bör utföras. Principalen har därtill begränsad insyn i agentens 
prioriteter och ageranden. Delegation av makt kan därför i värsta fall leda till 
situationer där principalen inte längre har kontroll över agentens före-
havanden, vilket innebär att agenten kan engagera sig i aktiviteter som 
strider mot principalens intressen. Till dessa hör inblandning i aktiviteter av 
korrupt natur, d.v.s. beteende som avviker från de formella förpliktelserna 
relaterade till en offentlig roll, med mål att uppnå fördel för en själv, en 
familjemedlem, vän eller annan närstående person eller grupp.  
Denna avhandling studerar politiska institutioner som verktyg med hjälp av 
vilka många av de problem som uppstår i relationen mellan principalen och 
agenten kan lösas. Politiska institutioner ses som fastställda regler, proce-
durer och praxis för beteende, som bör efterföljas och som strukturerar rela-
tionerna mellan individer. Som sådana definierar politiska institutioner del-
tagarna i ett antal politiska processer samt de procedurer och regler som 
deltagarna bör agera enligt eller rätta sig efter. Detta gör att politiska institu-
tioner definierar hur makt kan och borde utövas, och sätter gränser för vad 
som är tillåtet eller otillåtet, möjligt eller omöjligt.  
Avhandlingen studerar huruvida politiska institutioner påverkar före-
komsten av korruption genom att skapa förutsättningar för eller förhindra 
ansvarsutkrävande. Ansvarsutkrävande ses här som en viktig nyckel till 
problemen mellan principaler och agenter eftersom ansvarsutkrävande 
innebär att (i) principalen får mer information om agentens förehavanden 
och prioriteter, (ii) agenten tvingas rättfärdiga sitt agerande gentemot 
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principalen, och (iii) principalen får tillgång till sanktioner som kan 
användas om agenten felar. 
Avhandlingen intresserar sig för hur den exekutiva maktens struktur 
(operationaliserad som parlamentarism, presidentialism och semi-
presidentialism), valsystem (operationaliserade som parti- och kandidat-
centrerade), vertikal maktfördelning (operationaliserad som federalism, de-
centraliserad unitarism och centraliserad unitarism) samt byråkratins 
storlek (operationaliserad som BNP/capita) påverkar förekomsten av 
korruption. Dessa institutionella aspekter har valts ut med utgångspunkt i 
tidigare forskning kring sambandet mellan politiska institutioner och 
korruption. Denna tidigare forskning – som ofta intresserat sig för sam-
bandet mellan variablerna på makronivå – har inte producerat entydiga 
resultat. En stor del av densamma har inte heller på mikronivå skärskådat 
de mekanismer genom vilka politiska institution kan tänkas påverka före-
komsten av korruption.  
Mot denna bakgrund, har avhandlingen som avsikt att studera sambandet 
mellan politiska institutioner och korruption på såväl makro- som 
mikronivå. På makronivå studeras sambandet mellan variablerna med hjälp 
av statistisk analys. Målsättningen inom ramen för denna analys är att etab-
lera huruvida de politiska institutioner som avhandlingen intresserar sig för 
minskar förekomsten av korruption. På mikronivå studeras sambandet 
mellan variablerna med hjälp av två fallstudier (Österrike och Botswana). 
Målsättningen inom ramen för dessa analyser är att studera de mekanismer 
genom vilka politiska institutioner påverkar korruption, närmare bestämt 
huruvida de politiska institutioner som avhandlingen intresserar sig för 
minskar förekomsten av korruption genom att skapa förutsättningar för 
ansvarsutkrävande.  
Analyserna ger nya insikter i sambandet mellan politiska institutioner och 
korruption. Analyserna visar, för det första, att kvantitativ metod på 
makronivå inte nödvändigtvis är bäst lämpad för analyser av sambandet 
mellan de två variablerna. Detta beror på att såväl politiska institutioner 
som korruption i en dylik analys reduceras till en siffra, vilket gör det omöj-
ligt att studera korruptionens och institutionernas många ansikten, och 
kopplingar mellan variablerna. Istället visar studien att kvalitativ analys på 
mikronivå gör det möjligt att fånga olika aspekter av såväl korruption som 
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institutioner, vilket också bidrar till en bättre förståelse för samspelet 
mellan dessa.  
Den kvalitativa analysen visar att detta samspel med fördel kan studeras 
med hjälp av s.k. linjer för ansvarsutkrävande som utgör en del av de 
politiska institutionerna. Dessa linjer är tidvis starka d.v.s. möjliggör 
effektivt ansvarsutkrävande, och tidvis svaga d.v.s. hindrar effektivt 
ansvarsutkrävande. Fallstudien av Österrike visar att starka linjer oftast går 
hand i hand med låg korruption medan svaga linjer går hand i hand med 
högre korruption. Detta bekräftas också delvis genom fallstudien för 
Botswana. Detta tyder på att de politiska institutionerna i fråga påverkar 
förekomsten av korruption men inte enbart minskande eftersom linjerna 
som studeras till sin natur är både starka och svaga, d.v.s. har en minskande 
och ökande effekt på korruptionsnivån. Intressant nog förefaller vissa linjer 
dock ha en mer dominant roll än andra vilket gör att svaga linjer tidvis 
trängs undan av starkare linjer (och vice versa). Fallstudien av Österrike 
visar t.ex. att de politiska partierna utgör starka principaler i denna 
landskontext och att de starka linjerna för ansvarsutkrävande mellan partier 
och olika agenter förefaller kompensera för ett antal svagare linjer. 
Fallstudien av Botswana uppvisar därutöver svaga linjer för ansvarsutkrä-
vande kopplade till en låg korruptionsnivå, vilket tyder på att de politiska 
institutioner (och de linjer för ansvarsutkrävande som utgör en del av dem) 
som studeras inte till fullo kan förklara varför landet uppvisar en låg 
korruptionsnivå. Fallstudien uppmärksammar därför också andra faktorer 
som påverkar förekomsten av korruption. Studien tar fasta på Botswanas 
tidiga ledarskap och ledarnas bidrag till den låga korruptionsgrad landet 
idag uppvisar. Närmare bestämt betonar studien vikten av (i) inklusiva och 
konsultativa strategier som enar aktörer kring gemensamma målsättningar 
och förhindrar att aktörerna enbart agerar för egen vinning, (ii) att konstant 
och explicit fördöma korruption och betona kompetens, meriter och 
kontroll, (iii) (formella och informella) institutioner som bidrar till öppen-
het, respekt för basrättigheter, ansvarsutkrävande, kontroll och respekt för 
andra, och (iv) (social)politik vars målsättning är att omfördela tillgångar 
och öka alla medborgares välfärd. Fallstudien rekommenderar sålunda att 
framtida forskning kring korruptionens orsaker i högre grad borde fokusera 
på (i) institutioner i en bredare bemärkelse (d.v.s. formella såväl som 
informella) samt (ii) ledarskap och ledares värdegrund, ledarstil, strategier 
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och politiska linjeval. Överlag pekar avhandlingen dessutom på ett behov av 
kvalitativ och kontext-baserad analys av orsakerna till korruption. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Institutional definitions 
 
Institutions Features 
Presidential 
executive  
A 1. The Head of State simultaneously being Head of Government 
2. The Head of State nominating and leading Government 
B 1. The President being popularly elected with a fixed term 
2. Parliament not being able to discharge the President by a vote of no 
confidence 
Parliamentary 
executive 
A 1. The Head of State as a rule not simultaneously being Head of 
Government 
B 1. Government as a rule being elected from within Parliament and being 
dependent on parliamentary confidence 
Semi-
presidential 
executive 
A 1. The president as a rule being popularly elected.   
2. The president not being dependent on parliamentary confidence 
B 1. Government (incl. the PM) being dependent on the confidence of a 
popularly elected legislature 
C 1. The Head of Government and Head of State sharing executive powers 
Candidate-
centred 
electoral 
system 
A 1. Candidates having virtually unrestricted access to the ballot or 
2. Voters being able to influence order of names on the lists 
B 1. Voters voting directly for a candidate 
Party-centred 
electoral 
system  
A 1. Ballot-access being determined in-house (within party) or 
2. Voters being unable to influence order of names on the lists 
B 1. Voters usually not voting directly for a candidate 
Small 
bureaucracy 
A 1. A relatively smaller funding envelope for the public sector  
2. Actors within the public sector having control over a relatively 
narrower sphere of activities 
B 1. A smaller percentage of the workforce being employed by the public 
sector 
Large 
bureaucracy 
A 1. A larger funding envelope for the public sector  
2. Actors within the public sector having control over a relatively wide 
sphere of activities 
B 1. A larger percentage of the workforce being employed by the public 
sector 
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Federalism A 1. The entire territory is divided into autonomous regions 
B 1. Different layers of Government exist 
2. Labour is divided between these layers 
C 1. The autonomy of the regions and the competencies cannot be altered 
against the will of the regions 
Decentralized 
unitarism 
A 1. There may be a division into autonomous regions 
B 1. There may be different levels of government and division of labour 
also to the regions  
2. The regions may have final say on certain issues 
C 1. As a rule, autonomy and the division of competencies exist only if 
awarded by the center 
2. Powers can be withdrawn if the center so wishes   
Centralized 
unitarism 
A 1. Regions, to the extent that they exist, are not autonomous 
B 1. There may be different levels of government but little or no division of 
labour to the regions.  
2. The regions rarely have final say on key issues 
C 1. Autonomy and the division of competencies exist only if awarded by 
the center 
2. Powers can be withdrawn if the center so wishes 
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APPENDIX 2: Statistical data1054 
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Andorra 2 3,750 1 1 3  0,5 9,71 
Australia 2 4,450 1 1 1 34,6 23,5 9,99 
Austria 2 4,489 1 2 1 51,4 6,5 9,94 
Bahamas 2 3,820 1 1 3 16,6 47,2 9,69 
Barbados 2 3,670 1 1 3  33,2 9,5 
Belgium 3 3,953 1 2 1 49,0 0,4 9,94 
Belize 2 2,275 1 1 3  13,2 8,72 
Botswana 4 3,600 3 1 3  26,8 8,67 
Bulgaria 5 2,449 1 2 3 32,3 0,4 8,8 
Canada  2 4,424 1 1 1 41,1 29,6 10,02 
Cape Verde 3 2,712 3 2 3  3 8,05 
Chile 4 3,837 3 2 3 21,9 1,9 9,07 
Cyprus 2 3,194 3 2 3 37,4 0,6 9,68 
Czech Republic 
3 2,922 2 2 3 41,7 4,6 9,44 
Denmark 2 4,733 1 2 2 53,9 95,2 10,05 
Dominica 2 3,175 1 1 3  8,3 8,78 
Dominican 
Republic 
4 1,841 3 2 2 13,3 1,4 8,2 
El Salvador 5 2,105 3 2 3 17,0 2,4 8,33 
Estonia 3 3,380 2 2 3 28,0 66 8,87 
Germany 3 4,420 1 2 1 45,1 46,4 9,94 
Greece 4 2,902 1 2 3 40,7 0,1 9,41 
Grenada 3 3,175 1 1 3  13,2 8,48 
Guyana 4 1,922 3 2 3  18 7,87 
Hungary 3 3,132 1 1 3 46,5 21,6 9,05 
Iceland 2 4,993 1 2 3 42,0 96,6 9,92 
                                                 
 
1054 The key to categorizations can be found at the bottom of the table. For more 
information about the variables, see chapter 4.1.2. 
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India 5 2,186 1 1 1 15,8 1,1 7,58 
Ireland 2 4,200 1 2 3 31,6 1,1 9,74 
Israel 4 3,262 1 2 2 47,6 0,2 9,66 
Italy 3 2,908 1 1 2 46,1 0,4 9,89 
Jamaica 4 2,004 1 1 3 35,4 55,5 8,23 
Japan 3 3,743 1 1 3 39,1 0,9 10,04 
Kiribati 2 2,720 2 1 2  45,3 6,81 
Latvia 3 2,835 1 2 3 28,1 14,1 8,69 
Liechtenstein 2 3,750 1 2 3  10,7 9,95 
Lithuania 3 2,765 2 1 3 26,8 . 8,7 
Luxembourg  2 4,335 1 2 3 37,6 1,2 10,43 
Mali 5 2,209 3 1 3  0,2 6,67 
Marshall 
Islands 
2 2,070 1 1 3  . 7,41 
Mauritius 3 2,818 1 1 3 21,6 0,9 9,31 
Monaco 3 .. 1 1 3  4,6 10,04 
Mongolia 5 1,950 3 1 3 29,3 0 7,27 
Namibia 5 2,563 3 2 3 31,6 64,2 8,37 
Netherlands 2 4,488 1 2 2 44,2 42,4 9,93 
New Zealand 2 4,736 1 2 3 39,6 37,9 9,75 
Norway 2 4,544 1 2 3 42,3 97,8 10,04 
Panama 3 2,235 3 1 3 22,1 5,2 8,6 
Philippines 5 1,920 3 1 2 17,4 3,8 8 
Poland 3 2,693 2 2 2 41,1 0,1 8,88 
Portugal 2 3,635 1 2 2 43,1 1,1 9,47 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
3 3,504 1 1 3  40,7 8,71 
Samoa 
(Western) 
4 2,675 1 1 3  76,3  
Slovenia  3 3,383 2 2 3 40,2 0 9,44 
South Africa 3 3,045 3 2 2 27,9 39 8,87 
South Korea 
(Rep. of) 
4 2,967 3 1 3 23,9 12,2 9,51 
Spain  3 3,844 1 2 2 39,0 0,1 9,68 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
3 3,504 1 1 2  52 9,28 
St. Lucia 3 3,648 1 1 3  6,3 8,73 
Sweden 2 4,598 1 2 3 57,1 68,4 9,93 
Thailand 5 2,260 1 1 3 18,0 0,2 8,8 
United 
Kingdom 
3 4,437 1 1 2 37,5 16,1 9,86 
USA 2 4,064 3 1 1 34,2 43,6 10,24 
Vanuatu 4 2,761 1 1 2  54,6 7,18 
(i) PR = Political Rights, CL = Civil Liberties, source: Freedom House 
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(ii) The original scale ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. This scale has been transformed into a scale 
ranging from 0-5, source: World Bank Institute 
(iii) 1 = parliamentarian, 2 = semi-presidential, 3 = presidential, source: Comparative Data Set of 
Political Institutions, Åbo Akademi 
(iv) 1 = candidate-centred, 2 = party-centred, source: Comparative Data Set of Political 
Institutions, Åbo Akademi 
(v) 1 = federal, 2 = decentralized unitary, 3 = centralized unitary, source: Comparative Data Set 
of Political Institutions, Åbo Akademi  
(vi) Source: Statistics Finland (due to difficulties in accessing data, values for a handful of 
countries are those of 2001) 
(vii) Source: Quality of Governance Database 
(viii) Source: Quality of Governance Database 
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APPENDIX 3: Aggregation procedure for producing the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators1055 
 
Brief overview 
 
1. The construction of the indicators starts with the search for primary 
sources which include variables that correspond to the dimension of 
governance (including corruption) being measured. If a source 
contains several variables of interest to a particular WGI component, 
these are averaged into a single number and rescaled with the aim of 
generating one common scale.  
2. Sources are then divided into representative and non-representative 
ones depending on the country coverage. The former are aggregated 
to form a preliminary indicator for the WGI component of interest. 
At this stage, sources are accorded different weights depending on 
the extent to which they are correlated with one another (greater 
weights being assigned to sources which correlate with others). 
3. The next step involves regressing the non-representative sources on 
the preliminary composite indicator. Again, sources which correlate 
strongly with the sources in the preliminary composite indicator will 
be assigned greater weights.  
4. New weights are then generated for all sources based on their error 
variances1056, whereupon the re-weighted sources are aggregated 
into a final composite indicator.1057 
  
                                                 
 
1055 For more information, see Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007b).  
1056 Defined as “that part of the total variance caused by anything irrelevant to a 
study that cannot be experimentally controlled”, see the Free Dictionary by Farlex at 
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/variance+error (18.4.2012). 
1057 See Knack, S. (2006, 16); and Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2007b, 
11).  
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APPENDIX 4: Sources of the 2005 WGI control of corruption 
component1058 
  
                                                 
 
1058 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006); Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & 
Mastruzzi, M. (2007b); and World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf (16.4.2012). 
Source Publication Code Type Public Country 
coverage 
Repre-
senta-
tive 
African 
Development Bank 
Country Policy & 
Institutional 
Assessments 
ADB EPUB No 50  
Afrobarometer Afrobarometer 
Survey 
AFR HS Yes 18  
Asian 
Development Bank 
Country Policy & 
Institutional 
Assessments 
ASD EPUB Partially 26  
Business 
Environment Risk 
Intelligence 
Business Risk 
Service 
BRI ECBIP Yes 50  
Business 
Environment Risk 
Intelligence 
Qualitative Risk 
Measure 
QLM ECBIP Yes 115 x 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk 
Service 
EIU ECBIP Yes 120 x 
Freedom House Countries at the 
Crossroads 
CCR ENGO Yes 30  
Freedom House Nations in 
Transition 
FHT ENGO Yes 27  
Gallup 
International 
Voice of the People 
Survey 
GAL HS Yes 69  
Global Insight Global Risk Service DRI ECBIP Yes 111 x 
Global Insight Business 
Conditions and 
Risk 
WMO ECBIP Yes 202 x 
Institute for 
Management and 
Development 
World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
WCY FS Yes 49  
Latinobarometro Latinobarometro 
Surveys 
LBO HS Yes 18  
Merchant 
International 
Group 
Grey Area 
Dynamics 
MIG ECBIP Yes 159 x 
Political & 
Economic Risk 
Consultancy 
Corruption Survey PRC FS Yes 10  
Political Risk 
Services 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
PRS ECBIP Yes 140 x 
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Abbreviations: FS (Firm survey), HS (Household survey), ENGO (Expert assessment - NGO 
source), ECBIP (Expert assessment - Commercial business information provider), and EPUB 
(Expert assessment - Public sector source)  
World Bank Business 
Enterprise 
Environment 
Survey 
BPS FS Yes 27  
World Bank Country Policy & 
Institutional 
Assessments 
PIA EPUB Partially 136  
World Economic 
Forum 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
GCS FS Yes 117 x 
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APPENDIX 5: Aspects of corruption of the WGI control of corruption 
component1059  
Afrobarometer 
How many elected leaders (parliamentarians) do you think are involved in 
corruption? 
How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption? 
How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption? 
How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption? 
Gallup International 
Frequency of corruption 
Frequency of household bribery 
Institute for Management Development 
Bribing and corruption exist in the economy 
Latinobarómetro 
Frequency of corruption 
Political Economic Risk Consultancy 
To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the business 
environment for foreign companies? 
World Bank BEEPS 
How common is it for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get 
things done? 
Percentage of total annual sales firms pay in unofficial payments to public 
officials? 
How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new 
legislation? 
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials impose costs on other firms? 
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business? 
  
                                                 
 
1059 Aspects included in the sub-sources of the index for 2005, see Kaufmann, D., 
Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2006, 47-80). 
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World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
Public trust in financial honesty of politicians 
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common 
Frequency of bribery in the economy 
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities, tax 
payments, loan applications, awarding of public contracts, influencing laws, 
policies regulations, decrees, getting favourable judicial decisions 
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose 
costs on other firms 
Extent to which influence of powerful firms with political ties impose costs on 
other firms 
African Development Bank 
Transparency / corruption 
Asian Development Bank 
Anticorruption and Accounting Institutions 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence and QLM 
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including 
xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to compromise. 
Indirect Diversion of Funds (QLM) 
EIU 
Corruption among public officials 
Freedom House 
Nations in Transit: corruption 
Countries at the Crossroads: Anti-Corruption and Transparency 
Global Insight's DRI 
Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point 
increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period. 
Global Insight's Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO) 
Corruption: An assessment of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. 
The amount of red tape likely to be countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of 
encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
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Merchant International Group 
Corruption 
Political Risk Services 
Corruption. Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the 
economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political 
system.  
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APPENDIX 6: Categorization of electoral systems 
 
Candidate-centred electoral systems 
 
Shugart1060 regards Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), Single Transferable Vote 
(STV), Single-seat district (SSD) plurality systems (including the Two-Round System 
TRS) as well as open list PR systems as candidate-centred. Shugart also includes an 
electoral system which he, inspired by Taagepera and Shugart1061, calls a “quasi-list 
PR”1062 system. Quasi-list PR systems differ from open list PR systems in the degree 
of candidate-centeredness but both are classified as candidate-centred.  
 
Shugart acknowledges the difficulty involved in classifying mixed systems into can-
didate- and party-centred. He stresses that their classification needs to be made on a 
case-to-case basis. Within the framework of my own research I have solved this by 
including a) mixed systems with ≥ 51% single-member districts or b) mixed systems 
which employ open lists at the level where list PR is used, in the candidate-centred 
category. As for other candidate-centred systems, I move along the same lines as 
Shugart, regarding First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV), Single Transferable Vote (STV), Alternative Vote (AV), Block Vote (BV) and 
Two-round system (TRS) as candidate-centred electoral systems. Proportional 
electoral systems with open lists also belong to this category: 
 
Candidate-centred electoral systems 
Shugart Additions 
SNTV Mixed systems with ≥ 51% single-member districts  
STV 
SSD 
TRS Mixed systems which employ open lists at the level where list 
PR is used Open list PR 
Quasi-list PR 
 
  
                                                 
 
1060 Shugart, M.S. (2001).  
1061 Taagepera, R. & Shugart, M.S. (1989).  
1062 Voters in a quasi-list PR system do not have the option of voting for a list. As a 
result, candidates require a much larger share of votes from the party electorate to 
be elected, than do candidates in an open-list system, see Shugart, M.S., (2000, 20).  
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Party-centred electoral systems 
 
Shugart1063 regards closed lists systems as party-centred but also includes other 
categories such as systems with “separate nomination and allocation districts” and 
“flexible lists”1064. He distinguishes the former from closed list PR in that “voters […] 
must cast nominal votes for the one candidate nominated by their preferred party in 
sub-districts”1065. According to Shugart, systems with “flexible lists” are distinguis-
hed by the fact that voters are able to cast preference votes. This, however, rarely 
occurs.1066 No mixed systems are included in Shugart’s classification.  
 
In line with the above, I regard electoral systems such as proportional systems a) 
with closed lists or b) where the personal vote alone does not determine the out-
come, as party-centred. As for mixed systems, I choose to include mixed systems a) 
with < 51% single-member districts or b) where closed lists are employed at the 
level where list PR is used, in the party-centred category:  
 
Party-centred electoral systems 
Shugart Additions 
Closed list PR Mixed systems with < 51% single-member 
districts  
Separate nomination and 
allocation districts 
Mixed systems which employ closed lists at the 
level where list PR is used 
Flexible lists 
 
                                                 
 
1063 Shugart, M.S. (2001).  
1064 Shugart, M.S. (2001, 184).  
1065 Shugart, M.S. (2001, 185).  
1066 Shugart, M.S. (2001, 186).  
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in behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
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however, that single political institutions tend to send a multitude 
of often contradictory signals with regards to accountability, at 
times enhancing accountability and at others hampering it. As a 
consequence, single political institutions also have reducing as well 
as increasing effects on levels of corruption. 
The study recognizes that institution-building does not constitute 
a panacea against corruption, and also analyses a number of 
other factors with a bearing on levels of corruption. These include 
individual leaders as well as their values, leadership styles, strategies, 
policy choices and contributions to institution-building.
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